{"id":502,"date":"2022-07-08T14:42:12","date_gmt":"2022-07-08T14:42:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/?post_type=chapter&p=502"},"modified":"2022-07-08T14:42:56","modified_gmt":"2022-07-08T14:42:56","slug":"kennedy-v-brewerton-school-district-597-u-s-____2022","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/chapter\/kennedy-v-brewerton-school-district-597-u-s-____2022\/","title":{"raw":"Kennedy v. Brewerton School District","rendered":"Kennedy v. Brewerton School District"},"content":{"raw":"OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1\r\nSyllabus\r\n\r\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\r\nSyllabus\r\nKENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT\r\nCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR\r\nTHE NINTH CIRCUIT\r\nNo. 21\u2013418. Argued April 25, 2022\u2014Decided June 27, 2022\r\nPetitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach in\r\nthe Bremerton School District after he knelt at midfield after games to\r\noffer a quiet personal prayer. Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, alleging that the District\u2019s actions violated the First Amendment\u2019s Free\r\nSpeech and Free Exercise Clauses. He also moved for a preliminary\r\ninjunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court\r\ndenied that motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After the parties\r\nengaged in discovery, they filed cross-motions for summary judgment.\r\nThe District Court found that the \u201c\u2018sole reason\u2019\u201d for the District\u2019s decision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived \u201crisk of constitutional\r\nliability\u201d under the Establishment Clause for his \u201creligious conduct\u201d\r\nafter three games in October 2015. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231. The\r\nDistrict Court granted summary judgment to the District and the\r\nNinth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear\r\nthe case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. 4 F. 4th 910, 911.\r\nSeveral dissenters argued that the panel applied a flawed understanding of the Establishment Clause reflected in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403\r\nU. S. 602, and that this Court has abandoned Lemon\u2019s \u201cahistorical,\r\natextual\u201d approach to discerning Establishment Clause violations. 4\r\nF. 4th, at 911, and n. 3.\r\nHeld: The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance\r\nfrom government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Pp. 11\u201332.\r\n(a) Mr. Kennedy contends that the District\u2019s conduct violated both\r\nthe Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.\r\nWhere the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, the Free\r\nSpeech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious\r\nactivities. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6. A\r\nplaintiff must demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the\r\nFree Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. If the plaintiff carries his or\r\nher burden, the defendant must show that its actions were nonetheless\r\njustified and appropriately tailored. Pp. 11\u201330.\r\n(1) Mr. Kennedy discharged his burden under the Free Exercise\r\nClause. The Court\u2019s precedents permit a plaintiff to demonstrate a\r\nfree exercise violation multiple ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to\r\na policy that is not \u201cneutral\u201d or \u201cgenerally applicable.\u201d Employment\r\nDiv., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 879\u2013\r\n881. Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, under which the government must\r\ndemonstrate its course was justified by a compelling state interest and\r\nwas narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. See, e.g., Church of\r\nLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546.\r\nHere, no one questions that Mr. Kennedy seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise involving giving \u201cthanks through\r\nprayer\u201d briefly \u201con the playing field\u201d at the conclusion of each game he\r\ncoaches. App. 168, 171. The contested exercise here does not involve\r\nleading prayers with the team; the District disciplined Mr. Kennedy\r\nonly for his decision to persist in praying quietly without his students\r\nafter three games in October 2015. In forbidding Mr. Kennedy\u2019s brief\r\nprayer, the District\u2019s challenged policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. By its own admission, the District sought to restrict\r\nMr. Kennedy\u2019s actions at least in part because of their religious character. Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District\u2019s unquestioned \u201cobject.\u201d The District explained that it could not allow an onduty employee to engage in religious conduct even though it allowed\r\nother on-duty employees to engage in personal secular conduct. The\r\nDistrict\u2019s performance evaluation after the 2015 football season also\r\nadvised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the ground that he failed to\r\nsupervise student-athletes after games, but any sort of postgame supervisory requirement was not applied in an evenhanded way.\r\nPp. 12\u201314. The District thus conceded that its policies were neither\r\nneutral nor generally applicable.\r\n(2) Mr. Kennedy also discharged his burden under the Free\r\nSpeech Clause. The First Amendment\u2019s protections extend to \u201cteachers and students,\u201d neither of whom \u201cshed their constitutional rights to\r\nfreedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.\u201d Tinker v.\r\nDes Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506.\r\nBut teachers and coaches are also government employees paid in part\r\nto speak on the government\u2019s behalf and to convey its intended messages. To account for the complexity associated with the interplay between free speech rights and government employment, this Court\u2019s decisions in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205,\r\nWill Cty., 391 U. S. 563, and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, and\r\nrelated cases suggest proceeding in two steps. The first step involves\r\na threshold inquiry into the nature of the speech at issue. When an\r\nemployee \u201cspeaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern,\u201d\r\nthe Court\u2019s cases indicate that the First Amendment may be implicated and courts should proceed to a second step. Id., at 423. At this\r\nstep, courts should engage in \u201ca delicate balancing of the competing\r\ninterests surrounding the speech and its consequences.\u201d Ibid. At the\r\nfirst step of the Pickering\u2013Garcetti inquiry, the parties\u2019 disagreement\r\ncenters on one question: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech\r\nattributable to the District?\r\nWhen Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his\r\nsuspension, he was not engaged in speech \u201cordinarily within the scope\u201d\r\nof his duties as a coach. Lane v. Franks, 573 U. S. 228, 240. He did\r\nnot speak pursuant to government policy and was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players,\r\ndiscussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach.\r\nSimply put: Mr. Kennedy\u2019s prayers did not \u201cow[e their] existence\u201d to\r\nMr. Kennedy\u2019s responsibilities as a public employee. Garcetti, 547\r\nU. S., at 421. The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy\u2019s prayers\u2014during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend\r\nbriefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities\u2014confirms that Mr. Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting\r\nwithin the scope of his duties as a coach. It is not dispositive that\r\nCoach Kennedy served as a role model and remained on duty after\r\ngames. To hold otherwise is to posit an \u201cexcessively broad job descriptio[n]\u201d by treating everything teachers and coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control. Garcetti,\r\n547 U. S., at 424. That Mr. Kennedy used available time to pray does\r\nnot transform his speech into government speech. Acknowledging that\r\nMr. Kennedy\u2019s prayers represented his own private speech means he\r\nhas carried his threshold burden. Under the Pickering\u2013Garcetti framework, a second step remains where the government may seek to prove\r\nthat its interests as employer outweigh even an employee\u2019s private\r\nspeech on a matter of public concern. See Lane, 573 U. S., at 242.\r\nPp. 15\u201319.\r\n(3) Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden shifts to the District. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally\r\nmust satisfy at least \u201cstrict scrutiny,\u201d showing that its restrictions on\r\nthe plaintiff\u2019s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533. A similar\r\nstandard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause. See Reed\r\nv. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 171. The District asks the Court to\r\napply to Mr. Kennedy\u2019s claims the more lenient second-step Pickering\u2013\r\nGarcetti test, or alternatively, intermediate scrutiny. The Court concludes, however, that the District cannot sustain its burden under any\r\nstandard. Pp. 19\u201330.\r\ni. The District, like the Ninth Circuit below, insists Mr. Kennedy\u2019s rights to religious exercise and free speech must yield to the\r\nDistrict\u2019s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation under\r\nLemon and its progeny. The Lemon approach called for an examination of a law\u2019s purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with\r\nreligion. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612\u2013613. In time, that approach also\r\ncame to involve estimations about whether a \u201creasonable observer\u201d\r\nwould consider the government\u2019s challenged action an \u201cendorsement\u201d\r\nof religion. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties\r\nUnion, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593. But\u2014given the\r\napparent \u201cshortcomings\u201d associated with Lemon\u2019s \u201cambitiou[s],\u201d abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clause\u2014this\r\nCourt long ago abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot.\r\nAmerican Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (plurality opinion).\r\nIn place of Lemon and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by \u201c\u2018reference to historical practices and understandings.\u2019 \u201d Town of Greece v.\r\nGalloway, 572 U. S. 565, 576. A natural reading of the First Amendment suggests that the Clauses have \u201ccomplementary\u201d purposes, not\r\nwarring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15. An analysis\r\nfocused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has\r\nlong represented the rule rather than some \u201c\u2018exception\u2019\u201d within the\r\n\u201cCourt\u2019s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.\u201d Town of Greece, at 575.\r\nThe District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guidance. Pp. 19\u201330.\r\nii. The District next attempts to justify its suppression of Mr.\r\nKennedy\u2019s religious activity by arguing that doing otherwise would coerce students to pray. The Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in\r\nproceedings below and evidence of coercion in this record is absent.\r\nThe District suggests that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or\r\ncoach should be deemed\u2014without more and as a matter of law\u2014impermissibly coercive on students. A rule that the only acceptable government role models for students are those who eschew any visible religious expression would undermine a long constitutional tradition in\r\nwhich learning how to tolerate diverse expressive activities has always\r\nbeen \u201cpart of learning how to live in a pluralistic society.\u201d Lee v. Wesiman, 505 U. S. 577, 590. No historically sound understanding of the\r\nEstablishment Clause begins to \u201cmak[e] it necessary for government\r\nto be hostile to religion\u201d in this way. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306,\r\n314. Pp. 24\u201330.\r\niii. There is no conflict between the constitutional commands of\r\nthe First Amendment in this case. There is only the \u201cmere shadow\u201d of\r\na conflict, a false choice premised on a misconstruction of the Establishment Clause. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374\r\nU. S. 203, 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring). A government entity\u2019s concerns about phantom constitutional violations do not justify actual violations of an individual\u2019s First Amendment rights. Pp. 30\u201331.\r\n(c) Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free\r\nand diverse Republic. Here, a government entity sought to punish an\r\nindividual for engaging in a personal religious observance, based on a\r\nmistaken view that it has a duty to suppress religious observances\r\neven as it allows comparable secular speech. The Constitution neither\r\nmandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination. Mr. Kennedy is\r\nentitled to summary judgment on his religious exercise and free speech\r\nclaims. Pp. 31\u201332.\r\n991 F. 3d 1004, reversed.\r\nGORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,\r\nC. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, except as to Part III\u2013B. THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J.,\r\nfiled concurring opinions. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in\r\nwhich BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.\r\n\r\n_________________\r\n_________________\r\nCite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)","rendered":"

OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1
\nSyllabus<\/p>\n

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
\nSyllabus
\nKENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT
\nCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
\nTHE NINTH CIRCUIT
\nNo. 21\u2013418. Argued April 25, 2022\u2014Decided June 27, 2022
\nPetitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach in
\nthe Bremerton School District after he knelt at midfield after games to
\noffer a quiet personal prayer. Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, alleging that the District\u2019s actions violated the First Amendment\u2019s Free
\nSpeech and Free Exercise Clauses. He also moved for a preliminary
\ninjunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court
\ndenied that motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After the parties
\nengaged in discovery, they filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
\nThe District Court found that the \u201c\u2018sole reason\u2019\u201d for the District\u2019s decision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived \u201crisk of constitutional
\nliability\u201d under the Establishment Clause for his \u201creligious conduct\u201d
\nafter three games in October 2015. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231. The
\nDistrict Court granted summary judgment to the District and the
\nNinth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear
\nthe case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. 4 F. 4th 910, 911.
\nSeveral dissenters argued that the panel applied a flawed understanding of the Establishment Clause reflected in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
\nU. S. 602, and that this Court has abandoned Lemon\u2019s \u201cahistorical,
\natextual\u201d approach to discerning Establishment Clause violations. 4
\nF. 4th, at 911, and n. 3.
\nHeld: The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance
\nfrom government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Pp. 11\u201332.
\n(a) Mr. Kennedy contends that the District\u2019s conduct violated both
\nthe Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
\nWhere the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, the Free
\nSpeech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious
\nactivities. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6. A
\nplaintiff must demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the
\nFree Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. If the plaintiff carries his or
\nher burden, the defendant must show that its actions were nonetheless
\njustified and appropriately tailored. Pp. 11\u201330.
\n(1) Mr. Kennedy discharged his burden under the Free Exercise
\nClause. The Court\u2019s precedents permit a plaintiff to demonstrate a
\nfree exercise violation multiple ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to
\na policy that is not \u201cneutral\u201d or \u201cgenerally applicable.\u201d Employment
\nDiv., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 879\u2013
\n881. Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, under which the government must
\ndemonstrate its course was justified by a compelling state interest and
\nwas narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. See, e.g., Church of
\nLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546.
\nHere, no one questions that Mr. Kennedy seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise involving giving \u201cthanks through
\nprayer\u201d briefly \u201con the playing field\u201d at the conclusion of each game he
\ncoaches. App. 168, 171. The contested exercise here does not involve
\nleading prayers with the team; the District disciplined Mr. Kennedy
\nonly for his decision to persist in praying quietly without his students
\nafter three games in October 2015. In forbidding Mr. Kennedy\u2019s brief
\nprayer, the District\u2019s challenged policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. By its own admission, the District sought to restrict
\nMr. Kennedy\u2019s actions at least in part because of their religious character. Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District\u2019s unquestioned \u201cobject.\u201d The District explained that it could not allow an onduty employee to engage in religious conduct even though it allowed
\nother on-duty employees to engage in personal secular conduct. The
\nDistrict\u2019s performance evaluation after the 2015 football season also
\nadvised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the ground that he failed to
\nsupervise student-athletes after games, but any sort of postgame supervisory requirement was not applied in an evenhanded way.
\nPp. 12\u201314. The District thus conceded that its policies were neither
\nneutral nor generally applicable.
\n(2) Mr. Kennedy also discharged his burden under the Free
\nSpeech Clause. The First Amendment\u2019s protections extend to \u201cteachers and students,\u201d neither of whom \u201cshed their constitutional rights to
\nfreedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.\u201d Tinker v.
\nDes Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506.
\nBut teachers and coaches are also government employees paid in part
\nto speak on the government\u2019s behalf and to convey its intended messages. To account for the complexity associated with the interplay between free speech rights and government employment, this Court\u2019s decisions in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205,
\nWill Cty., 391 U. S. 563, and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, and
\nrelated cases suggest proceeding in two steps. The first step involves
\na threshold inquiry into the nature of the speech at issue. When an
\nemployee \u201cspeaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern,\u201d
\nthe Court\u2019s cases indicate that the First Amendment may be implicated and courts should proceed to a second step. Id., at 423. At this
\nstep, courts should engage in \u201ca delicate balancing of the competing
\ninterests surrounding the speech and its consequences.\u201d Ibid. At the
\nfirst step of the Pickering\u2013Garcetti inquiry, the parties\u2019 disagreement
\ncenters on one question: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech
\nattributable to the District?
\nWhen Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his
\nsuspension, he was not engaged in speech \u201cordinarily within the scope\u201d
\nof his duties as a coach. Lane v. Franks, 573 U. S. 228, 240. He did
\nnot speak pursuant to government policy and was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players,
\ndiscussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach.
\nSimply put: Mr. Kennedy\u2019s prayers did not \u201cow[e their] existence\u201d to
\nMr. Kennedy\u2019s responsibilities as a public employee. Garcetti, 547
\nU. S., at 421. The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy\u2019s prayers\u2014during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend
\nbriefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities\u2014confirms that Mr. Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting
\nwithin the scope of his duties as a coach. It is not dispositive that
\nCoach Kennedy served as a role model and remained on duty after
\ngames. To hold otherwise is to posit an \u201cexcessively broad job descriptio[n]\u201d by treating everything teachers and coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control. Garcetti,
\n547 U. S., at 424. That Mr. Kennedy used available time to pray does
\nnot transform his speech into government speech. Acknowledging that
\nMr. Kennedy\u2019s prayers represented his own private speech means he
\nhas carried his threshold burden. Under the Pickering\u2013Garcetti framework, a second step remains where the government may seek to prove
\nthat its interests as employer outweigh even an employee\u2019s private
\nspeech on a matter of public concern. See Lane, 573 U. S., at 242.
\nPp. 15\u201319.
\n(3) Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden shifts to the District. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally
\nmust satisfy at least \u201cstrict scrutiny,\u201d showing that its restrictions on
\nthe plaintiff\u2019s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533. A similar
\nstandard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause. See Reed
\nv. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 171. The District asks the Court to
\napply to Mr. Kennedy\u2019s claims the more lenient second-step Pickering\u2013
\nGarcetti test, or alternatively, intermediate scrutiny. The Court concludes, however, that the District cannot sustain its burden under any
\nstandard. Pp. 19\u201330.
\ni. The District, like the Ninth Circuit below, insists Mr. Kennedy\u2019s rights to religious exercise and free speech must yield to the
\nDistrict\u2019s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation under
\nLemon and its progeny. The Lemon approach called for an examination of a law\u2019s purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with
\nreligion. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612\u2013613. In time, that approach also
\ncame to involve estimations about whether a \u201creasonable observer\u201d
\nwould consider the government\u2019s challenged action an \u201cendorsement\u201d
\nof religion. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
\nUnion, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593. But\u2014given the
\napparent \u201cshortcomings\u201d associated with Lemon\u2019s \u201cambitiou[s],\u201d abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clause\u2014this
\nCourt long ago abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot.
\nAmerican Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (plurality opinion).
\nIn place of Lemon and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by \u201c\u2018reference to historical practices and understandings.\u2019 \u201d Town of Greece v.
\nGalloway, 572 U. S. 565, 576. A natural reading of the First Amendment suggests that the Clauses have \u201ccomplementary\u201d purposes, not
\nwarring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15. An analysis
\nfocused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has
\nlong represented the rule rather than some \u201c\u2018exception\u2019\u201d within the
\n\u201cCourt\u2019s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.\u201d Town of Greece, at 575.
\nThe District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guidance. Pp. 19\u201330.
\nii. The District next attempts to justify its suppression of Mr.
\nKennedy\u2019s religious activity by arguing that doing otherwise would coerce students to pray. The Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in
\nproceedings below and evidence of coercion in this record is absent.
\nThe District suggests that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or
\ncoach should be deemed\u2014without more and as a matter of law\u2014impermissibly coercive on students. A rule that the only acceptable government role models for students are those who eschew any visible religious expression would undermine a long constitutional tradition in
\nwhich learning how to tolerate diverse expressive activities has always
\nbeen \u201cpart of learning how to live in a pluralistic society.\u201d Lee v. Wesiman, 505 U. S. 577, 590. No historically sound understanding of the
\nEstablishment Clause begins to \u201cmak[e] it necessary for government
\nto be hostile to religion\u201d in this way. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306,
\n314. Pp. 24\u201330.
\niii. There is no conflict between the constitutional commands of
\nthe First Amendment in this case. There is only the \u201cmere shadow\u201d of
\na conflict, a false choice premised on a misconstruction of the Establishment Clause. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
\nU. S. 203, 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring). A government entity\u2019s concerns about phantom constitutional violations do not justify actual violations of an individual\u2019s First Amendment rights. Pp. 30\u201331.
\n(c) Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free
\nand diverse Republic. Here, a government entity sought to punish an
\nindividual for engaging in a personal religious observance, based on a
\nmistaken view that it has a duty to suppress religious observances
\neven as it allows comparable secular speech. The Constitution neither
\nmandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination. Mr. Kennedy is
\nentitled to summary judgment on his religious exercise and free speech
\nclaims. Pp. 31\u201332.
\n991 F. 3d 1004, reversed.
\nGORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
\nC. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, except as to Part III\u2013B. THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J.,
\nfiled concurring opinions. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
\nwhich BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.<\/p>\n

_________________
\n_________________
\nCite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":99453,"menu_order":10,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-502","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":112,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/502","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/99453"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/502\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":504,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/502\/revisions\/504"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/112"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/502\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=502"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=502"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=502"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/monroecc-crj103\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=502"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}