{"id":231,"date":"2018-08-09T18:45:42","date_gmt":"2018-08-09T18:45:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/?post_type=chapter&p=231"},"modified":"2018-09-05T15:45:50","modified_gmt":"2018-09-05T15:45:50","slug":"united-states-v-jones","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/chapter\/united-states-v-jones\/","title":{"raw":"United States v. Jones","rendered":"United States v. Jones"},"content":{"raw":"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\r\n

UNITED STATES v. JONES<\/b><\/h3>\r\n

565 U.S.400 (2012)<\/b><\/h3>\r\nSyllabus\r\n\r\nThe Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to install a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle registered to respondent Jones\u2019s wife. The warrant authorized installation in the District of Columbia and within 10 days, but agents installed the device on the 11th day and in Maryland. The Government then tracked the vehicle\u2019s movements for 28 days. It subsequently secured an indictment of Jones and others on drug trafficking conspiracy charges. The District Court suppressed the GPS data obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones\u2019s residence, but held the remaining data admissible because Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy when the vehicle was on public streets. Jones was convicted. The D.\u00a0C. Circuit reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment.\r\n\r\nHeld:\u00a0The Government\u2019s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle\u2019s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.\r\n\r\n(a)\u00a0The Fourth Amendment protects the \u201cright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d Here, the Government\u2019s physical intrusion on an \u201ceffect\u201d for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a \u201csearch.\u201d This type of encroachment on an area enumerated in the Amendment would have been considered a search within the meaning of the Amendment at the time it was adopted.\r\n\r\n(b)\u00a0This conclusion is consistent with this Court\u2019s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th century was tied to common-law trespass. Later cases, which have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach, have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan\u2019s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.\u00a0S. 347 , which said that the Fourth Amendment protects a person\u2019s \u201creasonable expectation of privacy,\u201d id., at 360. Here, the Court need not address the Government\u2019s contention that Jones had no \u201creasonable expectation of privacy,\u201d because Jones\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must \u201cassur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.\u201d Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.\u00a0S. 27 . Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.\u00a0S. 165 ; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.\u00a0S. 56 . United States v. Knotts, 460 U.\u00a0S. 276 , and United States v. Karo, 468 U.\u00a0S. 705 \u2014post-Katz cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to \u201cbeepers,\u201d electronic tracking devices representing another form of electronic monitoring\u2014do not foreclose the conclusion that a search occurred here. New York v. Class, 475 U.\u00a0S. 106 , and Oliver v. United States, 466 U.\u00a0S. 170 , also do not support the Government\u2019s position.\r\n\r\n(c)\u00a0The Government\u2019s alternative argument\u2014that if the attachment and use of the device was a search, it was a reasonable one\u2014is forfeited because it was not raised below.\r\n\r\n615 F.\u00a03d 544, affirmed.\r\n\r\nScalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.\u00a0J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined.","rendered":"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\n

UNITED STATES v. JONES<\/b><\/h3>\n

565 U.S.400 (2012)<\/b><\/h3>\n

Syllabus<\/p>\n

The Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to install a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle registered to respondent Jones\u2019s wife. The warrant authorized installation in the District of Columbia and within 10 days, but agents installed the device on the 11th day and in Maryland. The Government then tracked the vehicle\u2019s movements for 28 days. It subsequently secured an indictment of Jones and others on drug trafficking conspiracy charges. The District Court suppressed the GPS data obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones\u2019s residence, but held the remaining data admissible because Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy when the vehicle was on public streets. Jones was convicted. The D.\u00a0C. Circuit reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment.<\/p>\n

Held:\u00a0The Government\u2019s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle\u2019s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.<\/p>\n

(a)\u00a0The Fourth Amendment protects the \u201cright of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d Here, the Government\u2019s physical intrusion on an \u201ceffect\u201d for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a \u201csearch.\u201d This type of encroachment on an area enumerated in the Amendment would have been considered a search within the meaning of the Amendment at the time it was adopted.<\/p>\n

(b)\u00a0This conclusion is consistent with this Court\u2019s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th century was tied to common-law trespass. Later cases, which have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach, have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan\u2019s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.\u00a0S. 347 , which said that the Fourth Amendment protects a person\u2019s \u201creasonable expectation of privacy,\u201d id., at 360. Here, the Court need not address the Government\u2019s contention that Jones had no \u201creasonable expectation of privacy,\u201d because Jones\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must \u201cassur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.\u201d Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.\u00a0S. 27 . Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.\u00a0S. 165 ; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.\u00a0S. 56 . United States v. Knotts, 460 U.\u00a0S. 276 , and United States v. Karo, 468 U.\u00a0S. 705 \u2014post-Katz cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to \u201cbeepers,\u201d electronic tracking devices representing another form of electronic monitoring\u2014do not foreclose the conclusion that a search occurred here. New York v. Class, 475 U.\u00a0S. 106 , and Oliver v. United States, 466 U.\u00a0S. 170 , also do not support the Government\u2019s position.<\/p>\n

(c)\u00a0The Government\u2019s alternative argument\u2014that if the attachment and use of the device was a search, it was a reasonable one\u2014is forfeited because it was not raised below.<\/p>\n

615 F.\u00a03d 544, affirmed.<\/p>\n

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.\u00a0J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53384,"menu_order":20,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-231","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":115,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/231","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53384"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/231\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":402,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/231\/revisions\/402"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/115"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/231\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=231"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=231"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=231"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=231"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}