{"id":56,"date":"2014-09-17T00:42:06","date_gmt":"2014-09-17T00:42:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.candelalearning.com\/buslegalenv\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=56"},"modified":"2015-04-21T16:42:28","modified_gmt":"2015-04-21T16:42:28","slug":"5-5-the-scope-of-judicial-review","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/chapter\/5-5-the-scope-of-judicial-review\/","title":{"raw":"The Scope of Judicial Review","rendered":"The Scope of Judicial Review"},"content":{"raw":"<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h3>Learning Objectives<\/h3>\r\nBy the end of this section, you will be able to:\r\n<ul id=\"mayer_1.0-ch52_s02_l01\" class=\"im_orderedlist\">\r\n\t<li>Describe the \u201cexhaustion of remedies\u201d requirement.<\/li>\r\n\t<li>Detail various strategies for obtaining judicial review of agency rules.<\/li>\r\n\t<li>Explain under what circumstances it is possible to sue the government.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\nNeither an administrative agency\u2019s adjudication nor its issuance of a regulation is necessarily final. Most federal agency decisions are appealable to the federal circuit courts. To get to court, the appellant must overcome numerous complex hurdles. He or she must have standing\u2014that is, be in some sense directly affected by the decision or regulation. The case must be ripe for review; administrative remedies such as further appeal within the agency must have been exhausted.\r\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s01\" class=\"im_section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"im_title im_editable im_block\">Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies<\/h2>\r\nBefore you can complain to court about an agency\u2019s action, you must first try to get the agency to reconsider its action. Generally, you must have asked for a hearing at the hearing examiner level, there must have been a decision reached that was unfavorable to you, and you must have appealed the decision to the full board. The full board must rule against you, and only then will you be heard by a court. The broadest exception to this <span class=\"im_margin_term\"><span class=\"im_glossterm\">exhaustion of administrative remedies<\/span><\/span> requirement is if the agency had no authority to issue the rule or regulation in the first place, if exhaustion of remedies would be impractical or futile, or if great harm would happen should the rule or regulation continue to apply. Also, if the agency is not acting in good faith, the courts will hear an appeal without exhaustion.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s02\" class=\"im_section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"im_title im_editable im_block\">Strategies for Obtaining Judicial Review<\/h2>\r\nOnce these obstacles are cleared, the court may look at one of a series of claims. The appellant might assert that the agency\u2019s action was ultra vires (UL-truh VI-reez)\u2014beyond the scope of its authority as set down in the statute. This attack is rarely successful. A somewhat more successful claim is that the agency did not abide by its own procedures or those imposed upon it by the Administrative Procedure Act.\r\n\r\nIn formal rulemaking, the appellant also might insist that the agency lacked substantial evidence for the determination that it made. If there is virtually no evidence to support the agency\u2019s findings, the court may reverse. But findings of fact are not often overturned by the courts.\r\n\r\nLikewise, there has long been a presumption that when an agency issues a regulation, it has the authority to do so: those opposing the regulation must bear a heavy burden in court to upset it. This is not a surprising rule, for otherwise courts, not administrators, would be the authors of regulations. Nevertheless, regulations cannot exceed the scope of the authority conferred by Congress on the agency. In an important 1981 case before the Supreme Court, the issue was whether the secretary of labor, acting through the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), could lawfully issue a standard limiting exposure to cotton dust in the workplace without first undertaking a cost-benefit analysis. A dozen cotton textile manufacturers and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, representing 175 companies, asserted that the cotton dust standard was unlawful because it did not rationally relate the benefits to be derived from the standard to the costs that the standard would impose. See Section 5.6 \"Cases\", <em class=\"im_emphasis\">American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan<\/em>.\r\n\r\nIn summary, then, an individual or a company may (after exhaustion of administrative remedies) challenge agency action where such action is the following:\r\n<ul id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s02_l01\" class=\"im_itemizedlist im_editable im_block\">\r\n\t<li>not in accordance with the agency\u2019s scope of authority<\/li>\r\n\t<li>not in accordance with the US Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act<\/li>\r\n\t<li>not in accordance with the substantial evidence test<\/li>\r\n\t<li>unwarranted by the facts<\/li>\r\n\t<li>arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord with the law<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nSection 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act sets out those standards. While it is difficult to show that an agency\u2019s action is arbitrary and capricious, there are cases that have so held. For example, after the Reagan administration set aside a Carter administration rule from the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration on passive restraints in automobiles, State Farm and other insurance companies challenged the reversal as arbitrary and capricious. Examining the record, the Supreme Court found that the agency had failed to state enough reasons for its reversal and required the agency to review the record and the rule and provide adequate reasons for its reversal. State Farm and other insurance companies thus gained a legal benefit by keeping an agency rule that placed costs on automakers for increased passenger safety and potentially reducing the number of injury claims from those it had insured.<span id=\"mayer_1.0-fn05_006\" class=\"im_footnote\"><em class=\"im_emphasis\">Motor Vehicle Manufacturers\u2019 Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Ins.<\/em>, 463 US 29 (1983).<\/span>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s03\" class=\"im_section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"im_title im_editable im_block\">Suing the Government<\/h2>\r\nIn the modern administrative state, the range of government activity is immense, and administrative agencies frequently get in the way of business enterprise. Often, bureaucratic involvement is wholly legitimate, compelled by law; sometimes, however, agencies or government officials may overstep their bounds, in a fit of zeal or spite. What recourse does the private individual or company have?\r\n\r\nMainly for historical reasons, it has always been more difficult to sue the government than to sue private individuals or corporations. For one thing, the government has long had recourse to the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a shield against lawsuits. Yet in 1976, Congress amended the Administrative Procedure Act to waive any federal claim to sovereign immunity in cases of injunctive or other nonmonetary relief. Earlier, in 1946, in the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress had waived sovereign immunity of the federal government for most tort claims for money damages, although the act contains several exceptions for specific agencies (e.g., one cannot sue for injuries resulting from fiscal operations of the Treasury Department or for injuries stemming from activities of the military in wartime). The act also contains a major exception for claims \u201cbased upon [an official\u2019s] exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.\u201d This exception prevents suits against parole boards for paroling dangerous criminals who then kill or maim in the course of another crime and suits against officials whose decision to ship explosive materials by public carrier leads to mass deaths and injuries following an explosion en route.<span id=\"mayer-5624-20111224-173052-448260\" class=\"im_footnote\"><em class=\"im_emphasis\">Dalehite v. United States<\/em>, 346 US 15 (1953).<\/span>\r\n\r\nIn recent years, the Supreme Court has been stripping away the traditional immunity enjoyed by many government officials against personal suits. Some government employees\u2014judges, prosecutors, legislators, and the president, for example\u2014have absolute immunity against suit for official actions. But many public administrators and government employees have at best a qualified immunity. Under a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (so-called Section 1983 actions), <em class=\"im_emphasis\">state<\/em> officials can be sued in federal court for money damages whenever \u201cunder color of any state law\u201d they deprive anyone of his rights under the Constitution or federal law. In <em class=\"im_emphasis\">Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents<\/em>, the Supreme Court held that <em class=\"im_emphasis\">federal<\/em> agents may be sued for violating the plaintiff\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights against an unlawful search of his home.<span id=\"mayer_1.0-fn05_008\" class=\"im_footnote\"><em class=\"im_emphasis\">Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents<\/em>, 403 US 388 (1971).<\/span> Subsequent cases have followed this logic to permit suits for violations of other constitutional provisions. This area of the law is in a state of flux, and it is likely to continue to evolve.\r\n\r\nSometimes damage is done to an individual or business because the government has given out erroneous information. For example, suppose that Charles, a bewildered, disabled navy employee, is receiving a federal disability annuity. Under the regulations, he would lose his pension if he took a job that paid him in each of two succeeding years more than 80 percent of what he earned in his old navy job. A few years later, Congress changed the law, making him ineligible if he earned more than 80 percent in anyone year. For many years, Charles earned considerably less than the ceiling amount. But then one year he got the opportunity to make some extra money. Not wishing to lose his pension, he called an employee relations specialist in the US Navy and asked how much he could earn and still keep his pension. The specialist gave him erroneous information over the telephone and then sent him an out-of-date form that said Charles could safely take on the extra work. Unfortunately, as it turned out, Charles did exceed the salary limit, and so the government cut off his pension during the time he earned too much. Charles sues to recover his lost pension. He argues that he relied to his detriment on false information supplied by the navy and that in fairness the government should be estopped from denying his claim.\r\n\r\nUnfortunately for Charles, he will lose his case. In <em class=\"im_emphasis\">Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond<\/em>, the Supreme Court reasoned that it would be unconstitutional to permit recovery.<span id=\"mayer_1.0-fn05_009\" class=\"im_footnote\"><em class=\"im_emphasis\">Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond<\/em>, 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).<\/span> The appropriations clause of Article I says that federal money can be paid out only through an appropriation made by law. The law prevented this particular payment to be made. If the court were to make an exception, it would permit executive officials in effect to make binding payments, even though unauthorized, simply by misrepresenting the facts. The harsh reality, therefore, is that mistakes of the government are generally held against the individual, not the government, unless the law specifically provides for recompense (as, for example, in the Federal Tort Claims Act just discussed).\r\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s03_n01\" class=\"im_key_takeaways im_editable im_block textbox\">\r\n<h3 class=\"im_title\">Key Takeaway<\/h3>\r\nAfter exhausting administrative remedies, there are numerous grounds for seeking judicial review of an agency\u2019s order or of a final rule. While courts defer to agencies to some degree, an agency must follow its own rules, comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, act within the scope of its delegated authority, avoid acting in an arbitrary manner, and make final rules that are supported by substantial evidence.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\r\n<h3>Exercises<\/h3>\r\n<section id=\"self-check-questions\">\r\n<ol>\r\n\t<li>Why would US courts require that someone seeking judicial review of an agency order first exhaust administrative remedies?<\/li>\r\n\t<li>On the Internet, find a case where someone has successfully sued the US government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. What kind of case was it? Did the government argue sovereign immunity? Does sovereign immunity even make sense to you?<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/section><\/div>\r\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch52_s02_s06_n02\" class=\"im_exercises im_editable im_block\"><\/div>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h3>Learning Objectives<\/h3>\n<p>By the end of this section, you will be able to:<\/p>\n<ul id=\"mayer_1.0-ch52_s02_l01\" class=\"im_orderedlist\">\n<li>Describe the \u201cexhaustion of remedies\u201d requirement.<\/li>\n<li>Detail various strategies for obtaining judicial review of agency rules.<\/li>\n<li>Explain under what circumstances it is possible to sue the government.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<p>Neither an administrative agency\u2019s adjudication nor its issuance of a regulation is necessarily final. Most federal agency decisions are appealable to the federal circuit courts. To get to court, the appellant must overcome numerous complex hurdles. He or she must have standing\u2014that is, be in some sense directly affected by the decision or regulation. The case must be ripe for review; administrative remedies such as further appeal within the agency must have been exhausted.<\/p>\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s01\" class=\"im_section\">\n<h2 class=\"im_title im_editable im_block\">Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies<\/h2>\n<p>Before you can complain to court about an agency\u2019s action, you must first try to get the agency to reconsider its action. Generally, you must have asked for a hearing at the hearing examiner level, there must have been a decision reached that was unfavorable to you, and you must have appealed the decision to the full board. The full board must rule against you, and only then will you be heard by a court. The broadest exception to this <span class=\"im_margin_term\"><span class=\"im_glossterm\">exhaustion of administrative remedies<\/span><\/span> requirement is if the agency had no authority to issue the rule or regulation in the first place, if exhaustion of remedies would be impractical or futile, or if great harm would happen should the rule or regulation continue to apply. Also, if the agency is not acting in good faith, the courts will hear an appeal without exhaustion.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s02\" class=\"im_section\">\n<h2 class=\"im_title im_editable im_block\">Strategies for Obtaining Judicial Review<\/h2>\n<p>Once these obstacles are cleared, the court may look at one of a series of claims. The appellant might assert that the agency\u2019s action was ultra vires (UL-truh VI-reez)\u2014beyond the scope of its authority as set down in the statute. This attack is rarely successful. A somewhat more successful claim is that the agency did not abide by its own procedures or those imposed upon it by the Administrative Procedure Act.<\/p>\n<p>In formal rulemaking, the appellant also might insist that the agency lacked substantial evidence for the determination that it made. If there is virtually no evidence to support the agency\u2019s findings, the court may reverse. But findings of fact are not often overturned by the courts.<\/p>\n<p>Likewise, there has long been a presumption that when an agency issues a regulation, it has the authority to do so: those opposing the regulation must bear a heavy burden in court to upset it. This is not a surprising rule, for otherwise courts, not administrators, would be the authors of regulations. Nevertheless, regulations cannot exceed the scope of the authority conferred by Congress on the agency. In an important 1981 case before the Supreme Court, the issue was whether the secretary of labor, acting through the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), could lawfully issue a standard limiting exposure to cotton dust in the workplace without first undertaking a cost-benefit analysis. A dozen cotton textile manufacturers and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, representing 175 companies, asserted that the cotton dust standard was unlawful because it did not rationally relate the benefits to be derived from the standard to the costs that the standard would impose. See Section 5.6 &#8220;Cases&#8221;, <em class=\"im_emphasis\">American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>In summary, then, an individual or a company may (after exhaustion of administrative remedies) challenge agency action where such action is the following:<\/p>\n<ul id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s02_l01\" class=\"im_itemizedlist im_editable im_block\">\n<li>not in accordance with the agency\u2019s scope of authority<\/li>\n<li>not in accordance with the US Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act<\/li>\n<li>not in accordance with the substantial evidence test<\/li>\n<li>unwarranted by the facts<\/li>\n<li>arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord with the law<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act sets out those standards. While it is difficult to show that an agency\u2019s action is arbitrary and capricious, there are cases that have so held. For example, after the Reagan administration set aside a Carter administration rule from the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration on passive restraints in automobiles, State Farm and other insurance companies challenged the reversal as arbitrary and capricious. Examining the record, the Supreme Court found that the agency had failed to state enough reasons for its reversal and required the agency to review the record and the rule and provide adequate reasons for its reversal. State Farm and other insurance companies thus gained a legal benefit by keeping an agency rule that placed costs on automakers for increased passenger safety and potentially reducing the number of injury claims from those it had insured.<span id=\"mayer_1.0-fn05_006\" class=\"im_footnote\"><em class=\"im_emphasis\">Motor Vehicle Manufacturers\u2019 Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Ins.<\/em>, 463 US 29 (1983).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s03\" class=\"im_section\">\n<h2 class=\"im_title im_editable im_block\">Suing the Government<\/h2>\n<p>In the modern administrative state, the range of government activity is immense, and administrative agencies frequently get in the way of business enterprise. Often, bureaucratic involvement is wholly legitimate, compelled by law; sometimes, however, agencies or government officials may overstep their bounds, in a fit of zeal or spite. What recourse does the private individual or company have?<\/p>\n<p>Mainly for historical reasons, it has always been more difficult to sue the government than to sue private individuals or corporations. For one thing, the government has long had recourse to the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a shield against lawsuits. Yet in 1976, Congress amended the Administrative Procedure Act to waive any federal claim to sovereign immunity in cases of injunctive or other nonmonetary relief. Earlier, in 1946, in the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress had waived sovereign immunity of the federal government for most tort claims for money damages, although the act contains several exceptions for specific agencies (e.g., one cannot sue for injuries resulting from fiscal operations of the Treasury Department or for injuries stemming from activities of the military in wartime). The act also contains a major exception for claims \u201cbased upon [an official\u2019s] exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.\u201d This exception prevents suits against parole boards for paroling dangerous criminals who then kill or maim in the course of another crime and suits against officials whose decision to ship explosive materials by public carrier leads to mass deaths and injuries following an explosion en route.<span id=\"mayer-5624-20111224-173052-448260\" class=\"im_footnote\"><em class=\"im_emphasis\">Dalehite v. United States<\/em>, 346 US 15 (1953).<\/span><\/p>\n<p>In recent years, the Supreme Court has been stripping away the traditional immunity enjoyed by many government officials against personal suits. Some government employees\u2014judges, prosecutors, legislators, and the president, for example\u2014have absolute immunity against suit for official actions. But many public administrators and government employees have at best a qualified immunity. Under a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (so-called Section 1983 actions), <em class=\"im_emphasis\">state<\/em> officials can be sued in federal court for money damages whenever \u201cunder color of any state law\u201d they deprive anyone of his rights under the Constitution or federal law. In <em class=\"im_emphasis\">Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents<\/em>, the Supreme Court held that <em class=\"im_emphasis\">federal<\/em> agents may be sued for violating the plaintiff\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights against an unlawful search of his home.<span id=\"mayer_1.0-fn05_008\" class=\"im_footnote\"><em class=\"im_emphasis\">Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents<\/em>, 403 US 388 (1971).<\/span> Subsequent cases have followed this logic to permit suits for violations of other constitutional provisions. This area of the law is in a state of flux, and it is likely to continue to evolve.<\/p>\n<p>Sometimes damage is done to an individual or business because the government has given out erroneous information. For example, suppose that Charles, a bewildered, disabled navy employee, is receiving a federal disability annuity. Under the regulations, he would lose his pension if he took a job that paid him in each of two succeeding years more than 80 percent of what he earned in his old navy job. A few years later, Congress changed the law, making him ineligible if he earned more than 80 percent in anyone year. For many years, Charles earned considerably less than the ceiling amount. But then one year he got the opportunity to make some extra money. Not wishing to lose his pension, he called an employee relations specialist in the US Navy and asked how much he could earn and still keep his pension. The specialist gave him erroneous information over the telephone and then sent him an out-of-date form that said Charles could safely take on the extra work. Unfortunately, as it turned out, Charles did exceed the salary limit, and so the government cut off his pension during the time he earned too much. Charles sues to recover his lost pension. He argues that he relied to his detriment on false information supplied by the navy and that in fairness the government should be estopped from denying his claim.<\/p>\n<p>Unfortunately for Charles, he will lose his case. In <em class=\"im_emphasis\">Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond<\/em>, the Supreme Court reasoned that it would be unconstitutional to permit recovery.<span id=\"mayer_1.0-fn05_009\" class=\"im_footnote\"><em class=\"im_emphasis\">Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond<\/em>, 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).<\/span> The appropriations clause of Article I says that federal money can be paid out only through an appropriation made by law. The law prevented this particular payment to be made. If the court were to make an exception, it would permit executive officials in effect to make binding payments, even though unauthorized, simply by misrepresenting the facts. The harsh reality, therefore, is that mistakes of the government are generally held against the individual, not the government, unless the law specifically provides for recompense (as, for example, in the Federal Tort Claims Act just discussed).<\/p>\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch05_s05_s03_n01\" class=\"im_key_takeaways im_editable im_block textbox\">\n<h3 class=\"im_title\">Key Takeaway<\/h3>\n<p>After exhausting administrative remedies, there are numerous grounds for seeking judicial review of an agency\u2019s order or of a final rule. While courts defer to agencies to some degree, an agency must follow its own rules, comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, act within the scope of its delegated authority, avoid acting in an arbitrary manner, and make final rules that are supported by substantial evidence.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\n<h3>Exercises<\/h3>\n<section id=\"self-check-questions\">\n<ol>\n<li>Why would US courts require that someone seeking judicial review of an agency order first exhaust administrative remedies?<\/li>\n<li>On the Internet, find a case where someone has successfully sued the US government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. What kind of case was it? Did the government argue sovereign immunity? Does sovereign immunity even make sense to you?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/section>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"mayer_1.0-ch52_s02_s06_n02\" class=\"im_exercises im_editable im_block\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t <section class=\"citations-section\" role=\"contentinfo\">\n\t\t\t <h3>Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t <div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <div id=\"citation-list-56\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t <div class=\"licensing\"><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">CC licensed content, Shared previously<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>Business and the Legal Environment. <strong>Authored by<\/strong>: Anonymous. <strong>Provided by<\/strong>: Anonymous. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/business-and-the-legal-environment\/\">http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/business-and-the-legal-environment\/<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/4.0\/\">CC BY-NC-SA: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike<\/a><\/em><\/li><\/ul><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t <\/section>","protected":false},"author":5,"menu_order":33,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[{\"type\":\"cc\",\"description\":\"Business and the Legal Environment\",\"author\":\"Anonymous\",\"organization\":\"Anonymous\",\"url\":\"http:\/\/2012books.lardbucket.org\/books\/business-and-the-legal-environment\/\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by-nc-sa\",\"license_terms\":\"\"}]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-56","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":779,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/56","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/56\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1210,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/56\/revisions\/1210"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/779"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/56\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=56"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=56"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=56"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/clinton-buslegalenv\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=56"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}