JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

Artibee v Home Place Corp. 28 NY3d 739 (2017)

http://courts.state.ny.us/Reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_01145.htm (February 24, 2019)

(Justia Summary Opinion https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2017/5.html February 24, 2019)

Plaintiff suffered injuries while traveling on a state highway when a large branch broke off a tree bordering the road, fell through Plaintiff’s Jeep, and struck her on the head. Plaintiff and her spouse, derivatively, brought this action alleging that Defendant, the alleged owner of the property on which the tree was located, was negligent in failing to inspect, trim, and remove the dead or diseased tree. Plaintiff also sued the State, alleging negligence on the part of Department of Transportation employees for failing to properly maintain the trees or warn drivers of hazards along the state highway. Defendant moved for a jury charge directing the apportionment of liability for Plaintiff’s injuries between Defendant and the State. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for a jury instruction regarding apportionment. The Appellate Division modified by reversing the denial of Defendant’s motion for a jury charge on apportionment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fact-finder may not apportion fault to the State when a plaintiff claims that both the State and a private party are liable for noneconomic losses in a personal injury action.

“CPLR 1601 (1) “modifie[d] the common-law rule of joint and several liability by limiting a joint tortfeasor’s liability in certain circumstances” (Rangolan, 96 NY2d at 46). The statute provides that, in a personal injury action involving two or more jointly-liable tortfeasors or in a claim brought against the State in the Court of Claims, the liability for noneconomic loss of a defendant with 50% or less “of the total liability assigned to all persons liable . . . shall not exceed that defendant’s equitable share determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person causing or contributing to the total liability for non-economic loss” (CPLR 1601 [1]). In other words, under CPLR 1601, “a joint tortfeasor whose share of fault is 50% or less [is] liable for [a] plaintiff’s noneconomic loss only to the extent of that tortfeasor’s share of the total noneconomic loss,” so that “low-fault tortfeasors are liable only for their actual assessed share of responsibility” (Chianese v Meier, 98 NY2d 270, 275 [2002]). Apportionment against a nonparty defendant is available under section 1601, unless “the claimant proves that with due diligence he or she was unable to obtain jurisdiction over” the nonparty defendant “in said action (or in a claim against the state, in a court of this state)” (CPLR 1601 [1]).”

“The statutory language permitting the State to seek apportionment in the Court of Claims against a private defendant if the claimant could have sued that defendant in any court of this State was specifically requested by the office of the Attorney General (see Mem of Dept of Law, Bill Jacket, L 1986, ch 682, at 14). Pursuant to that language, as long as a claimant in the [*3]Court of Claims could have commenced an action against a private tortfeasor in any court in the State of New York, then the tortfeasor’s culpable conduct can be considered by the Court of Claims in determining the State’s equitable share of the total liability (see Siegel, NY Prac § 168C, at 290 [5th ed 2011]). The statute does not, however, contain similar, express enabling language to allow apportionment against the state in a Supreme Court action (see id. [acknowledging that such a rule has derived from case law, rather than any “statute in point”]).”

“Initially, we reject any argument that plaintiff did not face a jurisdictional limitation in impleading the State as a codefendant in this action. Rather, the State Constitution and our case law both indicate that the restriction on Supreme Court imposed by the doctrine of [*4]sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. Specifically, we have explained that the New York Constitution, article VI, § 9, which “preserv[es] the State’s historical sovereign immunity from suit,” is a constitutional limitation on “the jurisdiction of Supreme Court” (People v Correa, 15 NY3d 213, 227 [2010] [emphasis added]; see Siegel, NY Prac § 12, at 16 [5th ed 2011] [noting that “[t]here are two broad categories of original jurisdiction that . . . [S]upreme [C]ourt lacks: cases of which exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred by Congress on the federal courts, and actions against the state, where jurisdiction is conferred exclusively on the [C]ourt of [C]laims”]). Article VI, § 9 states that the Court of Claims “shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against the state or by the state against the claimant or between conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide.” As this Court stated in Correa, “claims for money damages brought against the State . . . must be initiated and tried in the Court of Claims” and, thus, “Supreme Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over [such] claims” (15 NY3d at 227-228 [emphasis added]) — that is, article VI, § 9 limits the jurisdiction of Supreme Court.[FN3]”

Rangolan v. County of Nassau 96 N.Y.2d 42 (2001)

https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2001/96-n-y-2d-42-0.html (February 24, 2019)

“Under CPLR article 16, a defendant may apportion its liability for noneconomic damages among other tortfeasors provided that it is 50% or less at fault (CPLR 1601 [1]). The issue before us, as certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is whether CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) precludes apportionment where a defendant’s liability arises from a breach of a non-delegable duty. We hold that CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) is not an exception to apportionment under CPLR article 16, but a savings provision that preserves the principles of vicarious liability.”

“Plaintiff Neville Rangolan was incarcerated at the Nassau County Correctional Center where he was seriously beaten by Steven King, a fellow inmate. Rangolan had cooperated as a confidential informant against King, and his inmate file cautioned that he was not to be housed with King. A corrections officer, however, failed to notice the warning and placed Rangolan and King in the same dormitory. Rangolan and his wife commenced this action against defendant Nassau County in Federal court, alleging, among other things, negligence for failure to protect Rangolan and violation of his Eighth Amendment rights under 42 USC § 1983. The United States District Court dismissed Rangolan’s section 1983 claim, but granted his motion for judgment as a matter of law on his negligence claim and ordered a trial on damages. The District Court denied the County’s request to instruct the jury on apportionment of damages between the County and King, concluding that CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) rendered apportionment under article 16 unavailable where the County’s liability arose from a breach of a non-delegable duty.”

“The jury awarded Rangolan damages for past and future pain and suffering, and also awarded damages to Rangolan’s wife for loss of services. On the County’s motion, the Court ordered a new trial on damages unless the Rangolans stipulated to a reduced award. The Rangolans accepted the reduced *46 award and both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal of Rangolan’s section 1983 claim. However, noting the absence of controlling precedent interpreting CPLR 1602 (2) (iv), the Second Circuit certified to us the following question: “whether a tortfeasor such as the County can, in the facts and circumstances of this case, seek to apportion its liability with another tortfeasor such as King pursuant to N. Y. C.P.L.R. 1601, or whether N. Y. C.P.L.R. 1602 (2) (iv) precludes such a defendant from seeking apportionment.” We answer the first part of the question in the affirmative, and thus the second part in the negative.”