{"id":92,"date":"2019-12-03T02:01:53","date_gmt":"2019-12-03T02:01:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/ny-personal-injury-law\/?post_type=chapter&p=92"},"modified":"2019-12-17T19:37:24","modified_gmt":"2019-12-17T19:37:24","slug":"qualified-immunity-and-false-arrest","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/ny-personal-injury-law\/chapter\/qualified-immunity-and-false-arrest\/","title":{"raw":"Qualified Immunity and False Arrest","rendered":"Qualified Immunity and False Arrest"},"content":{"raw":"FALSE ARREST AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY<\/strong>\r\n\r\nDistrict of Columbia v. Wesby<\/em>, 583 U.S. ___ (2018)\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/583\/15-1485\/<\/a>\r\n\r\nNOTE:\u2002Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See\u00a0United States<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,<\/em>\u00a0200 U.\u00a0S. 321 .\r\n\r\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\r\n\r\nSyllabus\r\n\r\nDistrict of Columbia et\u00a0al.\u00a0v.\u00a0<\/em>Wesby et\u00a0al.\r\n\r\ncertiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit\r\n\r\nNo. 15\u20131485.\u2003Argued October 4, 2017\u2014Decided January 22, 2018\r\n\r\nDistrict of Columbia police officers responded to a complaint about loud music and illegal activities in a vacant house. Inside, they found the house nearly barren and in disarray. The officers smelled marijuana and observed beer bottles and cups of liquor on the floor, which was dirty. They found a make-shift strip club in the living room, and a naked woman and several men in an upstairs bedroom. Many party- goers scattered when they saw the uniformed officers, and some hid. The officers questioned everyone and got inconsistent stories. Two women identified \u201cPeaches\u201d as the house\u2019s tenant and said that she had given the partygoers permission to have the party. But Peaches was not there. When the officers spoke by phone to Peaches, she was nervous, agitated, and evasive. At first, she claimed that she was renting the house and had given the partygoers permission to have the party, but she eventually admitted that she did not have permission to use the house. The owner confirmed that he had not given anyone permission to be there. The officers then arrested the partygoers for unlawful entry.\r\n\r\nSeveral partygoers sued for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment and District law. The District Court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry and that two of the officers, petitioners here, were not entitled to qualified immunity. A divided panel of the D.\u00a0C. Circuit affirmed.\r\n\r\nHeld<\/em>:\r\n\r\n1.\u00a0The officers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers. Pp.\u00a07\u201313.\r\n\r\n(a)\u00a0Considering the \u201ctotality of the circumstances,\u201d\u00a0Maryland<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Pringle<\/em>, 540 U.\u00a0S. 366 , the officers made an \u201centirely reasonable inference\u201d that the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house,\u00a0id.<\/em>, at 372. Taken together, the condition of the house and the conduct of the partygoers allowed the officers to make several \u201c\u00a0\u2018common-sense conclusions about human behavior.\u2019\u00a0\u201d\u00a0Illinois v. Gates,\u00a0<\/em>462 U.\u00a0S. 213 . Because most homeowners do not live in such conditions or permit such activities in their homes, the officers could infer that the partygoers knew the party was not authorized. The officers also could infer that the partygoers knew that they were not supposed to be in the house because they scattered and hid when the officers arrived. See\u00a0Illinois\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Wardlow<\/em>, 528 U.\u00a0S. 119 \u2013125. The partygoers\u2019 vague and implausible answers to questioning also gave the officers reason to infer that the partygoers were lying and that their lies suggested a guilty mind. Cf.\u00a0Devenpeck\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Alford<\/em>, 543 U.\u00a0S. 146 \u2013156. Peaches\u2019 lying and evasive behavior gave the officers reason to discredit everything she said. The officers also could have inferred that she lied when she said she had invited the partygoers to the house, or that she told the partygoers that she was not actually renting the house. Pp.\u00a07\u201311.\r\n\r\n(b) The panel majority failed to follow two basic and well-established principles of law. First, it viewed each fact \u201cin isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances.\u201d\u00a0Pringle<\/em>,\u00a0supra<\/em>, at 372, n.\u00a02. Second, it believed that it could dismiss outright any circumstances that were \u201csusceptible of innocent explanation,\u201d\u00a0United States\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Arvizu<\/em>, 534 U.\u00a0S. 266 . Instead, it should have asked whether a reasonable officer could conclude\u2014considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself\u2014that there was a \u201csubstantial chance of criminal activity,\u201d\u00a0Gates, supra,<\/em>\u00a0at 244, n.\u00a013. Pp.\u00a011\u201313.\r\n\r\n2.\u00a0The officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Pp.\u00a013\u201319.\r\n\r\n(a)\u00a0As relevant here, officers are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.\u00a0S.\u00a0C. \u00a71983 unless the unlawfulness of their conduct was \u201cclearly established at the time,\u201d\u00a0Reichle<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Howards<\/em>, 566 U. S. 658 . To be clearly established, a legal principle must be \u201csettled law,\u201d\u00a0Hunter\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Bryant<\/em>, 502 U.\u00a0S. 224 , and it must clearly prohibit the officer\u2019s conduct in the particular circumstances before him, see\u00a0Saucier\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Katz<\/em>, 533 U.\u00a0S. 194 . In the warrantless arrest context, \u201ca body of relevant case law\u201d is usually necessary to \u201c\u00a0\u2018clearly establish\u2019 the answer\u201d with respect to probable cause.\u00a0Brosseau<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Haugen<\/em>, 543 U.\u00a0S. 194 .\r\n\r\nEven assuming that the officers lacked actual probable cause to arrest the partygoers, they are entitled to qualified immunity because, given \u201cthe circumstances with which [they] w[ere] confronted,\u201d they \u201creasonably but mistakenly conclude[d] that probable cause [wa]s present.\u201d\u00a0Anderson<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Creighton<\/em>, 483 U.\u00a0S. 635 . The panel majority and the partygoers have failed to identify a single precedent finding a Fourth Amendment violation \u201cunder similar circumstances.\u201d\u00a0White\u00a0<\/em>v. Pauly,\u00a0<\/em>580 U.\u00a0S. ___, ___. And this is not an \u201cobvious case\u201d where \u201ca body of relevant case law\u201d is unnecessary.\u00a0Brosseau, supra<\/em>, at 199. Pp.\u00a013\u201316.\r\n\r\n(b)\u00a0Instead of following this straightforward analysis, the panel majority reasoned that, under clearly established District law, a suspect\u2019s bona fide belief of a right to enter vitiates probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry. Thus, it concluded that the \u201cuncontroverted evidence\u201d of an invitation in this case meant that the officers could not infer the partygoers\u2019 intent from other circumstances or disbelieve their story. But looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, a reasonable officer could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here. There was no controlling case holding that a bona fide belief of a right to enter defeats probable cause, that officers cannot infer a suspect\u2019s guilty state of mind based on his conduct alone, or that officers must accept a suspect\u2019s innocent explanation at face value. And several precedents suggested the opposite. Pp.\u00a016\u201319.\r\n\r\n765 F.\u00a03d 13, reversed and remanded.\r\n\r\nThomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.\u00a0J., and Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part.\r\n\r\n ","rendered":"

FALSE ARREST AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY<\/strong><\/p>\n

District of Columbia v. Wesby<\/em>, 583 U.S. ___ (2018)<\/p>\n

https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/583\/15-1485\/<\/a><\/p>\n

NOTE:\u2002Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See\u00a0United States<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,<\/em>\u00a0200 U.\u00a0S. 321 .<\/p>\n

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/p>\n

Syllabus<\/p>\n

District of Columbia et\u00a0al.\u00a0v.\u00a0<\/em>Wesby et\u00a0al.<\/p>\n

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit<\/p>\n

No. 15\u20131485.\u2003Argued October 4, 2017\u2014Decided January 22, 2018<\/p>\n

District of Columbia police officers responded to a complaint about loud music and illegal activities in a vacant house. Inside, they found the house nearly barren and in disarray. The officers smelled marijuana and observed beer bottles and cups of liquor on the floor, which was dirty. They found a make-shift strip club in the living room, and a naked woman and several men in an upstairs bedroom. Many party- goers scattered when they saw the uniformed officers, and some hid. The officers questioned everyone and got inconsistent stories. Two women identified \u201cPeaches\u201d as the house\u2019s tenant and said that she had given the partygoers permission to have the party. But Peaches was not there. When the officers spoke by phone to Peaches, she was nervous, agitated, and evasive. At first, she claimed that she was renting the house and had given the partygoers permission to have the party, but she eventually admitted that she did not have permission to use the house. The owner confirmed that he had not given anyone permission to be there. The officers then arrested the partygoers for unlawful entry.<\/p>\n

Several partygoers sued for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment and District law. The District Court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry and that two of the officers, petitioners here, were not entitled to qualified immunity. A divided panel of the D.\u00a0C. Circuit affirmed.<\/p>\n

Held<\/em>:<\/p>\n

1.\u00a0The officers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers. Pp.\u00a07\u201313.<\/p>\n

(a)\u00a0Considering the \u201ctotality of the circumstances,\u201d\u00a0Maryland<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Pringle<\/em>, 540 U.\u00a0S. 366 , the officers made an \u201centirely reasonable inference\u201d that the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house,\u00a0id.<\/em>, at 372. Taken together, the condition of the house and the conduct of the partygoers allowed the officers to make several \u201c\u00a0\u2018common-sense conclusions about human behavior.\u2019\u00a0\u201d\u00a0Illinois v. Gates,\u00a0<\/em>462 U.\u00a0S. 213 . Because most homeowners do not live in such conditions or permit such activities in their homes, the officers could infer that the partygoers knew the party was not authorized. The officers also could infer that the partygoers knew that they were not supposed to be in the house because they scattered and hid when the officers arrived. See\u00a0Illinois\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Wardlow<\/em>, 528 U.\u00a0S. 119 \u2013125. The partygoers\u2019 vague and implausible answers to questioning also gave the officers reason to infer that the partygoers were lying and that their lies suggested a guilty mind. Cf.\u00a0Devenpeck\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Alford<\/em>, 543 U.\u00a0S. 146 \u2013156. Peaches\u2019 lying and evasive behavior gave the officers reason to discredit everything she said. The officers also could have inferred that she lied when she said she had invited the partygoers to the house, or that she told the partygoers that she was not actually renting the house. Pp.\u00a07\u201311.<\/p>\n

(b) The panel majority failed to follow two basic and well-established principles of law. First, it viewed each fact \u201cin isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances.\u201d\u00a0Pringle<\/em>,\u00a0supra<\/em>, at 372, n.\u00a02. Second, it believed that it could dismiss outright any circumstances that were \u201csusceptible of innocent explanation,\u201d\u00a0United States\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Arvizu<\/em>, 534 U.\u00a0S. 266 . Instead, it should have asked whether a reasonable officer could conclude\u2014considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself\u2014that there was a \u201csubstantial chance of criminal activity,\u201d\u00a0Gates, supra,<\/em>\u00a0at 244, n.\u00a013. Pp.\u00a011\u201313.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0The officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Pp.\u00a013\u201319.<\/p>\n

(a)\u00a0As relevant here, officers are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.\u00a0S.\u00a0C. \u00a71983 unless the unlawfulness of their conduct was \u201cclearly established at the time,\u201d\u00a0Reichle<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Howards<\/em>, 566 U. S. 658 . To be clearly established, a legal principle must be \u201csettled law,\u201d\u00a0Hunter\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Bryant<\/em>, 502 U.\u00a0S. 224 , and it must clearly prohibit the officer\u2019s conduct in the particular circumstances before him, see\u00a0Saucier\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0Katz<\/em>, 533 U.\u00a0S. 194 . In the warrantless arrest context, \u201ca body of relevant case law\u201d is usually necessary to \u201c\u00a0\u2018clearly establish\u2019 the answer\u201d with respect to probable cause.\u00a0Brosseau<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Haugen<\/em>, 543 U.\u00a0S. 194 .<\/p>\n

Even assuming that the officers lacked actual probable cause to arrest the partygoers, they are entitled to qualified immunity because, given \u201cthe circumstances with which [they] w[ere] confronted,\u201d they \u201creasonably but mistakenly conclude[d] that probable cause [wa]s present.\u201d\u00a0Anderson<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0Creighton<\/em>, 483 U.\u00a0S. 635 . The panel majority and the partygoers have failed to identify a single precedent finding a Fourth Amendment violation \u201cunder similar circumstances.\u201d\u00a0White\u00a0<\/em>v. Pauly,\u00a0<\/em>580 U.\u00a0S. ___, ___. And this is not an \u201cobvious case\u201d where \u201ca body of relevant case law\u201d is unnecessary.\u00a0Brosseau, supra<\/em>, at 199. Pp.\u00a013\u201316.<\/p>\n

(b)\u00a0Instead of following this straightforward analysis, the panel majority reasoned that, under clearly established District law, a suspect\u2019s bona fide belief of a right to enter vitiates probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry. Thus, it concluded that the \u201cuncontroverted evidence\u201d of an invitation in this case meant that the officers could not infer the partygoers\u2019 intent from other circumstances or disbelieve their story. But looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, a reasonable officer could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here. There was no controlling case holding that a bona fide belief of a right to enter defeats probable cause, that officers cannot infer a suspect\u2019s guilty state of mind based on his conduct alone, or that officers must accept a suspect\u2019s innocent explanation at face value. And several precedents suggested the opposite. Pp.\u00a016\u201319.<\/p>\n

765 F.\u00a03d 13, reversed and remanded.<\/p>\n

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.\u00a0J., and Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part.<\/p>\n

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