Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.<\/p>\r\nAfter Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment \u2019s warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) , and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981) , did not justify the search in this case. We agree with that conclusion.\r\n\r\nUnder Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee\u2019s \u201c \u2018immediate control,\u2019 \u201d meaning \u201cthe area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.\u201d 395 U. S., at 763. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel\u2019s reaching-distance rule determine Belton\u2019s scope. Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant\u2019s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.\r\n\r\nOn August 25, 1999, acting on an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed knocked on the front door and asked to speak to the owner. Gant answered the door and, after identifying himself, stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left the residence and conducted a records check, which revealed that Gant\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license.\r\n\r\nWhen the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered the driveway, and Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant was the driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it drove by him. Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car, and shut the door. Griffith, who was about 30 feet away, called to Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10-to-12 feet from Gant\u2019s car. Griffith immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him.\r\n\r\nBecause the other arrestees were secured in the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car: One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.\r\n\r\nGant was charged with two offenses\u2014possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia (i.e., the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle. When asked at the suppression hearing why the search was conducted, Officer Griffith responded: \u201cBecause the law says we can do it.\u201d App. 75.\r\n\r\nThe trial court rejected the State\u2019s contention that the officers had probable cause to search Gant\u2019s car for contraband when the search began, id., at 18, 30, but it denied the motion to suppress. Relying on the fact that the police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and apprehended him only shortly after he exited his car, the court held that the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest. Id., at 37. A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment.\r\n
* * * * *<\/p>\r\nWhen \u201cthe justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car, and under the supervision of an officer,\u201d the court concluded, a \u201cwarrantless search of the arrestee\u2019s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence.\u201d Id., at 5, 162 P. 3d, at 644. Accordingly, the court held that the search of Gant\u2019s car was unreasonable.\r\n
* * * * *<\/p>\r\nConsistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that \u201csearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment \u2014subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.\u201d Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914). The exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 230\u2013234 (1973); Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763.\r\n\r\nIn Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may only include \u201cthe arrestee\u2019s person and the area \u2018within his immediate control\u2019\u2014construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.\u201d Ibid. That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. See ibid. (noting that searches incident to arrest are reasonable \u201cin order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use\u201d and \u201cin order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction\u201d of evidence (emphasis added)). If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367\u2013368 (1964).\r\n\r\nIn Belton, we considered Chimel\u2019s application to the automobile context. A lone police officer in that case stopped a speeding car in which Belton was one of four occupants. While asking for the driver\u2019s license and registration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and observed an envelope on the car floor marked \u201cSupergold\u201d\u2014a name he associated with marijuana. Thus having probable cause to believe the occupants had committed a drug offense, the officer ordered them out of the vehicle, placed them under arrest, and patted them down. Without handcuffing the arrestees, the officer \u201csplit them up into four separate areas of the Thruway \u2026 so they would not be in physical touching area of each other\u201d and searched the vehicle, including the pocket of a jacket on the backseat, in which he found cocaine. 453 U. S., at 456.\r\n
* * * * *<\/p>\r\nThe Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton as merely delineating \u201cthe proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile\u201d incident to an arrest, id., at 459.That is, when the passenger compartment is within an arrestee\u2019s reaching distance, Belton supplies the generalization that the entire compartment and any containers therein may be reached. On that view of Belton, the state court concluded that the search of Gant\u2019s car was unreasonable because Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search. It also found that no other exception to the warrant requirement applied in this case.\r\n\r\nGant now urges us to adopt the reading of Belton followed by the Arizona Supreme Court.\r\n\r\nDespite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court\u2019s reading of Belton, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. This reading may be attributable to Justice Brennan\u2019s dissent in Belton, in which he characterized the Court\u2019s holding as resting on the \u201cfiction \u2026 that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car.\u201d 453 U. S., at 466. Under the majority\u2019s approach, he argued, \u201cthe result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car\u201d before conducting the search. Id., at 468.\r\n\r\nSince we decided Belton, Courts of Appeals have given different answers to the question whether a vehicle must be within an arrestee\u2019s reach to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest,2 but Justice Brennan\u2019s reading of the Court\u2019s opinion has predominated. As Justice O\u2019Connor observed, \u201clower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.\u201d Thornton, 541 U. S., at 624 (opinion concurring in part). Justice Scalia has similarly noted that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing a search in \u201cthis precise factual scenario \u2026 are legion.\u201d Id., at 628 (opinion concurring in judgment) (collecting cases).3 Indeed, some courts have upheld searches under Belton \u201ceven when \u2026 the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene.\u201d 541 U. S., at 628 (same).\r\n\r\nAlthough it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is \u201creasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.\u201d Thornton, 541 U. S., at 632). In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. See, e.g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 324 (2001) ; Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 118 (1998) . But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee\u2019s vehicle and any containers therein.\r\n\r\nNeither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched Gant\u2019s car. Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case. Whereas Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license\u2014an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant\u2019s car. Cf. Knowles, 525 U. S., at 118. Because police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.\r\n
* * * * *<\/p>\r\nThe experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely \u201cwithin \u2018the area into which an arrestee might reach,\u2019 \u201d 453 U. S., at 460, and blind adherence to Belton\u2019s faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches. The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us to approve routine constitutional violations.\r\n\r\nPolice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant\u2019s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee\u2019s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search. Accordingly, the judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.\r\n\r\nIt is so ordered.\r\n\r\n(Footnotes omitted)","rendered":"
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.<\/p>\n
After Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment \u2019s warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969) , and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981) , did not justify the search in this case. We agree with that conclusion.<\/p>\n
Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee\u2019s \u201c \u2018immediate control,\u2019 \u201d meaning \u201cthe area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.\u201d 395 U. S., at 763. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel\u2019s reaching-distance rule determine Belton\u2019s scope. Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant\u2019s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.<\/p>\n
On August 25, 1999, acting on an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed knocked on the front door and asked to speak to the owner. Gant answered the door and, after identifying himself, stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left the residence and conducted a records check, which revealed that Gant\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license.<\/p>\n
When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered the driveway, and Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant was the driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it drove by him. Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car, and shut the door. Griffith, who was about 30 feet away, called to Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10-to-12 feet from Gant\u2019s car. Griffith immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him.<\/p>\n
Because the other arrestees were secured in the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car: One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.<\/p>\n
Gant was charged with two offenses\u2014possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia (i.e., the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle. When asked at the suppression hearing why the search was conducted, Officer Griffith responded: \u201cBecause the law says we can do it.\u201d App. 75.<\/p>\n
The trial court rejected the State\u2019s contention that the officers had probable cause to search Gant\u2019s car for contraband when the search began, id., at 18, 30, but it denied the motion to suppress. Relying on the fact that the police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and apprehended him only shortly after he exited his car, the court held that the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest. Id., at 37. A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment.<\/p>\n
* * * * *<\/p>\n
When \u201cthe justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol car, and under the supervision of an officer,\u201d the court concluded, a \u201cwarrantless search of the arrestee\u2019s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence.\u201d Id., at 5, 162 P. 3d, at 644. Accordingly, the court held that the search of Gant\u2019s car was unreasonable.<\/p>\n
* * * * *<\/p>\n
Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that \u201csearches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment \u2014subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.\u201d Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914). The exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 230\u2013234 (1973); Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763.<\/p>\n
In Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may only include \u201cthe arrestee\u2019s person and the area \u2018within his immediate control\u2019\u2014construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.\u201d Ibid. That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. See ibid. (noting that searches incident to arrest are reasonable \u201cin order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use\u201d and \u201cin order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction\u201d of evidence (emphasis added)). If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367\u2013368 (1964).<\/p>\n
In Belton, we considered Chimel\u2019s application to the automobile context. A lone police officer in that case stopped a speeding car in which Belton was one of four occupants. While asking for the driver\u2019s license and registration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and observed an envelope on the car floor marked \u201cSupergold\u201d\u2014a name he associated with marijuana. Thus having probable cause to believe the occupants had committed a drug offense, the officer ordered them out of the vehicle, placed them under arrest, and patted them down. Without handcuffing the arrestees, the officer \u201csplit them up into four separate areas of the Thruway \u2026 so they would not be in physical touching area of each other\u201d and searched the vehicle, including the pocket of a jacket on the backseat, in which he found cocaine. 453 U. S., at 456.<\/p>\n
* * * * *<\/p>\n
The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton as merely delineating \u201cthe proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile\u201d incident to an arrest, id., at 459.That is, when the passenger compartment is within an arrestee\u2019s reaching distance, Belton supplies the generalization that the entire compartment and any containers therein may be reached. On that view of Belton, the state court concluded that the search of Gant\u2019s car was unreasonable because Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search. It also found that no other exception to the warrant requirement applied in this case.<\/p>\n
Gant now urges us to adopt the reading of Belton followed by the Arizona Supreme Court.<\/p>\n
Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court\u2019s reading of Belton, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. This reading may be attributable to Justice Brennan\u2019s dissent in Belton, in which he characterized the Court\u2019s holding as resting on the \u201cfiction \u2026 that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car.\u201d 453 U. S., at 466. Under the majority\u2019s approach, he argued, \u201cthe result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car\u201d before conducting the search. Id., at 468.<\/p>\n
Since we decided Belton, Courts of Appeals have given different answers to the question whether a vehicle must be within an arrestee\u2019s reach to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest,2 but Justice Brennan\u2019s reading of the Court\u2019s opinion has predominated. As Justice O\u2019Connor observed, \u201clower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.\u201d Thornton, 541 U. S., at 624 (opinion concurring in part). Justice Scalia has similarly noted that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing a search in \u201cthis precise factual scenario \u2026 are legion.\u201d Id., at 628 (opinion concurring in judgment) (collecting cases).3 Indeed, some courts have upheld searches under Belton \u201ceven when \u2026 the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene.\u201d 541 U. S., at 628 (same).<\/p>\n
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is \u201creasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.\u201d Thornton, 541 U. S., at 632). In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. See, e.g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 324 (2001) ; Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 118 (1998) . But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee\u2019s vehicle and any containers therein.<\/p>\n
Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched Gant\u2019s car. Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case. Whereas Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license\u2014an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant\u2019s car. Cf. Knowles, 525 U. S., at 118. Because police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.<\/p>\n
* * * * *<\/p>\n
The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely \u201cwithin \u2018the area into which an arrestee might reach,\u2019 \u201d 453 U. S., at 460, and blind adherence to Belton\u2019s faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches. The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us to approve routine constitutional violations.<\/p>\n
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant\u2019s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee\u2019s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search. Accordingly, the judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.<\/p>\n
It is so ordered.<\/p>\n
(Footnotes omitted)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53384,"menu_order":14,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-219","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":115,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/219","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53384"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/219\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":391,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/219\/revisions\/391"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/115"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/219\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=219"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=219"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=219"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=219"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}