{"id":158,"date":"2018-08-09T17:24:13","date_gmt":"2018-08-09T17:24:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/?post_type=chapter&p=158"},"modified":"2018-08-29T19:23:38","modified_gmt":"2018-08-29T19:23:38","slug":"mcdonald-v-chicago","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/chapter\/mcdonald-v-chicago\/","title":{"raw":"McDonald v. Chicago","rendered":"McDonald v. Chicago"},"content":{"raw":"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\r\n

McDonald v. Chicago<\/b>\r\n561 U.S. 742 (2010)<\/b><\/h3>\r\nTwo years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. Chicago (hereinafter City) and the village of Oak Park, a Chicago suburb, have laws effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. After Heller, petitioners filed this federal suit against the City, which was consolidated with two related actions, alleging that the City\u2019s handgun ban has left them vulnerable to criminals. They sought a declaration that the ban and several related City ordinances violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Rejecting petitioners\u2019 argument that the ordinances are unconstitutional, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit previously had upheld the constitutionality of a handgun ban, that Heller had explicitly refrained from opining on whether the Second Amendment applied to the States, and that the court had a duty to follow established Circuit precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on three 19th-century cases\u2014United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542<\/a>, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252<\/a>, and Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535<\/a>\u2014which were decided in the wake of this Court\u2019s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.\r\n\r\nHeld:\u00a0The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.\r\n\r\nJustice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II\u2013A, II\u2013B, II\u2013D, III\u2013A, and III\u2013B, concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right, recognized in Heller, to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.\r\n\r\n(a)\u00a0 Petitioners base their case on two submissions. Primarily, they argue that the right to keep and bear arms is protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Slaughter-House Cases\u2019 narrow interpretation of the Clause should now be rejected. As a secondary argument, they contend that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right. Chicago and Oak Park (municipal respondents) maintain that a right set out in the Bill of Rights applies to the States only when it is an indispensable attribute of any \u201c\u00a0\u2018civilized\u2019\u00a0\u201d legal system. If it is possible to imagine a civilized country that does not recognize the right, municipal respondents assert, that right is not protected by due process. And since there are civilized countries that ban or strictly regulate the private possession of handguns, they maintain that due process does not preclude such measures.\r\n\r\n(b)\u00a0The Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, originally applied only to the Federal Government, not to the States, see Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, but the constitutional Amendments adopted in the Civil War\u2019s aftermath fundamentally altered the federal system. Four years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court held in the Slaughter-House Cases, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights \u201cwhich owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws,\u201d \u2026.. and that the fundamental rights predating the creation of the Federal Government were not protected by the Clause. Under this narrow reading, the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only very limited rights. Subsequently, the Court held that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government in Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542<\/a>, Presser, 116 U. S. 252<\/a>, and Miller, 153 U. S. 535<\/a>, the decisions on which the Seventh Circuit relied in this case.\r\n\r\n(c)\u00a0Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies to the States is considered in light of the Court\u2019s precedents applying the Bill of Rights\u2019 protections to the States.\r\n\r\n(1)\u00a0In the late 19th century, the Court began to hold that the Due Process Clause prohibits the States from infringing Bill of Rights protections. See, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516<\/a>. Five features of the approach taken during the ensuing era are noted. First, the Court viewed the due process question as entirely separate from the question whether a right was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78<\/a>. Second, the Court explained that the only rights due process protected against state infringement were those \u201cof such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.\u201d Ibid. Third, some cases during this era \u201ccan be seen as having asked \u2026 if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection\u201d asserted therein. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145<\/a>. Fourth, the Court did not hesitate to hold that a Bill of Rights guarantee failed to meet the test for Due Process Clause protection, finding that freedom of speech and press qualified, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652<\/a>; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697<\/a>, but the grand jury indictment requirement did not, Hurtado, supra. Finally, even when such a right was held to fall within the conception of due process, the protection or remedies afforded against state infringement sometimes differed from those provided against abridgment by the Federal Government.\r\n\r\n(2)\u00a0Justice Black championed the alternative theory that \u00a71 of the Fourteenth Amendment totally incorporated all of the Bill of Rights\u2019 provisions\u2026 but the Court never has embraced that theory.\r\n\r\n(3)\u00a0 The Court eventually moved in the direction advocated by Justice Black, by adopting a theory of selective incorporation by which the Due Process Clause incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments. See, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U. S. 335<\/a>. These decisions abandoned three of the characteristics of the earlier period. The Court clarified that the governing standard is whether a particular Bill of Rights protection is fundamental to our Nation\u2019s particular scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice. Duncan, supra, at 149. The Court eventually held that almost all of the Bill of Rights\u2019 guarantees met the requirements for protection under the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that Bill of Rights protections must \u201call \u2026 be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.\u201d Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1<\/a>. Under this approach, the Court overruled earlier decisions holding that particular Bill of Rights guarantees or remedies did not apply to the States. See Gideon, supra, which overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455<\/a>.\r\n\r\n(d)\u00a0The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms fully applicable to the States.\r\n\r\n(1)\u00a0The Court must decide whether that right is fundamental to the Nation\u2019s scheme of ordered liberty, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145<\/a>, or, as the Court has said in a related context, whether it is \u201cdeeply rooted in this Nation\u2019s history and tradition,\u201d Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702<\/a>. Heller points unmistakably to the answer. Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present, and the Heller Court held that individual self-defense is \u201cthe central component\u201d of the Second Amendment right. 554 U. S., at ___. Explaining that \u201cthe need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute\u201d in the home, ibid., the Court found that this right applies to handguns because they are \u201cthe most preferred firearm in the nation to \u2018keep\u2019 and use for protection of one\u2019s home and family,\u201d id., at ___. It thus concluded that citizens must be permitted \u201cto use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.\u201d Heller also clarifies that this right is \u201cdeeply rooted in this Nation\u2019s history and traditions,\u201d Glucksberg, supra, at 721. Heller explored the right\u2019s origins in English law and noted the esteem with which the right was regarded during the colonial era and at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. This is powerful evidence that the right was regarded as fundamental in the sense relevant here. That understanding persisted in the years immediately following the Bill of Rights\u2019 ratification and is confirmed by the state constitutions of that era, which protected the right to keep and bear arms.\r\n\r\n(2)\u00a0A survey of the contemporaneous history also demonstrates clearly that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Framers and ratifiers counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to the Nation\u2019s system of ordered liberty.\r\n\r\n(i)\u00a0By the 1850\u2019s, the fear that the National Government would disarm the universal militia had largely faded, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for self-defense. Abolitionist authors wrote in support of the right, and attempts to disarm \u201cFree-Soilers\u201d in \u201cBloody Kansas,\u201d met with outrage that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms had been taken from the people. After the Civil War, the Southern States engaged in systematic efforts to disarm and injure African Americans, see Heller, supra, at ___. These injustices prompted the 39th Congress to pass the Freedmen\u2019s Bureau Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to protect the right to keep and bear arms. Congress, however, ultimately deemed these legislative remedies insufficient, and approved the Fourteenth Amendment. Today, it is generally accepted that that Amendment was understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting the rights set out in the Civil Rights Act. See General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375<\/a>. In Congressional debates on the proposed Amendment, its legislative proponents in the 39th Congress referred to the right to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right deserving of protection. Evidence from the period immediately following the Amendment\u2019s ratification confirms that that right was considered fundamental.\r\n\r\n(ii)\u00a0Despite all this evidence, municipal respondents argue that Members of Congress overwhelmingly viewed \u00a71 of the Fourteenth Amendment as purely an antidiscrimination rule. But while \u00a71 does contain an antidiscrimination rule, i.e., the Equal Protection Clause, it can hardly be said that the section does no more than prohibit discrimination. If what municipal respondents mean is that the Second Amendment should be singled out for special\u2014and specially unfavorable\u2014treatment, the Court rejects the suggestion. The right to keep and bear arms must be regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a prohibition that could be ignored so long as the States legislated in an evenhanded manner.\r\n\r\n<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Justice Alito \u2026 concluded\u2026 that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.","rendered":"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\n

McDonald v. Chicago<\/b>
\n561 U.S. 742 (2010)<\/b><\/h3>\n

Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. Chicago (hereinafter City) and the village of Oak Park, a Chicago suburb, have laws effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. After Heller, petitioners filed this federal suit against the City, which was consolidated with two related actions, alleging that the City\u2019s handgun ban has left them vulnerable to criminals. They sought a declaration that the ban and several related City ordinances violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Rejecting petitioners\u2019 argument that the ordinances are unconstitutional, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit previously had upheld the constitutionality of a handgun ban, that Heller had explicitly refrained from opining on whether the Second Amendment applied to the States, and that the court had a duty to follow established Circuit precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on three 19th-century cases\u2014United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542<\/a>, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252<\/a>, and Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535<\/a>\u2014which were decided in the wake of this Court\u2019s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.<\/p>\n

Held:\u00a0The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.<\/p>\n

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II\u2013A, II\u2013B, II\u2013D, III\u2013A, and III\u2013B, concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right, recognized in Heller, to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.<\/p>\n

(a)\u00a0 Petitioners base their case on two submissions. Primarily, they argue that the right to keep and bear arms is protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Slaughter-House Cases\u2019 narrow interpretation of the Clause should now be rejected. As a secondary argument, they contend that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right. Chicago and Oak Park (municipal respondents) maintain that a right set out in the Bill of Rights applies to the States only when it is an indispensable attribute of any \u201c\u00a0\u2018civilized\u2019\u00a0\u201d legal system. If it is possible to imagine a civilized country that does not recognize the right, municipal respondents assert, that right is not protected by due process. And since there are civilized countries that ban or strictly regulate the private possession of handguns, they maintain that due process does not preclude such measures.<\/p>\n

(b)\u00a0The Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, originally applied only to the Federal Government, not to the States, see Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, but the constitutional Amendments adopted in the Civil War\u2019s aftermath fundamentally altered the federal system. Four years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court held in the Slaughter-House Cases, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights \u201cwhich owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws,\u201d \u2026.. and that the fundamental rights predating the creation of the Federal Government were not protected by the Clause. Under this narrow reading, the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only very limited rights. Subsequently, the Court held that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government in Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542<\/a>, Presser, 116 U. S. 252<\/a>, and Miller, 153 U. S. 535<\/a>, the decisions on which the Seventh Circuit relied in this case.<\/p>\n

(c)\u00a0Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies to the States is considered in light of the Court\u2019s precedents applying the Bill of Rights\u2019 protections to the States.<\/p>\n

(1)\u00a0In the late 19th century, the Court began to hold that the Due Process Clause prohibits the States from infringing Bill of Rights protections. See, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516<\/a>. Five features of the approach taken during the ensuing era are noted. First, the Court viewed the due process question as entirely separate from the question whether a right was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78<\/a>. Second, the Court explained that the only rights due process protected against state infringement were those \u201cof such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law.\u201d Ibid. Third, some cases during this era \u201ccan be seen as having asked \u2026 if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection\u201d asserted therein. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145<\/a>. Fourth, the Court did not hesitate to hold that a Bill of Rights guarantee failed to meet the test for Due Process Clause protection, finding that freedom of speech and press qualified, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652<\/a>; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697<\/a>, but the grand jury indictment requirement did not, Hurtado, supra. Finally, even when such a right was held to fall within the conception of due process, the protection or remedies afforded against state infringement sometimes differed from those provided against abridgment by the Federal Government.<\/p>\n

(2)\u00a0Justice Black championed the alternative theory that \u00a71 of the Fourteenth Amendment totally incorporated all of the Bill of Rights\u2019 provisions\u2026 but the Court never has embraced that theory.<\/p>\n

(3)\u00a0 The Court eventually moved in the direction advocated by Justice Black, by adopting a theory of selective incorporation by which the Due Process Clause incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments. See, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U. S. 335<\/a>. These decisions abandoned three of the characteristics of the earlier period. The Court clarified that the governing standard is whether a particular Bill of Rights protection is fundamental to our Nation\u2019s particular scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice. Duncan, supra, at 149. The Court eventually held that almost all of the Bill of Rights\u2019 guarantees met the requirements for protection under the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that Bill of Rights protections must \u201call \u2026 be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.\u201d Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1<\/a>. Under this approach, the Court overruled earlier decisions holding that particular Bill of Rights guarantees or remedies did not apply to the States. See Gideon, supra, which overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455<\/a>.<\/p>\n

(d)\u00a0The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms fully applicable to the States.<\/p>\n

(1)\u00a0The Court must decide whether that right is fundamental to the Nation\u2019s scheme of ordered liberty, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145<\/a>, or, as the Court has said in a related context, whether it is \u201cdeeply rooted in this Nation\u2019s history and tradition,\u201d Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702<\/a>. Heller points unmistakably to the answer. Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present, and the Heller Court held that individual self-defense is \u201cthe central component\u201d of the Second Amendment right. 554 U. S., at ___. Explaining that \u201cthe need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute\u201d in the home, ibid., the Court found that this right applies to handguns because they are \u201cthe most preferred firearm in the nation to \u2018keep\u2019 and use for protection of one\u2019s home and family,\u201d id., at ___. It thus concluded that citizens must be permitted \u201cto use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.\u201d Heller also clarifies that this right is \u201cdeeply rooted in this Nation\u2019s history and traditions,\u201d Glucksberg, supra, at 721. Heller explored the right\u2019s origins in English law and noted the esteem with which the right was regarded during the colonial era and at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. This is powerful evidence that the right was regarded as fundamental in the sense relevant here. That understanding persisted in the years immediately following the Bill of Rights\u2019 ratification and is confirmed by the state constitutions of that era, which protected the right to keep and bear arms.<\/p>\n

(2)\u00a0A survey of the contemporaneous history also demonstrates clearly that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Framers and ratifiers counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to the Nation\u2019s system of ordered liberty.<\/p>\n

(i)\u00a0By the 1850\u2019s, the fear that the National Government would disarm the universal militia had largely faded, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for self-defense. Abolitionist authors wrote in support of the right, and attempts to disarm \u201cFree-Soilers\u201d in \u201cBloody Kansas,\u201d met with outrage that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms had been taken from the people. After the Civil War, the Southern States engaged in systematic efforts to disarm and injure African Americans, see Heller, supra, at ___. These injustices prompted the 39th Congress to pass the Freedmen\u2019s Bureau Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to protect the right to keep and bear arms. Congress, however, ultimately deemed these legislative remedies insufficient, and approved the Fourteenth Amendment. Today, it is generally accepted that that Amendment was understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting the rights set out in the Civil Rights Act. See General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375<\/a>. In Congressional debates on the proposed Amendment, its legislative proponents in the 39th Congress referred to the right to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right deserving of protection. Evidence from the period immediately following the Amendment\u2019s ratification confirms that that right was considered fundamental.<\/p>\n

(ii)\u00a0Despite all this evidence, municipal respondents argue that Members of Congress overwhelmingly viewed \u00a71 of the Fourteenth Amendment as purely an antidiscrimination rule. But while \u00a71 does contain an antidiscrimination rule, i.e., the Equal Protection Clause, it can hardly be said that the section does no more than prohibit discrimination. If what municipal respondents mean is that the Second Amendment should be singled out for special\u2014and specially unfavorable\u2014treatment, the Court rejects the suggestion. The right to keep and bear arms must be regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a prohibition that could be ignored so long as the States legislated in an evenhanded manner.<\/p>\n

<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Justice Alito \u2026 concluded\u2026 that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53384,"menu_order":4,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-158","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":113,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/158","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53384"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/158\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":334,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/158\/revisions\/334"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/113"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/158\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=158"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=158"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=158"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=158"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}