{"id":233,"date":"2018-08-09T18:47:16","date_gmt":"2018-08-09T18:47:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/?post_type=chapter&p=233"},"modified":"2018-09-05T15:48:29","modified_gmt":"2018-09-05T15:48:29","slug":"carpenter-v-united-states","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/chapter\/carpenter-v-united-states\/","title":{"raw":"Carpenter v. United States","rendered":"Carpenter v. United States"},"content":{"raw":"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\r\n

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES <\/b><\/h3>\r\n

585 U.S.___ (2018)<\/b><\/h3>\r\nSyllabus\r\n\r\nCell phones perform their wide and growing variety of functions by continuously connecting to a set of radio antennas called \u201ccell sites.\u201d Each time a phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location information (CSLI). Wireless carriers collect and store this information for their own business purposes. Here, after the FBI identified the cell phone numbers of several robbery suspects, prosecutors were granted court orders to obtain the suspects\u2019 cell phone records under the Stored Communications Act. Wireless carriers produced CSLI for petitioner Timothy Carpenter\u2019s phone, and the Government was able to obtain 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter\u2019s movements over 127 days\u2014an average of 101 data points per day. Carpenter moved to suppress the data, arguing that the Government\u2019s seizure of the records without obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied the motion, and prosecutors used the records at trial to show that Carpenter\u2019s phone was near four of the robbery locations at the time those robberies occurred. Carpenter was convicted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had shared that information with his wireless carriers.\r\n\r\nHeld<\/i>: 1.\u00a0The Government\u2019s acquisition of Carpenter\u2019s cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search.\r\n\r\n(a)\u00a0The Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests but certain expectations of privacy as well. Katz<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 389 U.\u00a0S. 347, 351. Thus, when an individual \u201cseeks to preserve something as private,\u201d and his expectation of privacy is \u201cone that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,\u201d official intrusion into that sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause. Smith<\/i> v. Maryland<\/i>, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The analysis regarding which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection is informed by historical understandings \u201cof what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.\u201d Carroll<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 267 U.\u00a0S. 132. These Founding-era understandings continue to inform this Court when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools. See, e.g., Kyllo<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 533 U.\u00a0S. 27.\r\n\r\n(b)\u00a0The digital data at issue\u2014personal location information maintained by a third party\u2014does not fit neatly under existing precedents but lies at the intersection of two lines of cases. One set addresses a person\u2019s expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements. See, e.g., United States<\/i> v. Jones, <\/i>565 U.\u00a0S. 400 (five Justices concluding that privacy concerns would be raised by GPS tracking). The other addresses a person\u2019s expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties. See United States<\/i> v. Miller,<\/i> 425 U.\u00a0S. 435 (no expectation of privacy in financial records held by a bank), and Smith, <\/i>442 U.\u00a0S. 735 (no expectation of privacy in records of dialed telephone numbers conveyed to telephone company).\r\n\r\n(c)\u00a0Tracking a person\u2019s past movements through CSLI partakes of many of the qualities of GPS monitoring considered in Jones\u2014<\/i>it is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled. At the same time, however, the fact that the individual continuously reveals his location to his wireless carrier implicates the third-party principle of Smith <\/i>and Miller.<\/i> Given the unique nature of cell-site records, this Court declines to extend Smith<\/i> and Miller<\/i> to cover them.\r\n\r\n(1)\u00a0A majority of the Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. Allowing government access to cell-site records\u2014which \u201chold for many Americans the \u2018privacies of life,\u2019\u00a0\u201d Riley<\/i> v. California<\/i>, 573 U.\u00a0S. ___,\u2014contravenes that expectation. In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring considered in Jones<\/i>: They give the Government near perfect surveillance and allow it to travel back in time to retrace a person\u2019s whereabouts, subject only to the five-year retention policies of most wireless carriers. The Government contends that CSLI data is less precise than GPS information, but it thought the data accurate enough here to highlight it during closing argument in Carpenter\u2019s trial. At any rate, the rule the Court adopts \u201cmust take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development,\u201d Kyllo<\/i>, 533 U.\u00a0S., at 36, and the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision.\r\n\r\n(2)\u00a0The Government contends that the third-party doctrine governs this case, because cell-site records, like the records in Smith <\/i>and Miller<\/i>, are \u201cbusiness records,\u201d created and maintained by wireless carriers. But there is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith <\/i>and Miller<\/i> and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers.\r\n\r\nThe third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another. Smith <\/i>and Miller<\/i>, however, did not rely solely on the act of sharing. They also considered \u201cthe nature of the particular documents sought\u201d and limitations on any \u201clegitimate \u2018expectation of privacy\u2019 concerning their contents.\u201d Miller<\/i>, 425 U.\u00a0S., at 442. In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case the Government fails to appreciate the lack of comparable limitations on the revealing nature of CSLI.\r\n\r\nNor does the second rationale for the third-party doctrine\u2014voluntary exposure\u2014hold up when it comes to CSLI. Cell phone location information is not truly \u201cshared\u201d as the term is normally understood. First, cell phones and the services they provide are \u201csuch a pervasive and insistent part of daily life\u201d that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society. Riley<\/i>, 573 U.\u00a0S., at ___. Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the user\u2019s part beyond powering up.\r\n\r\n(d)\u00a0This decision is narrow. It does not express a view on matters not before the Court; does not disturb the application of Smith<\/i> and Miller <\/i>or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras; does not address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information; and does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.\r\n\r\n2.\u00a0 The Government did not obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring Carpenter\u2019s cell-site records. It acquired those records pursuant to a court order under the Stored Communications Act, which required the Government to show \u201creasonable grounds\u201d for believing that the records were \u201crelevant and material to an ongoing investigation.\u201d 18 U.\u00a0S.\u00a0C. \u00a72703(d). That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant. Consequently, an order issued under \u00a72703(d) is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records. Not all orders compelling the production of documents will require a showing of probable cause. A warrant is required only in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party. And even though the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific exceptions\u2014e.g.<\/i>, exigent circumstances\u2014may support a warrantless search.\r\n\r\n<\/a> 819 F.\u00a03d 880, reversed and remanded.\r\n\r\nRoberts, C.\u00a0J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion.","rendered":"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/h2>\n

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES <\/b><\/h3>\n

585 U.S.___ (2018)<\/b><\/h3>\n

Syllabus<\/p>\n

Cell phones perform their wide and growing variety of functions by continuously connecting to a set of radio antennas called \u201ccell sites.\u201d Each time a phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location information (CSLI). Wireless carriers collect and store this information for their own business purposes. Here, after the FBI identified the cell phone numbers of several robbery suspects, prosecutors were granted court orders to obtain the suspects\u2019 cell phone records under the Stored Communications Act. Wireless carriers produced CSLI for petitioner Timothy Carpenter\u2019s phone, and the Government was able to obtain 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter\u2019s movements over 127 days\u2014an average of 101 data points per day. Carpenter moved to suppress the data, arguing that the Government\u2019s seizure of the records without obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied the motion, and prosecutors used the records at trial to show that Carpenter\u2019s phone was near four of the robbery locations at the time those robberies occurred. Carpenter was convicted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had shared that information with his wireless carriers.<\/p>\n

Held<\/i>: 1.\u00a0The Government\u2019s acquisition of Carpenter\u2019s cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search.<\/p>\n

(a)\u00a0The Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests but certain expectations of privacy as well. Katz<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 389 U.\u00a0S. 347, 351. Thus, when an individual \u201cseeks to preserve something as private,\u201d and his expectation of privacy is \u201cone that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,\u201d official intrusion into that sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause. Smith<\/i> v. Maryland<\/i>, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The analysis regarding which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection is informed by historical understandings \u201cof what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.\u201d Carroll<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 267 U.\u00a0S. 132. These Founding-era understandings continue to inform this Court when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools. See, e.g., Kyllo<\/i> v. United States,<\/i> 533 U.\u00a0S. 27.<\/p>\n

(b)\u00a0The digital data at issue\u2014personal location information maintained by a third party\u2014does not fit neatly under existing precedents but lies at the intersection of two lines of cases. One set addresses a person\u2019s expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements. See, e.g., United States<\/i> v. Jones, <\/i>565 U.\u00a0S. 400 (five Justices concluding that privacy concerns would be raised by GPS tracking). The other addresses a person\u2019s expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties. See United States<\/i> v. Miller,<\/i> 425 U.\u00a0S. 435 (no expectation of privacy in financial records held by a bank), and Smith, <\/i>442 U.\u00a0S. 735 (no expectation of privacy in records of dialed telephone numbers conveyed to telephone company).<\/p>\n

(c)\u00a0Tracking a person\u2019s past movements through CSLI partakes of many of the qualities of GPS monitoring considered in Jones\u2014<\/i>it is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled. At the same time, however, the fact that the individual continuously reveals his location to his wireless carrier implicates the third-party principle of Smith <\/i>and Miller.<\/i> Given the unique nature of cell-site records, this Court declines to extend Smith<\/i> and Miller<\/i> to cover them.<\/p>\n

(1)\u00a0A majority of the Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. Allowing government access to cell-site records\u2014which \u201chold for many Americans the \u2018privacies of life,\u2019\u00a0\u201d Riley<\/i> v. California<\/i>, 573 U.\u00a0S. ___,\u2014contravenes that expectation. In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring considered in Jones<\/i>: They give the Government near perfect surveillance and allow it to travel back in time to retrace a person\u2019s whereabouts, subject only to the five-year retention policies of most wireless carriers. The Government contends that CSLI data is less precise than GPS information, but it thought the data accurate enough here to highlight it during closing argument in Carpenter\u2019s trial. At any rate, the rule the Court adopts \u201cmust take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development,\u201d Kyllo<\/i>, 533 U.\u00a0S., at 36, and the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision.<\/p>\n

(2)\u00a0The Government contends that the third-party doctrine governs this case, because cell-site records, like the records in Smith <\/i>and Miller<\/i>, are \u201cbusiness records,\u201d created and maintained by wireless carriers. But there is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith <\/i>and Miller<\/i> and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers.<\/p>\n

The third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another. Smith <\/i>and Miller<\/i>, however, did not rely solely on the act of sharing. They also considered \u201cthe nature of the particular documents sought\u201d and limitations on any \u201clegitimate \u2018expectation of privacy\u2019 concerning their contents.\u201d Miller<\/i>, 425 U.\u00a0S., at 442. In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case the Government fails to appreciate the lack of comparable limitations on the revealing nature of CSLI.<\/p>\n

Nor does the second rationale for the third-party doctrine\u2014voluntary exposure\u2014hold up when it comes to CSLI. Cell phone location information is not truly \u201cshared\u201d as the term is normally understood. First, cell phones and the services they provide are \u201csuch a pervasive and insistent part of daily life\u201d that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society. Riley<\/i>, 573 U.\u00a0S., at ___. Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the user\u2019s part beyond powering up.<\/p>\n

(d)\u00a0This decision is narrow. It does not express a view on matters not before the Court; does not disturb the application of Smith<\/i> and Miller <\/i>or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras; does not address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information; and does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0 The Government did not obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring Carpenter\u2019s cell-site records. It acquired those records pursuant to a court order under the Stored Communications Act, which required the Government to show \u201creasonable grounds\u201d for believing that the records were \u201crelevant and material to an ongoing investigation.\u201d 18 U.\u00a0S.\u00a0C. \u00a72703(d). That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant. Consequently, an order issued under \u00a72703(d) is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records. Not all orders compelling the production of documents will require a showing of probable cause. A warrant is required only in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party. And even though the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific exceptions\u2014e.g.<\/i>, exigent circumstances\u2014may support a warrantless search.<\/p>\n

<\/a> 819 F.\u00a03d 880, reversed and remanded.<\/p>\n

Roberts, C.\u00a0J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":53384,"menu_order":21,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-233","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":115,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/233","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/53384"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/233\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":404,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/233\/revisions\/404"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/115"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/233\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=233"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=233"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=233"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=233"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}