NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Belton
50 N.Y. 2d 447 (1980)
Cooke, Chief Judge
A warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an inaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the article.
On April 9, 1978, defendant and three companions were traveling on the New York State Thruway in Ontario County when their car was stopped by a State trooper for speeding. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer smelled the distinct odor of marihuana emanating from within and observed on the floor an envelope which he recognized as a type that is commonly used to sell the substance. At that point the officer ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, patted each down, removed the envelope from the floor and ascertained that it contained a small amount of marihuana.
After the marihuana was found, the individuals, still standing outside the car, were placed under arrest. The officer then reentered the vehicle, searched the passenger compartment and seized the marihuana cigarette butts lying in the ashtrays. He also rifled through the pockets of five jackets on the back seat. Upon opening the zippered pockets of one of them, he discovered a small amount of cocaine and defendant’s identification.
Following denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a criminal substance in the sixth degree. A unanimous Appellate Division affirmed, holding the warrantless search of he jacket lawful as incident to defendant’s arrest for possession of marihuana (68 A.D2d 198,416 N.Y.S.2d 922). There should be a reversal.
Analysis begins with the general proposition that, except in a few narrowly circumscribed instances, the Fourth Amendment condemns warrantless searches and seizures as unreasonable (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 455,91 S.Ct, 2022,2032,29 L.Ed.2d 564). The privacy interest of our citizens is far too cherished a right to be entrusted to the discretion of the officer in the field. Reasonableness of the intrusion does not turn upon the belief, however well founded it may be, that the article sought is concealed in a particular place. The Constitution, therefore, focuses upon the desirability of having the judiciary, rather than the police, determine when searches and seizures are permissible and the limitations that are to be placed upon such activities. Necessarily, then, the predicate for the warrantless search must be carefully examined to ensure that its scope, both temporally and geographically, did not exceed constitutional limits.
The People maintain that the warrantless search of defendants jacket was reasonable on the ground that it was incident to his lawful arrest. A custodial arrest of a suspect based upon probable cause without a warrant in a public place constitutes a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820,46 L.Ed.2d 598). That arrest being a lawful and substantial intrusion, any search incident thereto requires no additional justification (People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.S.2d 383 N.E.2d 452; see, also, People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351,361 N.Y.S.2d 897, 320 N.E. 2d 636).
When a suspect is placed under custodial arrest, there is always present the danger that he may seek to use a weapon to effect an escape or destroy or conceal evidence of a crime. Thus, to safeguard himself and others, and to prevent the loss of critical evidence, it is reasonable from a Fourth Amendment perspective for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless “search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence” (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685). Upon arrest, the privacy interest of the arrestee in possessions within the arrestee’s immediate control are subsumed within the State’s interest in discovering weapons, thwarting access to means of escape and preventing the destruction of evidence (see, United States v. Robinson, 414, U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427). But while the arrest establishes the authority for the warrantless search, it does not transform the initial predicate into carte blanche justification to rummage through all articles which might bear some connection to the arrestee (see, Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538; People v. Williams, 37 N.Y.2d 206, 371 N.Y.S.2d 880, 333 N.E.2d 160; People v. Lewis 26 N.Y.2d 547, 311 N.Y.S.2d 905, 260 N.E.2d 538).
The privacy interest of the arrestee in an object remains intact once he is effectively neutralized or the object is within the exclusive control of the police (see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed. 2d 235; United States v Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed2d 538).At that point, any exigency which would otherwise have justified a warrantless search has been dissipated and the search is no longer an incident to the arrest (but ef. People v. De Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838, 385 N.E.2d 577; People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582, 313 N.E.2d 49). The critical inquiry focuses upon the extent to which the arrestee may gain access to the property rather than the time or space between the arrest and search (see, United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed 2d 771).
In this regard, United States v. Chadwick (433 U.S.1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed2d 538, supra) is instructive. There, railroad officials in San Diego observed two individuals loading a heavy footlocker onto a train bound for Boston. Their suspicions were aroused when the trunk leaked talcum powder, a substance commonly used to mask the odor of marihuana. The officials notified Federal agents who relayed the information to their counterparts in Boston. When the train arrived in that city, the two individuals who have loaded the footlocker in San Diego were on hand and lifted it into the trunk of Chadwick’s waiting car. At that point, Federal agents arrested all three, seized the footlocker and transported them to the Federal building. There with the arrestees safely incarcerated, the agents opened the trunk and seized a large quantity of marihuana. In holding the search unlawful, the court rejected the notion that it was incidental to Chadwick’s arrest. Said the court: “Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence ,a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest” (433 U.S., at p. 15,97 S.Ct., at p. 2485; see, also, Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, supra).
That defendant retained an expectation of privacy in the contents of his jacket pockets notwithstanding the fact of his arrest is beyond dispute. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more private receptacle where one might place one’s most personal items than the zippered recesses of a jacket. Defendant’s arrest, standing alone, did not vitiate that privacy interest by being converted into a license for law enforcement authorities to engage in a warrantless search of unlimited temporal and geographic scope. Once defendant had been removed from the automobile and placed under arrest, a search of the interiors of a private receptacle safely within the exclusive custody and control of the police may not be upheld as incident to his arrest (United Stales v. Chadwick, 433 US 1,97 S.Ct. 2476,53 L.Ed.2d 538, supra; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,99 S. Ct 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, supra). The car was in a secure place where it could have been easily guarded, its occupants under arrest and safely away from the vehicle, their removal to the police station imminent. There was, therefore, no reason why the search should not have awaited the issuance of a warrant.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, the motion to suppress granted and the indictment dismissed.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
New York v. Belton
453 U.S. 454 (1981)
Syllabus
An automobile in which respondent was one of the occupants was stopped by a New York State policeman for traveling at an excessive rate of speed. In the process of discovering that none of the occupants owned the car or was related to the owner, the policeman smelled burnt marihuana and saw on the floor of the car an envelope suspected of containing marihuana. He then directed the occupants to get out of the car and arrested them for unlawful possession of marihuana. After searching each of the occupants, he searched the passenger compartment of the car, found a jacket belonging to respondent, unzipped one of the pockets, and discovered cocaine. Subsequently, respondent was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. After the trial court had denied his motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his jacket pocket, respondent pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, while preserving his claim that the cocaine had been seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search and seizure, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: The search of respondent’s jacket was a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, and hence did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The jacket, being located inside the passenger compartment of the car, was “within the arrestee’s immediate control” within the meaning of Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, wherein it was held that a lawful custodial arrest creates a situation justifying the contemporaneous warrantless search of the arrestee and of the immediately surrounding area. Not only may the police search the passenger compartment of the car in such circumstances, they may also examine the contents of any containers found in the passenger compartment. And such a container may be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.
50 N.Y.2d 447, reversed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J.
(Concurring and Dissenting Opinions Omitted)
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Belton
55 N.Y. 2d 49 (1982)
Cooke, Chief Judge.
The United States Supreme Court, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, having disagreed with our perception of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and reversed our earlier decision, this case comes once again to this court. Defendant urges that, although the search in question has been held valid under the Federal Constitution, we should hold that it violated section 12 of article I of the State Constitution, a contention not confronted when the case was previously before us. The identical wording of the two provisions does not proscribe our more strictly construing the State Constitution that the Supreme Court has construed the Federal Constitution (see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1901, 20 L.Ed.2d 917; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730). We do not find it necessary to consider the Supreme Court’s rationale as applied to our Constitution, however, therefore we hold on a different rationale that the search and seizure were not improper under the State Constitution. The evidence sought to suppressed was, therefore, admissible and defendant’s conviction should in consequence, be affirmed.
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The Supreme Court, extending the rationale of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.685, has now held that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the warrantless seizure and search of a closed container within the passenger compartment of an automobile shortly after the arrest of the vehicle’s occupants. It ruled that even though the search of the zippered jacket pocket took place after the occupants had left the vehicle and been placed under arrest, the search was permissible as incident to the arrest, and the cocaine admissible as the product of a proper search incident to lawful arrest (New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768). It found no need, in view of that conclusion, to consider the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement, although as it acknowledged (453 U.S. 454, 462, n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2865, n. 6, supra), the court had previously recognized the exception (see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543).
A majority of this court now concludes that the search which followed the defendant’s lawful arrest was permissible under the State Constitution under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
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Until the Supreme Court’s decision in the instant case, the search has been limited both temporally and geographically, a search being upheld only when it closely follows arrest and is of the person of the individual arrested and the area within his immediate reach (the “grabbable” area). In extending Chimel to the facts of this case, in which defendant’s jacket was neither on his person nor within his reach (he being outside teh vehicle with his pocket zippered), the Supreme Court departed from the rationale in Chimel. Once the exception is employed to justify a warrantless search for objects outside an arrested person’s reach it no longer has nay distinct spatial boundary. As Judge Wachtler, dissenting in People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254, 267, 344 N.Y.S.2d 900, 298 N.E.2d 78, put it, “search and seizure law [becomes] uncontrollable when the rubric [is] adopted and the rationale discarded.”
A separate exception to the warrant requirement is that recognized with respect to automobiles. Its predicate is the reduced expectation of privacy associated with automobiles and the inherent mobility of such vehicles (see, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706; see, generally, 2 La Fave, Search and Seizure, pp 508-544). As the Supreme Court has noted, “the configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property” (Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2591, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 supra). Among the factors that contribute to this decreased expectation are that automobiles “operate on public streets; they are serviced in public places; * * * their interiors are highly visible; and they are subject to extensive regulation and inspection” (Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 154, 99 S.Ct. 421, 436, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 [Powell, J., concurring]; see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-591, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2469-70, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 [plurality opn.]). In addition, the mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant (see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538, supra; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543, supra).
Logically, these considerations should apply to containers within the passenger compartment as well as to the compartment itself. Such containers, as distinct from their contents, are subject to public view, and generally are subject to the same risk of theft or intrusion as other articles in the passenger compartment. Likewise, the special problems created by the mobility of automobiles apply equally to containers in the compartment. In both cases, the impracticability of obtaining a warrant and the danger that evidence may be lost in the interim merge as supportable bases for an exception to the warrant requirement.
* * * * *
In conclusion, then, we hold, that where police have validly arrested an occupant of an automobile, and they have reason to believe that the car may contain evidence related to the crime for which the occupant was arrested or that a weapon may be discovered or a means of escape thwarted, they may contemporaneously search the passenger compartment, including any containers found therein. The search of defendant’s jacket as it lay on the back seat was therefore proper, and the evidence admissible.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
(Concurring and Dissenting Opinions Omitted)
