NEW YORK STATE COURT OF APPEALS
People v LaValle
3 NY3d 88 (2004)
G.B. Smith, J.
A Suffolk County jury found defendant Stephen S. LaValle guilty of first degree murder in the course of and in furtherance of first degree rape (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]) and sentenced him to death. His direct appeal comes to us from Supreme Court pursuant to our unique jurisdiction in death penalty cases (NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b]; CPL 450.70 [1]). For the reasons that follow, we uphold the conviction, but vacate the death sentence, and remit for resentencing in accordance with CPL 470.30 (5) (c). In vacating the death sentence, we conclude that the jury deadlock instruction prescribed in CPL 400.27 (10) is unconstitutional under article I, § 6 of the State Constitution. We further conclude that this defect in the existing statute can only be cured by a new deadlock instruction from the Legislature.
I. FACTS
Around 12:30 p.m. on Saturday, May 31, 1997, the body of Cynthia Quinn was found in the woods near Mills Road in Yaphank, a village in Suffolk County. Her neck, chest, back and arms were covered with 73 puncture wounds made with a screwdriver-like instrument. She had been raped. She also had a broken rib, bruises on her arms and abrasions on many parts of her body. About six hours earlier, she had left her home for her customary morning jog. Several Yaphank residents saw her running along her route. By 7:30 a.m., her husband Brian Quinn grew concerned that she had not returned home and began searching for her. He had expected her to return by 7:00 a.m. because, as a self-employed carpenter, he was scheduled to report to a work site at 7:30 a.m. He also knew that Cynthia, a high school track coach, had a track meet that same morning. Initially, Brian searched the surrounding area in his car, with his two young children, and then enlisted the help of fellow volunteer firefighters. Eventually, several units of the police department joined the search. The body was discovered by two volunteer firefighters.
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Two days after the murder, on June 2, 1997, the police arrested defendant in connection with the robbery after he was told to report to his parole officer….
Defendant eventually confessed to the murder of Cynthia Quinn.…..On June 5, 1997, a grand jury indicted defendant for murder in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]intentional murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of rape in the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit rape in the first degree); three counts of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1], [2], [3]intentional murder, depraved indifference murder and felony murder),[FN1] and robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [2]). He was arraigned on June 9, 1997. On August 12, 1997, the People served notice of intent to seek the death penalty (CPL 250.40).
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Two days after summations, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder (intentional murder) …. The penalty phase began on August 3, 1999 and concluded on August 6 when the jury rendered a verdict that defendant be sentenced to death.
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III. PENALTY PHASE
We next address the constitutionality of the “deadlock instruction” the court delivered to the jury prior to its deliberation on the appropriate sentence for defendant. Pursuant to CPL 400.27 (10), the court instructed the jurors on their duty to decide whether defendant should be sentenced to death or to life without parole. Either choice had to be unanimous. The court further instructed the jurors, as required by statute, that if they failed to agree, the court would sentence defendant to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving a minimum of 20 to 25 years. Although defendant did not object when the instruction was given, he had sought a ruling prior to trial that CPL 400.27 (10) was unconstitutional under the Federal and State Constitutions, both on its face and as applied. His motion preserved the argument for appeal.
Like some other states with death penalty statutes, New York recognized that jurors should know the consequences of a deadlock (citation omitted). However, New York’s deadlock provision is unique in that the sentence required after a deadlock is less severe than the sentences the jury is allowed to consider. No other death penalty scheme in the country requires judges to instruct jurors that if they cannot unanimously agree between two choices, the judge will sentence defendant to a third, more lenient, choice.
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The New York Legislature determined that defendants convicted of capital first degree murder should either be sentenced to death or the most severe alternative sentence, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. What, then, is the consequence of telling the jury that it may not impose a sentence of life with parole eligibility after 20 to 25 years, but that the court will impose that sentence if the jury cannot agree? The deadlock instruction interjects the fear that if jurors do not reach unanimity, the defendant may be paroled in 20 years and pose a threat to society in the future. Yet, in New York a defendant’s future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravator the jury may consider.
By interjecting future dangerousness, the deadlock instruction gives rise to an unconstitutionally palpable risk that one or more jurors who cannot bear the thought that a defendant may walk the streets again after serving 20 to 25 years will join jurors favoring death in order to avoid the deadlock sentence…. For jurors who are inclined toward life without parole, the choice is between death and life with parole, a Hobson’s choice in light of the jurors’ likely concerns over defendant’s future dangerousness. The choice of death results not through “a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves,” but through fear and coercion (citations omitted). New York’s statute is unique in its coercive effect.
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Here, the trial court reasoned that it was more likely that jurors favoring life without parole would not switch to death since lack of unanimity would mean that the defendant would remain incarcerated for at least 20 to 25 years, an option preferable to death. But under the existing statute, life with parole was not one of the options available to the jury. New York’s Legislature did not intend for jurors to choose life with parole. …..
It is of course possible that one or more jurors who favor death might be coerced into choosing life without parole rather than have defendant be sentenced to life with parole. That, however, does not cure the coercive effect of the deadlock instruction before us. The coercive effect is not relieved by recognizing that some jurors may be coerced in the opposite direction.
…..Under New York’s deadlock instruction the choice is not, as it should be, the result of a reasoned understanding that it was the appropriate one. We hold today that the deadlock instruction required by CPL 400.27 (10) is unconstitutional under the State Constitution because of the unacceptable risk that it may result in a coercive, and thus arbitrary and unreliable, sentence.
The dissent contends that the majority is ignoring the will of the Legislature. The Court, however, plays a crucial and necessary function in our system of checks and balances. It is the responsibility of the judiciary to safeguard the rights afforded under our State Constitution. While the Legislature may vote to have a death penalty, it cannot create one that offends constitutional rights. Thus, it is necessarily our responsibility to strike down the deadlock instruction in CPL 400.27 (10) because it creates the substantial risk of coercing jurors into sentencing a defendant to death in violation of our Due Process Clause. The deadlock instruction is invalid under our own case law condemning coercive instructions, and the State Constitution’s Due Process Clause, providing greater protection than its federal counterpart. Consequently, defendant’s death sentence must be set aside.
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We cannot, however, ourselves craft a new instruction, because to do so would usurp legislative prerogative. We have the power to eliminate an unconstitutional sentencing procedure, but we do not have the power to fill the void with a different procedure, particularly one that potentially imposes a greater sentence than the possible deadlock sentence that has been prescribed. ……We thus conclude that under the present statute, the death penalty may not be imposed. Cases in which death notices have been filed may go forward as noncapital first degree murder prosecutions.
E. REMEDY
CPL 470.30 (1) authorizes this Court to take corrective action upon a reversal or modification. CPL 470.30 (5) (c) authorizes this Court to “set the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing by the court for a determination as to whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole or to a term of imprisonment for the class A-I felony of murder in the first degree other than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.” Pursuant to these provisions, the case should be remitted to the trial court for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole or a sentence with a minimum of 20 to 25 years and a maximum of life. In light of our conclusion, the remaining penalty phase claims are academic.
Accordingly, the judgment should be modified by vacating the sentence of death and remitting to Supreme Court, Suffolk County {**3 NY3d at 132}for resentencing in accordance with CPL 470.30 (5) (c) and Penal Law §§ 60.06 and 70.00 and, as so modified, affirmed.
