I<\/b><\/p>\r\nIn 1991 Agent William Elliott of the United States Department of the Interior came to suspect that marijuana was being grown in the home belonging to petitioner Danny Kyllo, part of a triplex on Rhododendron Drive in Florence, Oregon. Indoor marijuana growth typically requires high-intensity lamps. In order to determine whether an amount of heat was emanating from petitioner\u2019s home consistent with the use of such lamps, at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott and Dan Haas used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the triplex. Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. The imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth\u2013black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images. The scan of Kyllo\u2019s home took only a few minutes and was performed from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott\u2019s vehicle across the street from the front of the house and also from the street in back of the house. The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner\u2019s home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex. Agent Elliott concluded that petitioner was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house, which indeed he was. Based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of petitioner\u2019s home, and the agents found an indoor growing operation involving more than 100 plants. Petitioner was indicted on one count of manufacturing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1). He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea.\r\n\r\nThe Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding the intrusiveness of thermal imaging. On remand the District Court found that the Agema 210 \u201cis a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house\u201d; it \u201cdid not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure\u201d; \u201c[t]he device used cannot penetrate walls or windows to reveal conversations or human activities\u201d; and \u201c[n]o intimate details of the home were observed.\u201d Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39\u201440. Based on these findings, the District Court upheld the validity of the warrant that relied in part upon the thermal imaging, and reaffirmed its denial of the motion to suppress. A divided Court of Appeals initially reversed, 140 F.3d 1249 (1998), but that opinion was withdrawn and the panel (after a change in composition) affirmed, 190 F.3d 1041 (1999), with Judge Noonan dissenting. The court held that petitioner had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, id.<\/i>, at 1046, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager \u201cdid not expose any intimate details of Kyllo\u2019s life,\u201d only \u201camorphous \u2018hot spots\u2019 on the roof and exterior wall,\u201d id.<\/i>, at 1047. We granted certiorari.\r\n
II<\/b><\/p>\r\nThe Fourth Amendment provides that \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.\u201d \u201cAt the very core\u201d of the Fourth Amendment \u201cstands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d Silverman <\/i>v. United States<\/i>, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no. See Illinois <\/i>v. Rodriguez<\/i>, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton <\/i>v. New York<\/i>, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).\r\n\r\nThe present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a home. We have previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, if any, is too much. While we upheld enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex in Dow Chemical<\/i>, we noted that we found \u201cit important that this is not<\/i> an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened,\u201d 476 U.S., at 237, n.\u00a04 (emphasis in original).\r\n
III<\/b><\/p>\r\nIt would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology. For example, as the cases discussed above make clear, the technology enabling human flight has exposed to public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage that once were private. See Ciraolo<\/i>, supra<\/i>, at 215. The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.\r\n\r\nThe Government maintains, however, that the thermal imaging must be upheld because it detected \u201conly heat radiating from the external surface of the house.\u201d\r\n\r\nWe have said that the Fourth Amendment draws \u201ca firm line at the entrance to the house,\u201d Payton<\/i>, 445 U.S., at 590. That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright\u2013which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly possible to conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in this case that no \u201csignificant\u201d compromise of the homeowner\u2019s privacy has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.\r\n\r\n\u201cThe Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.\u201d Carroll<\/i> v. United States<\/i>, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).\r\n\r\nWhere, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a \u201csearch\u201d and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.\r\n\r\nSince we hold the Thermovision imaging to have been an unlawful search, it will remain for the District Court to determine whether, without the evidence it provided, the search warrant issued in this case was supported by probable cause\u2013and if not, whether there is any other basis for supporting admission of the evidence that the search pursuant to the warrant produced.\r\n\r\nThe judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\r\n\r\nIt is so ordered.\r\n\r\nJustice Stevens, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice O\u2019Connor, and Justice Kennedy join,\r\ndissenting.\r\n\r\nThere is, in my judgment, a distinction of constitutional magnitude between \u201cthrough-the-wall surveillance\u201d that gives the observer or listener direct access to information in a private area, on the one hand, and the thought processes used to draw inferences from information in the public domain, on the other hand. The Court has crafted a rule that purports to deal with direct observations of the inside of the home, but the case before us merely involves indirect deductions from \u201coff-the-wall\u201d surveillance, that is, observations of the exterior of the home. Those observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of petitioner\u2019s home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy.1<\/a> Moreover, I believe that the supposedly \u201cbright-line\u201d rule the Court has created in response to its concerns about future technological developments is unnecessary, unwise, and inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.\r\n\r\nThere is no need for the Court to craft a new rule to decide this case, as it is controlled by established principles from our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. One of those core principles, of course, is that \u201csearches and seizures inside a home<\/i> without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.\u201d Payton<\/i> v. New York,<\/i> 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (emphasis added). But it is equally well settled that searches and seizures of property in plain view are presumptively reasonable. See id<\/i>., at 586\u2014587. Whether that property is residential or commercial, the basic principle is the same: \u201c\u00a0\u2018What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.\u2019\u00a0\u201d California<\/i> v. Ciraolo,<\/i> 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katz<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)); see Florida<\/i> v. Riley,<\/i> 488 U.S. 445, 449\u2014450 (1989); California<\/i> v. Greenwood,<\/i> 486 U.S. 35, 40\u201441 (1988); Dow Chemical Co.<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 476 U.S. 227, 235\u2014236 (1986); Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Colo.<\/i> v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,<\/i> 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974). That is the principle implicated here.\r\n\r\nIndeed, the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building, particularly if it is vented, as was the case here. Additionally, any member of the public might notice that one part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfaces. Such use of the senses would not convert into an unreasonable search if, instead, an adjoining neighbor allowed an officer onto her property to verify her perceptions with a sensitive thermometer. Nor, in my view, does such observation become an unreasonable search if made from a distance with the aid of a device that merely discloses that the exterior of one house, or one area of the house, is much warmer than another. Nothing more occurred in this case.\r\n\r\nThus, the notion that heat emissions from the outside of a dwelling is a private matter implicating the protections of the Fourth Amendment (the text of which guarantees the right of people \u201cto be secure in<\/i> their \u2026 houses\u201d against unreasonable searches and seizures (emphasis added)) is not only unprecedented but also quite difficult to take seriously. Heat waves, like aromas that are generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building. A subjective expectation that they would remain private is not only implausible but also surely not \u201cone that society is prepared to recognize as \u2018reasonable.\u2019\u00a0\u201d Katz<\/i>, 389 U.S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).\r\n\r\nTo be sure, the homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning what takes place within the home, and the Fourth Amendment\u2019s protection against physical invasions of the home should apply to their functional equivalent. But the equipment in this case did not penetrate the walls of petitioner\u2019s home, and while it did pick up \u201cdetails of the home\u201d that were exposed to the public, ante<\/i>, at 10, it did not obtain \u201cany information regarding the interior<\/i> of the home,\u201d ante<\/i>, at 6 (emphasis added). In the Court\u2019s own words, based on what the thermal imager \u201cshowed\u201d regarding the outside of petitioner\u2019s home, the officers \u201cconcluded\u201d that petitioner was engaging in illegal activity inside the home. Ante<\/i>, at 2. It would be quite absurd to characterize their thought processes as \u201csearches,\u201d regardless of whether they inferred (rightly) that petitioner was growing marijuana in his house, or (wrongly) that \u201cthe lady of the house [was taking] her daily sauna and bath.\u201d Ante<\/i>, at 10\u201411. In either case, the only conclusions the officers reached concerning the interior of the home were at least as indirect as those that might have been inferred from the contents of discarded garbage, see California<\/i> v. Greenwood,<\/i> 486 U.S. 35 (1988), or pen register data, see Smith<\/i> v. Maryland,<\/i> 442 U.S. 735 (1979), or, as in this case, subpoenaed utility records, see 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (CA9 1999). For the first time in its history, the Court assumes that an inference can amount to a Fourth Amendment violation.\r\n\r\nAlthough the Court is properly and commendably concerned about the threats to privacy that may flow from advances in the technology available to the law enforcement profession, it has unfortunately failed to heed the tried and true counsel of judicial restraint. Instead of concentrating on the rather mundane issue that is actually presented by the case before it, the Court has endeavored to craft an all-encompassing rule for the future. It would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to grapple with these emerging issues rather than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitutional constraints.\r\n\r\nI respectfully dissent.","rendered":" Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.<\/p>\n This case presents the question whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a \u201csearch\u201d within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.<\/p>\n I<\/b><\/p>\n In 1991 Agent William Elliott of the United States Department of the Interior came to suspect that marijuana was being grown in the home belonging to petitioner Danny Kyllo, part of a triplex on Rhododendron Drive in Florence, Oregon. Indoor marijuana growth typically requires high-intensity lamps. In order to determine whether an amount of heat was emanating from petitioner\u2019s home consistent with the use of such lamps, at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott and Dan Haas used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the triplex. Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. The imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth\u2013black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images. The scan of Kyllo\u2019s home took only a few minutes and was performed from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott\u2019s vehicle across the street from the front of the house and also from the street in back of the house. The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of petitioner\u2019s home were relatively hot compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in the triplex. Agent Elliott concluded that petitioner was using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house, which indeed he was. Based on tips from informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant authorizing a search of petitioner\u2019s home, and the agents found an indoor growing operation involving more than 100 plants. Petitioner was indicted on one count of manufacturing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1). He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea.<\/p>\n The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding the intrusiveness of thermal imaging. On remand the District Court found that the Agema 210 \u201cis a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the house\u201d; it \u201cdid not show any people or activity within the walls of the structure\u201d; \u201c[t]he device used cannot penetrate walls or windows to reveal conversations or human activities\u201d; and \u201c[n]o intimate details of the home were observed.\u201d Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39\u201440. Based on these findings, the District Court upheld the validity of the warrant that relied in part upon the thermal imaging, and reaffirmed its denial of the motion to suppress. A divided Court of Appeals initially reversed, 140 F.3d 1249 (1998), but that opinion was withdrawn and the panel (after a change in composition) affirmed, 190 F.3d 1041 (1999), with Judge Noonan dissenting. The court held that petitioner had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, id.<\/i>, at 1046, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager \u201cdid not expose any intimate details of Kyllo\u2019s life,\u201d only \u201camorphous \u2018hot spots\u2019 on the roof and exterior wall,\u201d id.<\/i>, at 1047. We granted certiorari.<\/p>\n II<\/b><\/p>\n The Fourth Amendment provides that \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.\u201d \u201cAt the very core\u201d of the Fourth Amendment \u201cstands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.\u201d Silverman <\/i>v. United States<\/i>, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no. See Illinois <\/i>v. Rodriguez<\/i>, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Payton <\/i>v. New York<\/i>, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).<\/p>\n The present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a home. We have previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, if any, is too much. While we upheld enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex in Dow Chemical<\/i>, we noted that we found \u201cit important that this is not<\/i> an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened,\u201d 476 U.S., at 237, n.\u00a04 (emphasis in original).<\/p>\n III<\/b><\/p>\n It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology. For example, as the cases discussed above make clear, the technology enabling human flight has exposed to public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage that once were private. See Ciraolo<\/i>, supra<\/i>, at 215. The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.<\/p>\n The Government maintains, however, that the thermal imaging must be upheld because it detected \u201conly heat radiating from the external surface of the house.\u201d<\/p>\n We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws \u201ca firm line at the entrance to the house,\u201d Payton<\/i>, 445 U.S., at 590. That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright\u2013which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly possible to conclude from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in this case that no \u201csignificant\u201d compromise of the homeowner\u2019s privacy has occurred, we must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.<\/p>\n \u201cThe Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.\u201d Carroll<\/i> v. United States<\/i>, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).<\/p>\n Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a \u201csearch\u201d and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.<\/p>\n Since we hold the Thermovision imaging to have been an unlawful search, it will remain for the District Court to determine whether, without the evidence it provided, the search warrant issued in this case was supported by probable cause\u2013and if not, whether there is any other basis for supporting admission of the evidence that the search pursuant to the warrant produced.<\/p>\n The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.<\/p>\n It is so ordered.<\/p>\n Justice Stevens, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice O\u2019Connor, and Justice Kennedy join,SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\n
KYLLO v. UNITED STATES<\/b><\/h3>\n
530 U.S. 1305 (2001)<\/b><\/h3>\n
\ndissenting.<\/p>\n