{"id":1262,"date":"2017-09-27T17:43:33","date_gmt":"2017-09-27T17:43:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=1262"},"modified":"2017-10-02T18:03:48","modified_gmt":"2017-10-02T18:03:48","slug":"7-4-end-of-chapter-material","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/7-4-end-of-chapter-material\/","title":{"raw":"7.4 End-of-Chapter Material","rendered":"7.4 End-of-Chapter Material"},"content":{"raw":"<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Summary<\/h4>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p01\" class=\"para\">Often more than one criminal defendant participates in the commission of a crime. Defendants working together with a common criminal purpose are acting with complicity and are responsible for the same crimes, to the same degree.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p02\" class=\"para\">At early common law, there were four parties to a crime. A principal in the first degree actually committed the crime. A principal in the second degree was present at the crime scene and assisted in the crime\u2019s commission. An accessory before the fact was not present at the crime scene but helped prepare for the crime\u2019s commission. An accessory after the fact helped a party after he or she committed a crime by providing aid in escaping or avoiding arrest and prosecution or conviction. In modern times, there are only two parties to a crime: a principal, who is in the same category with his or her accomplice(s), and accessory(ies). Principals actually commit the crime, and they and their accomplices are criminally responsible for it. Accessories play the same role as accessories after the fact at common law.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p03\" class=\"para\">The criminal act element required to be an accomplice in most jurisdictions is assistance in the commission of a crime. Words are enough to constitute the accomplice criminal act. Mere presence at the scene, even presence at the scene combined with flight after the crime\u2019s commission, is not enough to constitute the accomplice criminal act unless there is a legal duty to act.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p04\" class=\"para\">The criminal intent element required for accomplice liability in many jurisdictions is specific intent or purposely to commit the crime at issue. In some states, general intent or knowingly that the principal will commit the crime creates an inference of intent if the offense is serious. In a minority of jurisdictions, general intent or knowingly that the principal will commit the crime is sufficient.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p05\" class=\"para\">The natural and probable consequences doctrine holds accomplices criminally responsible for all crimes the principal commits that are reasonably foreseeable. In many jurisdictions an accomplice can be prosecuted for a crime the principal commits even if the principal is not prosecuted or acquitted.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p06\" class=\"para\">Vicarious liability transfers criminal responsibility from one party to another because of a special relationship. Vicarious liability is common between employers and employees and is the basis for corporate criminal liability. Pursuant to modern corporate criminal liability, a corporation can be fined for a crime(s) a corporate agent or employee commits during the scope of employment. The corporate agent or employee also is criminally responsible for his or her conduct. In general, the law disfavors individual criminal vicarious liability. The law in this area is evolving as the incidence of juveniles committing crimes increases.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p07\" class=\"para\">In modern times, an accessory is the equivalent of an accessory after the fact at common law. The criminal act element required for an accessory is providing assistance to a principal in escape, avoiding detection, or arrest and prosecution, or conviction for the commission of a felony, high-level misdemeanor, or any crime, depending on the jurisdiction. Words are enough to constitute the accessory criminal act. Several jurisdictions exempt family members from criminal responsibility for acting as an accessory.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p08\" class=\"para\">The criminal intent element required for an accessory in most jurisdictions is general intent or knowingly that the principal committed a crime, and specific intent or purposely that the principal escape, avoid detection, or arrest and prosecution, or conviction for the offense. Accessory is a separate crime that is usually graded as a misdemeanor, although some jurisdictions grade accessory as a felony.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title\">You Be the Law Professor<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p09\" class=\"para\">You are a law professor searching for cases to illustrate certain legal concepts for your students. Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide which <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">legal concept<\/strong> it represents. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\r\n \t<li>The defendant\u2019s vehicle matched the description of a vehicle seen in the vicinity of a burglary before the burglary, during the burglary, and after the burglary. The defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was an accomplice to the burglary. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">accomplice act<\/strong>, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">accomplice intent<\/strong>, or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">both<\/strong>? Read <em class=\"emphasis\">Collins v. State<\/em>, 438 So. 2d 1036 (1983). The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=8573128029213310764&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_vis=1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=8573128029213310764&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_vis=1<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The defendants, foster parents, were found guilty as accomplices to the felony murder of their two-year-old foster daughter. Although both defendants testified that the victim died from injuries experienced after a fall from a swing, medical experts reported that the victim\u2019s injuries were inconsistent with that testimony and appeared to be the result of child abuse. The jury convicted the defendants as accomplices to felony murder after a jury instruction stating that an omission to act could constitute the criminal act element for accomplice liability when there is a duty to act, and parents have a legal duty to come to the aid of their children. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">omission to act<\/strong>, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">statutory interpretation<\/strong>, or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">both<\/strong>? Read <em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Jackson<\/em>, 137 Wn. 2d 712 (1999). The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/wa-supreme-court\/1412039.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/wa-supreme-court\/1412039.html<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The defendant, an electrical contracting company, was found guilty of violating OSHA regulations that led to an employee\u2019s death. The victim, an apprentice in training, touched a live electrical wire and died from electrocution. The OSHA statute in question required \u201cwillful\u201d conduct on behalf of the company. The jury instruction on willful stated that a company acted willfully or knowingly if individual employees of that company acted knowingly. The evidence indicated that some employees knew or were aware of live wiring in the vicinity of the accident. The defendant appealed and claimed that the jury instruction should have stated that a company acted willfully or knowingly if individual employees acted knowingly <em class=\"emphasis\">and<\/em> had a <em class=\"emphasis\">duty to report<\/em> that knowledge to the company. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal intent<\/strong>, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">vicarious liability<\/strong>, or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">both<\/strong>? Read <em class=\"emphasis\">U.S. v. L.E. Meyers Co.<\/em>, 562 F.3d 845 (2009). The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=2854285863509787279&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=2854285863509787279&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The defendant was convicted of both first-degree murder and accessory after the fact to that murder. The trial court did not instruct the jury that the offenses were mutually exclusive and that they could only convict the defendant of one or the other. The defendant appealed on the basis that he was entitled to a jury instruction that prevented a conviction on both murder and accessory after the fact to murder. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal elements required for accessory after the fact<\/strong>, the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal elements required for murder<\/strong>, or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">both<\/strong>? Read <em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Melvin<\/em>, No. 382PA09 (North Carolina 2010). The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/nc-supreme-court\/1549865.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/nc-supreme-court\/1549865.html<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n03\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Cases of Interest<\/h4>\r\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l02\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\r\n \t<li><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Merida-Medina<\/em>, 191 P.3d 708 (2008), discusses accomplice liability: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=9533921177591527482&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=9533921177591527482&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n \t<li><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Guminga<\/em>, 395 N.W.2d 344 (1986), discusses vicarious liability and due process: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=9718401866480992202&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=9718401866480992202&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n \t<li><em class=\"emphasis\">Staten v. State<\/em>, 519 So. 2d 622 (1988), discusses principal and accessory criminal responsibility: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=5691885691013540689&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=5691885691013540689&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n04\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Articles of Interest<\/h4>\r\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l03\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\r\n \t<li>Spectator liability in gang rape: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664162\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664162<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li>Corporate criminal liability: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.pointoflaw.com\/feature\/archives\/2009\/07\/corporate-criminal-liability-s.php\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.pointoflaw.com\/feature\/archives\/2009\/07\/corporate-criminal -liability-s.php<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li>Criminal vicarious liability in general: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.lectlaw.com\/mjl\/cl048.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lectlaw.com\/mjl\/cl048.htm<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n05\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Website of Interest<\/h4>\r\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l04\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\r\n \t<li>White collar crime blog site: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/lawprofessors.typepad.com\/whitecollarcrime_blog\/2009\/12\/recent-articles.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/lawprofessors.typepad.com\/whitecollarcrime_blog\/2009\/12\/recent-articles.html<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n06\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Statistics of Interest<\/h4>\r\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l05\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\r\n \t<li>FBI statistics on pending corporate and securities fraud cases: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.fbi.gov\/stats-services\/publications\/financial-crimes-report-2009\/financial-crimes-report-2009#corporate\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.fbi.gov\/stats-services\/publications\/financial-crimes-report-2009\/financial-crimes-report-2009#corporate<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<h2>References<\/h2>\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">Joubert v. State<\/em>, 235 SW3d 729, 731 (2007), accessed January 22, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=10119211983865864217&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=10119211983865864217&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.","rendered":"<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Summary<\/h4>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p01\" class=\"para\">Often more than one criminal defendant participates in the commission of a crime. Defendants working together with a common criminal purpose are acting with complicity and are responsible for the same crimes, to the same degree.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p02\" class=\"para\">At early common law, there were four parties to a crime. A principal in the first degree actually committed the crime. A principal in the second degree was present at the crime scene and assisted in the crime\u2019s commission. An accessory before the fact was not present at the crime scene but helped prepare for the crime\u2019s commission. An accessory after the fact helped a party after he or she committed a crime by providing aid in escaping or avoiding arrest and prosecution or conviction. In modern times, there are only two parties to a crime: a principal, who is in the same category with his or her accomplice(s), and accessory(ies). Principals actually commit the crime, and they and their accomplices are criminally responsible for it. Accessories play the same role as accessories after the fact at common law.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p03\" class=\"para\">The criminal act element required to be an accomplice in most jurisdictions is assistance in the commission of a crime. Words are enough to constitute the accomplice criminal act. Mere presence at the scene, even presence at the scene combined with flight after the crime\u2019s commission, is not enough to constitute the accomplice criminal act unless there is a legal duty to act.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p04\" class=\"para\">The criminal intent element required for accomplice liability in many jurisdictions is specific intent or purposely to commit the crime at issue. In some states, general intent or knowingly that the principal will commit the crime creates an inference of intent if the offense is serious. In a minority of jurisdictions, general intent or knowingly that the principal will commit the crime is sufficient.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p05\" class=\"para\">The natural and probable consequences doctrine holds accomplices criminally responsible for all crimes the principal commits that are reasonably foreseeable. In many jurisdictions an accomplice can be prosecuted for a crime the principal commits even if the principal is not prosecuted or acquitted.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p06\" class=\"para\">Vicarious liability transfers criminal responsibility from one party to another because of a special relationship. Vicarious liability is common between employers and employees and is the basis for corporate criminal liability. Pursuant to modern corporate criminal liability, a corporation can be fined for a crime(s) a corporate agent or employee commits during the scope of employment. The corporate agent or employee also is criminally responsible for his or her conduct. In general, the law disfavors individual criminal vicarious liability. The law in this area is evolving as the incidence of juveniles committing crimes increases.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p07\" class=\"para\">In modern times, an accessory is the equivalent of an accessory after the fact at common law. The criminal act element required for an accessory is providing assistance to a principal in escape, avoiding detection, or arrest and prosecution, or conviction for the commission of a felony, high-level misdemeanor, or any crime, depending on the jurisdiction. Words are enough to constitute the accessory criminal act. Several jurisdictions exempt family members from criminal responsibility for acting as an accessory.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p08\" class=\"para\">The criminal intent element required for an accessory in most jurisdictions is general intent or knowingly that the principal committed a crime, and specific intent or purposely that the principal escape, avoid detection, or arrest and prosecution, or conviction for the offense. Accessory is a separate crime that is usually graded as a misdemeanor, although some jurisdictions grade accessory as a felony.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\n<h3 class=\"title\">You Be the Law Professor<\/h3>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_p09\" class=\"para\">You are a law professor searching for cases to illustrate certain legal concepts for your students. Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide which <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">legal concept<\/strong> it represents. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.<\/p>\n<ol id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\n<li>The defendant\u2019s vehicle matched the description of a vehicle seen in the vicinity of a burglary before the burglary, during the burglary, and after the burglary. The defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was an accomplice to the burglary. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">accomplice act<\/strong>, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">accomplice intent<\/strong>, or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">both<\/strong>? Read <em class=\"emphasis\">Collins v. State<\/em>, 438 So. 2d 1036 (1983). The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=8573128029213310764&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_vis=1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=8573128029213310764&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_vis=1<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>The defendants, foster parents, were found guilty as accomplices to the felony murder of their two-year-old foster daughter. Although both defendants testified that the victim died from injuries experienced after a fall from a swing, medical experts reported that the victim\u2019s injuries were inconsistent with that testimony and appeared to be the result of child abuse. The jury convicted the defendants as accomplices to felony murder after a jury instruction stating that an omission to act could constitute the criminal act element for accomplice liability when there is a duty to act, and parents have a legal duty to come to the aid of their children. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">omission to act<\/strong>, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">statutory interpretation<\/strong>, or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">both<\/strong>? Read <em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Jackson<\/em>, 137 Wn. 2d 712 (1999). The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/wa-supreme-court\/1412039.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/wa-supreme-court\/1412039.html<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>The defendant, an electrical contracting company, was found guilty of violating OSHA regulations that led to an employee\u2019s death. The victim, an apprentice in training, touched a live electrical wire and died from electrocution. The OSHA statute in question required \u201cwillful\u201d conduct on behalf of the company. The jury instruction on willful stated that a company acted willfully or knowingly if individual employees of that company acted knowingly. The evidence indicated that some employees knew or were aware of live wiring in the vicinity of the accident. The defendant appealed and claimed that the jury instruction should have stated that a company acted willfully or knowingly if individual employees acted knowingly <em class=\"emphasis\">and<\/em> had a <em class=\"emphasis\">duty to report<\/em> that knowledge to the company. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal intent<\/strong>, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">vicarious liability<\/strong>, or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">both<\/strong>? Read <em class=\"emphasis\">U.S. v. L.E. Meyers Co.<\/em>, 562 F.3d 845 (2009). The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=2854285863509787279&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=2854285863509787279&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>The defendant was convicted of both first-degree murder and accessory after the fact to that murder. The trial court did not instruct the jury that the offenses were mutually exclusive and that they could only convict the defendant of one or the other. The defendant appealed on the basis that he was entitled to a jury instruction that prevented a conviction on both murder and accessory after the fact to murder. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal elements required for accessory after the fact<\/strong>, the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal elements required for murder<\/strong>, or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">both<\/strong>? Read <em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Melvin<\/em>, No. 382PA09 (North Carolina 2010). The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/nc-supreme-court\/1549865.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/nc-supreme-court\/1549865.html<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n03\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Cases of Interest<\/h4>\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l02\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\n<li><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Merida-Medina<\/em>, 191 P.3d 708 (2008), discusses accomplice liability: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=9533921177591527482&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=9533921177591527482&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Guminga<\/em>, 395 N.W.2d 344 (1986), discusses vicarious liability and due process: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=9718401866480992202&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=9718401866480992202&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li><em class=\"emphasis\">Staten v. State<\/em>, 519 So. 2d 622 (1988), discusses principal and accessory criminal responsibility: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=5691885691013540689&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=5691885691013540689&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n04\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Articles of Interest<\/h4>\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l03\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\n<li>Spectator liability in gang rape: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664162\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664162<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Corporate criminal liability: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.pointoflaw.com\/feature\/archives\/2009\/07\/corporate-criminal-liability-s.php\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.pointoflaw.com\/feature\/archives\/2009\/07\/corporate-criminal -liability-s.php<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Criminal vicarious liability in general: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.lectlaw.com\/mjl\/cl048.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.lectlaw.com\/mjl\/cl048.htm<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n05\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Website of Interest<\/h4>\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l04\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\n<li>White collar crime blog site: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/lawprofessors.typepad.com\/whitecollarcrime_blog\/2009\/12\/recent-articles.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/lawprofessors.typepad.com\/whitecollarcrime_blog\/2009\/12\/recent-articles.html<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_n06\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Statistics of Interest<\/h4>\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch07_s04_l05\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\n<li>FBI statistics on pending corporate and securities fraud cases: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.fbi.gov\/stats-services\/publications\/financial-crimes-report-2009\/financial-crimes-report-2009#corporate\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.fbi.gov\/stats-services\/publications\/financial-crimes-report-2009\/financial-crimes-report-2009#corporate<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<h2>References<\/h2>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">Joubert v. State<\/em>, 235 SW3d 729, 731 (2007), accessed January 22, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=10119211983865864217&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=10119211983865864217&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t <section class=\"citations-section\" role=\"contentinfo\">\n\t\t\t <h3>Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t <div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <div id=\"citation-list-1262\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t <div class=\"licensing\"><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">CC licensed content, Shared previously<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>Criminal Law. <strong>Provided by<\/strong>: University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing . <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/open.lib.umn.edu\/criminallaw\/\">http:\/\/open.lib.umn.edu\/criminallaw\/<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/4.0\/\">CC BY-NC-SA: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike<\/a><\/em><\/li><\/ul><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t <\/section>","protected":false},"author":23485,"menu_order":4,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[{\"type\":\"cc\",\"description\":\"Criminal Law\",\"author\":\"\",\"organization\":\"University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing \",\"url\":\"http:\/\/open.lib.umn.edu\/criminallaw\/\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by-nc-sa\",\"license_terms\":\"\"}]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-1262","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":1254,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/1262","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/23485"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/1262\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1591,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/1262\/revisions\/1591"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/1254"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/1262\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1262"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=1262"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=1262"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=1262"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}