LABOR LAW SECTION 240(1)

Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Company, 78 N.Y.2d 509, 513 (1991)

https://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/I91_0210.htm

“It is settled that section 240(1) “‘is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed’ (See Quigley v. Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68.)” (Koenig v Patrick Constr. Co., supra, at 319). Thus, we have interpreted the section as imposing absolute liability for a breach which has proximately caused an injury. Negligence, if any, of the injured worker is of no consequence (see, Bland v Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452, 459-461; Zimmer v Performing Arts, supra, at 521; Koenig v Patrick Constr. Co., supra). In furtherance of this same legislative purpose of protecting workers “against the known hazards of the occupation” (Koenig v Patrick Constr. Co., supra, at 319), we have determined that the duty under section 240(1) is non-delegable and that an owner is liable for a violation of the section even though the job was performed by an independent contractor over which it exercised no supervision or control (see, Haimes v New York Tel. Co., 46 NY2d 132, 136-137).”

THE RULE OF LEX LOCI DELICTI (THE CHOICE OF LAW)

Schultz v Boy Scouts of Am. 65 NY2d 189 (1985)

https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/archives/schultz_boyscouts.htm

“Plaintiffs, Richard E. and Margaret Schultz, instituted this action to recover damages for personal injuries they and their sons, Richard and Christopher, suffered because the boys were sexually abused by defendant Edmund Coakeley and for damages sustained as a result of Christopher’s wrongful death after he committed suicide. Coakeley, a brother in the Franciscan order, was the boys’ school teacher and leader of their scout troop. Plaintiffs allege that the sexual abuse occurred while Coakeley was acting in those capacities and the causes of action before us on this appeal charge defendants Boy Scouts of America, Inc., and the Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc. (sued as Franciscan Brothers of the Poor, Inc.), with negligently hiring and supervising him.”

“Plaintiffs are domiciled in New Jersey and some of the injuries were sustained there. Thus, a choice-of-law issue is presented because New Jersey recognizes the doctrine of charitable immunity and New York does not. Defendants contend New Jersey law governs this litigation and that its courts have already determined that plaintiffs’ claims are barred in a separate action against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark (see, Schultz v Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 NJ 530, 472 A2d 531). Following the rationale of Babcock v Jackson (12 NY2d 473) and similar cases, we hold that New Jersey law applies and that plaintiffs are precluded from relitigating its effect on the claims they assert.”