{"id":85,"date":"2019-12-03T01:56:14","date_gmt":"2019-12-03T01:56:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/ny-personal-injury-law\/?post_type=chapter&p=85"},"modified":"2019-12-17T19:35:03","modified_gmt":"2019-12-17T19:35:03","slug":"liability","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/ny-personal-injury-law\/chapter\/liability\/","title":{"raw":"Liability","rendered":"Liability"},"content":{"raw":"Common Carriers Liability<\/strong>\r\n\r\nBethel v. NYC TR. AUTH.<\/em> 92 N.Y.2d 348 (1998)\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/new-york\/court-of-appeals\/1998\/92-n-y-2d-348-0.html<\/a>\r\n\r\n\u201cWe granted leave to appeal in this case to confront directly whether a duty of highest care should continue to be applied, as a matter of law, to common carriers and conclude that it should not. We thus realign the standard of care required of common carriers with the traditional, basic negligence standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. Under that standard, there is no stratification of degrees of care as a matter of law (see, Prosser and Keeton, Torts \u00a7 34, at 210 [5th ed]). Rather, \"there are only different amounts of care, as a matter of fact\" (id., at 211).\u201d\r\n\r\nEmployer Liability\/Within Scope of Employment<\/strong>\r\n\r\nDoe v. Githrie Clinic LTD<\/em> 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1644\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-2nd-circuit\/1655765.html<\/a>\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/ny-court-of-appeals\/1654495.html<\/a>\r\n\r\nDoe\u00a0lost in federal court and appealed to the Second Circuit, which\u00a0affirmed the dismissal.\r\n\r\nIn in answer to a certification question, the NY Court of Appeals ruled:\r\n\r\n\u201cIn a separate opinion (710 F3d 492 [2d Cir 2013]), the Second Circuit found that the nurse\u2019s actions were not foreseeable to defendants, nor were her actions taken within the scope of her employment (id. at 495). The court explained that in his complaint Doe himself alleged that the nurse was motivated by purely personal reasons and \u201cthose reasons had \u2018nothing to do with [Doe\u2019s] treatment and care'\u201d (id., citing Doe complaint at \u00b6 25). \u201cAs such,\u201d the court held, the nurse\u2019s \u201cactions cannot be imputed to the defendants on the basis of respondeat superior\u201d (id. at 496). The court certified the question to this Court, however, whether Doe may assert a specific and legally distinct cause of action against defendant, for breach of the fiduciary\u00a0duty of confidentiality, even when respondeat superior liability is absent (id. at 498).\u201d\r\n\r\nThe question before the NY Court of Appeals was: \u201cWhether, under New York law, the common law right of action for breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality for the unauthorized disclosure of medical information may run directly against medical corporations, even when the employee responsible for the breach is not a physician and acts outside the scope of her employment?\u201d\r\n\r\nIn a 6-1\u00a0opinion, the court answered no holding that a medical corporation\u2019s duty of safekeeping a patient\u2019s confidential medical information is limited to those risks that are reasonably foreseeable and to actions within the scope of employment.\r\n\r\n ","rendered":"

Common Carriers Liability<\/strong><\/p>\n

Bethel v. NYC TR. AUTH.<\/em> 92 N.Y.2d 348 (1998)<\/p>\n

https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/new-york\/court-of-appeals\/1998\/92-n-y-2d-348-0.html<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cWe granted leave to appeal in this case to confront directly whether a duty of highest care should continue to be applied, as a matter of law, to common carriers and conclude that it should not. We thus realign the standard of care required of common carriers with the traditional, basic negligence standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. Under that standard, there is no stratification of degrees of care as a matter of law (see, Prosser and Keeton, Torts \u00a7 34, at 210 [5th ed]). Rather, “there are only different amounts of care, as a matter of fact” (id., at 211).\u201d<\/p>\n

Employer Liability\/Within Scope of Employment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Doe v. Githrie Clinic LTD<\/em> 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1644<\/p>\n

https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-2nd-circuit\/1655765.html<\/a><\/p>\n

https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/ny-court-of-appeals\/1654495.html<\/a><\/p>\n

Doe\u00a0lost in federal court and appealed to the Second Circuit, which\u00a0affirmed the dismissal.<\/p>\n

In in answer to a certification question, the NY Court of Appeals ruled:<\/p>\n

\u201cIn a separate opinion (710 F3d 492 [2d Cir 2013]), the Second Circuit found that the nurse\u2019s actions were not foreseeable to defendants, nor were her actions taken within the scope of her employment (id. at 495). The court explained that in his complaint Doe himself alleged that the nurse was motivated by purely personal reasons and \u201cthose reasons had \u2018nothing to do with [Doe\u2019s] treatment and care’\u201d (id., citing Doe complaint at \u00b6 25). \u201cAs such,\u201d the court held, the nurse\u2019s \u201cactions cannot be imputed to the defendants on the basis of respondeat superior\u201d (id. at 496). The court certified the question to this Court, however, whether Doe may assert a specific and legally distinct cause of action against defendant, for breach of the fiduciary\u00a0duty of confidentiality, even when respondeat superior liability is absent (id. at 498).\u201d<\/p>\n

The question before the NY Court of Appeals was: \u201cWhether, under New York law, the common law right of action for breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality for the unauthorized disclosure of medical information may run directly against medical corporations, even when the employee responsible for the breach is not a physician and acts outside the scope of her employment?\u201d<\/p>\n

In a 6-1\u00a0opinion, the court answered no holding that a medical corporation\u2019s duty of safekeeping a patient\u2019s confidential medical information is limited to those risks that are reasonably foreseeable and to actions within the scope of employment.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n\n\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t

Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
CC licensed content, Original<\/div>