{"id":460,"date":"2015-07-17T17:38:22","date_gmt":"2015-07-17T17:38:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.candelalearning.com\/masteryusgovernment1x6xmaster\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=460"},"modified":"2017-04-06T21:22:44","modified_gmt":"2017-04-06T21:22:44","slug":"reading-power-of-the-u-s-supreme-court","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/chapter\/reading-power-of-the-u-s-supreme-court\/","title":{"raw":"F. Reading: Power of the U.S. Supreme Court","rendered":"F. Reading: Power of the U.S. Supreme Court"},"content":{"raw":"<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_n01\" class=\"learning_objectives editable block\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title\">Learning Objectives<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_p01\" class=\"para\">After reading this section, you should be able to answer the following questions:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\r\n \t<li>What is judicial review?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Why is <em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury v. Madison<\/em> important?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>What is judicial power and how is it constrained?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>What are the leading judicial philosophies?<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton described the courts as \u201cthe least dangerous\u201d branch of government. Yet, they do possess considerable power. For example, because of the Court\u2019s 5\u20134 decision in 2002, the more than seven million public high school students engaged in \u201ccompetitive\u201d extracurricular activities\u2014including cheerleading, Future Farmers of America, Spanish club, and choir\u2014can be required to submit to random drug testing.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_021\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">Board of Education v. Earls<\/em>, 536 US 822 (2002).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Judicial Review<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The federal courts\u2019 most significant power is <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">judicial review<\/a><\/span>. Exercising it, they can refuse to apply a state or federal law because, in their judgment, it violates the U.S. Constitution.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury v. Madison<\/em><\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Judicial review was asserted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1803 in the decision of Chief Justice John Marshall in the case of <em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury v. Madison<\/em> (5 US 137, 1803).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_f01\" class=\"figure small editable block\">\r\n<p class=\"para\">Marshall was chief justice of the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835 and the author of many decisions, including <em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury v. Madison<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"attachment_463\" align=\"alignright\" width=\"200\"]<a href=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images-archive-read-only\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/607\/2015\/07\/21191953\/1024px-John_Marshall_by_Henry_Inman_1832.jpg\"><img class=\"wp-image-463 \" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images-archive-read-only\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/607\/2015\/07\/21191953\/1024px-John_Marshall_by_Henry_Inman_1832-826x1024.jpg\" alt=\"Portrait of John Marshall. Oil painting by Henry Inman.\" width=\"200\" height=\"248\" \/><\/a> Portrait of John Marshall by Henry Inman. Marshall was chief justice of the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835 and the author of many decisions, including Marbury v. Madison.[\/caption]\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">After losing the election of 1800, John Adams made a flurry of forty-two appointments of justices of the peace for Washington, DC in the last days of his presidency. His purpose in doing so was to ensure that the judiciary would remain dominated by his Federalist party. The Senate approved the appointments, and Secretary of State John Marshall stamped the officials\u2019 commissions with the Great Seal of the United States. But no one in the outgoing administration delivered the signed and sealed commissions to the appointees. The new president, Thomas Jefferson, instructed his secretary of state, James Madison, not to deliver them. One appointee, William Marbury, sued, asking the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus, a court order requiring Madison to hand over the commission.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">The case went directly to the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction. John Marshall was now chief justice, having been appointed by Adams and confirmed by the Senate. He had a dilemma: a prominent Federalist, he was sympathetic to Marbury, but President Jefferson would likely refuse to obey a ruling from the Court in Marbury\u2019s favor. However, ruling in favor of Madison would permit an executive official to defy the provisions of the law without penalty.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Marshall\u2019s solution was a political masterpiece. The Court ruled that Marbury was entitled to his commission and that Madison had broken the law by not delivering it. But it also ruled that the part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting the Court the power to issue writs of mandamus was unconstitutional because it expanded the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond its definition in Article III; this expansion could be done only by a constitutional amendment. Therefore, Marbury\u2019s suit could not be heard by the Supreme Court. The decision simultaneously supported Marbury and the Federalists, did not challenge Jefferson, and relinquished the Court\u2019s power to issue writs of mandamus. Above all, it asserted the prerogative of judicial review for the Supreme Court.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_022\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]This discussion is based in part on Jean Edward Smith, <em class=\"emphasis\">John Marshall: Definer of a Nation<\/em> (New York: Holt, 1996), introduction and chap. 13. For an analysis of the distinction between judicial review and judicial supremacy (the obligation of officials to follow the Court\u2019s reasoning in the future), and the politics involved in the latter, see Keith E. Whittington, <em class=\"emphasis\">Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Judicial Review Assessed<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">For forty years after <em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury<\/em>, the Court did not overturn a single law of Congress. And when it finally did, it was the Dred Scott decision, which dramatically damaged the Court\u2019s power. The Court ruled that people of African descent who were slaves (and their descendants, whether or not they were slaves) were not protected by the Constitution and could never be U.S. citizens. The Court also held that the U.S. Congress had no authority to prohibit slavery in federal territories.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_023\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">Dred Scott v. Sandford<\/em>, 60 US 393 (1857).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The pace of judicial review picked up in the 1960s and continues to this day. The Supreme Court has invalidated an average of eighteen federal laws per decade. The Court has displayed even less compunction about voiding state laws. For example, the famous <em class=\"emphasis\">Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas<\/em> desegregation case overturned statutes from Kansas, Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia that either required or permitted segregated public schools. The average number of state and local laws invalidated per decade is 122, although it has fluctuated from a high of 195 to a low for the period 2000\u20132008 of 34.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_024\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Lawrence Baum, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Supreme Court<\/em>, 10th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Judicial review can be seen as reinforcing the system of checks and balances. It is a way of policing the actions of Congress, the president, and state governments to make sure that they are in accord with the Constitution. But whether an act violates the Constitution is often sharply debated, not least by members of the Court.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Constraints on Judicial Power<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">There are three types of constraints on the power of the Supreme Court and lower court judges: they are precedents, internal limitations, and external checks.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Ruling by Precedent<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Judges look to <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">precedent<\/a><\/span>, previously decided cases, to guide and justify their decisions. They are expected to follow the principle of stare decisis, which is Latin for \u201cto stand on the decision.\u201d They identify the similarity between the case under consideration and previous ones. Then they apply the rule of law contained in the earlier case or cases to the current case. Often, one side is favored by the evidence and the precedents.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Precedents, however, have less of an influence on judicial power than would be expected. According to a study, \u201cjustices interpret precedent in order to move existing precedents closer to their preferred outcomes and to justify new policy choices.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_025\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Thomas G. Hansford and James F. Spriggs II, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 130.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Precedents may erode over time. The 1954 Brown school desegregation decision overturned the 1896 Plessy decision that had upheld the constitutionality of separate but equal facilities and thus segregation.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_026\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">Plessy v. Ferguson<\/em>, 153 US (1896); <em class=\"emphasis\">Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas<\/em>, 347 US 484 (1954).[\/footnote]<\/span> Or they may be overturned relatively quickly. In 2003, the Supreme Court by 6\u20133 struck down a Texas law that made homosexual acts a crime, overruling the Court\u2019s decision seventeen years earlier upholding a similar antisodomy law in Georgia. The previous case \u201cwas not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today,\u201d Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_027\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]The earlier case was <em class=\"emphasis\">Bowers v. Hardwick<\/em>, 478 US 1861 (1986); it was overruled by <em class=\"emphasis\">Lawrence v. Texas<\/em>, 02-102 (2003).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Judges may disagree about which precedents apply to a case. Consider students wanting to use campus facilities for prayer groups: if this is seen as violating the separation of church and state, they lose their case; if it is seen as freedom of speech, they win it. Precedents may allow a finding for either party, or a case may involve new areas of the law.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Internal Limitations<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">For the courts to exercise power, there must be a case to decide: a controversy between legitimate adversaries who have suffered or are about to suffer in some way. The case must be about the protection or enforcement of legal rights or the redress of wrongs. Judges cannot solicit cases, although they can use their decisions to signal their willingness to hear (more) cases in particular policy areas.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Judges, moreover, are expected to follow the Constitution and the law despite their policy preferences. In a speech to a bar association, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens regretted two of his majority opinions, saying he had no choice but to uphold the federal statutes.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_028\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Linda Greenhouse, \u201cJustice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails),\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, August 25, 2005, A1.[\/footnote]\u00a0<\/span>That the Supreme Court was divided on these cases indicates, however, that some of the other justices interpreted the laws differently.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">A further internal limitation is that judges are obliged to explain and justify their decisions to the courts above and below. The Supreme Court\u2019s written opinions are subject to scrutiny by other judges, law professors, lawyers, elected officials, the public, and, of course, the media.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">External Checks on Power<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The executive and legislative branches can check or try to check judicial power. Through their authority to nominate federal judges, presidents influence the power and direction of the courts by filling vacancies with people likely to support their policies.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">They may object to specific decisions in speeches, press conferences, or written statements. In his\u00a0<a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.msnbc.msn.com\/id\/35083829\/vp\/35109810\" target=\"_blank\">2010 State of the Union address<\/a>, with six of the justices seated in front of him, President Obama criticized the Supreme Court\u2019s decision that corporations have a First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures in candidate elections.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_029\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission<\/em>, 558 US 50 (2010).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents can engage in frontal assaults. Following his overwhelming reelection victory, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed to Congress in February 1937 that another justice be added to the Supreme Court for each sitting justice over the age of seventy. This would have increased the number of justices on the court from nine to fifteen. His ostensible justification was the Court\u2019s workload and the ages of the justices. Actually, he was frustrated by the Court\u2019s decisions, which gutted his New Deal economic programs by declaring many of its measures unconstitutional.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">The president\u2019s proposal was damned by its opponents as unwarranted meddling with the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the judiciary. It was further undermined when the justices pointed out that they were quite capable of coping with their workload, which was not at all excessive. Media coverage, editorials, and commentary were generally critical, even hostile to the proposal, framing it as \u201ccourt packing\u201d and calling it a \u201cscheme.\u201d The proposal seemed a rare blunder on FDR\u2019s part. But while Congress was debating it, one of the justices shifted to the Roosevelt side in a series of regulatory cases, giving the president a majority on the court at least for these cases. This led to the famous aphorism \u201ca switch in time saves nine.\u201d Within a year, two of the conservative justices retired and were replaced by staunch Roosevelt supporters.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">Congress can check judicial power. It overcomes a decision of the Court by writing a new law or rewriting a law to meet the Court\u2019s constitutional objections without altering the policy. It can threaten to\u2014and sometimes succeed in\u2014removing a subject from the courts\u2019 jurisdiction, or propose a constitutional amendment to undo a Court decision.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">Indeed, the first piece of legislation signed by President Obama overturned a 5\u20134 Supreme Court 2007 decision that gave a woman a maximum of six months to seek redress after receiving the first check for less pay than her peers.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_030\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &amp; Rubber Co.<\/em> 550 US (2007).[\/footnote]<\/span> Named after the woman who at the end of her nineteen-year career complained that she had been paid less than men, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act extends the period to six months after <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> discriminatory paycheck. It also applies to anyone seeking redress for pay discrimination based on race, religion, disability, or age.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">The Constitution grants Congress the power to impeach judges. But since the Constitution was ratified, the House has impeached only eleven federal judges, and the Senate has convicted just five of them. They were convicted for such crimes as bribery, racketeering, perjury, tax evasion, incompetence, and insanity, but not for wrongly interpreting the law.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p08\" class=\"para editable block\">The Supreme Court may lose power if the public perceives it as going too far. Politicians and interest groups criticize, even condemn, particular decisions. They stir up public indignation against the Court and individual justices. This happened to Chief Justice Earl Warren and his colleagues during the 1950s for their school desegregation and other civil rights decisions.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_f01\" class=\"figure large medium-height editable block\">\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"450\"]<img src=\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/section_19\/1c69298b8a56e6d8ce3a80c0cef43819.jpg\" alt=\"A flyer printed in the old-fashioned style of &quot;Wanted&quot; posters. It reads, &quot;Wanted for impeachment,&quot; with mug shots of Earl Warren beneath, and the following sections: &quot;Description,&quot; &quot;Criminal Record,&quot; and &quot;Caution.&quot;\" width=\"450\" height=\"646\" \/> The controversial decisions of the Warren Court inspired a movement to impeach the chief justice.[\/caption]\r\n<p class=\"para\">How the decisions and reactions to them are framed in media reports can support or undermine the Court\u2019s legitimacy.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_n01\" class=\"callout block\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title\">Comparing Content:\u00a0<em class=\"emphasis\">Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas<\/em><\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p10\" class=\"para\">How a decision can be reported and framed differently is illustrated by news coverage of the 1954 Supreme Court school desegregation ruling.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p11\" class=\"para\">The <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em> of May 18, 1954, presents the decision as monumental and historic, and school desegregation as both necessary and desirable. Southern opposition is acknowledged but downplayed, as is the difficulty of implementing the decision. The front-page headline states \u201cHigh Court Bans School Segregation; 9\u20130 Decision Grants Time to Comply.\u201d A second front-page article is headlined \u201cReactions of South.\u201d Its basic theme is captured in two prominent paragraphs:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<blockquote>\r\n<p class=\"para\">underneath the surface . . . it was evident that many Southerners recognized that the decision had laid down the legal principle rejecting segregation in public education facilities\u201d and \u201cthat it had left open a challenge to the region to join in working out a program of necessary changes in the present bi-racial school systems.<\/p>\r\n<\/blockquote>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p12\" class=\"para\">There is an almost page-wide photograph of the nine members of the Supreme Court. They look particularly distinguished, legitimate, authoritative, decisive, and serene.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p13\" class=\"para\">In the South, the story was different. The <em class=\"emphasis\">Atlanta Constitution<\/em> headlined its May 18, 1954, story \u201cCourt Kills Segregation in Schools: Cheap Politics, Talmadge Retorts.\u201d By using \u201cKills\u201d instead of the <em class=\"emphasis\">Times<\/em>\u2019s \u201cBans,\u201d omitting the fact headlined in the <em class=\"emphasis\">Times<\/em> that the decision was unanimous, and including the reaction from Georgia Governor Herman E. Talmadge, the <em class=\"emphasis\">Constitution\u00a0<\/em>depicted the Court\u2019s decision far more critically than the <em class=\"emphasis\">Times<\/em>. This negative frame was reinforced by the headlines of the other stories on its front page. \u201cGeorgia\u2019s Delegation Hits Ruling\u201d announces one; \u201cSegregation To Continue, School Officials Predict\u201d is a second. Another story quotes Georgia\u2019s attorney general as saying that the \u201cRuling Doesn\u2019t Apply to Georgia\u201d and pledging a long fight.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p14\" class=\"para\">The <em class=\"emphasis\">Times<\/em>\u2019 coverage supported and legitimized the Supreme Court\u2019s decision. Coverage in the<em class=\"emphasis\">Constitution<\/em> undermined it.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p15\" class=\"para editable block\">External pressure is also applied when the decisions, composition, and future appointments to the Supreme Court become issues during presidential elections.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_031\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Donald Grier Stephenson Jr., <em class=\"emphasis\">Campaigns and the Court: The U.S. Supreme Court in Presidential Elections<\/em> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).[\/footnote]<\/span> In a May 6, 2008, speech at Wake Forest University, Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain said that he would nominate for the Supreme Court \u201cmen and women with . . . a proven commitment to judicial restraint.\u201d Speaking to a Planned Parenthood convention on July 17, 2007, Senator Barack Obama identified his criteria as \u201csomebody who\u2019s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it\u2019s like . . . to be poor or African American or gay or disabled or old.\u201d<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Judges as Policymakers<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Judges have power because they decide cases: they interpret the Constitution and laws, and select precedents. These decisions often influence, even make, public policy and have important ramifications for social conflict. For example, the Supreme Court has effectively established the ground rules for elections. In 1962 it set forth its \u201cone person, one vote\u201d standard for judging electoral districts.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_032\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">Baker v. Carr<\/em>, 369 US 186 (1962).[\/footnote]<\/span> It has declared term limits for members of Congress unconstitutional. It has upheld state laws making it extremely difficult for third parties to challenge the dominance of the two major parties.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_033\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]See David K. Ryden, ed., <em class=\"emphasis\">The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process<\/em> (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), especially the editor\u2019s \u201cOverview,\u201d 1\u20134.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Judicial Philosophies<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">How willing judges are to make public policy depends in part on their judicial philosophies.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_034\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]For the argument that the justices\u2019 behavior is largely determined by their individual policy preferences, see Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited<\/em> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, <em class=\"emphasis\">Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).[\/footnote]<\/span> Some follow <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">judicial restraint<\/a><\/span>, deciding cases on the narrowest grounds possible. In interpreting federal laws, they defer to the views expressed in Congress by those who made the laws. They shy away from invalidating laws and the actions of government officials. They tend to define some issues as political questions that should be left to the other branches of government or the voters. When the Constitution is silent, ambiguous, or open ended on a subject (e.g., \u201cfreedom of speech,\u201d \u201cdue process of law,\u201d and \u201cequal protection of the laws\u201d), they look to see whether the practice being challenged is a long-standing American tradition. They are inclined to adhere to precedent.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Judicial restraint is sometimes paired with <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">strict constructionism<\/a><\/span>. Judges apply the Constitution according to what they believe was its original meaning as understood by a reasonable person when the Constitution was written.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Other judges follow a philosophy of <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">judicial activism<\/a><\/span> (although they may not call it that). Activist judges are willing to substitute their policy views for the policy actions or inaction of the other branches of government.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Judicial activism is often paired with <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">loose constructionism<\/a><\/span>, viewing the Constitution as a living document that the founders left deliberately ambiguous. In interpreting the Constitution, these judges are responsive to what they see as changes in society and its needs. A plurality of the Supreme Court found a right to privacy implicit in the Constitution and used it to overturn a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_035\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">Griswold v. Connecticut<\/em>, 381 US 479 (1965).[\/footnote]<\/span> The justices later used that privacy right as a basis for the famous <em class=\"emphasis\">Roe v. Wade<\/em> decision, \u201cdiscovering\u201d a woman\u2019s constitutional right to an abortion.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">The distinction between judicial restraint and strict constructionism on the one hand and judicial activism and loose constructionism on the other can become quite muddy. In 1995, the Supreme Court, by a 5\u20134 vote, struck down the Gun-Free School Zone Act\u2014an attempt by Congress to keep guns out of schools.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_036\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">United States, Petitioner v. Alfonso Lopez, Jr.<\/em>, 514 US 549 (1995).[\/footnote]<\/span> The ruling was that Congress had overstepped its authority and that only states had the power to pass such laws. This decision by the conservative majority, interpreting the Constitution according to what it believed was the original intentions of the framers, exemplified strict constructionism. It also exemplified judicial activism: for the first time in fifty years, the Court curtailed the power of Congress under the Constitution\u2019s commerce clause to interfere with local affairs.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_037\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]In <em class=\"emphasis\">The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789\u20132008<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), Lucas A. Powe Jr. argues that the Court \u201cserves ruling political coalitions\u201d and attacks the conservative Rehnquist Court for overturning legislation that extended rights and privileges, and protected and improved society.[\/footnote]<\/span> A 5\u20134 conservative majority has also interpreted the Second Amendment to prohibit the regulation of guns.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_038\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]The cases are <em class=\"emphasis\">District of Columbia et al. v. Heller<\/em>, 554 US (2008) and <em class=\"emphasis\">McDonald et al. v. City of Chicago et al.<\/em> 561 US (2010).[\/footnote]<\/span> This decision, too, could be seen as activist.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Political Views in Action<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">One doesn\u2019t have to believe that justices are politicians in black robes to understand that some of their decisions are influenced, if not determined, by their political views.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_039\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]For the argument that there is nothing wrong with a political court or with political motives in constitutional adjudication, see Terri Jennings Peretti, <em class=\"emphasis\">In Defense of a Political Court<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 73.[\/footnote]<\/span> Judges appointed by a Democratic president are more liberal than those appointed by a Republican president on labor and economic regulation, civil rights and liberties, and criminal justice.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_040\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning, and Ronald Stidham, \u201cPresident Clinton\u2019s District Judges: \u2018Extreme Liberals\u2019 or Just Plain Moderates?\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Judicature<\/em> 84, no. 5 (March\u2013April 2001): 282\u201388; and \u201cThe Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush\u2019s Judicial Appointees: Far-Right, Conservative, or Moderate?\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Judicature<\/em> 88, no. 1 (July\u2013August 2004): 20\u201329.[\/footnote]<\/span> Republican and Democratic federal appeals court judges decide differently on contentious issues such as abortion, racial integration and racial preferences, church-state relations, environmental protection, and gay rights.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">On rare occasions, the Supreme Court renders a controversial decision that graphically reveals its power and is seen as motivated by political partisanship. In December 2000, the Court voted 5\u20134, with the five most conservative justices in the majority, that the Florida Election Code\u2019s \u201cintent of the voter\u201d standard provided insufficient guidance for manually recounting disputed ballots and that there was no time left to conduct recounts under constitutionally acceptable standards.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_041\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]<em class=\"emphasis\">Bush v. Gore<\/em>, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000); also see David Margolick, Evgenia Peretz, and Michael Shnayerson, \u201cThe Path to Florida,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Vanity Fair<\/em>, October 2004.[\/footnote]<\/span> This ensured that Republican George W. Bush would become president.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">The decision was widely reported and discussed in the media. Defenders framed it as principled, based on legal considerations. Critics deplored it as legally frail and politically partisan. They quoted the bitter comment of dissenting Justice Stevens: \u201cAlthough we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year\u2019s presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the nation\u2019s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_042\" class=\"footnote\">[footnote]Quoted in Linda Greenhouse\u2019s analysis \u201cBush v. Gore: A Special Report; Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, February 20, 2001, A1.[\/footnote]<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_n01\" class=\"key_takeaways editable block\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title\">Key Takeaways<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_p04\" class=\"para\">In this section, we have explained how judicial review originated, how it is exercised, and what its effects are. We described the power of the courts, especially of the Supreme Court, and how it may be constrained by precedent, internal limitations, and external pressures. Justices make policy and are influenced by their ideological views and judicial philosophies.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_n01\" class=\"learning_objectives editable block\">\n<h2 class=\"title\">Learning Objectives<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_p01\" class=\"para\">After reading this section, you should be able to answer the following questions:<\/p>\n<ol id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\n<li>What is judicial review?<\/li>\n<li>Why is <em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury v. Madison<\/em> important?<\/li>\n<li>What is judicial power and how is it constrained?<\/li>\n<li>What are the leading judicial philosophies?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton described the courts as \u201cthe least dangerous\u201d branch of government. Yet, they do possess considerable power. For example, because of the Court\u2019s 5\u20134 decision in 2002, the more than seven million public high school students engaged in \u201ccompetitive\u201d extracurricular activities\u2014including cheerleading, Future Farmers of America, Spanish club, and choir\u2014can be required to submit to random drug testing.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_021\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Board of Education v. Earls, 536 US 822 (2002).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-1\" href=\"#footnote-460-1\" aria-label=\"Footnote 1\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Judicial Review<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The federal courts\u2019 most significant power is <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">judicial review<\/a><\/span>. Exercising it, they can refuse to apply a state or federal law because, in their judgment, it violates the U.S. Constitution.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury v. Madison<\/em><\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Judicial review was asserted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1803 in the decision of Chief Justice John Marshall in the case of <em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury v. Madison<\/em> (5 US 137, 1803).<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_f01\" class=\"figure small editable block\">\n<p class=\"para\">Marshall was chief justice of the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835 and the author of many decisions, including <em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury v. Madison<\/em>.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_463\" style=\"width: 210px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images-archive-read-only\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/607\/2015\/07\/21191953\/1024px-John_Marshall_by_Henry_Inman_1832.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-463\" class=\"wp-image-463\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images-archive-read-only\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/607\/2015\/07\/21191953\/1024px-John_Marshall_by_Henry_Inman_1832-826x1024.jpg\" alt=\"Portrait of John Marshall. Oil painting by Henry Inman.\" width=\"200\" height=\"248\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-463\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Portrait of John Marshall by Henry Inman. Marshall was chief justice of the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835 and the author of many decisions, including Marbury v. Madison.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">After losing the election of 1800, John Adams made a flurry of forty-two appointments of justices of the peace for Washington, DC in the last days of his presidency. His purpose in doing so was to ensure that the judiciary would remain dominated by his Federalist party. The Senate approved the appointments, and Secretary of State John Marshall stamped the officials\u2019 commissions with the Great Seal of the United States. But no one in the outgoing administration delivered the signed and sealed commissions to the appointees. The new president, Thomas Jefferson, instructed his secretary of state, James Madison, not to deliver them. One appointee, William Marbury, sued, asking the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus, a court order requiring Madison to hand over the commission.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">The case went directly to the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction. John Marshall was now chief justice, having been appointed by Adams and confirmed by the Senate. He had a dilemma: a prominent Federalist, he was sympathetic to Marbury, but President Jefferson would likely refuse to obey a ruling from the Court in Marbury\u2019s favor. However, ruling in favor of Madison would permit an executive official to defy the provisions of the law without penalty.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Marshall\u2019s solution was a political masterpiece. The Court ruled that Marbury was entitled to his commission and that Madison had broken the law by not delivering it. But it also ruled that the part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting the Court the power to issue writs of mandamus was unconstitutional because it expanded the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond its definition in Article III; this expansion could be done only by a constitutional amendment. Therefore, Marbury\u2019s suit could not be heard by the Supreme Court. The decision simultaneously supported Marbury and the Federalists, did not challenge Jefferson, and relinquished the Court\u2019s power to issue writs of mandamus. Above all, it asserted the prerogative of judicial review for the Supreme Court.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_022\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"This discussion is based in part on Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (New York: Holt, 1996), introduction and chap. 13. For an analysis of the distinction between judicial review and judicial supremacy (the obligation of officials to follow the Court\u2019s reasoning in the future), and the politics involved in the latter, see Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-2\" href=\"#footnote-460-2\" aria-label=\"Footnote 2\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[2]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Judicial Review Assessed<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">For forty years after <em class=\"emphasis\">Marbury<\/em>, the Court did not overturn a single law of Congress. And when it finally did, it was the Dred Scott decision, which dramatically damaged the Court\u2019s power. The Court ruled that people of African descent who were slaves (and their descendants, whether or not they were slaves) were not protected by the Constitution and could never be U.S. citizens. The Court also held that the U.S. Congress had no authority to prohibit slavery in federal territories.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_023\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US 393 (1857).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-3\" href=\"#footnote-460-3\" aria-label=\"Footnote 3\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The pace of judicial review picked up in the 1960s and continues to this day. The Supreme Court has invalidated an average of eighteen federal laws per decade. The Court has displayed even less compunction about voiding state laws. For example, the famous <em class=\"emphasis\">Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas<\/em> desegregation case overturned statutes from Kansas, Delaware, South Carolina, and Virginia that either required or permitted segregated public schools. The average number of state and local laws invalidated per decade is 122, although it has fluctuated from a high of 195 to a low for the period 2000\u20132008 of 34.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_024\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 10th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-4\" href=\"#footnote-460-4\" aria-label=\"Footnote 4\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s01_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Judicial review can be seen as reinforcing the system of checks and balances. It is a way of policing the actions of Congress, the president, and state governments to make sure that they are in accord with the Constitution. But whether an act violates the Constitution is often sharply debated, not least by members of the Court.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Constraints on Judicial Power<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">There are three types of constraints on the power of the Supreme Court and lower court judges: they are precedents, internal limitations, and external checks.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Ruling by Precedent<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Judges look to <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">precedent<\/a><\/span>, previously decided cases, to guide and justify their decisions. They are expected to follow the principle of stare decisis, which is Latin for \u201cto stand on the decision.\u201d They identify the similarity between the case under consideration and previous ones. Then they apply the rule of law contained in the earlier case or cases to the current case. Often, one side is favored by the evidence and the precedents.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Precedents, however, have less of an influence on judicial power than would be expected. According to a study, \u201cjustices interpret precedent in order to move existing precedents closer to their preferred outcomes and to justify new policy choices.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_025\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Thomas G. Hansford and James F. Spriggs II, The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 130.\" id=\"return-footnote-460-5\" href=\"#footnote-460-5\" aria-label=\"Footnote 5\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Precedents may erode over time. The 1954 Brown school desegregation decision overturned the 1896 Plessy decision that had upheld the constitutionality of separate but equal facilities and thus segregation.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_026\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Plessy v. Ferguson, 153 US (1896); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 US 484 (1954).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-6\" href=\"#footnote-460-6\" aria-label=\"Footnote 6\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Or they may be overturned relatively quickly. In 2003, the Supreme Court by 6\u20133 struck down a Texas law that made homosexual acts a crime, overruling the Court\u2019s decision seventeen years earlier upholding a similar antisodomy law in Georgia. The previous case \u201cwas not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today,\u201d Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_027\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"The earlier case was Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US 1861 (1986); it was overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 02-102 (2003).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-7\" href=\"#footnote-460-7\" aria-label=\"Footnote 7\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[7]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Judges may disagree about which precedents apply to a case. Consider students wanting to use campus facilities for prayer groups: if this is seen as violating the separation of church and state, they lose their case; if it is seen as freedom of speech, they win it. Precedents may allow a finding for either party, or a case may involve new areas of the law.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Internal Limitations<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">For the courts to exercise power, there must be a case to decide: a controversy between legitimate adversaries who have suffered or are about to suffer in some way. The case must be about the protection or enforcement of legal rights or the redress of wrongs. Judges cannot solicit cases, although they can use their decisions to signal their willingness to hear (more) cases in particular policy areas.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Judges, moreover, are expected to follow the Constitution and the law despite their policy preferences. In a speech to a bar association, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens regretted two of his majority opinions, saying he had no choice but to uphold the federal statutes.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_028\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Linda Greenhouse, \u201cJustice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails),\u201d New York Times, August 25, 2005, A1.\" id=\"return-footnote-460-8\" href=\"#footnote-460-8\" aria-label=\"Footnote 8\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[8]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>That the Supreme Court was divided on these cases indicates, however, that some of the other justices interpreted the laws differently.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">A further internal limitation is that judges are obliged to explain and justify their decisions to the courts above and below. The Supreme Court\u2019s written opinions are subject to scrutiny by other judges, law professors, lawyers, elected officials, the public, and, of course, the media.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">External Checks on Power<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The executive and legislative branches can check or try to check judicial power. Through their authority to nominate federal judges, presidents influence the power and direction of the courts by filling vacancies with people likely to support their policies.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">They may object to specific decisions in speeches, press conferences, or written statements. In his\u00a0<a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.msnbc.msn.com\/id\/35083829\/vp\/35109810\" target=\"_blank\">2010 State of the Union address<\/a>, with six of the justices seated in front of him, President Obama criticized the Supreme Court\u2019s decision that corporations have a First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures in candidate elections.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_029\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 US 50 (2010).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-9\" href=\"#footnote-460-9\" aria-label=\"Footnote 9\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[9]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Presidents can engage in frontal assaults. Following his overwhelming reelection victory, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed to Congress in February 1937 that another justice be added to the Supreme Court for each sitting justice over the age of seventy. This would have increased the number of justices on the court from nine to fifteen. His ostensible justification was the Court\u2019s workload and the ages of the justices. Actually, he was frustrated by the Court\u2019s decisions, which gutted his New Deal economic programs by declaring many of its measures unconstitutional.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">The president\u2019s proposal was damned by its opponents as unwarranted meddling with the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the judiciary. It was further undermined when the justices pointed out that they were quite capable of coping with their workload, which was not at all excessive. Media coverage, editorials, and commentary were generally critical, even hostile to the proposal, framing it as \u201ccourt packing\u201d and calling it a \u201cscheme.\u201d The proposal seemed a rare blunder on FDR\u2019s part. But while Congress was debating it, one of the justices shifted to the Roosevelt side in a series of regulatory cases, giving the president a majority on the court at least for these cases. This led to the famous aphorism \u201ca switch in time saves nine.\u201d Within a year, two of the conservative justices retired and were replaced by staunch Roosevelt supporters.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">Congress can check judicial power. It overcomes a decision of the Court by writing a new law or rewriting a law to meet the Court\u2019s constitutional objections without altering the policy. It can threaten to\u2014and sometimes succeed in\u2014removing a subject from the courts\u2019 jurisdiction, or propose a constitutional amendment to undo a Court decision.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p06\" class=\"para editable block\">Indeed, the first piece of legislation signed by President Obama overturned a 5\u20134 Supreme Court 2007 decision that gave a woman a maximum of six months to seek redress after receiving the first check for less pay than her peers.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_030\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &amp; Rubber Co. 550 US (2007).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-10\" href=\"#footnote-460-10\" aria-label=\"Footnote 10\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Named after the woman who at the end of her nineteen-year career complained that she had been paid less than men, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act extends the period to six months after <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> discriminatory paycheck. It also applies to anyone seeking redress for pay discrimination based on race, religion, disability, or age.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p07\" class=\"para editable block\">The Constitution grants Congress the power to impeach judges. But since the Constitution was ratified, the House has impeached only eleven federal judges, and the Senate has convicted just five of them. They were convicted for such crimes as bribery, racketeering, perjury, tax evasion, incompetence, and insanity, but not for wrongly interpreting the law.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p08\" class=\"para editable block\">The Supreme Court may lose power if the public perceives it as going too far. Politicians and interest groups criticize, even condemn, particular decisions. They stir up public indignation against the Court and individual justices. This happened to Chief Justice Earl Warren and his colleagues during the 1950s for their school desegregation and other civil rights decisions.<\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_f01\" class=\"figure large medium-height editable block\">\n<div style=\"width: 460px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/section_19\/1c69298b8a56e6d8ce3a80c0cef43819.jpg\" alt=\"A flyer printed in the old-fashioned style of &quot;Wanted&quot; posters. It reads, &quot;Wanted for impeachment,&quot; with mug shots of Earl Warren beneath, and the following sections: &quot;Description,&quot; &quot;Criminal Record,&quot; and &quot;Caution.&quot;\" width=\"450\" height=\"646\" \/><\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-caption-text\">The controversial decisions of the Warren Court inspired a movement to impeach the chief justice.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"para\">How the decisions and reactions to them are framed in media reports can support or undermine the Court\u2019s legitimacy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_n01\" class=\"callout block\">\n<h3 class=\"title\">Comparing Content:\u00a0<em class=\"emphasis\">Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas<\/em><\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p10\" class=\"para\">How a decision can be reported and framed differently is illustrated by news coverage of the 1954 Supreme Court school desegregation ruling.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p11\" class=\"para\">The <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em> of May 18, 1954, presents the decision as monumental and historic, and school desegregation as both necessary and desirable. Southern opposition is acknowledged but downplayed, as is the difficulty of implementing the decision. The front-page headline states \u201cHigh Court Bans School Segregation; 9\u20130 Decision Grants Time to Comply.\u201d A second front-page article is headlined \u201cReactions of South.\u201d Its basic theme is captured in two prominent paragraphs:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p class=\"para\">underneath the surface . . . it was evident that many Southerners recognized that the decision had laid down the legal principle rejecting segregation in public education facilities\u201d and \u201cthat it had left open a challenge to the region to join in working out a program of necessary changes in the present bi-racial school systems.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p12\" class=\"para\">There is an almost page-wide photograph of the nine members of the Supreme Court. They look particularly distinguished, legitimate, authoritative, decisive, and serene.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p13\" class=\"para\">In the South, the story was different. The <em class=\"emphasis\">Atlanta Constitution<\/em> headlined its May 18, 1954, story \u201cCourt Kills Segregation in Schools: Cheap Politics, Talmadge Retorts.\u201d By using \u201cKills\u201d instead of the <em class=\"emphasis\">Times<\/em>\u2019s \u201cBans,\u201d omitting the fact headlined in the <em class=\"emphasis\">Times<\/em> that the decision was unanimous, and including the reaction from Georgia Governor Herman E. Talmadge, the <em class=\"emphasis\">Constitution\u00a0<\/em>depicted the Court\u2019s decision far more critically than the <em class=\"emphasis\">Times<\/em>. This negative frame was reinforced by the headlines of the other stories on its front page. \u201cGeorgia\u2019s Delegation Hits Ruling\u201d announces one; \u201cSegregation To Continue, School Officials Predict\u201d is a second. Another story quotes Georgia\u2019s attorney general as saying that the \u201cRuling Doesn\u2019t Apply to Georgia\u201d and pledging a long fight.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p14\" class=\"para\">The <em class=\"emphasis\">Times<\/em>\u2019 coverage supported and legitimized the Supreme Court\u2019s decision. Coverage in the<em class=\"emphasis\">Constitution<\/em> undermined it.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s02_s03_p15\" class=\"para editable block\">External pressure is also applied when the decisions, composition, and future appointments to the Supreme Court become issues during presidential elections.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_031\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Donald Grier Stephenson Jr., Campaigns and the Court: The U.S. Supreme Court in Presidential Elections (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-11\" href=\"#footnote-460-11\" aria-label=\"Footnote 11\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[11]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> In a May 6, 2008, speech at Wake Forest University, Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain said that he would nominate for the Supreme Court \u201cmen and women with . . . a proven commitment to judicial restraint.\u201d Speaking to a Planned Parenthood convention on July 17, 2007, Senator Barack Obama identified his criteria as \u201csomebody who\u2019s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it\u2019s like . . . to be poor or African American or gay or disabled or old.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Judges as Policymakers<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Judges have power because they decide cases: they interpret the Constitution and laws, and select precedents. These decisions often influence, even make, public policy and have important ramifications for social conflict. For example, the Supreme Court has effectively established the ground rules for elections. In 1962 it set forth its \u201cone person, one vote\u201d standard for judging electoral districts.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_032\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-12\" href=\"#footnote-460-12\" aria-label=\"Footnote 12\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> It has declared term limits for members of Congress unconstitutional. It has upheld state laws making it extremely difficult for third parties to challenge the dominance of the two major parties.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_033\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"See David K. Ryden, ed., The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), especially the editor\u2019s \u201cOverview,\u201d 1\u20134.\" id=\"return-footnote-460-13\" href=\"#footnote-460-13\" aria-label=\"Footnote 13\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Judicial Philosophies<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">How willing judges are to make public policy depends in part on their judicial philosophies.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_034\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"For the argument that the justices\u2019 behavior is largely determined by their individual policy preferences, see Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-14\" href=\"#footnote-460-14\" aria-label=\"Footnote 14\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[14]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Some follow <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">judicial restraint<\/a><\/span>, deciding cases on the narrowest grounds possible. In interpreting federal laws, they defer to the views expressed in Congress by those who made the laws. They shy away from invalidating laws and the actions of government officials. They tend to define some issues as political questions that should be left to the other branches of government or the voters. When the Constitution is silent, ambiguous, or open ended on a subject (e.g., \u201cfreedom of speech,\u201d \u201cdue process of law,\u201d and \u201cequal protection of the laws\u201d), they look to see whether the practice being challenged is a long-standing American tradition. They are inclined to adhere to precedent.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Judicial restraint is sometimes paired with <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">strict constructionism<\/a><\/span>. Judges apply the Constitution according to what they believe was its original meaning as understood by a reasonable person when the Constitution was written.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Other judges follow a philosophy of <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">judicial activism<\/a><\/span> (although they may not call it that). Activist judges are willing to substitute their policy views for the policy actions or inaction of the other branches of government.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">Judicial activism is often paired with <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">loose constructionism<\/a><\/span>, viewing the Constitution as a living document that the founders left deliberately ambiguous. In interpreting the Constitution, these judges are responsive to what they see as changes in society and its needs. A plurality of the Supreme Court found a right to privacy implicit in the Constitution and used it to overturn a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_035\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-15\" href=\"#footnote-460-15\" aria-label=\"Footnote 15\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[15]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> The justices later used that privacy right as a basis for the famous <em class=\"emphasis\">Roe v. Wade<\/em> decision, \u201cdiscovering\u201d a woman\u2019s constitutional right to an abortion.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s01_p05\" class=\"para editable block\">The distinction between judicial restraint and strict constructionism on the one hand and judicial activism and loose constructionism on the other can become quite muddy. In 1995, the Supreme Court, by a 5\u20134 vote, struck down the Gun-Free School Zone Act\u2014an attempt by Congress to keep guns out of schools.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_036\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"United States, Petitioner v. Alfonso Lopez, Jr., 514 US 549 (1995).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-16\" href=\"#footnote-460-16\" aria-label=\"Footnote 16\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[16]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> The ruling was that Congress had overstepped its authority and that only states had the power to pass such laws. This decision by the conservative majority, interpreting the Constitution according to what it believed was the original intentions of the framers, exemplified strict constructionism. It also exemplified judicial activism: for the first time in fifty years, the Court curtailed the power of Congress under the Constitution\u2019s commerce clause to interfere with local affairs.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_037\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789\u20132008 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), Lucas A. Powe Jr. argues that the Court \u201cserves ruling political coalitions\u201d and attacks the conservative Rehnquist Court for overturning legislation that extended rights and privileges, and protected and improved society.\" id=\"return-footnote-460-17\" href=\"#footnote-460-17\" aria-label=\"Footnote 17\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[17]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> A 5\u20134 conservative majority has also interpreted the Second Amendment to prohibit the regulation of guns.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_038\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"The cases are District of Columbia et al. v. Heller, 554 US (2008) and McDonald et al. v. City of Chicago et al. 561 US (2010).\" id=\"return-footnote-460-18\" href=\"#footnote-460-18\" aria-label=\"Footnote 18\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[18]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> This decision, too, could be seen as activist.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h3 class=\"title editable block\">Political Views in Action<\/h3>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">One doesn\u2019t have to believe that justices are politicians in black robes to understand that some of their decisions are influenced, if not determined, by their political views.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_039\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"For the argument that there is nothing wrong with a political court or with political motives in constitutional adjudication, see Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of a Political Court (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 73.\" id=\"return-footnote-460-19\" href=\"#footnote-460-19\" aria-label=\"Footnote 19\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[19]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Judges appointed by a Democratic president are more liberal than those appointed by a Republican president on labor and economic regulation, civil rights and liberties, and criminal justice.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_040\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning, and Ronald Stidham, \u201cPresident Clinton\u2019s District Judges: \u2018Extreme Liberals\u2019 or Just Plain Moderates?\u201d Judicature 84, no. 5 (March\u2013April 2001): 282\u201388; and \u201cThe Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush\u2019s Judicial Appointees: Far-Right, Conservative, or Moderate?\u201d Judicature 88, no. 1 (July\u2013August 2004): 20\u201329.\" id=\"return-footnote-460-20\" href=\"#footnote-460-20\" aria-label=\"Footnote 20\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Republican and Democratic federal appeals court judges decide differently on contentious issues such as abortion, racial integration and racial preferences, church-state relations, environmental protection, and gay rights.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">On rare occasions, the Supreme Court renders a controversial decision that graphically reveals its power and is seen as motivated by political partisanship. In December 2000, the Court voted 5\u20134, with the five most conservative justices in the majority, that the Florida Election Code\u2019s \u201cintent of the voter\u201d standard provided insufficient guidance for manually recounting disputed ballots and that there was no time left to conduct recounts under constitutionally acceptable standards.<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_041\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000); also see David Margolick, Evgenia Peretz, and Michael Shnayerson, \u201cThe Path to Florida,\u201d Vanity Fair, October 2004.\" id=\"return-footnote-460-21\" href=\"#footnote-460-21\" aria-label=\"Footnote 21\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/span> This ensured that Republican George W. Bush would become president.<\/p>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">The decision was widely reported and discussed in the media. Defenders framed it as principled, based on legal considerations. Critics deplored it as legally frail and politically partisan. They quoted the bitter comment of dissenting Justice Stevens: \u201cAlthough we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year\u2019s presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the nation\u2019s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.\u201d<span id=\"paletz_1.0-fn15_042\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Quoted in Linda Greenhouse\u2019s analysis \u201cBush v. Gore: A Special Report; Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices,\u201d New York Times, February 20, 2001, A1.\" id=\"return-footnote-460-22\" href=\"#footnote-460-22\" aria-label=\"Footnote 22\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[22]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_n01\" class=\"key_takeaways editable block\">\n<h2 class=\"title\">Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n<p id=\"paletz_1.0-ch15_s02_s03_s02_p04\" class=\"para\">In this section, we have explained how judicial review originated, how it is exercised, and what its effects are. We described the power of the courts, especially of the Supreme Court, and how it may be constrained by precedent, internal limitations, and external pressures. Justices make policy and are influenced by their ideological views and judicial philosophies.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t <section class=\"citations-section\" role=\"contentinfo\">\n\t\t\t <h3>Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t <div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <div id=\"citation-list-460\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t <div class=\"licensing\"><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">CC licensed content, Shared previously<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>21st Century American Government. <strong>Authored by<\/strong>: Anonymous. <strong>Provided by<\/strong>: Lardbucket. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/s19-02-power-of-the-us-supreme-court.html\">http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/s19-02-power-of-the-us-supreme-court.html<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/4.0\/\">CC BY-NC-SA: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike<\/a><\/em><\/li><\/ul><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">Public domain content<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>Portrait of John Marshall by Henry Inman. <strong>Authored by<\/strong>: Virginia Memory. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:John_Marshall_by_Henry_Inman,_1832.jpg\">https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:John_Marshall_by_Henry_Inman,_1832.jpg<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/about\/pdm\">Public Domain: No Known Copyright<\/a><\/em><\/li><li>Impeach Warren. <strong>Authored by<\/strong>: Unknown. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Impeach_Warren.png\">https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Impeach_Warren.png<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/about\/pdm\">Public Domain: No Known Copyright<\/a><\/em><\/li><\/ul><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t <\/section><hr class=\"before-footnotes clear\" \/><div class=\"footnotes\"><ol><li id=\"footnote-460-1\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Board of Education v. Earls<\/em>, 536 US 822 (2002). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-1\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 1\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-2\">This discussion is based in part on Jean Edward Smith, <em class=\"emphasis\">John Marshall: Definer of a Nation<\/em> (New York: Holt, 1996), introduction and chap. 13. For an analysis of the distinction between judicial review and judicial supremacy (the obligation of officials to follow the Court\u2019s reasoning in the future), and the politics involved in the latter, see Keith E. Whittington, <em class=\"emphasis\">Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-2\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 2\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-3\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Dred Scott v. Sandford<\/em>, 60 US 393 (1857). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-3\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 3\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-4\">Lawrence Baum, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Supreme Court<\/em>, 10th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-4\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 4\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-5\">Thomas G. Hansford and James F. Spriggs II, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 130. <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-5\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 5\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-6\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Plessy v. Ferguson<\/em>, 153 US (1896); <em class=\"emphasis\">Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas<\/em>, 347 US 484 (1954). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-6\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 6\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-7\">The earlier case was <em class=\"emphasis\">Bowers v. Hardwick<\/em>, 478 US 1861 (1986); it was overruled by <em class=\"emphasis\">Lawrence v. Texas<\/em>, 02-102 (2003). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-7\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 7\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-8\">Linda Greenhouse, \u201cJustice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails),\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, August 25, 2005, A1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-8\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 8\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-9\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission<\/em>, 558 US 50 (2010). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-9\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 9\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-10\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &amp; Rubber Co.<\/em> 550 US (2007). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-10\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 10\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-11\">Donald Grier Stephenson Jr., <em class=\"emphasis\">Campaigns and the Court: The U.S. Supreme Court in Presidential Elections<\/em> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-11\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 11\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-12\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Baker v. Carr<\/em>, 369 US 186 (1962). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-12\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 12\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-13\">See David K. Ryden, ed., <em class=\"emphasis\">The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process<\/em> (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), especially the editor\u2019s \u201cOverview,\u201d 1\u20134. <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-13\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 13\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-14\">For the argument that the justices\u2019 behavior is largely determined by their individual policy preferences, see Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, <em class=\"emphasis\">The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited<\/em> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, <em class=\"emphasis\">Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-14\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 14\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-15\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Griswold v. Connecticut<\/em>, 381 US 479 (1965). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-15\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 15\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-16\"><em class=\"emphasis\">United States, Petitioner v. Alfonso Lopez, Jr.<\/em>, 514 US 549 (1995). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-16\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 16\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-17\">In <em class=\"emphasis\">The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789\u20132008<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), Lucas A. Powe Jr. argues that the Court \u201cserves ruling political coalitions\u201d and attacks the conservative Rehnquist Court for overturning legislation that extended rights and privileges, and protected and improved society. <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-17\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 17\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-18\">The cases are <em class=\"emphasis\">District of Columbia et al. v. Heller<\/em>, 554 US (2008) and <em class=\"emphasis\">McDonald et al. v. City of Chicago et al.<\/em> 561 US (2010). <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-18\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 18\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-19\">For the argument that there is nothing wrong with a political court or with political motives in constitutional adjudication, see Terri Jennings Peretti, <em class=\"emphasis\">In Defense of a Political Court<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 73. <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-19\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 19\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-20\">Robert A. Carp, Kenneth L. Manning, and Ronald Stidham, \u201cPresident Clinton\u2019s District Judges: \u2018Extreme Liberals\u2019 or Just Plain Moderates?\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Judicature<\/em> 84, no. 5 (March\u2013April 2001): 282\u201388; and \u201cThe Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush\u2019s Judicial Appointees: Far-Right, Conservative, or Moderate?\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Judicature<\/em> 88, no. 1 (July\u2013August 2004): 20\u201329. <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-20\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 20\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-21\"><em class=\"emphasis\">Bush v. Gore<\/em>, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000); also see David Margolick, Evgenia Peretz, and Michael Shnayerson, \u201cThe Path to Florida,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Vanity Fair<\/em>, October 2004. <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-21\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 21\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-460-22\">Quoted in Linda Greenhouse\u2019s analysis \u201cBush v. Gore: A Special Report; Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">New York Times<\/em>, February 20, 2001, A1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-460-22\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 22\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"author":923,"menu_order":9,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[{\"type\":\"cc\",\"description\":\"21st Century American Government\",\"author\":\"Anonymous\",\"organization\":\"Lardbucket\",\"url\":\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/21st-century-american-government-and-politics\/s19-02-power-of-the-us-supreme-court.html\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by-nc-sa\",\"license_terms\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"pd\",\"description\":\"Portrait of John Marshall by Henry Inman\",\"author\":\"Virginia Memory\",\"organization\":\"\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:John_Marshall_by_Henry_Inman,_1832.jpg\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"pd\",\"license_terms\":\"\"},{\"type\":\"pd\",\"description\":\"Impeach Warren\",\"author\":\"Unknown\",\"organization\":\"\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/File:Impeach_Warren.png\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"pd\",\"license_terms\":\"\"}]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-460","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":430,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/460","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/923"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/460\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1424,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/460\/revisions\/1424"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/430"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/460\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=460"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=460"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=460"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/atd-herkimer-americangovernment\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=460"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}