{"id":411,"date":"2015-07-16T22:07:04","date_gmt":"2015-07-16T22:07:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.candelalearning.com\/masteryusgovernment1x6xmaster\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=411"},"modified":"2019-05-31T21:33:26","modified_gmt":"2019-05-31T21:33:26","slug":"reading-how-presidents-get-things-done","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/chapter\/reading-how-presidents-get-things-done\/","title":{"raw":"B. Reading: How Presidents Get Things Done","rendered":"B. Reading: How Presidents Get Things Done"},"content":{"raw":"<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_n01\" class=\"learning_objectives editable block\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title\">Learning Objectives<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p01\" class=\"para\">After reading this section, you should be able to answer the following questions:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\r\n \t<li>How does the president try to set the agenda for the political system, especially Congress?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>What challenges does the president face in achieving his agenda?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>What are the strengths and weaknesses of the presidential veto?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Can and do presidents lead Congress?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>What are the president\u2019s powers as chief executive?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Why do presidents give so many speeches?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>How do presidents seek public approval?<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The political system was designed by the framers to be infrequently innovative, to act with neither efficiency nor dispatch. Authority is decentralized. Political parties are usually in conflict. Interests are diverse.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_021\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]George C. Edwards III, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Yet, as we have explained, presidents face high expectations for action. Adding to these expectations is the soaring rhetoric of their election campaigns. For example, candidate Obama promised to deal with the problems of the economy, unemployment, housing, health care, Iraq, Afghanistan, and much more.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">As we have also explained, presidents do not invariably or even often have the power to meet these expectations. Consider the economy. Because the government and media report the inflation and unemployment rates and the number of new jobs created (or not created), the public is consistently reminded of these measures when judging the president\u2019s handling of the economy. And certainly the president does claim credit when the economy is doing well. Yet the president has far less control over the economy and these economic indicators than the media convey and many people believe.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">A president\u2019s opportunities to influence public policies depend in part on the preceding administration and the political circumstances under which the new president takes office.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_022\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Stephen Skowronek, <em class=\"emphasis\">Presidential Leadership in Political Time<\/em> (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).[\/footnote]\u00a0<\/span>Presidents often face intractable issues, encounter unpredictable events, have to make complex policy decisions, and are beset by scandals (policy, financial, sexual).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">Once in office, reality sinks in. Interviewing <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.thedailyshow.com\/watch\/wed-october-27-2010\/barack-obama-pt--1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">President Obama on <em class=\"emphasis\">The Daily Show<\/em><\/a>, Jon Stewart wondered whether the president\u2019s campaign slogan of \u201cYes we can\u201d should be changed to \u201cYes we can, given certain conditions.\u201d President Obama replied, \u201cI think I would say \u2018yes we can, but\u00a0. . .\u00a0it\u2019s not going to happen overnight.\u2019\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_023\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Sheryl Gay Stolberg, \u201cHope and Change as Promised, Just Not Overnight,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, October 28, 2010, A18.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">So how do presidents get things done? Presidential powers and prerogatives do offer opportunities for leadership.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_n02\" class=\"callout editable block\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title\">Link: Presidential Recordings<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p08\" class=\"para\">Between 1940 and 1973, six American presidents from both political parties secretly recorded just less than five thousand hours of their meetings and telephone conversations. Listen to some of them <a href=\"http:\/\/millercenter.org\/academic\/presidentialrecordings\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p10\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents indicate what issues should garner most attention and action; they help set the policy agenda. They lobby Congress to pass their programs, often by campaign-like swings around the country. Their position as head of their political party enables them to keep or gain allies (and win reelection). Inside the executive branch, presidents make policies by well-publicized appointments and executive orders. They use their ceremonial position as head of state to get into the news and gain public approval, making it easier to persuade others to follow their lead.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Agenda-Setter for the Political System<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents try to set the political agenda. They call attention to issues and solutions, using constitutional powers such as calling Congress into session, recommending bills, and informing its members about the state of the union, as well as giving speeches and making news.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_024\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Donna R. Hoffman and Alison D. Howard, <em class=\"emphasis\">Addressing the State of the Union<\/em> (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_f01\" class=\"figure medium editable block\">\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"alignright\" width=\"200\"]<img class=\"\" src=\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/section_17\/149c21d64ee208228db62f9ac2bce9ce.jpg\" alt=\"Photo of President Obama waving to the joint session of Congress upon completing the 2011 State of the Union Address. \" width=\"200\" height=\"133\" \/> The president\u2019s constitutional responsibility to inform Congress on \u201cthe state of the union\u201d has been elevated into a performance, nationally broadcast on all major networks and before a joint session on Capitol Hill, that summarizes the key items on his policy agenda.[\/caption]\r\n<p class=\"para\">Congress does not always defer to and sometimes spurns the president\u2019s agenda. Its members serve smaller, more distinct constituencies for different terms. When presidents hail from the same party as the majority of Congress members, they have more influence to ensure that their ideas receive serious attention on Capitol Hill. So presidents work hard to keep or increase the number of members of their party in Congress: raising funds for the party (and their own campaign), campaigning for candidates, and throwing weight (and money) in a primary election behind the strongest or their preferred candidate. Presidential coattails\u2014where members of Congress are carried to victory by the winning presidential candidates\u2014are increasingly short. Most legislators win by larger margins in their district than does the president. In the elections midway through the president\u2019s term, the president\u2019s party generally loses seats in Congress. In 2010, despite President Obama\u2019s efforts, the Republicans gained a whopping sixty-three seats and took control of the House of Representatives.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Since presidents usually have less party support in Congress in the second halves of their terms, they most often expect that Congress will be more amenable to their initiatives in their first two years. But even then,<span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">divided government<\/a><\/span>, where one party controls the presidency and another party controls one or both chambers of Congress, has been common over the last fifty years. For presidents, the prospect of both a friendly House and Senate has become the exception.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Even when the White House and Congress are controlled by the same party, as with President Obama and the 2009 and 2010 Congress, presidents do not monopolize the legislative agenda. Congressional leaders, especially of the opposing party, push other issues\u2014if only to pressure or embarrass the president. Members of Congress have made campaign promises they want to keep despite the president\u2019s policy preferences. Interest groups with pet projects crowd in.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">Nonetheless, presidents are better placed than any other individual to influence the legislative process. In particular, their high prominence in the news means that they have a powerful impact on what issues will\u2014and will not\u2014be considered in the political system as a whole.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">What about the contents of \u201cthe president\u2019s agenda\u201d? The president is but one player among many shaping it. The transition from election to inauguration is just over two months (Bush had less time because of the disputed 2000 Florida vote). Presidents are preoccupied first with naming a cabinet and White House staff. To build an agenda, presidents \u201cborrow, steal, co-opt, redraft, rename, and modify any proposal that fits their policy goals.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_025\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Paul C. Light, <em class=\"emphasis\">The President\u2019s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton<\/em>, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 89.[\/footnote]<\/span> Ideas largely come from fellow partisans outside the White House. Bills already introduced in Congress or programs proposed by the bureaucracy are handy. They have received discussion, study, and compromise that have built support. And presidents have more success getting borrowed legislation through Congress than policy proposals devised inside the White House.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_026\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Andrew Rudalevige, <em class=\"emphasis\">Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">Crises and unexpected events affect presidents\u2019 agenda choices. Issues pursue presidents, especially through questions and stories of White House reporters, as much as presidents pursue issues. A hugely destructive hurricane on the Gulf Coast propels issues of emergency management, poverty, and reconstruction onto the policy agenda whether a president wants them there or not.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p08\" class=\"para editable block\">Finally, many agenda items cannot be avoided. Presidents are charged by Congress with proposing an annual budget. Raw budget numbers represent serious policy choices. And there are ever more agenda items that never seem to get solved (e.g., energy, among many others).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Chief Lobbyist in Congress<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">After suggesting what Congress should do, presidents try to persuade legislators to follow through. But without a formal role, presidents are outsiders to the legislative process. They cannot introduce bills in Congress and must rely on members to do so.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Legislative Liaison<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents aim at legislative accomplishments by negotiating with legislators directly or through their\u00a0<span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">legislative liaison<\/a><\/span> officers: White House staffers assigned to deal with Congress who provide a conduit from president to Congress and back again. These staffers convey presidential preferences and pressure members of Congress; they also pass along members\u2019 concerns to the White House. They count votes, line up coalitions, and suggest times for presidents to rally fellow party members. And they try to cut deals.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Legislative liaison focuses less on twisting arms than on maintaining \u201can era of good feelings\u201d with Congress. Some favors are large: supporting an appropriation that benefits members\u2019 constituencies; traveling to members\u2019 home turf to help them raise funds for reelection; and appointing members\u2019 cronies to high office. Others are small: inviting them up to the White House, where they can talk with reporters; sending them autographed photos or extra tickets for White House tours; and allowing them to announce grants. Presidents hope the cordiality will encourage legislators to return the favor when necessary.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_027\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]This section relies on Kenneth Collier, <em class=\"emphasis\">Between the Branches: The White House Office of Legislative Affairs<\/em> (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Such good feelings are tough to maintain when presidents and the opposition party espouse conflicting policies, especially when that party has a majority in one or both chambers of Congress or both sides adopt take-it-or-leave-it stances.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">The Veto<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">When Congress sends a bill to the White House, a president can return it with objections.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_028\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]This section relies most on Charles M. Cameron, <em class=\"emphasis\">Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power\u00a0<\/em>(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see also Robert J. Spitzer, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Presidential Veto: Touchstone of the American Presidency<\/em> (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).[\/footnote]<\/span> This\u00a0<em><span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">veto<\/a><\/span><\/em>\u2014Latin for \u201cI forbid\u201d\u2014heightens the stakes. Congress can get its way only if it <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">overrides<\/a><\/span> the veto with two-thirds majorities in each chamber. Presidents who use the veto can block almost any bill they dislike; only around 4 percent of all vetoes have ever been successfully overridden.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_029\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]See Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, <em class=\"emphasis\">Vital Statistics on American Politics, 1999\u20132000<\/em> (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998), table 6-9.[\/footnote]<\/span> The threat of a veto can be enough to get Congress to enact legislation that presidents prefer.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The veto does have drawbacks for presidents. Consider the following:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ul id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02_l01\" class=\"itemizedlist editable block\">\r\n \t<li>Vetoes alienate members of Congress who worked hard crafting a bill. So vetoes are most used as a last resort. After the 1974 elections, Republican President Ford faced an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress. A Ford legislative liaison officer recalled, \u201cWe never deliberately sat down and made the decision that we would veto sixty bills in two years. . . . It was the only alternative.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_030\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Quoted in Paul C. Light, <em class=\"emphasis\">The President\u2019s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton<\/em>, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 112.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li>The veto is a blunt instrument. It is useless if Congress does not act on legislation in the first place. In his 1993 speech proposing health-care reform, President Clinton waved a pen and vowed to veto any bill that did not provide universal coverage. Such a threat meant nothing when Congress did not pass <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> reform. And unlike governors of most states, presidents lack a <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">line-item veto<\/a><\/span>, which allows a chief executive to reject parts of a bill. Congress sought to give the president this power in the late 1990s, but the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_031\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Clinton v. City of New York, 524 US 427 (1998).[\/footnote]<\/span> Presidents must take or leave bills in their totality.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Congress can turn the veto against presidents. For example, it can pass a popular bill\u2014especially in an election year\u2014and dare the president to reject it. President Clinton faced such \u201cveto bait\u201d from the Republican Congress when he was up for reelection in 1996. The <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/thomas.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/z?c104:H.R.3396.ENR.\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Defense of Marriage Act<\/a>, which would have restricted federal recognition of marriage to opposite-sex couples, was deeply distasteful to lesbians and gay men (a key Democratic constituency) but strongly backed in public opinion polls. A Clinton veto could bring blame for killing the bill or provoke a humiliating override. Signing it ran the risk of infuriating lesbian and gay voters. Clinton ultimately signed the legislation\u2014in the middle of the night with no cameras present.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Veto threats can backfire. After the Democrats took over the Senate in mid-2001, they moved the \u201cpatients\u2019 bill of rights\u201d authorizing lawsuits against health maintenance organizations to the top of the Senate agenda. President Bush said he would veto the bill unless it incorporated strict limits on rights to sue and low caps on damages won in lawsuits. Such a visible threat encouraged a public perception that Bush was opposed to any patients\u2019 bill of rights, or even to patients\u2019 rights at all.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_032\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Frank Bruni, \u201cBush Strikes a Positive Tone on a Patients\u2019 Bill of Rights,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, July 10, 2001, A12.[\/footnote]<\/span> Veto threats thus can be ineffective or create political damage (or, as in this case, both).<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Savvy presidents use \u201cvetoes not only to block legislation but to shape it. . . .Vetoes are not fatal bullets but bargaining ploys.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_033\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Charles M. Cameron, <em class=\"emphasis\">Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power<\/em> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 171.[\/footnote]<\/span> Veto threats and vetoing ceremonies become key to presidential communications in the news, which welcomes the story of Capitol Hill-versus-White House disputes, particularly under divided government. In 1996, President Clinton faced a tough welfare reform bill from a Republican Congress whose leaders dared him to veto the bill so they could claim he broke his 1992 promise to \u201cend welfare as we know it.\u201d Clinton vetoed the first bill; Republicans reduced the cuts but kept tough provisions denying benefits to children born to welfare recipients. Clinton vetoed this second version; Republicans shrank the cuts again and reduced the impact on children. Finally, Clinton signed the bill\u2014and ran ads during his reelection campaign proclaiming how <em class=\"emphasis\">he<\/em> had \u201cended welfare as we know it.\u201d<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Signing Statements<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In a <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">signing statement<\/a><\/span>, the president claims the right to ignore or refuse to enforce laws, parts of laws, or provisions of appropriations bills even though Congress has enacted them and he has signed them into law. This practice was uncommon until developed during President Ronald Reagan\u2019s second term. It escalated under President George W. Bush, who rarely exercised the veto but instead issued almost 1,200 signing statements in eight years\u2014about twice as many as all his predecessors combined. As one example, he rejected the requirement that he report to Congress on how he had provided safeguards against political interference in federally funded research. He justified his statements on the \u201cinherent\u201d power of the commander in chief and on a hitherto obscure doctrine called the unitary executive, which holds that the executive branch can overrule Congress and the courts on the basis of the president\u2019s interpretation of the Constitution.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">President Obama ordered executive officials to consult with the attorney general before relying on any of President Bush\u2019s signing statements to bypass a law. Yet he initially issued some signing statements himself. Then, to avoid clashing with Congress, he refrained from doing so. He did claim that the executive branch could bypass what he deemed to be unconstitutional restraints on executive power. But he did not invoke the unitary executive theory.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_034\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Charlie Savage, \u201cObama\u2019s Embrace of a Bush Tactic Riles Congress,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, August 9, 2009, A1; and Charlie Savage, \u201cObama Takes a New Route to Opposing Parts of Laws,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, January 9, 2010, A9.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s04\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Presidential Scorecards in Congress<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">How often do presidents get their way on Capitol Hill? On congressional roll call votes, Congress goes along with about three-fourths of presidential recommendations; the success rate is highest earlier in the term.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_035\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]George C. Edwards III, <em class=\"emphasis\">At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress<\/em> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, <em class=\"emphasis\">The President in the Legislative Arena<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); and Mark A. Peterson, <em class=\"emphasis\">Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For overall legislative productivity, the classic starting point is David R. Mayhew\u2019s\u00a0<em class=\"emphasis\">Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946\u20131990<\/em> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).[\/footnote]<\/span> Even on controversial, important legislation for which they expressed a preference well in advance of congressional action, presidents still do well. Congress seldom ignores presidential agenda items entirely. One study estimates that over half of presidential recommendations are substantially reflected in legislative action.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_036\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Mark A. Peterson, <em class=\"emphasis\">Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Andrew Rudalevige, <em class=\"emphasis\">Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 136.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s04_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Can and do presidents lead Congress, then? Not quite. Most presidential success is determined by Congress\u2019s partisan and ideological makeup. Divided government and party polarization on Capitol Hill have made Congress more willing to disagree with the president. So recent presidents are less successful even while being choosier about bills to endorse. Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson staked out positions on well over half of congressional roll call votes. Their successors have taken positions on fewer than one-fourth of them\u2014especially when their party did not control Congress. \u201cPresidents, wary of an increasingly independent-minded congressional membership, have come to actively support legislation only when it is of particular importance to them, in an attempt to minimize defeat.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_037\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Lyn Ragsdale, <em class=\"emphasis\">Vital Statistics on the Presidency<\/em>, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 360. See also Steven A. Shull and Thomas C. Shaw, <em class=\"emphasis\">Explaining Congressional-Presidential Relations: A Multiple Perspective Approach<\/em> (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), chap. 4.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Chief Executive<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">As chief executive, the president can move first and quickly, daring others to respond. Presidents like both the feeling of power and favorable news stories of them acting decisively. Though Congress and courts can respond, they often react slowly; many if not most presidential actions are never challenged.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_038\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Terry M. Moe, \u201cThe Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage,\u201d in <em class=\"emphasis\">The Presidency and the Political System<\/em>, 6th ed., ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 443\u201374; and William G. Howell, <em class=\"emphasis\">Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).[\/footnote]<\/span> Such direct presidential action is based in several powers: to appoint officials, to issue executive orders, to \u201ctake care that the laws be faithfully executed,\u201d and to wage war.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Appointment Powers<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents both hire and (with the exception of regulatory commissions) fire executive officers. They also appoint ambassadors, the members of independent agencies, and the judiciary.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_039\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]See David E. Lewis, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance<\/em>(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); and G. Calvin Mackenzie, ed., <em class=\"emphasis\">Innocent until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process<\/em>, ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The months between election and inauguration are consumed by the need to rapidly assemble a\u00a0<span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">cabinet<\/a><\/span>, a group that reports to and advises the president, made up of the heads of the fourteen executive departments and whatever other positions the president accords <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/administration\/cabinet\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">cabinet-level rank<\/a>. Finding \u201cthe right person for the job\u201d is but one criterion. Cabinet appointees overwhelmingly hail from the president\u2019s party; choosing fellow partisans rewards the winning coalition and helps achieve policy.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_040\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Jeffrey E. Cohen, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Politics of the U.S. Cabinet: Representation in the Executive Branch, 1789\u20131984<\/em> (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).[\/footnote]<\/span> Presidents also try to create a team that, in Clinton\u2019s phrase, \u201clooks like America.\u201d In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower was stung by the news media\u2019s joke that his first cabinet\u2014all male, all white\u2014consisted of \u201cnine millionaires and a plumber\u201d (the latter was a union official, a short-lived labor secretary). By contrast, George W. Bush\u2019s and Barack Obama\u2019s cabinets had a generous complement of persons of color and women\u2014and at least one member of the other party.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">These presidential appointees must be confirmed by the Senate. If the Senate rarely votes down a nominee on the floor, it no longer rubber-stamps scandal-free nominees. A nominee may be stopped in a committee. About one out of every twenty key nominations is never confirmed, usually when a committee does not schedule it for a vote.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_041\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Glen S. Kurtz, Richard Fleisher, and Jon R. Bond, \u201cFrom Abe Fortas to Zo\u00eb Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">American Political Science Review<\/em> 92 (December 1998): 871\u201381.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Confirmation hearings are opportunities for senators to quiz nominees about pet projects of interest to their states, to elicit pledges to testify or provide information, and to extract promises of policy actions.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_042\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]G. Calvin Mackenzie, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Politics of Presidential Appointments<\/em> (New York: Free Press, 1981), especially chap. 7.[\/footnote]<\/span> To win confirmation, cabinet officers pledge to be responsive and accountable to Congress. Subcabinet officials and federal judges, lacking the prominence of cabinet and Supreme Court nominees, are even more belatedly nominated and more slowly confirmed. Even senators in the president\u2019s party routinely block nominees to protest poor treatment or win concessions.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">As a result, presidents have to wait a long time before their appointees take office. Five months into President George W. Bush\u2019s first term, one study showed that of the 494 cabinet and subcabinet positions to fill, under half had received nominations; under one-fourth had been confirmed.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_043\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]James Dao, \u201cIn Protest, Republican Senators Hold Up Defense Confirmations,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, May 10, 2001, A20; and Crystal Nix Hines, \u201cLag in Appointments Strains the Cabinet,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, June 14, 2001, A20.[\/footnote]<\/span> One scholar observed, \u201cIn America today, you can get a master\u2019s degree, build a house, bicycle across country, or make a baby in less time than it takes to put the average appointee on the job.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_044\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]G. Calvin Mackenzie, \u201cThe State of the Presidential Appointments Process,\u201d in <em class=\"emphasis\">Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process<\/em>, ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 1\u201349 at 40\u201341.[\/footnote]<\/span> With presidential appointments unfilled, initiatives are delayed and day-to-day running of the departments is left by default to career civil servants.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">No wonder presidents can, and increasingly do, install an acting appointee or use their power to make recess appointments.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_045\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]G. Calvin Mackenzie, \u201cThe State of the Presidential Appointments Process,\u201d in<em class=\"emphasis\">Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process<\/em> (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 35.[\/footnote]<\/span> But such unilateral action can produce a backlash. In 2004, two nominees for federal court had been held up by Democratic senators; when Congress was out of session for a week, President Bush named them to judgeships in recess appointments. Furious Democrats threatened to filibuster or otherwise block all Bush\u2019s judicial nominees. Bush had no choice but to make a deal that he would not make any more judicial recess appointments for the rest of the year.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_046\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Neil A. Lewis, \u201cDeal Ends Impasse over Judicial Nominees,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, May 19, 2004, A1.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Executive Orders<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents make policies by <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">executive orders<\/a><\/span>.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_047\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Kenneth R. Mayer, <em class=\"emphasis\">With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).[\/footnote]<\/span> This power comes from the constitutional mandate that they \u201ctake care that the laws be faithfully executed.\u201d<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\"><a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.archives.gov\/federal-register\/codification\/chapter.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Executive orders<\/a> are directives to administrators in the executive branch on how to implement legislation. Courts treat them as equivalent to laws. Dramatic events have resulted from executive orders. Some famous executive orders include Lincoln\u2019s Emancipation Proclamation, Franklin D. Roosevelt\u2019s closing the banks to avoid runs on deposits and his authorizing internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, Truman\u2019s desegregation of the armed forces, Kennedy\u2019s establishment of the Peace Corps, and Nixon\u2019s creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. More typically, executive orders reorganize the executive branch and impose restrictions or directives on what bureaucrats may or may not do. The attraction of executive orders was captured by one aide to President Clinton: \u201cStroke of the pen. Law of the land. Kind of cool.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_048\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Paul Begala, quoted in James Bennet, \u201cTrue to Form, Clinton Shifts Energies Back to U.S. Focus,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, July 5, 1998, 10.[\/footnote]<\/span> Related ways for presidents to try to get things done are by memoranda to cabinet officers, proclamations authorized by legislation, and (usually secret) national security directives.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_049\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Phillip J. Cooper, <em class=\"emphasis\">By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action<\/em> (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Executive orders are imperfect for presidents; they can be easily overturned. One president can do something \u201cwith the stroke of a pen\u201d; the next can easily undo it. President Reagan\u2019s executive order withholding American aid to international population control agencies that provide abortion counseling was rescinded by an executive order by President Clinton in 1993, then reinstated by another executive order by President Bush in 2001\u2014and rescinded once more by President Obama in 2009. Moreover, since executive orders are supposed to be a mere execution of what Congress has already decided, they can be superseded by congressional action.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">War Powers<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Opportunities to act on behalf of the entire nation in international affairs are irresistible to presidents. Presidents almost always gravitate toward foreign policy as their terms progress. Domestic policy wonk Bill Clinton metamorphosed into a foreign policy enthusiast from 1993 to 2001. Even prior to 9\/11 the notoriously untraveled George W. Bush was undergoing the same transformation. President Obama has been just as if not more involved in foreign policy than his predecessors.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Congress\u2014as long as it is consulted\u2014is less inclined to challenge presidential initiatives in foreign policy than in domestic policy. This idea that the president has greater autonomy in foreign than domestic policy is known as the \u201cTwo Presidencies Thesis.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_050\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]See Barbara Hinckley, <em class=\"emphasis\">Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).[\/footnote] Such deference seems largely limited to presidents\u2019 own initiatives.[footnote]See Richard Fleisher, Jon R. Bond, Glen S. Krutz, and Stephen Hanna, \u201cThe Demise of the Two Presidencies,\u201d<em class=\"emphasis\">American Politics Quarterly<\/em> 28 (2000): 3\u201325; and Andrew Rudalevige, <em class=\"emphasis\">Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002),148\u201349.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">War powers provide another key avenue for presidents to act unilaterally. After the 9\/11 attacks, President Bush\u2019s Office of Legal Counsel to the US Department of Justice argued that as commander in chief President Bush could do what was necessary to protect the American people.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_051\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]John Yoo, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9\/11<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Since World War II, presidents have never asked Congress for (or received) a declaration of war. Instead, they rely on open-ended congressional authorizations to use force (such as for wars in Vietnam and \u201cagainst terrorism\u201d), United Nations resolutions (wars in Korea and the Persian Gulf), North American Treaty Organization (NATO) actions (peacekeeping operations and war in the former Yugoslavia), and orchestrated requests from tiny international organizations like the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (invasion of Grenada). Sometimes, presidents amass all these: in his last press conference before the start of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, President Bush invoked the congressional authorization of force, UN resolutions, <em class=\"emphasis\">and<\/em> the inherent power of the president to protect the United States derived from his oath of office.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">Congress can react against undeclared wars by cutting funds for military interventions. Such efforts are time consuming and not in place until long after the initial incursion. But congressional action, or its threat, did prevent military intervention in Southeast Asia during the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 and sped up the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon in the mid-1980s and Somalia in 1993.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_052\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, <em class=\"emphasis\">While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">Congress\u2019s most concerted effort to restrict presidential war powers, the <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.loc.gov\/law\/help\/war-powers.php\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">War Powers Act<\/a>, which passed over President Nixon\u2019s veto in 1973, may have backfired. It established that presidents must consult with Congress prior to a foreign commitment of troops, must report to Congress within forty-eight hours of the introduction of armed forces, and must withdraw such troops after sixty days if Congress does not approve. All presidents denounce this legislation. But it gives them the right to commit troops for sixty days with little more than requirements to consult and report\u2014conditions presidents often feel free to ignore. And the presidential prerogative under the War Powers Act to commit troops on a short-term basis means that Congress often reacts after the fact. Since Vietnam, the act has done little to prevent presidents from unilaterally launching invasions.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_053\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Louis Fisher,<em class=\"emphasis\">Presidential War Power<\/em> (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995); Barbara Hinckley, <em class=\"emphasis\">Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chap. 4.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">President Obama did not seek Congressional authorization before ordering the US military to join attacks on the Libyan air defenses and government forces in March 2011. After the bombing campaign started, Obama sent Congress a letter contending that as commander in chief he had constitutional authority for the attacks. The White House lawyers distinguished between this limited military operation and a war.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Presidents and the People<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Public approval helps the president assure agreement, attract support, and discourage opposition. Presidents with high popularity win more victories in Congress on high-priority bills.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_054\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Brandice Canes-Wrone, <em class=\"emphasis\">Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).[\/footnote]<\/span> But obtaining public approval can be complicated. Presidents face contradictory expectations, even demands, from the public: to be an ordinary person yet display heroic qualities, to be nonpolitical yet excel (unobtrusively) at the politics required to get things done, to be a visionary leader yet respond to public opinion.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_055\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Paradoxes of the American Presidency<\/em>, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Public Approval<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">For over fifty years, pollsters have asked survey respondents, \u201cDo you approve or disapprove of the way that the president is handling his job?\u201d Over time there has been variation from one president to the next, but the general pattern is unmistakable.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_056\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]James A. Stimson, \u201cPublic Support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Public Opinion Quarterly<\/em> 40 (1976): 1\u201321; Samuel Kernell, \u201cExplaining Presidential Popularity,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">American Political Science Review<\/em> 72 (1978): 506\u201322; and Richard A. Brody, <em class=\"emphasis\">Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support<\/em> (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).[\/footnote]<\/span> Approval starts out fairly high (near the percentage of the popular vote), increases slightly during the honeymoon, fades over the term, and then levels off. Presidents differ largely in the <em class=\"emphasis\">rate<\/em> at which their approval rating declines. President Kennedy\u2019s support eroded only slightly, as opposed to the devastating drops experienced by Ford and Carter. Presidents in their first terms are well aware that, if they fall below 50 percent, they are in danger of losing reelection or of losing allies in Congress in the midterm elections.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Events during a president\u2019s term\u2014and how the news media frame them\u2014drive approval ratings up or down. Depictions of economic hard times, drawn-out military engagements (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq), unpopular decisions (e.g., Ford\u2019s pardon of Nixon), and other bad news drag approval ratings lower. The main upward push comes from quick international interventions, as for President Obama after the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, or successfully addressing national emergencies, which boost a president\u2019s approval for several months. Under such conditions, official Washington speaks more in one voice than usual, the media drop their criticism as a result, and presidents depict themselves as embodiments of a united America. The successful war against Iraq in 1991 pushed approval ratings for the elder Bush to 90 percent, exceeded only by the ratings of his son after 9\/11. It may be beside the point whether the president\u2019s decision was smart or a blunder. Kennedy\u2019s press secretary, Pierre Salinger, later recalled how the president\u2019s approval ratings actually climbed after Kennedy backed a failed invasion by Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs: \u201cHe called me into his office and he said, \u2018Did you see that Gallup poll today?\u2019 I said, \u2018Yes.\u2019 He said, \u2018Do you think I have to continue doing stupid things like that to remain popular with the American people?\u2019\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_057\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Quoted in Daniel C. Hallin, ed., <em class=\"emphasis\">The Presidency, the Press and the People<\/em> (La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, 1992), 21.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">But as a crisis subsides, so too do official unity, tributes in the press, and the president\u2019s lofty approval ratings. Short-term effects wane over the course of time. Bush\u2019s huge boost from 9\/11 lasted well into early 2003; he got a smaller, shorter lift from the invasion of Iraq in April 2003 and another from the capture of Saddam Hussein in December before dropping to levels perilously near, then below, 50 percent. Narrowly reelected in 2008, Bush saw his approval sink to new lows (around 30 percent) over the course of his second term.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Polls<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Naturally and inevitably, presidents employ pollsters to measure public opinion. Poll data can influence presidents\u2019 behavior, the calculation and presentation of their decisions and policies, and their rhetoric.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_058\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, <em class=\"emphasis\">Politicians Don\u2019t Pander<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">After the devastating loss of Congress to the Republicans midway through his first term, President Clinton hired public relations consultant Dick Morris to find widely popular issues on which he could take a stand. Morris used a \u201c60 percent rule\u201d: if six out of ten Americans were in favor of something, Clinton had to be too. Thus the Clinton White House crafted and adopted some policies knowing that they had broad popular support, such as balancing the budget and \u201creforming\u201d welfare.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Even when public opinion data have no effects on a presidential decision, they can still be used to ascertain the best way to justify the policy or to find out how to present (i.e., spin) unpopular policies so that they become more acceptable to the public. Polls can identify the words and phrases that best sell policies to people. President George W. Bush referred to \u201cschool choice\u201d instead of \u201cschool voucher programs,\u201d to the \u201cdeath tax\u201d instead of \u201cinheritance taxes,\u201d and to \u201cwealth-generating private accounts\u201d rather than \u201cthe privatization of Social Security.\u201d He presented reducing taxes for wealthy Americans as a \u201cjobs\u201d package.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_059\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Joshua Green, \u201cThe Other War Room,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Washington Monthly<\/em>34, no. 4 (April 2002): 11\u201316; and Ben Fritz, Bryan Keefer, and Brendan Nyhan, <em class=\"emphasis\">All the President\u2019s Spin: George W. Bush, the Media, and the Truth<\/em> (New York: Touchstone, 2004).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Polls can even be used to adjust a president\u2019s personal behavior. After a poll showed that some people did not believe that President Obama was a Christian, he attended services, with photographers in tow, at a prominent church in Washington, DC.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Speechmaker-in-Chief<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents speak for various reasons: to represent the country, address issues, promote policies, and seek legislative accomplishments; to raise funds for their campaign, their party, and its candidates; and to berate the opposition. They also speak to control the executive branch by publicizing their thematic focus, ushering along appointments, and issuing executive orders.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_060\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]See Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, <em class=\"emphasis\">Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media<\/em> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); and John Anthony Maltese, <em class=\"emphasis\">Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News<\/em> (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).[\/footnote]<\/span> They aim their speeches at those physically present and, often, at the far larger audience reached through the media.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">In their speeches, presidents celebrate, express national emotion, educate, advocate, persuade, and attack. Their speeches vary in importance, subject, and venue. They give major ones, such as the inauguration and State of the Union. They memorialize events such as 9\/11 and speak at the site of tragedies (as President Obama did on January 12, 2011, in Tucson, Arizona, after the shootings of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and bystanders by a crazed gunman). They give commencement addresses. They speak at party rallies. And they make numerous routine remarks and brief statements.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_n01\" class=\"video editable block\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title\">Video Clip:\u00a0President Obama's Speech<\/h3>\r\n<p class=\"title\">President Obama traveled to Tucson on\u00a0January 12, 201, to help memorialize those who died in the\u00a0shooting rampage there. Watch the entire speech below:<\/p>\r\nhttps:\/\/youtu.be\/ztbJmXQDIGA\r\n\r\nPresidents are more or less engaged in composing and editing their speeches. For speeches that articulate policies, the contents will usually be considered in advance by the people in the relevant executive branch departments and agencies who make suggestions and try to resolve or meld conflicting views, for example, on foreign policy by the State and Defense departments, the CIA, and National Security Council. It will be up to the president, to buy in on, modify, or reject themes, arguments, and language.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">The president\u2019s speechwriters are involved in the organization and contents of the speech.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_061\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]This discussion is based on Robert Schlesinger, <em class=\"emphasis\">White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters\u00a0<\/em>(New York: Simon &amp; Schuster, 2008).[\/footnote]<\/span> They contribute memorable phrases, jokes, applause lines, transitions, repetition, rhythm, emphases, and places to pause. They write for ease of delivery, the cadence of the president\u2019s voice, mannerisms of expression, idioms, pace, and timing.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">In search of friendly audiences, congenial news media and vivid backdrops, presidents often travel outside Washington to give their speeches.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_062\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Roderick Hart, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Barbara Hinckley,<em class=\"emphasis\">The Symbolic Presidency<\/em> (New York: Routledge, 1991); and Gregory L. Hager and Terry Sullivan, \u201cPresident-Centered and Presidency-Centered Explanations of Presidential Public Activity,\u201d<em class=\"emphasis\">American Journal of Political Science<\/em> 38 (November 1994): 1079\u20131103.[\/footnote]<\/span> In his first one hundred days in office in 2001, George W. Bush visited twenty-six states to give speeches; this was a new record even though he refused to spend a night anywhere other than in his own beds at the White House, at Camp David (the presidential retreat), or on his Texas ranch.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_063\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]David E. Sanger and Marc Lacey, \u201cIn Early Battles, Bush Learns Need for Compromises,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, April 29, 2001, A1.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">Memorable settings may be chosen as backdrops for speeches, but they can backfire. On May 1, 2003, President Bush emerged in a flight suit from a plane just landed on the aircraft carrier USS <em class=\"emphasis\">Abraham Lincoln<\/em> and spoke in front of a huge banner that proclaimed \u201cMission Accomplished,\u201d implying the end of major combat operations in Iraq. The banner was positioned for the television cameras to ensure that the open sea, not San Diego, appeared in the background. The slogan may have originated with the ship\u2019s commander or sailors, but the Bush people designed and placed it perfectly for the cameras and choreographed the scene.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_f01\" class=\"figure large medium-height editable block\">\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"attachment_414\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"450\"]<a href=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images-archive-read-only\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/607\/2015\/07\/21191948\/2346224460_953ec7c240_o.jpg\"><img class=\"wp-image-414\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images-archive-read-only\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/607\/2015\/07\/21191948\/2346224460_953ec7c240_o.jpg\" alt=\"Photo of President George W. Bush giving the thumbs-up sign with a large sign in the background that reads, &quot;Mission Accomplished.&quot; \" width=\"450\" height=\"338\" \/><\/a> As violence in Iraq continued and worsened, the banner would be framed by critics of the war as a publicity stunt, a symbol of the administration\u2019s arrogance and failure.[\/caption]\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">Speechmaking can entail <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">going public<\/a><\/span>: presidents give a major address to promote public approval of their decisions, to advance their policy objectives and solutions in Congress and the bureaucracy, or to defend themselves against accusations of illegality and immorality. Going public is \u201ca strategic adaptation to the information age.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_064\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Samuel Kernell, <em class=\"emphasis\">Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership<\/em>, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 2; and Stephen J. Farnsworth, <em class=\"emphasis\">Spinner in Chief: How Presidents Sell Their Policies and Themselves<\/em> (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p08\" class=\"para editable block\">According to a study of presidents\u2019 television addresses, they fail to increase public approval of the president and rarely increase public support for the policy action the president advocates.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_065\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]George C. Edwards III, <em class=\"emphasis\">On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit<\/em> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 241.[\/footnote]<\/span> There can, however, be a <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">rally phenomenon<\/a><\/span>. The president\u2019s approval rating rises during periods of international tension and likely use of American force. Even at a time of policy failure, the president can frame the issue and lead public opinion. Crisis news coverage likely supports the president.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p09\" class=\"para editable block\">Moreover, nowadays, presidents, while still going public\u2014that is, appealing to national audiences\u2014increasingly go local: they take a targeted approach to influencing public opinion. They go for audiences who might be persuadable, such as their party base and interest groups, and to strategically chosen locations.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_066\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Jeffrey E. Cohen, <em class=\"emphasis\">Going Local: Presidential Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age<\/em>(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_n02\" class=\"key_takeaways editable block\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title\">Key Takeaways<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p10\" class=\"para\">The president gets things done as an agenda-setter and the chief lobbyist and via his veto power and signing statements. To what extent he can lead Congress depends on its party composition and ideological makeup. As the chief executive, the president gets things done through the appointment powers, executive orders, and war powers. The president seeks power and public approval through speeches and by heeding public response to polls.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_n01\" class=\"learning_objectives editable block\">\n<h2 class=\"title\">Learning Objectives<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p01\" class=\"para\">After reading this section, you should be able to answer the following questions:<\/p>\n<ol id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\n<li>How does the president try to set the agenda for the political system, especially Congress?<\/li>\n<li>What challenges does the president face in achieving his agenda?<\/li>\n<li>What are the strengths and weaknesses of the presidential veto?<\/li>\n<li>Can and do presidents lead Congress?<\/li>\n<li>What are the president\u2019s powers as chief executive?<\/li>\n<li>Why do presidents give so many speeches?<\/li>\n<li>How do presidents seek public approval?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The political system was designed by the framers to be infrequently innovative, to act with neither efficiency nor dispatch. Authority is decentralized. Political parties are usually in conflict. Interests are diverse.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_021\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"George C. Edwards III, The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-1\" href=\"#footnote-411-1\" aria-label=\"Footnote 1\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Yet, as we have explained, presidents face high expectations for action. Adding to these expectations is the soaring rhetoric of their election campaigns. For example, candidate Obama promised to deal with the problems of the economy, unemployment, housing, health care, Iraq, Afghanistan, and much more.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">As we have also explained, presidents do not invariably or even often have the power to meet these expectations. Consider the economy. Because the government and media report the inflation and unemployment rates and the number of new jobs created (or not created), the public is consistently reminded of these measures when judging the president\u2019s handling of the economy. And certainly the president does claim credit when the economy is doing well. Yet the president has far less control over the economy and these economic indicators than the media convey and many people believe.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">A president\u2019s opportunities to influence public policies depend in part on the preceding administration and the political circumstances under which the new president takes office.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_022\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Stephen Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-2\" href=\"#footnote-411-2\" aria-label=\"Footnote 2\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[2]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>Presidents often face intractable issues, encounter unpredictable events, have to make complex policy decisions, and are beset by scandals (policy, financial, sexual).<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">Once in office, reality sinks in. Interviewing <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.thedailyshow.com\/watch\/wed-october-27-2010\/barack-obama-pt--1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">President Obama on <em class=\"emphasis\">The Daily Show<\/em><\/a>, Jon Stewart wondered whether the president\u2019s campaign slogan of \u201cYes we can\u201d should be changed to \u201cYes we can, given certain conditions.\u201d President Obama replied, \u201cI think I would say \u2018yes we can, but\u00a0. . .\u00a0it\u2019s not going to happen overnight.\u2019\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_023\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Sheryl Gay Stolberg, \u201cHope and Change as Promised, Just Not Overnight,\u201d New York Times, October 28, 2010, A18.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-3\" href=\"#footnote-411-3\" aria-label=\"Footnote 3\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">So how do presidents get things done? Presidential powers and prerogatives do offer opportunities for leadership.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_n02\" class=\"callout editable block\">\n<h3 class=\"title\">Link: Presidential Recordings<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p08\" class=\"para\">Between 1940 and 1973, six American presidents from both political parties secretly recorded just less than five thousand hours of their meetings and telephone conversations. Listen to some of them <a href=\"http:\/\/millercenter.org\/academic\/presidentialrecordings\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_p10\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents indicate what issues should garner most attention and action; they help set the policy agenda. They lobby Congress to pass their programs, often by campaign-like swings around the country. Their position as head of their political party enables them to keep or gain allies (and win reelection). Inside the executive branch, presidents make policies by well-publicized appointments and executive orders. They use their ceremonial position as head of state to get into the news and gain public approval, making it easier to persuade others to follow their lead.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Agenda-Setter for the Political System<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents try to set the political agenda. They call attention to issues and solutions, using constitutional powers such as calling Congress into session, recommending bills, and informing its members about the state of the union, as well as giving speeches and making news.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_024\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Donna R. Hoffman and Alison D. Howard, Addressing the State of the Union (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-4\" href=\"#footnote-411-4\" aria-label=\"Footnote 4\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_f01\" class=\"figure medium editable block\">\n<div style=\"width: 210px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"\" src=\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/section_17\/149c21d64ee208228db62f9ac2bce9ce.jpg\" alt=\"Photo of President Obama waving to the joint session of Congress upon completing the 2011 State of the Union Address.\" width=\"200\" height=\"133\" \/><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-caption-text\">The president\u2019s constitutional responsibility to inform Congress on \u201cthe state of the union\u201d has been elevated into a performance, nationally broadcast on all major networks and before a joint session on Capitol Hill, that summarizes the key items on his policy agenda.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"para\">Congress does not always defer to and sometimes spurns the president\u2019s agenda. Its members serve smaller, more distinct constituencies for different terms. When presidents hail from the same party as the majority of Congress members, they have more influence to ensure that their ideas receive serious attention on Capitol Hill. So presidents work hard to keep or increase the number of members of their party in Congress: raising funds for the party (and their own campaign), campaigning for candidates, and throwing weight (and money) in a primary election behind the strongest or their preferred candidate. Presidential coattails\u2014where members of Congress are carried to victory by the winning presidential candidates\u2014are increasingly short. Most legislators win by larger margins in their district than does the president. In the elections midway through the president\u2019s term, the president\u2019s party generally loses seats in Congress. In 2010, despite President Obama\u2019s efforts, the Republicans gained a whopping sixty-three seats and took control of the House of Representatives.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Since presidents usually have less party support in Congress in the second halves of their terms, they most often expect that Congress will be more amenable to their initiatives in their first two years. But even then,<span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">divided government<\/a><\/span>, where one party controls the presidency and another party controls one or both chambers of Congress, has been common over the last fifty years. For presidents, the prospect of both a friendly House and Senate has become the exception.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Even when the White House and Congress are controlled by the same party, as with President Obama and the 2009 and 2010 Congress, presidents do not monopolize the legislative agenda. Congressional leaders, especially of the opposing party, push other issues\u2014if only to pressure or embarrass the president. Members of Congress have made campaign promises they want to keep despite the president\u2019s policy preferences. Interest groups with pet projects crowd in.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">Nonetheless, presidents are better placed than any other individual to influence the legislative process. In particular, their high prominence in the news means that they have a powerful impact on what issues will\u2014and will not\u2014be considered in the political system as a whole.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">What about the contents of \u201cthe president\u2019s agenda\u201d? The president is but one player among many shaping it. The transition from election to inauguration is just over two months (Bush had less time because of the disputed 2000 Florida vote). Presidents are preoccupied first with naming a cabinet and White House staff. To build an agenda, presidents \u201cborrow, steal, co-opt, redraft, rename, and modify any proposal that fits their policy goals.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_025\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Paul C. Light, The President\u2019s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 89.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-5\" href=\"#footnote-411-5\" aria-label=\"Footnote 5\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Ideas largely come from fellow partisans outside the White House. Bills already introduced in Congress or programs proposed by the bureaucracy are handy. They have received discussion, study, and compromise that have built support. And presidents have more success getting borrowed legislation through Congress than policy proposals devised inside the White House.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_026\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Andrew Rudalevige, Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-6\" href=\"#footnote-411-6\" aria-label=\"Footnote 6\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">Crises and unexpected events affect presidents\u2019 agenda choices. Issues pursue presidents, especially through questions and stories of White House reporters, as much as presidents pursue issues. A hugely destructive hurricane on the Gulf Coast propels issues of emergency management, poverty, and reconstruction onto the policy agenda whether a president wants them there or not.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s01_p08\" class=\"para editable block\">Finally, many agenda items cannot be avoided. Presidents are charged by Congress with proposing an annual budget. Raw budget numbers represent serious policy choices. And there are ever more agenda items that never seem to get solved (e.g., energy, among many others).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Chief Lobbyist in Congress<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">After suggesting what Congress should do, presidents try to persuade legislators to follow through. But without a formal role, presidents are outsiders to the legislative process. They cannot introduce bills in Congress and must rely on members to do so.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Legislative Liaison<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents aim at legislative accomplishments by negotiating with legislators directly or through their\u00a0<span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">legislative liaison<\/a><\/span> officers: White House staffers assigned to deal with Congress who provide a conduit from president to Congress and back again. These staffers convey presidential preferences and pressure members of Congress; they also pass along members\u2019 concerns to the White House. They count votes, line up coalitions, and suggest times for presidents to rally fellow party members. And they try to cut deals.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Legislative liaison focuses less on twisting arms than on maintaining \u201can era of good feelings\u201d with Congress. Some favors are large: supporting an appropriation that benefits members\u2019 constituencies; traveling to members\u2019 home turf to help them raise funds for reelection; and appointing members\u2019 cronies to high office. Others are small: inviting them up to the White House, where they can talk with reporters; sending them autographed photos or extra tickets for White House tours; and allowing them to announce grants. Presidents hope the cordiality will encourage legislators to return the favor when necessary.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_027\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"This section relies on Kenneth Collier, Between the Branches: The White House Office of Legislative Affairs (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-7\" href=\"#footnote-411-7\" aria-label=\"Footnote 7\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[7]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Such good feelings are tough to maintain when presidents and the opposition party espouse conflicting policies, especially when that party has a majority in one or both chambers of Congress or both sides adopt take-it-or-leave-it stances.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">The Veto<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">When Congress sends a bill to the White House, a president can return it with objections.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_028\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"This section relies most on Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power\u00a0(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see also Robert J. Spitzer, The Presidential Veto: Touchstone of the American Presidency (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-8\" href=\"#footnote-411-8\" aria-label=\"Footnote 8\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> This\u00a0<em><span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">veto<\/a><\/span><\/em>\u2014Latin for \u201cI forbid\u201d\u2014heightens the stakes. Congress can get its way only if it <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">overrides<\/a><\/span> the veto with two-thirds majorities in each chamber. Presidents who use the veto can block almost any bill they dislike; only around 4 percent of all vetoes have ever been successfully overridden.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_029\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"See Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, 1999\u20132000 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998), table 6-9.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-9\" href=\"#footnote-411-9\" aria-label=\"Footnote 9\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[9]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> The threat of a veto can be enough to get Congress to enact legislation that presidents prefer.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The veto does have drawbacks for presidents. Consider the following:<\/p>\n<ul id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02_l01\" class=\"itemizedlist editable block\">\n<li>Vetoes alienate members of Congress who worked hard crafting a bill. So vetoes are most used as a last resort. After the 1974 elections, Republican President Ford faced an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress. A Ford legislative liaison officer recalled, \u201cWe never deliberately sat down and made the decision that we would veto sixty bills in two years. . . . It was the only alternative.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_030\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Quoted in Paul C. Light, The President\u2019s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 112.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-10\" href=\"#footnote-411-10\" aria-label=\"Footnote 10\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/li>\n<li>The veto is a blunt instrument. It is useless if Congress does not act on legislation in the first place. In his 1993 speech proposing health-care reform, President Clinton waved a pen and vowed to veto any bill that did not provide universal coverage. Such a threat meant nothing when Congress did not pass <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> reform. And unlike governors of most states, presidents lack a <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">line-item veto<\/a><\/span>, which allows a chief executive to reject parts of a bill. Congress sought to give the president this power in the late 1990s, but the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_031\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Clinton v. City of New York, 524 US 427 (1998).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-11\" href=\"#footnote-411-11\" aria-label=\"Footnote 11\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[11]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Presidents must take or leave bills in their totality.<\/li>\n<li>Congress can turn the veto against presidents. For example, it can pass a popular bill\u2014especially in an election year\u2014and dare the president to reject it. President Clinton faced such \u201cveto bait\u201d from the Republican Congress when he was up for reelection in 1996. The <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/thomas.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/z?c104:H.R.3396.ENR.\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Defense of Marriage Act<\/a>, which would have restricted federal recognition of marriage to opposite-sex couples, was deeply distasteful to lesbians and gay men (a key Democratic constituency) but strongly backed in public opinion polls. A Clinton veto could bring blame for killing the bill or provoke a humiliating override. Signing it ran the risk of infuriating lesbian and gay voters. Clinton ultimately signed the legislation\u2014in the middle of the night with no cameras present.<\/li>\n<li>Veto threats can backfire. After the Democrats took over the Senate in mid-2001, they moved the \u201cpatients\u2019 bill of rights\u201d authorizing lawsuits against health maintenance organizations to the top of the Senate agenda. President Bush said he would veto the bill unless it incorporated strict limits on rights to sue and low caps on damages won in lawsuits. Such a visible threat encouraged a public perception that Bush was opposed to any patients\u2019 bill of rights, or even to patients\u2019 rights at all.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_032\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Frank Bruni, \u201cBush Strikes a Positive Tone on a Patients\u2019 Bill of Rights,\u201d New York Times, July 10, 2001, A12.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-12\" href=\"#footnote-411-12\" aria-label=\"Footnote 12\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Veto threats thus can be ineffective or create political damage (or, as in this case, both).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Savvy presidents use \u201cvetoes not only to block legislation but to shape it. . . .Vetoes are not fatal bullets but bargaining ploys.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_033\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Charles M. Cameron, Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 171.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-13\" href=\"#footnote-411-13\" aria-label=\"Footnote 13\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Veto threats and vetoing ceremonies become key to presidential communications in the news, which welcomes the story of Capitol Hill-versus-White House disputes, particularly under divided government. In 1996, President Clinton faced a tough welfare reform bill from a Republican Congress whose leaders dared him to veto the bill so they could claim he broke his 1992 promise to \u201cend welfare as we know it.\u201d Clinton vetoed the first bill; Republicans reduced the cuts but kept tough provisions denying benefits to children born to welfare recipients. Clinton vetoed this second version; Republicans shrank the cuts again and reduced the impact on children. Finally, Clinton signed the bill\u2014and ran ads during his reelection campaign proclaiming how <em class=\"emphasis\">he<\/em> had \u201cended welfare as we know it.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Signing Statements<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In a <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">signing statement<\/a><\/span>, the president claims the right to ignore or refuse to enforce laws, parts of laws, or provisions of appropriations bills even though Congress has enacted them and he has signed them into law. This practice was uncommon until developed during President Ronald Reagan\u2019s second term. It escalated under President George W. Bush, who rarely exercised the veto but instead issued almost 1,200 signing statements in eight years\u2014about twice as many as all his predecessors combined. As one example, he rejected the requirement that he report to Congress on how he had provided safeguards against political interference in federally funded research. He justified his statements on the \u201cinherent\u201d power of the commander in chief and on a hitherto obscure doctrine called the unitary executive, which holds that the executive branch can overrule Congress and the courts on the basis of the president\u2019s interpretation of the Constitution.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">President Obama ordered executive officials to consult with the attorney general before relying on any of President Bush\u2019s signing statements to bypass a law. Yet he initially issued some signing statements himself. Then, to avoid clashing with Congress, he refrained from doing so. He did claim that the executive branch could bypass what he deemed to be unconstitutional restraints on executive power. But he did not invoke the unitary executive theory.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_034\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Charlie Savage, \u201cObama\u2019s Embrace of a Bush Tactic Riles Congress,\u201d New York Times, August 9, 2009, A1; and Charlie Savage, \u201cObama Takes a New Route to Opposing Parts of Laws,\u201d New York Times, January 9, 2010, A9.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-14\" href=\"#footnote-411-14\" aria-label=\"Footnote 14\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[14]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s04\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Presidential Scorecards in Congress<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">How often do presidents get their way on Capitol Hill? On congressional roll call votes, Congress goes along with about three-fourths of presidential recommendations; the success rate is highest earlier in the term.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_035\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"George C. Edwards III, At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); and Mark A. Peterson, Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For overall legislative productivity, the classic starting point is David R. Mayhew\u2019s\u00a0Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946\u20131990 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-15\" href=\"#footnote-411-15\" aria-label=\"Footnote 15\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[15]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Even on controversial, important legislation for which they expressed a preference well in advance of congressional action, presidents still do well. Congress seldom ignores presidential agenda items entirely. One study estimates that over half of presidential recommendations are substantially reflected in legislative action.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_036\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Mark A. Peterson, Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Andrew Rudalevige, Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 136.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-16\" href=\"#footnote-411-16\" aria-label=\"Footnote 16\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[16]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s02_s04_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Can and do presidents lead Congress, then? Not quite. Most presidential success is determined by Congress\u2019s partisan and ideological makeup. Divided government and party polarization on Capitol Hill have made Congress more willing to disagree with the president. So recent presidents are less successful even while being choosier about bills to endorse. Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson staked out positions on well over half of congressional roll call votes. Their successors have taken positions on fewer than one-fourth of them\u2014especially when their party did not control Congress. \u201cPresidents, wary of an increasingly independent-minded congressional membership, have come to actively support legislation only when it is of particular importance to them, in an attempt to minimize defeat.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_037\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Lyn Ragsdale, Vital Statistics on the Presidency, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 360. See also Steven A. Shull and Thomas C. Shaw, Explaining Congressional-Presidential Relations: A Multiple Perspective Approach (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), chap. 4.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-17\" href=\"#footnote-411-17\" aria-label=\"Footnote 17\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[17]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Chief Executive<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">As chief executive, the president can move first and quickly, daring others to respond. Presidents like both the feeling of power and favorable news stories of them acting decisively. Though Congress and courts can respond, they often react slowly; many if not most presidential actions are never challenged.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_038\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Terry M. Moe, \u201cThe Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage,\u201d in The Presidency and the Political System, 6th ed., ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 443\u201374; and William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-18\" href=\"#footnote-411-18\" aria-label=\"Footnote 18\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[18]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Such direct presidential action is based in several powers: to appoint officials, to issue executive orders, to \u201ctake care that the laws be faithfully executed,\u201d and to wage war.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Appointment Powers<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents both hire and (with the exception of regulatory commissions) fire executive officers. They also appoint ambassadors, the members of independent agencies, and the judiciary.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_039\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"See David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); and G. Calvin Mackenzie, ed., Innocent until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process, ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-19\" href=\"#footnote-411-19\" aria-label=\"Footnote 19\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[19]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The months between election and inauguration are consumed by the need to rapidly assemble a\u00a0<span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">cabinet<\/a><\/span>, a group that reports to and advises the president, made up of the heads of the fourteen executive departments and whatever other positions the president accords <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/administration\/cabinet\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">cabinet-level rank<\/a>. Finding \u201cthe right person for the job\u201d is but one criterion. Cabinet appointees overwhelmingly hail from the president\u2019s party; choosing fellow partisans rewards the winning coalition and helps achieve policy.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_040\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Politics of the U.S. Cabinet: Representation in the Executive Branch, 1789\u20131984 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-20\" href=\"#footnote-411-20\" aria-label=\"Footnote 20\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Presidents also try to create a team that, in Clinton\u2019s phrase, \u201clooks like America.\u201d In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower was stung by the news media\u2019s joke that his first cabinet\u2014all male, all white\u2014consisted of \u201cnine millionaires and a plumber\u201d (the latter was a union official, a short-lived labor secretary). By contrast, George W. Bush\u2019s and Barack Obama\u2019s cabinets had a generous complement of persons of color and women\u2014and at least one member of the other party.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">These presidential appointees must be confirmed by the Senate. If the Senate rarely votes down a nominee on the floor, it no longer rubber-stamps scandal-free nominees. A nominee may be stopped in a committee. About one out of every twenty key nominations is never confirmed, usually when a committee does not schedule it for a vote.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_041\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Glen S. Kurtz, Richard Fleisher, and Jon R. Bond, \u201cFrom Abe Fortas to Zo\u00eb Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate,\u201d American Political Science Review 92 (December 1998): 871\u201381.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-21\" href=\"#footnote-411-21\" aria-label=\"Footnote 21\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Confirmation hearings are opportunities for senators to quiz nominees about pet projects of interest to their states, to elicit pledges to testify or provide information, and to extract promises of policy actions.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_042\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"G. Calvin Mackenzie, The Politics of Presidential Appointments (New York: Free Press, 1981), especially chap. 7.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-22\" href=\"#footnote-411-22\" aria-label=\"Footnote 22\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[22]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> To win confirmation, cabinet officers pledge to be responsive and accountable to Congress. Subcabinet officials and federal judges, lacking the prominence of cabinet and Supreme Court nominees, are even more belatedly nominated and more slowly confirmed. Even senators in the president\u2019s party routinely block nominees to protest poor treatment or win concessions.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">As a result, presidents have to wait a long time before their appointees take office. Five months into President George W. Bush\u2019s first term, one study showed that of the 494 cabinet and subcabinet positions to fill, under half had received nominations; under one-fourth had been confirmed.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_043\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"James Dao, \u201cIn Protest, Republican Senators Hold Up Defense Confirmations,\u201d New York Times, May 10, 2001, A20; and Crystal Nix Hines, \u201cLag in Appointments Strains the Cabinet,\u201d New York Times, June 14, 2001, A20.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-23\" href=\"#footnote-411-23\" aria-label=\"Footnote 23\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[23]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> One scholar observed, \u201cIn America today, you can get a master\u2019s degree, build a house, bicycle across country, or make a baby in less time than it takes to put the average appointee on the job.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_044\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"G. Calvin Mackenzie, \u201cThe State of the Presidential Appointments Process,\u201d in Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process, ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 1\u201349 at 40\u201341.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-24\" href=\"#footnote-411-24\" aria-label=\"Footnote 24\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[24]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> With presidential appointments unfilled, initiatives are delayed and day-to-day running of the departments is left by default to career civil servants.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s01_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">No wonder presidents can, and increasingly do, install an acting appointee or use their power to make recess appointments.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_045\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"G. Calvin Mackenzie, \u201cThe State of the Presidential Appointments Process,\u201d inInnocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 35.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-25\" href=\"#footnote-411-25\" aria-label=\"Footnote 25\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> But such unilateral action can produce a backlash. In 2004, two nominees for federal court had been held up by Democratic senators; when Congress was out of session for a week, President Bush named them to judgeships in recess appointments. Furious Democrats threatened to filibuster or otherwise block all Bush\u2019s judicial nominees. Bush had no choice but to make a deal that he would not make any more judicial recess appointments for the rest of the year.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_046\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Neil A. Lewis, \u201cDeal Ends Impasse over Judicial Nominees,\u201d New York Times, May 19, 2004, A1.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-26\" href=\"#footnote-411-26\" aria-label=\"Footnote 26\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[26]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Executive Orders<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents make policies by <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">executive orders<\/a><\/span>.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_047\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-27\" href=\"#footnote-411-27\" aria-label=\"Footnote 27\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[27]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> This power comes from the constitutional mandate that they \u201ctake care that the laws be faithfully executed.\u201d<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\"><a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.archives.gov\/federal-register\/codification\/chapter.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Executive orders<\/a> are directives to administrators in the executive branch on how to implement legislation. Courts treat them as equivalent to laws. Dramatic events have resulted from executive orders. Some famous executive orders include Lincoln\u2019s Emancipation Proclamation, Franklin D. Roosevelt\u2019s closing the banks to avoid runs on deposits and his authorizing internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, Truman\u2019s desegregation of the armed forces, Kennedy\u2019s establishment of the Peace Corps, and Nixon\u2019s creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. More typically, executive orders reorganize the executive branch and impose restrictions or directives on what bureaucrats may or may not do. The attraction of executive orders was captured by one aide to President Clinton: \u201cStroke of the pen. Law of the land. Kind of cool.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_048\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Paul Begala, quoted in James Bennet, \u201cTrue to Form, Clinton Shifts Energies Back to U.S. Focus,\u201d New York Times, July 5, 1998, 10.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-28\" href=\"#footnote-411-28\" aria-label=\"Footnote 28\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Related ways for presidents to try to get things done are by memoranda to cabinet officers, proclamations authorized by legislation, and (usually secret) national security directives.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_049\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Phillip J. Cooper, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-29\" href=\"#footnote-411-29\" aria-label=\"Footnote 29\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[29]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Executive orders are imperfect for presidents; they can be easily overturned. One president can do something \u201cwith the stroke of a pen\u201d; the next can easily undo it. President Reagan\u2019s executive order withholding American aid to international population control agencies that provide abortion counseling was rescinded by an executive order by President Clinton in 1993, then reinstated by another executive order by President Bush in 2001\u2014and rescinded once more by President Obama in 2009. Moreover, since executive orders are supposed to be a mere execution of what Congress has already decided, they can be superseded by congressional action.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">War Powers<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Opportunities to act on behalf of the entire nation in international affairs are irresistible to presidents. Presidents almost always gravitate toward foreign policy as their terms progress. Domestic policy wonk Bill Clinton metamorphosed into a foreign policy enthusiast from 1993 to 2001. Even prior to 9\/11 the notoriously untraveled George W. Bush was undergoing the same transformation. President Obama has been just as if not more involved in foreign policy than his predecessors.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Congress\u2014as long as it is consulted\u2014is less inclined to challenge presidential initiatives in foreign policy than in domestic policy. This idea that the president has greater autonomy in foreign than domestic policy is known as the \u201cTwo Presidencies Thesis.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_050\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"See Barbara Hinckley, Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-30\" href=\"#footnote-411-30\" aria-label=\"Footnote 30\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[30]<\/sup><\/a> Such deference seems largely limited to presidents\u2019 own initiatives.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"See Richard Fleisher, Jon R. Bond, Glen S. Krutz, and Stephen Hanna, \u201cThe Demise of the Two Presidencies,\u201dAmerican Politics Quarterly 28 (2000): 3\u201325; and Andrew Rudalevige, Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002),148\u201349.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-31\" href=\"#footnote-411-31\" aria-label=\"Footnote 31\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[31]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">War powers provide another key avenue for presidents to act unilaterally. After the 9\/11 attacks, President Bush\u2019s Office of Legal Counsel to the US Department of Justice argued that as commander in chief President Bush could do what was necessary to protect the American people.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_051\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9\/11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-32\" href=\"#footnote-411-32\" aria-label=\"Footnote 32\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[32]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Since World War II, presidents have never asked Congress for (or received) a declaration of war. Instead, they rely on open-ended congressional authorizations to use force (such as for wars in Vietnam and \u201cagainst terrorism\u201d), United Nations resolutions (wars in Korea and the Persian Gulf), North American Treaty Organization (NATO) actions (peacekeeping operations and war in the former Yugoslavia), and orchestrated requests from tiny international organizations like the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (invasion of Grenada). Sometimes, presidents amass all these: in his last press conference before the start of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, President Bush invoked the congressional authorization of force, UN resolutions, <em class=\"emphasis\">and<\/em> the inherent power of the president to protect the United States derived from his oath of office.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">Congress can react against undeclared wars by cutting funds for military interventions. Such efforts are time consuming and not in place until long after the initial incursion. But congressional action, or its threat, did prevent military intervention in Southeast Asia during the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 and sped up the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon in the mid-1980s and Somalia in 1993.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_052\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-33\" href=\"#footnote-411-33\" aria-label=\"Footnote 33\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[33]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">Congress\u2019s most concerted effort to restrict presidential war powers, the <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.loc.gov\/law\/help\/war-powers.php\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">War Powers Act<\/a>, which passed over President Nixon\u2019s veto in 1973, may have backfired. It established that presidents must consult with Congress prior to a foreign commitment of troops, must report to Congress within forty-eight hours of the introduction of armed forces, and must withdraw such troops after sixty days if Congress does not approve. All presidents denounce this legislation. But it gives them the right to commit troops for sixty days with little more than requirements to consult and report\u2014conditions presidents often feel free to ignore. And the presidential prerogative under the War Powers Act to commit troops on a short-term basis means that Congress often reacts after the fact. Since Vietnam, the act has done little to prevent presidents from unilaterally launching invasions.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_053\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Louis Fisher,Presidential War Power (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995); Barbara Hinckley, Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chap. 4.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-34\" href=\"#footnote-411-34\" aria-label=\"Footnote 34\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[34]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s03_s03_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">President Obama did not seek Congressional authorization before ordering the US military to join attacks on the Libyan air defenses and government forces in March 2011. After the bombing campaign started, Obama sent Congress a letter contending that as commander in chief he had constitutional authority for the attacks. The White House lawyers distinguished between this limited military operation and a war.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Presidents and the People<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Public approval helps the president assure agreement, attract support, and discourage opposition. Presidents with high popularity win more victories in Congress on high-priority bills.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_054\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Brandice Canes-Wrone, Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-35\" href=\"#footnote-411-35\" aria-label=\"Footnote 35\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[35]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> But obtaining public approval can be complicated. Presidents face contradictory expectations, even demands, from the public: to be an ordinary person yet display heroic qualities, to be nonpolitical yet excel (unobtrusively) at the politics required to get things done, to be a visionary leader yet respond to public opinion.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_055\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-36\" href=\"#footnote-411-36\" aria-label=\"Footnote 36\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[36]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Public Approval<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">For over fifty years, pollsters have asked survey respondents, \u201cDo you approve or disapprove of the way that the president is handling his job?\u201d Over time there has been variation from one president to the next, but the general pattern is unmistakable.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_056\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"James A. Stimson, \u201cPublic Support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model,\u201d Public Opinion Quarterly 40 (1976): 1\u201321; Samuel Kernell, \u201cExplaining Presidential Popularity,\u201d American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 506\u201322; and Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-37\" href=\"#footnote-411-37\" aria-label=\"Footnote 37\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[37]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Approval starts out fairly high (near the percentage of the popular vote), increases slightly during the honeymoon, fades over the term, and then levels off. Presidents differ largely in the <em class=\"emphasis\">rate<\/em> at which their approval rating declines. President Kennedy\u2019s support eroded only slightly, as opposed to the devastating drops experienced by Ford and Carter. Presidents in their first terms are well aware that, if they fall below 50 percent, they are in danger of losing reelection or of losing allies in Congress in the midterm elections.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Events during a president\u2019s term\u2014and how the news media frame them\u2014drive approval ratings up or down. Depictions of economic hard times, drawn-out military engagements (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq), unpopular decisions (e.g., Ford\u2019s pardon of Nixon), and other bad news drag approval ratings lower. The main upward push comes from quick international interventions, as for President Obama after the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, or successfully addressing national emergencies, which boost a president\u2019s approval for several months. Under such conditions, official Washington speaks more in one voice than usual, the media drop their criticism as a result, and presidents depict themselves as embodiments of a united America. The successful war against Iraq in 1991 pushed approval ratings for the elder Bush to 90 percent, exceeded only by the ratings of his son after 9\/11. It may be beside the point whether the president\u2019s decision was smart or a blunder. Kennedy\u2019s press secretary, Pierre Salinger, later recalled how the president\u2019s approval ratings actually climbed after Kennedy backed a failed invasion by Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs: \u201cHe called me into his office and he said, \u2018Did you see that Gallup poll today?\u2019 I said, \u2018Yes.\u2019 He said, \u2018Do you think I have to continue doing stupid things like that to remain popular with the American people?\u2019\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_057\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Quoted in Daniel C. Hallin, ed., The Presidency, the Press and the People (La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, 1992), 21.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-38\" href=\"#footnote-411-38\" aria-label=\"Footnote 38\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[38]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">But as a crisis subsides, so too do official unity, tributes in the press, and the president\u2019s lofty approval ratings. Short-term effects wane over the course of time. Bush\u2019s huge boost from 9\/11 lasted well into early 2003; he got a smaller, shorter lift from the invasion of Iraq in April 2003 and another from the capture of Saddam Hussein in December before dropping to levels perilously near, then below, 50 percent. Narrowly reelected in 2008, Bush saw his approval sink to new lows (around 30 percent) over the course of his second term.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Polls<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Naturally and inevitably, presidents employ pollsters to measure public opinion. Poll data can influence presidents\u2019 behavior, the calculation and presentation of their decisions and policies, and their rhetoric.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_058\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, Politicians Don\u2019t Pander (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-39\" href=\"#footnote-411-39\" aria-label=\"Footnote 39\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[39]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">After the devastating loss of Congress to the Republicans midway through his first term, President Clinton hired public relations consultant Dick Morris to find widely popular issues on which he could take a stand. Morris used a \u201c60 percent rule\u201d: if six out of ten Americans were in favor of something, Clinton had to be too. Thus the Clinton White House crafted and adopted some policies knowing that they had broad popular support, such as balancing the budget and \u201creforming\u201d welfare.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Even when public opinion data have no effects on a presidential decision, they can still be used to ascertain the best way to justify the policy or to find out how to present (i.e., spin) unpopular policies so that they become more acceptable to the public. Polls can identify the words and phrases that best sell policies to people. President George W. Bush referred to \u201cschool choice\u201d instead of \u201cschool voucher programs,\u201d to the \u201cdeath tax\u201d instead of \u201cinheritance taxes,\u201d and to \u201cwealth-generating private accounts\u201d rather than \u201cthe privatization of Social Security.\u201d He presented reducing taxes for wealthy Americans as a \u201cjobs\u201d package.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_059\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Joshua Green, \u201cThe Other War Room,\u201d Washington Monthly34, no. 4 (April 2002): 11\u201316; and Ben Fritz, Bryan Keefer, and Brendan Nyhan, All the President\u2019s Spin: George W. Bush, the Media, and the Truth (New York: Touchstone, 2004).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-40\" href=\"#footnote-411-40\" aria-label=\"Footnote 40\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[40]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s04_s02_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Polls can even be used to adjust a president\u2019s personal behavior. After a poll showed that some people did not believe that President Obama was a Christian, he attended services, with photographers in tow, at a prominent church in Washington, DC.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Speechmaker-in-Chief<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents speak for various reasons: to represent the country, address issues, promote policies, and seek legislative accomplishments; to raise funds for their campaign, their party, and its candidates; and to berate the opposition. They also speak to control the executive branch by publicizing their thematic focus, ushering along appointments, and issuing executive orders.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_060\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"See Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); and John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-41\" href=\"#footnote-411-41\" aria-label=\"Footnote 41\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[41]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> They aim their speeches at those physically present and, often, at the far larger audience reached through the media.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">In their speeches, presidents celebrate, express national emotion, educate, advocate, persuade, and attack. Their speeches vary in importance, subject, and venue. They give major ones, such as the inauguration and State of the Union. They memorialize events such as 9\/11 and speak at the site of tragedies (as President Obama did on January 12, 2011, in Tucson, Arizona, after the shootings of Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and bystanders by a crazed gunman). They give commencement addresses. They speak at party rallies. And they make numerous routine remarks and brief statements.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_n01\" class=\"video editable block\">\n<h3 class=\"title\">Video Clip:\u00a0President Obama&#8217;s Speech<\/h3>\n<p class=\"title\">President Obama traveled to Tucson on\u00a0January 12, 201, to help memorialize those who died in the\u00a0shooting rampage there. Watch the entire speech below:<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" id=\"oembed-1\" title=\"Watch President Obama&#39;s Full Speech at Tucson Memorial\" width=\"500\" height=\"281\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/ztbJmXQDIGA?feature=oembed&#38;rel=0\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>Presidents are more or less engaged in composing and editing their speeches. For speeches that articulate policies, the contents will usually be considered in advance by the people in the relevant executive branch departments and agencies who make suggestions and try to resolve or meld conflicting views, for example, on foreign policy by the State and Defense departments, the CIA, and National Security Council. It will be up to the president, to buy in on, modify, or reject themes, arguments, and language.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">The president\u2019s speechwriters are involved in the organization and contents of the speech.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_061\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"This discussion is based on Robert Schlesinger, White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters\u00a0(New York: Simon &amp; Schuster, 2008).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-42\" href=\"#footnote-411-42\" aria-label=\"Footnote 42\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[42]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> They contribute memorable phrases, jokes, applause lines, transitions, repetition, rhythm, emphases, and places to pause. They write for ease of delivery, the cadence of the president\u2019s voice, mannerisms of expression, idioms, pace, and timing.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">In search of friendly audiences, congenial news media and vivid backdrops, presidents often travel outside Washington to give their speeches.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_062\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Roderick Hart, The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Barbara Hinckley,The Symbolic Presidency (New York: Routledge, 1991); and Gregory L. Hager and Terry Sullivan, \u201cPresident-Centered and Presidency-Centered Explanations of Presidential Public Activity,\u201dAmerican Journal of Political Science 38 (November 1994): 1079\u20131103.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-43\" href=\"#footnote-411-43\" aria-label=\"Footnote 43\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[43]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> In his first one hundred days in office in 2001, George W. Bush visited twenty-six states to give speeches; this was a new record even though he refused to spend a night anywhere other than in his own beds at the White House, at Camp David (the presidential retreat), or on his Texas ranch.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_063\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"David E. Sanger and Marc Lacey, \u201cIn Early Battles, Bush Learns Need for Compromises,\u201d New York Times, April 29, 2001, A1.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-44\" href=\"#footnote-411-44\" aria-label=\"Footnote 44\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[44]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">Memorable settings may be chosen as backdrops for speeches, but they can backfire. On May 1, 2003, President Bush emerged in a flight suit from a plane just landed on the aircraft carrier USS <em class=\"emphasis\">Abraham Lincoln<\/em> and spoke in front of a huge banner that proclaimed \u201cMission Accomplished,\u201d implying the end of major combat operations in Iraq. The banner was positioned for the television cameras to ensure that the open sea, not San Diego, appeared in the background. The slogan may have originated with the ship\u2019s commander or sailors, but the Bush people designed and placed it perfectly for the cameras and choreographed the scene.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_f01\" class=\"figure large medium-height editable block\">\n<div id=\"attachment_414\" style=\"width: 460px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images-archive-read-only\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/607\/2015\/07\/21191948\/2346224460_953ec7c240_o.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-414\" class=\"wp-image-414\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images-archive-read-only\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/607\/2015\/07\/21191948\/2346224460_953ec7c240_o.jpg\" alt=\"Photo of President George W. Bush giving the thumbs-up sign with a large sign in the background that reads, &quot;Mission Accomplished.&quot;\" width=\"450\" height=\"338\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-414\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">As violence in Iraq continued and worsened, the banner would be framed by critics of the war as a publicity stunt, a symbol of the administration\u2019s arrogance and failure.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">Speechmaking can entail <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">going public<\/a><\/span>: presidents give a major address to promote public approval of their decisions, to advance their policy objectives and solutions in Congress and the bureaucracy, or to defend themselves against accusations of illegality and immorality. Going public is \u201ca strategic adaptation to the information age.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_064\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 2; and Stephen J. Farnsworth, Spinner in Chief: How Presidents Sell Their Policies and Themselves (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-45\" href=\"#footnote-411-45\" aria-label=\"Footnote 45\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[45]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p08\" class=\"para editable block\">According to a study of presidents\u2019 television addresses, they fail to increase public approval of the president and rarely increase public support for the policy action the president advocates.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_065\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"George C. Edwards III, On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 241.\" id=\"return-footnote-411-46\" href=\"#footnote-411-46\" aria-label=\"Footnote 46\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[46]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> There can, however, be a <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">rally phenomenon<\/a><\/span>. The president\u2019s approval rating rises during periods of international tension and likely use of American force. Even at a time of policy failure, the president can frame the issue and lead public opinion. Crisis news coverage likely supports the president.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p09\" class=\"para editable block\">Moreover, nowadays, presidents, while still going public\u2014that is, appealing to national audiences\u2014increasingly go local: they take a targeted approach to influencing public opinion. They go for audiences who might be persuadable, such as their party base and interest groups, and to strategically chosen locations.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn13_066\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Jeffrey E. Cohen, Going Local: Presidential Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).\" id=\"return-footnote-411-47\" href=\"#footnote-411-47\" aria-label=\"Footnote 47\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[47]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_n02\" class=\"key_takeaways editable block\">\n<h2 class=\"title\">Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch13_s02_s05_p10\" class=\"para\">The president gets things done as an agenda-setter and the chief lobbyist and via his veto power and signing statements. To what extent he can lead Congress depends on its party composition and ideological makeup. As the chief executive, the president gets things done through the appointment powers, executive orders, and war powers. The president seeks power and public approval through speeches and by heeding public response to polls.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t <section class=\"citations-section\" role=\"contentinfo\">\n\t\t\t <h3>Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t <div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <div id=\"citation-list-411\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t <div class=\"licensing\"><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">CC licensed content, Shared previously<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>21st Century American Government. <strong>Authored by<\/strong>: Anonymous. <strong>Provided by<\/strong>: Lardbucket. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/s17-02-how-presidents-get-things-done.html\">http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/s17-02-how-presidents-get-things-done.html<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/4.0\/\">CC BY-NC-SA: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike<\/a><\/em><\/li><li>A-OK. <strong>Authored by<\/strong>: mashroms. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/mashroms\/2346224460\/\">https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/mashroms\/2346224460\/<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-nd\/4.0\/\">CC BY-NC-ND: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives <\/a><\/em><\/li><\/ul><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">All rights reserved content<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>Watch President Obama&#039;s Full Speech at Tucson Memorial. <strong>Provided by<\/strong>: PBS News Hour. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/ztbJmXQDIGA\">https:\/\/youtu.be\/ztbJmXQDIGA<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em>All Rights Reserved<\/em>. <strong>License Terms<\/strong>: Standard YouTube video<\/li><\/ul><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">Public domain content<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>President Obama waves to joint session of Congress . <strong>Authored by<\/strong>: Chuck Kennedy. <strong>Provided by<\/strong>: Executive Office of the President of the United States. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Obama_waves_State_of_the_Union_2011.jpg\">https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Obama_waves_State_of_the_Union_2011.jpg<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/about\/pdm\">Public Domain: No Known Copyright<\/a><\/em><\/li><\/ul><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t <\/section><hr class=\"before-footnotes clear\" \/><div class=\"footnotes\"><ol><li id=\"footnote-411-1\">George C. Edwards III, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-1\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 1\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-2\">Stephen Skowronek, <em class=\"emphasis\">Presidential Leadership in Political Time<\/em> (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-2\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 2\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-3\">Sheryl Gay Stolberg, \u201cHope and Change as Promised, Just Not Overnight,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, October 28, 2010, A18. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-3\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 3\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-4\">Donna R. Hoffman and Alison D. Howard, <em class=\"emphasis\">Addressing the State of the Union<\/em> (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-4\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 4\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-5\">Paul C. Light, <em class=\"emphasis\">The President\u2019s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton<\/em>, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 89. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-5\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 5\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-6\">Andrew Rudalevige, <em class=\"emphasis\">Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-6\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 6\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-7\">This section relies on Kenneth Collier, <em class=\"emphasis\">Between the Branches: The White House Office of Legislative Affairs<\/em> (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-7\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 7\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-8\">This section relies most on Charles M. Cameron, <em class=\"emphasis\">Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power\u00a0<\/em>(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see also Robert J. Spitzer, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Presidential Veto: Touchstone of the American Presidency<\/em> (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-8\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 8\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-9\">See Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, <em class=\"emphasis\">Vital Statistics on American Politics, 1999\u20132000<\/em> (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998), table 6-9. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-9\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 9\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-10\">Quoted in Paul C. Light, <em class=\"emphasis\">The President\u2019s Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton<\/em>, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 112. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-10\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 10\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-11\">Clinton v. City of New York, 524 US 427 (1998). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-11\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 11\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-12\">Frank Bruni, \u201cBush Strikes a Positive Tone on a Patients\u2019 Bill of Rights,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, July 10, 2001, A12. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-12\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 12\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-13\">Charles M. Cameron, <em class=\"emphasis\">Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power<\/em> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 171. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-13\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 13\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-14\">Charlie Savage, \u201cObama\u2019s Embrace of a Bush Tactic Riles Congress,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, August 9, 2009, A1; and Charlie Savage, \u201cObama Takes a New Route to Opposing Parts of Laws,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, January 9, 2010, A9. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-14\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 14\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-15\">George C. Edwards III, <em class=\"emphasis\">At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress<\/em> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, <em class=\"emphasis\">The President in the Legislative Arena<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); and Mark A. Peterson, <em class=\"emphasis\">Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For overall legislative productivity, the classic starting point is David R. Mayhew\u2019s\u00a0<em class=\"emphasis\">Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946\u20131990<\/em> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-15\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 15\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-16\">Mark A. Peterson, <em class=\"emphasis\">Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Andrew Rudalevige, <em class=\"emphasis\">Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 136. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-16\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 16\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-17\">Lyn Ragsdale, <em class=\"emphasis\">Vital Statistics on the Presidency<\/em>, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 360. See also Steven A. Shull and Thomas C. Shaw, <em class=\"emphasis\">Explaining Congressional-Presidential Relations: A Multiple Perspective Approach<\/em> (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), chap. 4. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-17\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 17\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-18\">Terry M. Moe, \u201cThe Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage,\u201d in <em class=\"emphasis\">The Presidency and the Political System<\/em>, 6th ed., ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 443\u201374; and William G. Howell, <em class=\"emphasis\">Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-18\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 18\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-19\">See David E. Lewis, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance<\/em>(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); and G. Calvin Mackenzie, ed., <em class=\"emphasis\">Innocent until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process<\/em>, ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-19\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 19\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-20\">Jeffrey E. Cohen, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Politics of the U.S. Cabinet: Representation in the Executive Branch, 1789\u20131984<\/em> (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-20\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 20\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-21\">Glen S. Kurtz, Richard Fleisher, and Jon R. Bond, \u201cFrom Abe Fortas to Zo\u00eb Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">American Political Science Review<\/em> 92 (December 1998): 871\u201381. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-21\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 21\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-22\">G. Calvin Mackenzie, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Politics of Presidential Appointments<\/em> (New York: Free Press, 1981), especially chap. 7. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-22\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 22\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-23\">James Dao, \u201cIn Protest, Republican Senators Hold Up Defense Confirmations,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, May 10, 2001, A20; and Crystal Nix Hines, \u201cLag in Appointments Strains the Cabinet,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, June 14, 2001, A20. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-23\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 23\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-24\">G. Calvin Mackenzie, \u201cThe State of the Presidential Appointments Process,\u201d in <em class=\"emphasis\">Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process<\/em>, ed. G. Calvin Mackenzie (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 1\u201349 at 40\u201341. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-24\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 24\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-25\">G. Calvin Mackenzie, \u201cThe State of the Presidential Appointments Process,\u201d in<em class=\"emphasis\">Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process<\/em> (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 35. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-25\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 25\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-26\">Neil A. Lewis, \u201cDeal Ends Impasse over Judicial Nominees,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, May 19, 2004, A1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-26\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 26\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-27\">Kenneth R. Mayer, <em class=\"emphasis\">With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-27\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 27\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-28\">Paul Begala, quoted in James Bennet, \u201cTrue to Form, Clinton Shifts Energies Back to U.S. Focus,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, July 5, 1998, 10. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-28\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 28\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-29\">Phillip J. Cooper, <em class=\"emphasis\">By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action<\/em> (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-29\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 29\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-30\">See Barbara Hinckley, <em class=\"emphasis\">Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-30\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 30\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-31\">See Richard Fleisher, Jon R. Bond, Glen S. Krutz, and Stephen Hanna, \u201cThe Demise of the Two Presidencies,\u201d<em class=\"emphasis\">American Politics Quarterly<\/em> 28 (2000): 3\u201325; and Andrew Rudalevige, <em class=\"emphasis\">Managing the President\u2019s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002),148\u201349. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-31\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 31\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-32\">John Yoo, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9\/11<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-32\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 32\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-33\">William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, <em class=\"emphasis\">While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-33\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 33\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-34\">Louis Fisher,<em class=\"emphasis\">Presidential War Power<\/em> (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995); Barbara Hinckley, <em class=\"emphasis\">Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), chap. 4. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-34\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 34\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-35\">Brandice Canes-Wrone, <em class=\"emphasis\">Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-35\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 35\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-36\">Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Paradoxes of the American Presidency<\/em>, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-36\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 36\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-37\">James A. Stimson, \u201cPublic Support for American Presidents: A Cyclical Model,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Public Opinion Quarterly<\/em> 40 (1976): 1\u201321; Samuel Kernell, \u201cExplaining Presidential Popularity,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">American Political Science Review<\/em> 72 (1978): 506\u201322; and Richard A. Brody, <em class=\"emphasis\">Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support<\/em> (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-37\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 37\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-38\">Quoted in Daniel C. Hallin, ed., <em class=\"emphasis\">The Presidency, the Press and the People<\/em> (La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, 1992), 21. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-38\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 38\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-39\">Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, <em class=\"emphasis\">Politicians Don\u2019t Pander<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-39\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 39\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-40\">Joshua Green, \u201cThe Other War Room,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Washington Monthly<\/em>34, no. 4 (April 2002): 11\u201316; and Ben Fritz, Bryan Keefer, and Brendan Nyhan, <em class=\"emphasis\">All the President\u2019s Spin: George W. Bush, the Media, and the Truth<\/em> (New York: Touchstone, 2004). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-40\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 40\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-41\">See Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, <em class=\"emphasis\">Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media<\/em> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); and John Anthony Maltese, <em class=\"emphasis\">Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News<\/em> (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-41\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 41\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-42\">This discussion is based on Robert Schlesinger, <em class=\"emphasis\">White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters\u00a0<\/em>(New York: Simon &amp; Schuster, 2008). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-42\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 42\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-43\">Roderick Hart, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age<\/em> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Barbara Hinckley,<em class=\"emphasis\">The Symbolic Presidency<\/em> (New York: Routledge, 1991); and Gregory L. Hager and Terry Sullivan, \u201cPresident-Centered and Presidency-Centered Explanations of Presidential Public Activity,\u201d<em class=\"emphasis\">American Journal of Political Science<\/em> 38 (November 1994): 1079\u20131103. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-43\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 43\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-44\">David E. Sanger and Marc Lacey, \u201cIn Early Battles, Bush Learns Need for Compromises,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, April 29, 2001, A1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-44\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 44\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-45\">Samuel Kernell, <em class=\"emphasis\">Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership<\/em>, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 2; and Stephen J. Farnsworth, <em class=\"emphasis\">Spinner in Chief: How Presidents Sell Their Policies and Themselves<\/em> (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-45\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 45\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-46\">George C. Edwards III, <em class=\"emphasis\">On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit<\/em> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 241. <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-46\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 46\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-411-47\">Jeffrey E. Cohen, <em class=\"emphasis\">Going Local: Presidential Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age<\/em>(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). <a href=\"#return-footnote-411-47\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 47\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"author":923,"menu_order":7,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[{\"type\":\"cc\",\"description\":\"21st Century American Government\",\"author\":\"Anonymous\",\"organization\":\"Lardbucket\",\"url\":\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/s17-02-how-presidents-get-things-done.html\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by-nc-sa\",\"license_terms\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"pd\",\"description\":\"President Obama waves to joint session of Congress \",\"author\":\"Chuck Kennedy\",\"organization\":\"Executive Office of the President of the United States\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Obama_waves_State_of_the_Union_2011.jpg\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"pd\",\"license_terms\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"cc\",\"description\":\"A-OK\",\"author\":\"mashroms\",\"organization\":\"\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/mashroms\/2346224460\/\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by-nc-nd\",\"license_terms\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"copyrighted_video\",\"description\":\"Watch President Obama\\'s Full Speech at Tucson Memorial\",\"author\":\"\",\"organization\":\"PBS News Hour\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/ztbJmXQDIGA\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"arr\",\"license_terms\":\"Standard YouTube video\"}]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-411","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":384,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/411","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/923"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/411\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1539,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/411\/revisions\/1539"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/384"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/411\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=411"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=411"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=411"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=411"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}