\u00a0<\/b>Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.<\/b><\/p>\r\nAt a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, a high school principal saw some of her students unfurl a large banner conveying a message she reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use. Consistent with established school policy prohibiting such messages at school events, the principal directed the students to take down the banner. One student\u2014among those who had brought the banner to the event\u2014refused to do so. The principal confiscated the banner and later suspended the student. The Ninth Circuit held that the principal\u2019s actions violated the First Amendment<\/a> , and that the student could sue the principal for damages.\r\n\r\nOur cases make clear that students do not \u201cshed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.\u201d Tinker<\/i> v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.<\/i>, 393 U.\u00a0S. 503<\/a>, 506 (1969) . At the same time, we have held that \u201cthe constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,\u201d Bethel School Dist. No. 403<\/i> v. Fraser<\/i>, 478 U.\u00a0S. 675<\/a>, 682 (1986) , and that the rights of students \u201cmust be \u2018applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.\u2019\u00a0\u201d Hazelwood School Dist.<\/i> v. Kuhlmeier<\/i>, 484 U.\u00a0S. 260<\/a>, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker<\/i>, supra,<\/i> at 506). Consistent with these principles, we hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use. We conclude that the school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment<\/a> by confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending the student responsible for it.\r\n I<\/p>\r\nOn January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah. The torchbearers were to proceed along a street in front of Juneau-Douglas High School (JDHS) while school was in session. Petitioner Deborah Morse, the school principal, decided to permit staff and students to participate in the Torch Relay as an approved social event or class trip. App. 22\u201323. Students were allowed to leave class to observe the relay from either side of the street. Teachers and administrative officials monitored the students\u2019 actions.\r\n\r\nRespondent Joseph Frederick, a JDHS senior, was late to school that day. When he arrived, he joined his friends (all but one of whom were JDHS students) across the street from the school to watch the event. Not all the students waited patiently. Some became rambunctious, throwing plastic cola bottles and snowballs and scuffling with their classmates. As the torchbearers and camera crews passed by, Frederick and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase: \u201cBONG HiTS 4 JESUS.\u201d App. to Pet. for Cert. 70a. The large banner was easily readable by the students on the other side of the street.\r\n\r\nPrincipal Morse immediately crossed the street and demanded that the banner be taken down. Everyone but Frederick complied. Morse confiscated the banner and told Frederick to report to her office, where she suspended him for 10 days. Morse later explained that she told Frederick to take the banner down because she thought it encouraged illegal drug use, in violation of established school policy. Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520 states: \u201cThe Board specifically prohibits any assembly or public expression that \u2026 advocates the use of substances that are illegal to minors\u00a0\u2026\u00a0.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 53a. In addition, Juneau School Board Policy No. 5850 subjects \u201c[p]upils who participate in approved social events and class trips\u201d to the same student conduct rules that apply during the regular school program. Id.,<\/i> at 58a.\r\n * * * * *<\/p>\r\nWe granted certiorari on two questions: whether Frederick had a First Amendment<\/a><\/span> right to wield his banner, and, if so, whether that right was so clearly established that the principal may be held liable for damages. 549 U.\u00a0S. ___ (2006). We resolve the first question against Frederick, and therefore have no occasion to reach the second.<\/a> 1<\/a><\/span>\r\n II<\/p>\r\nAt the outset, we reject Frederick\u2019s argument that this is not a school speech case\u2014as has every other authority to address the question\u2026. Teachers and administrators were interspersed among the students and charged with supervising them. The high school band and cheerleaders performed. Frederick, standing among other JDHS students across the street from the school, directed his banner toward the school, making it plainly visible to most students. Under these circumstances, we agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot \u201cstand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.\u201d Id., <\/i>at 63a. There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school-speech precedents, see Porter <\/i>v. Ascension Parish School Bd.<\/i>, 393 F.\u00a03d 608, 615, n. 22 (CA5 2004), but not on these facts.\r\n III<\/p>\r\nThe message on Frederick\u2019s banner is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all. Frederick himself claimed \u201cthat the words were just nonsense meant to attract television cameras.\u201d 439 F.\u00a03d, at 1117\u20131118. But Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use and that interpretation is plainly a reasonable one.\r\n\r\nAs Morse later explained in a declaration, when she saw the sign, she thought that \u201cthe reference to a \u2018bong hit\u2019 would be widely understood by high school students and others as referring to smoking marijuana.\u201d App. 24. She further believed that \u201cdisplay of the banner would be construed by students, District personnel, parents and others witnessing the display of the banner, as advocating or promoting illegal drug use\u201d\u2014in violation of school policy. Id.,<\/i> at 25; see ibid. <\/i>(\u201cI told Frederick and the other members of his group to put the banner down because I felt that it violated the [school] policy against displaying \u2026 material that advertises or promotes use of illegal drugs\u201d).\r\n\r\nWe agree with Morse. At least two interpretations of the words on the banner demonstrate that the sign advocated the use of illegal drugs. First, the phrase could be interpreted as an imperative: \u201c[Take] bong hits \u2026\u201d\u2014a message equivalent, as Morse explained in her declaration, to \u201csmoke marijuana\u201d or \u201cuse an illegal drug.\u201d Alternatively, the phrase could be viewed as celebrating drug use\u2014\u201cbong hits [are a good thing],\u201d or \u201c[we take] bong hits\u201d\u2014and we discern no meaningful distinction between celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of fellow students and outright advocacy or promotion. See Guiles <\/i>v. Marineau<\/i>, 461 F.\u00a03d 320, 328 (CA2 2006) (discussing the present case and describing the sign as \u201ca clearly pro-drug banner\u201d).\r\n IV<\/p>\r\nThe question thus becomes whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment<\/a> <\/span>, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may.\r\n\r\nEven more to the point, these cases also recognize that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an \u201cimportant\u2014indeed, perhaps compelling\u201d interest. Id.,<\/i> at 661. Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the health and well-being of young people:\r\n\r\n\u201cSchool years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe. Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound; children grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly poor. And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 661\u2013662 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\r\n * * * * *<\/p>\r\nCongress has declared that part of a school\u2019s job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use. It has provided billions of dollars to support state and local drug-prevention programs, Brief for United States as Amicus<\/i> Curiae<\/i> 1, and required that schools receiving federal funds under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 certify that their drug prevention programs \u201cconvey a clear and consistent message that \u2026 the illegal use of drugs [is] wrong and harmful.\u201d 20 U.\u00a0S.\u00a0C. \u00a77114(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).\r\n\r\nThousands of school boards throughout the country\u2014including JDHS\u2014have adopted policies aimed at effectuating this message our rigid imminence requirement ought to be relaxed at schools\u201d). And even the dissent recognizes that the issues here are close enough that the principal should not be held liable in damages, but should instead enjoy qualified immunity for her actions. See post, <\/i>at 1. Stripped of rhetorical flourishes, then, the debate between the dissent and this opinion is less about constitutional first principles than about whether Frederick\u2019s banner constitutes promotion of illegal drug use. We have explained our view that it does. The dissent\u2019s contrary view on that relatively narrow question hardly justifies sounding the First Amendment bugle.\r\n * * * * *<\/p>\r\nSchool principals have a difficult job, and a vitally important one. When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedly unfurled his banner, Morse had to decide to act\u2014or not act\u2014on the spot. It was reasonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug use\u2014in violation of established school policy\u2014and that failing to act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge, including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use. The First Amendment<\/a> does not require schools to tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to those dangers.\r\n\r\nThe judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\r\n\r\nIt is so ordered.<\/i>","rendered":" \u00a0<\/b>Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.<\/b><\/p>\n At a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, a high school principal saw some of her students unfurl a large banner conveying a message she reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use. Consistent with established school policy prohibiting such messages at school events, the principal directed the students to take down the banner. One student\u2014among those who had brought the banner to the event\u2014refused to do so. The principal confiscated the banner and later suspended the student. The Ninth Circuit held that the principal\u2019s actions violated the First Amendment<\/a> , and that the student could sue the principal for damages.<\/p>\n Our cases make clear that students do not \u201cshed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.\u201d Tinker<\/i> v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.<\/i>, 393 U.\u00a0S. 503<\/a>, 506 (1969) . At the same time, we have held that \u201cthe constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,\u201d Bethel School Dist. No. 403<\/i> v. Fraser<\/i>, 478 U.\u00a0S. 675<\/a>, 682 (1986) , and that the rights of students \u201cmust be \u2018applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.\u2019\u00a0\u201d Hazelwood School Dist.<\/i> v. Kuhlmeier<\/i>, 484 U.\u00a0S. 260<\/a>, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker<\/i>, supra,<\/i> at 506). Consistent with these principles, we hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use. We conclude that the school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment<\/a> by confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending the student responsible for it.<\/p>\n I<\/p>\n On January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah. The torchbearers were to proceed along a street in front of Juneau-Douglas High School (JDHS) while school was in session. Petitioner Deborah Morse, the school principal, decided to permit staff and students to participate in the Torch Relay as an approved social event or class trip. App. 22\u201323. Students were allowed to leave class to observe the relay from either side of the street. Teachers and administrative officials monitored the students\u2019 actions.<\/p>\n Respondent Joseph Frederick, a JDHS senior, was late to school that day. When he arrived, he joined his friends (all but one of whom were JDHS students) across the street from the school to watch the event. Not all the students waited patiently. Some became rambunctious, throwing plastic cola bottles and snowballs and scuffling with their classmates. As the torchbearers and camera crews passed by, Frederick and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the phrase: \u201cBONG HiTS 4 JESUS.\u201d App. to Pet. for Cert. 70a. The large banner was easily readable by the students on the other side of the street.<\/p>\n Principal Morse immediately crossed the street and demanded that the banner be taken down. Everyone but Frederick complied. Morse confiscated the banner and told Frederick to report to her office, where she suspended him for 10 days. Morse later explained that she told Frederick to take the banner down because she thought it encouraged illegal drug use, in violation of established school policy. Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520 states: \u201cThe Board specifically prohibits any assembly or public expression that \u2026 advocates the use of substances that are illegal to minors\u00a0\u2026\u00a0.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 53a. In addition, Juneau School Board Policy No. 5850 subjects \u201c[p]upils who participate in approved social events and class trips\u201d to the same student conduct rules that apply during the regular school program. Id.,<\/i> at 58a.<\/p>\n * * * * *<\/p>\n We granted certiorari on two questions: whether Frederick had a First Amendment<\/a><\/span> right to wield his banner, and, if so, whether that right was so clearly established that the principal may be held liable for damages. 549 U.\u00a0S. ___ (2006). We resolve the first question against Frederick, and therefore have no occasion to reach the second.<\/a> 1<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n II<\/p>\n At the outset, we reject Frederick\u2019s argument that this is not a school speech case\u2014as has every other authority to address the question\u2026. Teachers and administrators were interspersed among the students and charged with supervising them. The high school band and cheerleaders performed. Frederick, standing among other JDHS students across the street from the school, directed his banner toward the school, making it plainly visible to most students. Under these circumstances, we agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot \u201cstand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.\u201d Id., <\/i>at 63a. There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school-speech precedents, see Porter <\/i>v. Ascension Parish School Bd.<\/i>, 393 F.\u00a03d 608, 615, n. 22 (CA5 2004), but not on these facts.<\/p>\n III<\/p>\n The message on Frederick\u2019s banner is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all. Frederick himself claimed \u201cthat the words were just nonsense meant to attract television cameras.\u201d 439 F.\u00a03d, at 1117\u20131118. But Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use and that interpretation is plainly a reasonable one.<\/p>\n As Morse later explained in a declaration, when she saw the sign, she thought that \u201cthe reference to a \u2018bong hit\u2019 would be widely understood by high school students and others as referring to smoking marijuana.\u201d App. 24. She further believed that \u201cdisplay of the banner would be construed by students, District personnel, parents and others witnessing the display of the banner, as advocating or promoting illegal drug use\u201d\u2014in violation of school policy. Id.,<\/i> at 25; see ibid. <\/i>(\u201cI told Frederick and the other members of his group to put the banner down because I felt that it violated the [school] policy against displaying \u2026 material that advertises or promotes use of illegal drugs\u201d).<\/p>\n We agree with Morse. At least two interpretations of the words on the banner demonstrate that the sign advocated the use of illegal drugs. First, the phrase could be interpreted as an imperative: \u201c[Take] bong hits \u2026\u201d\u2014a message equivalent, as Morse explained in her declaration, to \u201csmoke marijuana\u201d or \u201cuse an illegal drug.\u201d Alternatively, the phrase could be viewed as celebrating drug use\u2014\u201cbong hits [are a good thing],\u201d or \u201c[we take] bong hits\u201d\u2014and we discern no meaningful distinction between celebrating illegal drug use in the midst of fellow students and outright advocacy or promotion. See Guiles <\/i>v. Marineau<\/i>, 461 F.\u00a03d 320, 328 (CA2 2006) (discussing the present case and describing the sign as \u201ca clearly pro-drug banner\u201d).<\/p>\n IV<\/p>\n The question thus becomes whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment<\/a> <\/span>, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may.<\/p>\n Even more to the point, these cases also recognize that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an \u201cimportant\u2014indeed, perhaps compelling\u201d interest. Id.,<\/i> at 661. Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the health and well-being of young people:<\/p>\n \u201cSchool years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe. Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound; children grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is depressingly poor. And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 661\u2013662 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).<\/p>\n * * * * *<\/p>\n Congress has declared that part of a school\u2019s job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use. It has provided billions of dollars to support state and local drug-prevention programs, Brief for United States as Amicus<\/i> Curiae<\/i> 1, and required that schools receiving federal funds under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 certify that their drug prevention programs \u201cconvey a clear and consistent message that \u2026 the illegal use of drugs [is] wrong and harmful.\u201d 20 U.\u00a0S.\u00a0C. \u00a77114(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).<\/p>\n Thousands of school boards throughout the country\u2014including JDHS\u2014have adopted policies aimed at effectuating this message our rigid imminence requirement ought to be relaxed at schools\u201d). And even the dissent recognizes that the issues here are close enough that the principal should not be held liable in damages, but should instead enjoy qualified immunity for her actions. See post, <\/i>at 1. Stripped of rhetorical flourishes, then, the debate between the dissent and this opinion is less about constitutional first principles than about whether Frederick\u2019s banner constitutes promotion of illegal drug use. We have explained our view that it does. The dissent\u2019s contrary view on that relatively narrow question hardly justifies sounding the First Amendment bugle.<\/p>\n * * * * *<\/p>\n School principals have a difficult job, and a vitally important one. When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedly unfurled his banner, Morse had to decide to act\u2014or not act\u2014on the spot. It was reasonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug use\u2014in violation of established school policy\u2014and that failing to act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge, including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use. The First Amendment<\/a> does not require schools to tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to those dangers.<\/p>\n The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.<\/p>\n It is so ordered.<\/i><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53384,"menu_order":4,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-141","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":112,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/141","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53384"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/141\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":316,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/141\/revisions\/316"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/112"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/141\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=141"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=141"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=141"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=141"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\n
DEBORAH MORSE, <\/b>et\u00a0al. <\/b>v.<\/i> JOSEPH FREDERICK<\/b><\/h3>\n
551 US 393 (2007)<\/b><\/h3>\n