{"id":143,"date":"2018-08-09T17:12:34","date_gmt":"2018-08-09T17:12:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/?post_type=chapter&p=143"},"modified":"2018-08-29T19:05:14","modified_gmt":"2018-08-29T19:05:14","slug":"snyder-v-phelps","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/chapter\/snyder-v-phelps\/","title":{"raw":"Snyder v. Phelps","rendered":"Snyder v. Phelps"},"content":{"raw":"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/b><\/h2>\r\n

SNYDER v. PHELPS\r\n562 U.S. 443 (2011)<\/b><\/h3>\r\nNo. 09\u2013751.\u2003Argued October 6, 2010\u2014Decided March 2, 2011\r\n\r\nFor the past 20 years, the congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church has picketed military funerals to communicate its belief that God hates the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America\u2019s military. The church\u2019s picketing has also condemned the Catholic Church for scandals involving its clergy. Fred Phelps, who founded the church, and six Westboro Baptist parishioners (all relatives of Phelps) traveled to Maryland to picket the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. The picketing took place on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held, in accordance with guidance from local law enforcement officers. The picketers peacefully displayed their signs\u2014stating, e.g.,<\/i> \u201cThank God for Dead Soldiers,\u201d \u201cFags Doom Nations,\u201d \u201cAmerica is Doomed,\u201d \u201cPriests Rape Boys,\u201d and \u201cYou\u2019re Going to Hell\u201d\u2014for about 30 minutes before the funeral began. Matthew Snyder\u2019s father (Snyder), petitioner here, saw the tops of the picketers\u2019 signs when driving to the funeral, but did not learn what was written on the signs until watching a news broadcast later that night.\r\n\r\nSnyder filed a diversity action against Phelps, his daughters\u2014who participated in the picketing\u2014and the church (collectively Westboro) alleging, as relevant here, state tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. A jury held Westboro liable for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Westboro challenged the verdict as grossly excessive and sought judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the First Amendment fully protected its speech. The District Court reduced the punitive damages award, but left the verdict otherwise intact. The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Westboro\u2019s statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.\r\n\r\nHeld:<\/i>\u00a0The First Amendment shields Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case. Pp.\u00a05\u201315.\r\n\r\n(a) The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hustler Magazine, Inc.<\/i> v. Falwell<\/i>, 485 U. S. 46<\/a>, 50-51. Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. \u201c[S]peech on public issues occupies the \u2018\u00a0\u201chighest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values\u201d\u00a0\u2019 and is entitled to special protection.\u201d Connick<\/i> v. Myers<\/i>, 461 U. S. 138<\/a>, 145. Although the boundaries of what constitutes speech on matters of public concern are not well defined, this Court has said that speech is of public concern when it can \u201cbe fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,\u201d id.,<\/i> at 146, or when it \u201cis a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public,\u201d San Diego<\/i> v. Roe<\/i>, 543 U. S. 77<\/a>, 83\u201384. A statement\u2019s arguably \u201cinappropriate or controversial character \u2026 is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.\u201d Rankin<\/i> v. McPherson<\/i>, 483 U. S. 378<\/a>, 387. Pp.\u00a05\u20137.\r\n\r\nTo determine whether speech is of public or private concern, this Court must independently examine the \u201c\u00a0\u2018content, form, and context,\u2019\u00a0\u201d of the speech \u201c\u00a0\u2018as revealed by the whole record.\u2019\u00a0\u201d Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. <\/i>v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., <\/i>472 U. S. 749<\/a>, 761. In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all aspects of the speech. Pp.\u00a07\u20138.\r\n\r\nThe \u201ccontent\u201d of Westboro\u2019s signs plainly relates to public, rather than private, matters. The placards highlighted issues of public import\u2014the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of the Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy\u2014and Westboro conveyed its views on those issues in a manner designed to reach as broad a public audience as possible. Even if a few of the signs were viewed as containing messages related to a particular individual, that would not change the fact that the dominant theme of Westboro\u2019s demonstration spoke to broader public issues. P.\u00a08.\r\n\r\nThe \u201ccontext\u201d of the speech\u2014its connection with Matthew Snyder\u2019s funeral\u2014cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro\u2019s speech. The signs reflected Westboro\u2019s condemnation of much in modern society, and it cannot be argued that Westboro\u2019s use of speech on public issues was in any way contrived to insulate a personal attack on Snyder from liability. Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that the picketing did not represent Westboro\u2019s honestly held beliefs on public issues. Westboro may have chosen the picket location to increase publicity for its views, and its speech may have been particularly hurtful to Snyder. That does not mean that its speech should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection under the circumstances of this case. Pp.\u00a08\u201310.\r\n\r\nThat said, \u201c\u00a0\u2018[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.\u2019\u00a0\u201d Frisby<\/i> v. Schultz<\/i>, 487 U. S. 474<\/a>, 479. Westboro\u2019s choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government\u2019s regulatory reach\u2014it is \u201csubject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.\u201d Clark<\/i> v. Community for Creative Non-Violence<\/i>, 468 U. S. 288<\/a>, 293. The facts here are quite different, however, both with respect to the activity being regulated and the means of restricting those activities, from the few limited situations where the Court has concluded that the location of targeted picketing can be properly regulated under provisions deemed content neutral. Frisby<\/i>, supra,<\/i> at 477; Madsen<\/i> v. Women\u2019s Health Center, Inc.<\/i>, 512 U. S. 753<\/a>, 768, distinguished. Maryland now has a law restricting funeral picketing but that law was not in effect at the time of these events, so this Court has no occasion to consider whether that law is a \u201creasonable time, place, or manner restrictio[n]\u201d under the standards announced by this Court. Clark<\/i>, supra,<\/i> at 293. Pp.\u00a010\u201312.\r\n\r\nThe \u201cspecial protection\u201d afforded to what Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was \u201coutrageous\u201d for purposes of applying the state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. That would pose too great a danger that the jury would punish Westboro for its views on matters of public concern. For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside. Pp.\u00a012\u201313.\r\n\r\n(b)\u00a0Snyder also may not recover for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. He argues that he was a member of a captive audience at his son\u2019s funeral, but the captive audience doctrine\u2014which has been applied sparingly, see Rowan<\/i> v. Post Office Dept.<\/i>, 397 U. S. 728<\/a>, 736\u2013738; Frisby<\/i>, supra,<\/i> at 484\u2013485\u2014should not be expanded to the circumstances here. Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service, Snyder could see no more than the tops of the picketers\u2019 signs, and there is no indication that the picketing interfered with the funeral service itself. Pp.\u00a013\u201314.\r\n\r\n(c) Because the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion\u2014the allegedly unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish\u2014Snyder also cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts. P.\u00a014.\r\n\r\n(d) Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. It did not disrupt Mathew Snyder\u2019s funeral, and its choice to picket at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech. Because this Nation has chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that public debate is not stifled, Westboro must be shielded from tort liability for its picketing in this case. Pp.\u00a014\u201315.\r\n\r\n580 F.\u00a03d 206, affirmed.\r\n\r\nRoberts, C.\u00a0J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.","rendered":"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/b><\/h2>\n

SNYDER v. PHELPS
\n562 U.S. 443 (2011)<\/b><\/h3>\n

No. 09\u2013751.\u2003Argued October 6, 2010\u2014Decided March 2, 2011<\/p>\n

For the past 20 years, the congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church has picketed military funerals to communicate its belief that God hates the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America\u2019s military. The church\u2019s picketing has also condemned the Catholic Church for scandals involving its clergy. Fred Phelps, who founded the church, and six Westboro Baptist parishioners (all relatives of Phelps) traveled to Maryland to picket the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. The picketing took place on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held, in accordance with guidance from local law enforcement officers. The picketers peacefully displayed their signs\u2014stating, e.g.,<\/i> \u201cThank God for Dead Soldiers,\u201d \u201cFags Doom Nations,\u201d \u201cAmerica is Doomed,\u201d \u201cPriests Rape Boys,\u201d and \u201cYou\u2019re Going to Hell\u201d\u2014for about 30 minutes before the funeral began. Matthew Snyder\u2019s father (Snyder), petitioner here, saw the tops of the picketers\u2019 signs when driving to the funeral, but did not learn what was written on the signs until watching a news broadcast later that night.<\/p>\n

Snyder filed a diversity action against Phelps, his daughters\u2014who participated in the picketing\u2014and the church (collectively Westboro) alleging, as relevant here, state tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. A jury held Westboro liable for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Westboro challenged the verdict as grossly excessive and sought judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the First Amendment fully protected its speech. The District Court reduced the punitive damages award, but left the verdict otherwise intact. The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Westboro\u2019s statements were entitled to First Amendment protection because those statements were on matters of public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.<\/p>\n

Held:<\/i>\u00a0The First Amendment shields Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case. Pp.\u00a05\u201315.<\/p>\n

(a) The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hustler Magazine, Inc.<\/i> v. Falwell<\/i>, 485 U. S. 46<\/a>, 50-51. Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. \u201c[S]peech on public issues occupies the \u2018\u00a0\u201chighest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values\u201d\u00a0\u2019 and is entitled to special protection.\u201d Connick<\/i> v. Myers<\/i>, 461 U. S. 138<\/a>, 145. Although the boundaries of what constitutes speech on matters of public concern are not well defined, this Court has said that speech is of public concern when it can \u201cbe fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,\u201d id.,<\/i> at 146, or when it \u201cis a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public,\u201d San Diego<\/i> v. Roe<\/i>, 543 U. S. 77<\/a>, 83\u201384. A statement\u2019s arguably \u201cinappropriate or controversial character \u2026 is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.\u201d Rankin<\/i> v. McPherson<\/i>, 483 U. S. 378<\/a>, 387. Pp.\u00a05\u20137.<\/p>\n

To determine whether speech is of public or private concern, this Court must independently examine the \u201c\u00a0\u2018content, form, and context,\u2019\u00a0\u201d of the speech \u201c\u00a0\u2018as revealed by the whole record.\u2019\u00a0\u201d Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. <\/i>v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., <\/i>472 U. S. 749<\/a>, 761. In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all aspects of the speech. Pp.\u00a07\u20138.<\/p>\n

The \u201ccontent\u201d of Westboro\u2019s signs plainly relates to public, rather than private, matters. The placards highlighted issues of public import\u2014the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of the Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy\u2014and Westboro conveyed its views on those issues in a manner designed to reach as broad a public audience as possible. Even if a few of the signs were viewed as containing messages related to a particular individual, that would not change the fact that the dominant theme of Westboro\u2019s demonstration spoke to broader public issues. P.\u00a08.<\/p>\n

The \u201ccontext\u201d of the speech\u2014its connection with Matthew Snyder\u2019s funeral\u2014cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro\u2019s speech. The signs reflected Westboro\u2019s condemnation of much in modern society, and it cannot be argued that Westboro\u2019s use of speech on public issues was in any way contrived to insulate a personal attack on Snyder from liability. Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that the picketing did not represent Westboro\u2019s honestly held beliefs on public issues. Westboro may have chosen the picket location to increase publicity for its views, and its speech may have been particularly hurtful to Snyder. That does not mean that its speech should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection under the circumstances of this case. Pp.\u00a08\u201310.<\/p>\n

That said, \u201c\u00a0\u2018[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.\u2019\u00a0\u201d Frisby<\/i> v. Schultz<\/i>, 487 U. S. 474<\/a>, 479. Westboro\u2019s choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government\u2019s regulatory reach\u2014it is \u201csubject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.\u201d Clark<\/i> v. Community for Creative Non-Violence<\/i>, 468 U. S. 288<\/a>, 293. The facts here are quite different, however, both with respect to the activity being regulated and the means of restricting those activities, from the few limited situations where the Court has concluded that the location of targeted picketing can be properly regulated under provisions deemed content neutral. Frisby<\/i>, supra,<\/i> at 477; Madsen<\/i> v. Women\u2019s Health Center, Inc.<\/i>, 512 U. S. 753<\/a>, 768, distinguished. Maryland now has a law restricting funeral picketing but that law was not in effect at the time of these events, so this Court has no occasion to consider whether that law is a \u201creasonable time, place, or manner restrictio[n]\u201d under the standards announced by this Court. Clark<\/i>, supra,<\/i> at 293. Pp.\u00a010\u201312.<\/p>\n

The \u201cspecial protection\u201d afforded to what Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was \u201coutrageous\u201d for purposes of applying the state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. That would pose too great a danger that the jury would punish Westboro for its views on matters of public concern. For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside. Pp.\u00a012\u201313.<\/p>\n

(b)\u00a0Snyder also may not recover for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. He argues that he was a member of a captive audience at his son\u2019s funeral, but the captive audience doctrine\u2014which has been applied sparingly, see Rowan<\/i> v. Post Office Dept.<\/i>, 397 U. S. 728<\/a>, 736\u2013738; Frisby<\/i>, supra,<\/i> at 484\u2013485\u2014should not be expanded to the circumstances here. Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service, Snyder could see no more than the tops of the picketers\u2019 signs, and there is no indication that the picketing interfered with the funeral service itself. Pp.\u00a013\u201314.<\/p>\n

(c) Because the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion\u2014the allegedly unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish\u2014Snyder also cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts. P.\u00a014.<\/p>\n

(d) Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. It did not disrupt Mathew Snyder\u2019s funeral, and its choice to picket at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech. Because this Nation has chosen to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that public debate is not stifled, Westboro must be shielded from tort liability for its picketing in this case. Pp.\u00a014\u201315.<\/p>\n

580 F.\u00a03d 206, affirmed.<\/p>\n

Roberts, C.\u00a0J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53384,"menu_order":5,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-143","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":112,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/143","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53384"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/143\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":318,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/143\/revisions\/318"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/112"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/143\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=143"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=143"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=143"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=143"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}