UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
ARIZONA v. HICKS
480 U.S. 321(1987)
Opinion of the Court.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971), we said in certain circumstances a warrantless seizure by police of an item that comes within plain view during their lawful search of a private area may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. [citations omitted]. [I]n the present case to [we] decide whether this “plain view” doctrine may be invoked when the police have less than probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband.
On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of respondent’s apartment, striking and injuring a man in the apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered respondent’s apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons. They found and seized three weapons, including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of their search also discovered a stocking-cap mask.
One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed two sets of expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in the squalid and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment. Suspecting that they were stolen, he read and recorded their serial numbers- moving some of the components, including a Bang and Olufsen turntable, in order to do so- which he then reported by phone to his headquarters. On being advised that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he seized it immediately. It was later determined that some of the other serial numbers matched those on other stereo equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a warrant was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well. Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery.
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As an initial matter, the State argues that Officer Nelson’s actions constituted neither a “search” nor a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure. To be sure, that was the first step in a process by which respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not “meaningfully interfere” with respondent’s possessory interest in either the serial numbers r the equipment, and therefore did not amount to a seizure. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370, 105 S. Ct. 2778 (1985).
Officer Nelson’s moving the equipment, however, did constitute a “search” separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that came into view during the later search would not have constituted an independent search, because it would have produced no additional invasion of respondent’s privacy interests. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1033, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983). But taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent’s privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstances that validated the entry.
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We turn, then, to application of the doctrine to the facts of this case. “It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S., at 465, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Those circumstances include situations “[w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such [evidence] is supported…by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement,” ibid., such as the exigent-circumstances intrusion here. It would be absurd to say that an object could lawfully be seized and taken from the premises, but could not be moved for closer examination. It is clear, therefore, that the search here was valid if the “plain view” doctrine would have sustained a seizure of the equipment.
There is no doubt it would have done so if Officer Nelson had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen. The State has conceded, however, that he had only a “reasonable suspicion,” by which it means something less than probable cause. See Brief for Petitioner 18-19. We have not ruled on the question whether probable causes is required in order to invoke the “plain view” doctrine. [citations omitted].
We now hold that probable case is required. To say otherwise would be to cut the “plain view” doctrine lose form its theoretical and practical moorings.
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The State contends that, even if Officer Nelson’s search violated the Fourth Amendment, the court below should have admitted the evidence thus obtained under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. That was not the question on which certiorari was granted, and we decline to consider it.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals [which overturned his conviction] is affirmed.
(Concurring and Dissenting Opinions Omitted)
