UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Rhode Island v. Innis

466 US 291 (1980)

MR. JUSTICE STEWART DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 474, 1I6 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct.1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974, the Court held that, once a defendant in custody asks to speak with a lawyer all interrogation must cease until a lawyer is present. The issue in this case is whether the respondent was “interrogated” in violation of the standards promulgated in the Miranda opinion.

I

On the night of January 12, 1975, John Mulvaney, a Providence, R.I., taxicab driver, disappeared after being dispatched to pick up a customer. His body was discovered four days later buried in a shallow grave in Coventry, R.I. He had died from a shotgun blast aimed at the back of his head.

On January 17, 1975, shortly after midnight, the Providence police received a telephone call from Gerald Aubin, also a taxicab driver, who reported that he had just been robbed by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun. Aubin further reported that he had dropped off his assailant near Rhode Island College in a section of Providence known as Mount Pleasant. While at the Providence police station waiting to give a statement, Aubin noticed a picture of his assailant on a bulletin board. Aubin so informed one of the police officers present. The officer prepared a photo array, and again Aubin identified a picture of the same person. That person was the respondent. Shortly thereafter, the Providence police began a search of the Mount Pleasant area.

At approximately 4:30 a.m. on the same dated, Patrolman Lovell, while cruising the streets of Mount Pleasant in a patrol car, spotted the respondent standing in the street facing him. When Patrolman Lovell stopped his car, the respondent walked towards it. Patrolman Lovell then arrested the respondent, who was unarmed, and advised him of his so-called Miranda rights. While the two men waited in the patrol car for other police officers to arrive, Patrolman Lovell did not converse with the respondent other than to respond to the latter’s request for a cigarette.

Within minutes, Sergeant Sears arrived at the scene of the arrest, and he also gave the respondent the Miranda warnings. Immediately thereafter, Captain Leyden and other police officers arrived. [Captain Leyden advised the respondent of his Miranda rights. The respondent stated that he understood those rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer.] Captain Leyden then directed that the respondent be placed in a “caged wagon,” a four door police car with a wire screen mesh between the front and rear seats, and be driven to the central police station. Three officers, Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna, were assigned to accompany the respondent to the central station. They placed the respondent in the vehicle and shut the doors. Captain Leyden then instructed the officers not to question the respondent or intimidate or coerce him in any way. The three officers then entered the vehicle, and it departed.

While en route to the central station, Patrolman Gleckman initiated a conversation with Patrolman McKenna concerning the missing shotgun.¹1. As Patrolman Gleckman later testified:

“A. At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman McKenna stating that I frequent this area while on patrol and [that because a school for handicapped children is located nearby,] there’s a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.” App 443 – 44.

Patrolman McKenna apparently shared his fellow officer’s concern:

“A. I more or less concurred with him [Gleckman] that it was a safety factor and that we should, you know, continue to search for the weapon and try to find it.” Id., at 53.

While Patrolman Williams said nothing, he overheard the conversation between the two officers:

“A. He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little – I believe he said a girl – would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.” Id, at 59.

The respondent then interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located. At this point, Patrolman McKenna radioed back to Captain Leyden that they were returning to the scene of the arrest, and that the respondent would inform them of the location of the gun. At the time the respondent indicated that the officers should turn back, they had traveled no more than a mile, a trip encompassing only a few minutes.

The Police vehicle then returned to the scene of the arrest where a search for the shotgun was in progress. There, Captain Leyden again advised the respondent of his Miranda rights. The respondent replied that he understood those rights but that he “wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the school.” The respondent then led the police to a nearby field, where he pointed out the shotgun under some rocks by the side of the road.

II

In its Miranda opinion, the Court concluded that in the context of “custodial interrogation” certain procedural safeguards are necessary to protect a defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. More specifically, the Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-in-crimination.” 384 US, at 444, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974. Those safeguards included the now familiar Miranda warnings – namely, that the defendant be informed “that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires,” – or their equivalent. Id., at 479, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974.

The Court in the Miranda opinion also outlined in some detail the consequences that would result if a defendant sought to invoke those procedural safeguards. With regard to the right to the presence of counsel, the Court noted:

“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear… If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police they must respect his decision to remain silent.” Id., at 473 – 474, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974.

In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the respondent was fully informed of his Miranda rights and that he invoked his Miranda right to counsel when he told Captain Leyden that he wished to consult with a lawyer. It is also uncontested that the respondent was “in custody” while being transported to the police station.

The issue, therefore, is whether the respondent was “interrogated” by the police officers in violation of the respondent’s undisputed right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer. In resolving this issue, we first define the term “interrogation” under Miranda before turning to a consideration of the facts of this case.

A

The starting point for defining “interrogation” in this context is, of course, the Court’s Miranda opinion. There the Court observed that “[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id., at 444, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974 (emphasis added). This passage and other references throughout the opinion to “questioning” might suggest that the Miranda rules were to apply only to those police interrogation practices that involve express questioning of a defendant while in custody.

The case thus boils down to whether, in the context of a brief conversation, the officers should have known that the respondent would suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating response. Given the fact that the entire conversation appears to have consisted of no more than a few offhand remarks, we cannot say that the officers should have known that it was reasonably likely that Innis would so respond. This is not a case where the police carried on a lengthy harangue in the presence of the suspect. Nor does the record support the respondent’s contention that, under the circumstances, the officers’ comments are particularly “evocative.” It is our view, therefore, that the respondent was not subjected by the police to words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from him.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, in short, in equating “subtle compulsion” with interrogation. That the officers’ comments struck a responsive chord is readily apparent. Thus, it may be said, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did say, that the respondent was subjected to “subtle compulsion.” But that is not the end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a suspect’s incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. This was not established in the present case.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered. (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Omitted)