I<\/b><\/p>\r\nWhile the Republican National Convention was taking place in Dallas in 1984, respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration dubbed the \u201cRepublican War Chest Tour.\u201d As explained in literature distributed by the demonstrators and in speeches made by them, the purpose of this event was to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and of certain Dallas-based corporations. The demonstrators marched through the Dallas streets, chanting political slogans and stopping at several corporate locations to stage \u201cdie-ins\u201d intended to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war. On several occasions they spray-painted the walls of buildings and overturned potted plants, but Johnson himself took no part in such activities. He did, however, accept an American flag handed to him by a fellow protester who had taken it from a flagpole outside one of the targeted buildings. The demonstration ended in front of Dallas City Hall, where Johnson unfurled the American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire. While the flag burned, the protestors chanted, \u201cAmerica, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.\u201d After the demonstrators dispersed, a witness to the flag-burning collected the flag\u2019s remains and buried them in his backyard. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, though several witnesses testified that they had been seriously offended by the flag-burning.\r\n\r\nOf the approximately 100 demonstrators, Johnson alone was charged with a crime. The only criminal offense with which he was charged was the desecration of a venerated object in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. 42.09 (a)(3) (1989). After a trial, he was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas affirmed Johnson\u2019s conviction, 706 S.W.2d 120 (1986), but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, 755 S.W.2d 92 (1988), holding that the State could not, consistent with the First Amendment, punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances.\r\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\r\nThe First Amendment literally forbids the abridgement only of \u201cspeech,\u201d but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word. While we have rejected \u201cthe view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,\u201d United States v. O\u2019Brien, supra,<\/i> at 376, we have acknowledged that conduct may be \u201csufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\u201d Spence, supra,<\/i> at 409.\r\n\r\nIn deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether \u201c[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.\u201d 418 U.S., at 410-411. Hence, we have recognized the expressive nature of students\u2019 wearing of black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., <\/i>393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969); of a sit-in by blacks in a \u201cwhites only\u201d area to protest segregation, Brown v. Louisiana,<\/i> 383 U.S. 131, 141-142 (1966); of the wearing of American military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American military involvement in Vietnam, Schacht v. United States, <\/i>398 U.S. 58 (1970); and of picketing about a wide variety of causes, see e.g., Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., <\/i>391 U.S. 308, 313-314 (1968); United States v. Grace, <\/i>461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983).\r\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\r\n
A<\/b><\/p>\r\nTexas claims that its interest in preventing breaches of the peace justifies Johnson\u2019s conviction for flag desecration. However, no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of Johnson\u2019s burning of the flag. *** The only evidence offered by the State at trial to show the reaction to Johnson\u2019s actions was the testimony of several persons who had been seriously offended by the flag-burning.\r\n\r\nThe State\u2019s position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a principal \u201cfunction of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.\u201d Terminiello v. Chicago, <\/i>337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). See also Cox v. Louisiana,<\/i> 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist.,<\/i> 393 U.S., at 508-509; Coates v. Cincinnati,<\/i> 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,<\/i> 458 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988).***\r\n\r\nThus, we have not permitted the Government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the expression \u201cis directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.\u201d Brandenburg v. Ohio,<\/i> 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (reviewing circumstances surrounding rally and speeches by Ku Klux Klan). To accept Texas\u2019 arguments that it need only demonstrate \u201cthe potential for a breach of the peace,\u201d Brief for Petitioner 37, and that every flag-burning necessarily possesses that potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg.<\/i> This we decline to do.\r\n\r\nNor does Johnson\u2019s expressive conduct fall within that small class of \u201cfighting words\u201d that are \u201clikely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.\u201d Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,<\/i> 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942). No reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson\u2019s generalize expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. See id.,<\/i> at 572-573; Cantwell v. Connecticut,<\/i> 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, supra,<\/i> at 745 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).\r\n\r\nWe thus conclude that the State\u2019s interest in maintaining order is not implicated on these facts.\r\n
***<\/p>\r\n
B<\/b><\/p>\r\nThe State also asserts an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. In Spence, <\/i>we acknowledged that the Government\u2019s interest in preserving the flag\u2019s special symbolic value \u201cis directly related to expression in the context of activity\u201d such as affixing a peace symbol to a flag. 418 U.S., at 414, n. 8. We are equally persuaded that this interest is related to expression in the case of Johnson\u2019s burning of the flag. The State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive concepts, or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, we do not enjoy unity as a Nation. These concerns blossom only when a person\u2019s treatment of the flag communicates some message, and thus are related \u201cto the suppression of free expression\u201d within the meaning of O\u2019Brien. We are thus outside of O\u2019Brien\u2019s test altogether.\r\n
IV<\/b><\/p>\r\nIt remains to consider whether the State\u2019s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justifies Johnson\u2019s conviction.\r\n\r\nAs in Spence, <\/i>\u201c[w]e are confronted with a case of prosecution for the expression of an idea through activity,\u201d and \u201c[a]ccordingly, we must examine with particular care the interests advanced by [petitioner] to support its prosecution.\u201d 418 U.S., at 411. Johnson was not, we add, prosecuted for the expression of just any idea; he was prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the core of our First Amendment values. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, supra,<\/i> at 318; Frisby v. Schultz, <\/i>487 U.S., <\/u>, <\/u> (1988).\r\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\r\nIf there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.\r\n
* * *<\/p>\r\nWe have not recognized an exception to this principle even where our flag has been involved.\r\n
* * *<\/p>\r\nIn short, nothing in our precedents suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it. To bring its argument outside our precedents, Texas attempts to convince us that even if its interest in preserving the flag\u2019s symbolic role does not allow it to prohibit words or some expressive conduct critical of the flag, it does permit it to forbid the outright destruction of the flag. The State\u2019s argument cannot depend here on the distinction between written or spoken words and nonverbal conduct. That distinction, we have shown, is of no moment where the nonverbal conduct is expressive, as it is here, and where the regulation of that conduct is related to expression, as it is here. See supra, at 4-5. In addition, both Barnette<\/i> and Spence<\/i> involved expressive conduct, not only verbal communication, and both found that conduct protected.\r\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\r\nWe are fortified in today\u2019s conclusion by our conviction that forbidding criminal punishment for conduct such as Johnson\u2019s will not endanger the special role played by our flag or the feelings it inspires. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, we submit that nobody can suppose that this one gesture of an unknown man will change our Nation\u2019s attitude towards its flag. See Abrams v. United States, <\/i>250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, Texas\u2019 argument that the burning of an American flag \u201cis an act having a high likelihood to cause a breach of the peace,\u201d Brief for Petitioner 31, quoting Sutherland v. DeWulf,<\/i> 323 F.Supp. 740, 745 (SD I11. 1971) (citation omitted), and its statute\u2019s implicit assumption that physical mistreatment of the flag will lead to \u201cserious offense,\u201d tend to confirm that the flag\u2019s special role is not in danger; if it were, no one would riot or take offense because a flag had been burned.\r\n\r\nWe are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag\u2019s deservedly cherished place in our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson\u2019s is a sign and source of our strength.\r\n
* * *<\/p>\r\n
V<\/b><\/p>\r\nJohnson was convicted for engaging in expressive conduct. The State\u2019s interest in preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction because Johnson\u2019s conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Nor does the State\u2019s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justify his criminal conviction for engaging in political expression. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore affirmed.","rendered":"SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\n
TEXAS v. JOHNSON<\/b>
\n<\/b>491 U.S. 397(1989)<\/b><\/h3>\n
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.<\/p>\n
After publicly burning an American flag as a means of political protest, Gregory Lee Johnson was convicted of desecrating a flag in violation of Texas law. This case presents the question whether his conviction is consistent with the First Amendment. We hold that it is not.<\/p>\n
I<\/b><\/p>\n
While the Republican National Convention was taking place in Dallas in 1984, respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration dubbed the \u201cRepublican War Chest Tour.\u201d As explained in literature distributed by the demonstrators and in speeches made by them, the purpose of this event was to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and of certain Dallas-based corporations. The demonstrators marched through the Dallas streets, chanting political slogans and stopping at several corporate locations to stage \u201cdie-ins\u201d intended to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war. On several occasions they spray-painted the walls of buildings and overturned potted plants, but Johnson himself took no part in such activities. He did, however, accept an American flag handed to him by a fellow protester who had taken it from a flagpole outside one of the targeted buildings. The demonstration ended in front of Dallas City Hall, where Johnson unfurled the American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire. While the flag burned, the protestors chanted, \u201cAmerica, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.\u201d After the demonstrators dispersed, a witness to the flag-burning collected the flag\u2019s remains and buried them in his backyard. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, though several witnesses testified that they had been seriously offended by the flag-burning.<\/p>\n
Of the approximately 100 demonstrators, Johnson alone was charged with a crime. The only criminal offense with which he was charged was the desecration of a venerated object in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. 42.09 (a)(3) (1989). After a trial, he was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas affirmed Johnson\u2019s conviction, 706 S.W.2d 120 (1986), but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, 755 S.W.2d 92 (1988), holding that the State could not, consistent with the First Amendment, punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\n
The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgement only of \u201cspeech,\u201d but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word. While we have rejected \u201cthe view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,\u201d United States v. O\u2019Brien, supra,<\/i> at 376, we have acknowledged that conduct may be \u201csufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\u201d Spence, supra,<\/i> at 409.<\/p>\n
In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether \u201c[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.\u201d 418 U.S., at 410-411. Hence, we have recognized the expressive nature of students\u2019 wearing of black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., <\/i>393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969); of a sit-in by blacks in a \u201cwhites only\u201d area to protest segregation, Brown v. Louisiana,<\/i> 383 U.S. 131, 141-142 (1966); of the wearing of American military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American military involvement in Vietnam, Schacht v. United States, <\/i>398 U.S. 58 (1970); and of picketing about a wide variety of causes, see e.g., Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., <\/i>391 U.S. 308, 313-314 (1968); United States v. Grace, <\/i>461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983).<\/p>\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\n
A<\/b><\/p>\n
Texas claims that its interest in preventing breaches of the peace justifies Johnson\u2019s conviction for flag desecration. However, no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of Johnson\u2019s burning of the flag. *** The only evidence offered by the State at trial to show the reaction to Johnson\u2019s actions was the testimony of several persons who had been seriously offended by the flag-burning.<\/p>\n
The State\u2019s position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a principal \u201cfunction of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.\u201d Terminiello v. Chicago, <\/i>337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). See also Cox v. Louisiana,<\/i> 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist.,<\/i> 393 U.S., at 508-509; Coates v. Cincinnati,<\/i> 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,<\/i> 458 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988).***<\/p>\n
Thus, we have not permitted the Government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the expression \u201cis directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.\u201d Brandenburg v. Ohio,<\/i> 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (reviewing circumstances surrounding rally and speeches by Ku Klux Klan). To accept Texas\u2019 arguments that it need only demonstrate \u201cthe potential for a breach of the peace,\u201d Brief for Petitioner 37, and that every flag-burning necessarily possesses that potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg.<\/i> This we decline to do.<\/p>\n
Nor does Johnson\u2019s expressive conduct fall within that small class of \u201cfighting words\u201d that are \u201clikely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.\u201d Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,<\/i> 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942). No reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson\u2019s generalize expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. See id.,<\/i> at 572-573; Cantwell v. Connecticut,<\/i> 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, supra,<\/i> at 745 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).<\/p>\n
We thus conclude that the State\u2019s interest in maintaining order is not implicated on these facts.<\/p>\n
***<\/p>\n
B<\/b><\/p>\n
The State also asserts an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. In Spence, <\/i>we acknowledged that the Government\u2019s interest in preserving the flag\u2019s special symbolic value \u201cis directly related to expression in the context of activity\u201d such as affixing a peace symbol to a flag. 418 U.S., at 414, n. 8. We are equally persuaded that this interest is related to expression in the case of Johnson\u2019s burning of the flag. The State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive concepts, or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, we do not enjoy unity as a Nation. These concerns blossom only when a person\u2019s treatment of the flag communicates some message, and thus are related \u201cto the suppression of free expression\u201d within the meaning of O\u2019Brien. We are thus outside of O\u2019Brien\u2019s test altogether.<\/p>\n
IV<\/b><\/p>\n
It remains to consider whether the State\u2019s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justifies Johnson\u2019s conviction.<\/p>\n
As in Spence, <\/i>\u201c[w]e are confronted with a case of prosecution for the expression of an idea through activity,\u201d and \u201c[a]ccordingly, we must examine with particular care the interests advanced by [petitioner] to support its prosecution.\u201d 418 U.S., at 411. Johnson was not, we add, prosecuted for the expression of just any idea; he was prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the core of our First Amendment values. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, supra,<\/i> at 318; Frisby v. Schultz, <\/i>487 U.S., <\/u>, <\/u> (1988).<\/p>\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\n
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
We have not recognized an exception to this principle even where our flag has been involved.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
In short, nothing in our precedents suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it. To bring its argument outside our precedents, Texas attempts to convince us that even if its interest in preserving the flag\u2019s symbolic role does not allow it to prohibit words or some expressive conduct critical of the flag, it does permit it to forbid the outright destruction of the flag. The State\u2019s argument cannot depend here on the distinction between written or spoken words and nonverbal conduct. That distinction, we have shown, is of no moment where the nonverbal conduct is expressive, as it is here, and where the regulation of that conduct is related to expression, as it is here. See supra, at 4-5. In addition, both Barnette<\/i> and Spence<\/i> involved expressive conduct, not only verbal communication, and both found that conduct protected.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\n
We are fortified in today\u2019s conclusion by our conviction that forbidding criminal punishment for conduct such as Johnson\u2019s will not endanger the special role played by our flag or the feelings it inspires. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, we submit that nobody can suppose that this one gesture of an unknown man will change our Nation\u2019s attitude towards its flag. See Abrams v. United States, <\/i>250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, Texas\u2019 argument that the burning of an American flag \u201cis an act having a high likelihood to cause a breach of the peace,\u201d Brief for Petitioner 31, quoting Sutherland v. DeWulf,<\/i> 323 F.Supp. 740, 745 (SD I11. 1971) (citation omitted), and its statute\u2019s implicit assumption that physical mistreatment of the flag will lead to \u201cserious offense,\u201d tend to confirm that the flag\u2019s special role is not in danger; if it were, no one would riot or take offense because a flag had been burned.<\/p>\n
We are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag\u2019s deservedly cherished place in our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson\u2019s is a sign and source of our strength.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/p>\n
V<\/b><\/p>\n
Johnson was convicted for engaging in expressive conduct. The State\u2019s interest in preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction because Johnson\u2019s conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Nor does the State\u2019s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justify his criminal conviction for engaging in political expression. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore affirmed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53384,"menu_order":3,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-139","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":112,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/139","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53384"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/139\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":314,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/139\/revisions\/314"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/112"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/139\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=139"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=139"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=139"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=139"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}