***<\/p>\r\nJustice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.\r\n\r\nThe State of Illinois asks this Court to announce a \u201cbright-line rule\u201d authorizing the temporary detention of anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer. Brief for Petitioner 7\u201436. Respondent counters by asking us to adopt the opposite per se <\/i>rule\u2013that the fact that a person flees upon seeing the police can never, by itself, be sufficient to justify a temporary investigative stop of the kind authorized by Terry<\/i> v. Ohio,<\/i> 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Brief for Respondent 6\u201431.\r\n
* * * *<\/p>\r\nThe question in this case concerns \u201cthe degree of suspicion that attaches to\u201d a person\u2019s flight\u2013or, more precisely, what \u201ccommonsense conclusions\u201d can be drawn respecting the motives behind that flight. A pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons\u2013to catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of nature\u2013any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity. A pedestrian might also run because he or she has just sighted one or more police officers. In the latter instance, the State properly points out \u201cthat the fleeing person may be, inter alia<\/i>, (1) an escapee from jail; (2) wanted on a warrant, (3) in possession of contraband, (i.e. drugs, weapons, stolen goods, etc.); or (4) someone who has just committed another type of crime.\u201d Brief for Petitioner 9, n.\u00a04. In short, there are unquestionably circumstances in which a person\u2019s flight is suspicious, and undeniably instances in which a person runs for entirely innocent reasons.\r\n\r\nGiven the diversity and frequency of possible motivations for flight, it would be profoundly unwise to endorse either per se<\/i> rule. The inference we can reasonably draw about the motivation for a person\u2019s flight, rather, will depend on a number of different circumstances. Factors such as the time of day, the number of people in the area, the character of the neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, and whether the person\u2019s behavior was otherwise unusual might be relevant in specific cases. This number of variables is surely sufficient to preclude either a bright-line rule that always justifies, or that never justifies, an investigative stop based on the sole fact that flight began after a police officer appeared nearby.\r\n
* * * *<\/p>\r\nEven assuming we know that a person runs because he sees the police, the inference to be drawn may still vary from case to case. Flight to escape police detection, we have said, may have an entirely innocent motivation:\r\n\r\n\u201c[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that \u2018the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.\u2019 Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury\u2013not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves.\u201d Alberty<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 162 U.S. 499 (1896).\r\n\r\nIn addition to these concerns, a reasonable person may conclude that an officer\u2019s sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is criminal activity there is also a substantial element of danger\u2013either from the criminal or from a confrontation between the criminal and the police. These considerations can lead to an innocent and understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all speed.\r\n\r\nAmong some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer\u2019s sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither \u201caberrant\u201d nor \u201cabnormal.\u201d Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforcement investigations into their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient. In any event, just as we do not require \u201cscientific certainty\u201d for our commonsense conclusion that unprovoked flight can sometimes indicate suspicious motives, see ante,<\/i> at 4, neither do we require scientific certainty to conclude that unprovoked flight can occur for other, innocent reasons.\r\n
II<\/b><\/p>\r\nGuided by that totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court concludes that Officer Nolan had reasonable suspicion to stop respondent. Ante<\/i>, at 5. In this respect, my view differs from the Court\u2019s. The entire justification for the stop is articulated in the brief testimony of Officer Nolan. Some facts are perfectly clear; others are not. This factual insufficiency leads me to conclude that the Court\u2019s judgment is mistaken.\r\n\r\nRespondent Wardlow was arrested a few minutes after noon on September 9, 1995. 183 Ill. 2d 306 (1998). Nolan was part of an eight-officer, four-car caravan patrol team. The officers were headed for \u201cone of the areas in the 11th District [of Chicago] that\u2019s high [in] narcotics traffic.\u201d App. 8. The reason why four cars were in the caravan was that \u201c[n]ormally in these different areas there\u2019s an enormous amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers.\u201d Ibid.<\/i> Officer Nolan testified that he was in uniform on that day, but he did not recall whether he was driving a marked or an unmarked car. Id.,<\/i> at 4.\r\n\r\nOfficer Nolan and his partner were in the last of the four patrol cars that \u201cwere all caravaning eastbound down Van Buren.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 8. Nolan first observed respondent \u201cin front of 4035 West Van Buren.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 7. Wardlow \u201clooked in our direction and began fleeing.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 9. Nolan then \u201cbegan driving southbound down the street observing [respondent] running through the gangway and the alley southbound,\u201d and observed that Wardlow was carrying a white, opaque bag under his arm. Id.,<\/i> at 6, 9. After the car turned south and intercepted respondent as he \u201cran right towards us,\u201d Officer Nolan stopped him and conducted a \u201cprotective search,\u201d which revealed that the bag under respondent\u2019s arm contained a loaded handgun. Id.,<\/i> at 9.\r\n
This terse testimony is most noticeable for what it fails to reveal. Though asked whether he was in a marked or unmarked car, Officer Nolan could not recall the answer. Id.,<\/i> at 4. He was not asked whether any of the other three cars in the caravan were marked, or whether any of the other seven officers were in uniform. Though he explained that the size of the caravan was because \u201c[n]ormally in these different areas there\u2019s an enormous amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers,\u201d Officer Nolan did not testify as to whether anyone<\/i> besides Wardlow was nearby 4035 West Van Buren. Nor is it clear that that address was the intended destination of the caravan. As the Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted the record, \u201cit appears that the officers were simply driving by, on their way to some unidentified location, when they noticed defendant standing at 4035 West Van Buren.\u201d 287 Ill. App. 3d 367 (1997). Officer Nolan\u2019s testimony also does not reveal how fast the officers were driving. It does not indicate whether he saw respondent notice the other patrol cars. And it does not say whether the caravan, or any part of it, had already passed Wardlow by before he began to run.<\/p>\r\n
\r\n* * * *<\/p>\r\nI therefore respectfully dissent from the Court\u2019s judgment to reverse the court below.","rendered":"
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.<\/p>\n
Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two of the officers caught up with him, stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. Discovering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers\u2019 stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.<\/p>\n
On September 9, 1995, Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago Police Department. The officers were driving the last car of a four car caravan converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions. The officers were traveling together because they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers.<\/p>\n
As the caravan passed 4035 West Van Buren, Officer Nolan observed respondent Wardlow standing next to the building holding an opaque bag. Respondent looked in the direction of the officers and fled. Nolan and Harvey turned their car southbound, watched him as he ran through the gangway and an alley, and eventually cornered him on the street. Nolan then exited his car and stopped respondent. He immediately conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience it was common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions. During the frisk, Officer Nolan squeezed the bag respondent was carrying and felt a heavy, hard object similar to the shape of a gun. The officer then opened the bag and discovered a .38-caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition. The officers arrested Wardlow.<\/p>\n
The Illinois trial court denied respondent\u2019s motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Following a stipulated bench trial, Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Wardlow\u2019s conviction, concluding that the gun should have been suppressed because Officer Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop pursuant to Terry<\/i> v. Ohio<\/i>, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).<\/p>\n
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. 183 Ill. 2d 306 (1998). While rejecting the Appellate Court\u2019s conclusion that Wardlow was not in a high crime area, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that sudden flight in such an area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry<\/i> stop. Id<\/i>., at 310. Relying on Florida<\/i> v. Royer<\/i>, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the court explained that although police have the right to approach individuals and ask questions, the individual has no obligation to respond. The person may decline to answer and simply go on his or her way, and the refusal to respond, alone, does not provide a legitimate basis for an investigative stop. 183 Ill. 2d, at 311. The court then determined that flight may simply be an exercise of this right to \u201cgo on one\u2019s way,\u201d and, thus, could not constitute reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry<\/i> stop. Id<\/i>., at 312.<\/p>\n
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the argument that flight combined with the fact that it occurred in a high crime area supported a finding of reasonable suspicion because the \u201chigh crime area\u201d factor was not sufficient standing alone to justify a Terry<\/i> stop. Finding no independently suspicious circumstances to support an investigatory detention, the court held that the stop and subsequent arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. We granted certiorari, 526 U.S. ___ (1999), and now reverse.<\/p>\n
This case, involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer on a public street, is governed by the analysis we first applied in Terry<\/i>. In Terry<\/i>, we held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, supra<\/i>, at 30. While \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. United States<\/i> v. Sokolow<\/i>, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The officer must be able to articulate more than an \u201cinchoate and unparticularized suspicion or \u2018hunch\u2019 \u201d of criminal activity. Terry, supra<\/i>, at 27.<\/p>\n
Nolan and Harvey were among eight officers in a four-car caravan that was converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, and the officers anticipated encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug customers and individuals serving as lookouts. App. 8. It was in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him flee. An individual\u2019s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. Brown<\/i> v. Texas<\/i>, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a \u201chigh crime area\u201d among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry<\/i> analysis.\u00a0\u00a0Adams<\/i> v. Williams<\/i>, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).<\/p>\n
In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent\u2019s presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that arouse the officers\u2019 suspicion but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.\u00a0\u00a0Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.\u00a0\u00a0United States<\/i> v. Brignoni<\/i>, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Florida<\/i> v. Rodriguez<\/i>, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per<\/i> curiam<\/i>); United States<\/i> v. Sokolow, supra<\/i>, at 8-9.\u00a0\u00a0Headlong flight \u2013 wherever it occurs \u2013 is the consummate act of evasion; it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such. In reviewing the propriety of an officer\u2019s conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where non exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See United States<\/i> v. Cortez<\/i>, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). We conclude Officer Nolan was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity, and therefore, in investigating further.<\/p>\n
Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in Florida<\/i> v. Royer<\/i>, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), where we held that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probably cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Id<\/i>., at 498. And any \u201crefusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for detention or seizure.\u201d Florida<\/i> v. Bostick<\/i>, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not \u201cgoing about one\u2019s business\u201d; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual\u2019s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.<\/p>\n
Respondent and amici<\/i> also argue that there are innocent reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Even in Terry<\/i>, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation. The officer observed two individuals packing back and forth in front of a store, peering into the window and periodically conferring. Terry<\/i>, 392 U.S., at 5. All of this conduct was by itself lawful, but it also suggested that the individuals were casing the store for a planned robbery. Terry<\/i> recognized that the officers could detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity. Id<\/i>. At 30.<\/p>\n
In allowing such detentions, Terry<\/i> accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection with more drastic police action; persons arrested and detained on probable cause to believe they have committed a crime may turn out to be innocent. The Terry<\/i> stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause the individual must be allowed to go on his way. But in this case the officers found respondent in possession of a handgun, and arrested him for violation of an Illinois firearms statute. No question of the propriety of the arrest itself is before us.<\/p>\n
The judgement of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.<\/p>\n
It is so ordered.<\/p>\n
***<\/p>\n
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.<\/p>\n
The State of Illinois asks this Court to announce a \u201cbright-line rule\u201d authorizing the temporary detention of anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer. Brief for Petitioner 7\u201436. Respondent counters by asking us to adopt the opposite per se <\/i>rule\u2013that the fact that a person flees upon seeing the police can never, by itself, be sufficient to justify a temporary investigative stop of the kind authorized by Terry<\/i> v. Ohio,<\/i> 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Brief for Respondent 6\u201431.<\/p>\n
* * * *<\/p>\n
The question in this case concerns \u201cthe degree of suspicion that attaches to\u201d a person\u2019s flight\u2013or, more precisely, what \u201ccommonsense conclusions\u201d can be drawn respecting the motives behind that flight. A pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons\u2013to catch up with a friend a block or two away, to seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a bully, or simply to answer the call of nature\u2013any of which might coincide with the arrival of an officer in the vicinity. A pedestrian might also run because he or she has just sighted one or more police officers. In the latter instance, the State properly points out \u201cthat the fleeing person may be, inter alia<\/i>, (1) an escapee from jail; (2) wanted on a warrant, (3) in possession of contraband, (i.e. drugs, weapons, stolen goods, etc.); or (4) someone who has just committed another type of crime.\u201d Brief for Petitioner 9, n.\u00a04. In short, there are unquestionably circumstances in which a person\u2019s flight is suspicious, and undeniably instances in which a person runs for entirely innocent reasons.<\/p>\n
Given the diversity and frequency of possible motivations for flight, it would be profoundly unwise to endorse either per se<\/i> rule. The inference we can reasonably draw about the motivation for a person\u2019s flight, rather, will depend on a number of different circumstances. Factors such as the time of day, the number of people in the area, the character of the neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, and whether the person\u2019s behavior was otherwise unusual might be relevant in specific cases. This number of variables is surely sufficient to preclude either a bright-line rule that always justifies, or that never justifies, an investigative stop based on the sole fact that flight began after a police officer appeared nearby.<\/p>\n
* * * *<\/p>\n
Even assuming we know that a person runs because he sees the police, the inference to be drawn may still vary from case to case. Flight to escape police detection, we have said, may have an entirely innocent motivation:<\/p>\n
\u201c[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that \u2018the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.\u2019 Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury\u2013not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves.\u201d Alberty<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 162 U.S. 499 (1896).<\/p>\n
In addition to these concerns, a reasonable person may conclude that an officer\u2019s sudden appearance indicates nearby criminal activity. And where there is criminal activity there is also a substantial element of danger\u2013either from the criminal or from a confrontation between the criminal and the police. These considerations can lead to an innocent and understandable desire to quit the vicinity with all speed.<\/p>\n
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer\u2019s sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither \u201caberrant\u201d nor \u201cabnormal.\u201d Moreover, these concerns and fears are known to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforcement investigations into their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient. In any event, just as we do not require \u201cscientific certainty\u201d for our commonsense conclusion that unprovoked flight can sometimes indicate suspicious motives, see ante,<\/i> at 4, neither do we require scientific certainty to conclude that unprovoked flight can occur for other, innocent reasons.<\/p>\n
II<\/b><\/p>\n
Guided by that totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court concludes that Officer Nolan had reasonable suspicion to stop respondent. Ante<\/i>, at 5. In this respect, my view differs from the Court\u2019s. The entire justification for the stop is articulated in the brief testimony of Officer Nolan. Some facts are perfectly clear; others are not. This factual insufficiency leads me to conclude that the Court\u2019s judgment is mistaken.<\/p>\n
Respondent Wardlow was arrested a few minutes after noon on September 9, 1995. 183 Ill. 2d 306 (1998). Nolan was part of an eight-officer, four-car caravan patrol team. The officers were headed for \u201cone of the areas in the 11th District [of Chicago] that\u2019s high [in] narcotics traffic.\u201d App. 8. The reason why four cars were in the caravan was that \u201c[n]ormally in these different areas there\u2019s an enormous amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers.\u201d Ibid.<\/i> Officer Nolan testified that he was in uniform on that day, but he did not recall whether he was driving a marked or an unmarked car. Id.,<\/i> at 4.<\/p>\n
Officer Nolan and his partner were in the last of the four patrol cars that \u201cwere all caravaning eastbound down Van Buren.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 8. Nolan first observed respondent \u201cin front of 4035 West Van Buren.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 7. Wardlow \u201clooked in our direction and began fleeing.\u201d Id.,<\/i> at 9. Nolan then \u201cbegan driving southbound down the street observing [respondent] running through the gangway and the alley southbound,\u201d and observed that Wardlow was carrying a white, opaque bag under his arm. Id.,<\/i> at 6, 9. After the car turned south and intercepted respondent as he \u201cran right towards us,\u201d Officer Nolan stopped him and conducted a \u201cprotective search,\u201d which revealed that the bag under respondent\u2019s arm contained a loaded handgun. Id.,<\/i> at 9.<\/p>\n
This terse testimony is most noticeable for what it fails to reveal. Though asked whether he was in a marked or unmarked car, Officer Nolan could not recall the answer. Id.,<\/i> at 4. He was not asked whether any of the other three cars in the caravan were marked, or whether any of the other seven officers were in uniform. Though he explained that the size of the caravan was because \u201c[n]ormally in these different areas there\u2019s an enormous amount of people, sometimes lookouts, customers,\u201d Officer Nolan did not testify as to whether anyone<\/i> besides Wardlow was nearby 4035 West Van Buren. Nor is it clear that that address was the intended destination of the caravan. As the Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted the record, \u201cit appears that the officers were simply driving by, on their way to some unidentified location, when they noticed defendant standing at 4035 West Van Buren.\u201d 287 Ill. App. 3d 367 (1997). Officer Nolan\u2019s testimony also does not reveal how fast the officers were driving. It does not indicate whether he saw respondent notice the other patrol cars. And it does not say whether the caravan, or any part of it, had already passed Wardlow by before he began to run.<\/p>\n
\n* * * *<\/p>\n
I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court\u2019s judgment to reverse the court below.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53384,"menu_order":5,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-168","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":114,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/168","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53384"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/168\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":344,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/168\/revisions\/344"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/114"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/168\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=168"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=168"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=168"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=168"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}