{"id":167,"date":"2019-01-11T15:30:17","date_gmt":"2019-01-11T15:30:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-philosophy\/?post_type=chapter&p=167"},"modified":"2019-01-14T14:11:00","modified_gmt":"2019-01-14T14:11:00","slug":"parts-3-7-8-of-book-ii-from-physics","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-philosophy\/chapter\/parts-3-7-8-of-book-ii-from-physics\/","title":{"raw":"Aristotle - Parts 3, 7, & 8 of Book II, from Physics","rendered":"Aristotle – Parts 3, 7, & 8 of Book II, from Physics"},"content":{"raw":"Physics, Book II\r\n\r\nPart 3<\/strong>\r\n\r\nNow that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed\u00a0to consider causes, their character and number. Knowledge is the object\u00a0of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped\u00a0the \u2018why\u2019 of (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly we too must\u00a0do this as regards both coming to be and passing away and every kind of\u00a0physical change, in order that, knowing their principles, we may try to\u00a0refer to these principles each of our problems.\r\n\r\nIn one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and\u00a0which persists, is called \u2018cause\u2019, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver\u00a0of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are\u00a0species.\r\nIn another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement\u00a0of the essence, and its genera, are called \u2018causes\u2019 (e.g. of the octave\u00a0the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition.\r\nAgain (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g.\u00a0the man who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and\u00a0generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is\u00a0changed.\r\n\r\nAgain (4) in the sense of end or \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019 a\u00a0thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. (\u2018Why is he walking\u00a0about?\u2019 we say. \u2018To be healthy\u2019, and, having said that, we think we have\u00a0assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps\u00a0which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards\u00a0the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments\u00a0are means towards health. All these things are \u2018for the sake of\u2019 the end,\u00a0though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments.\r\n\r\nThis then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term\u00a0\u2019cause\u2019 is used.\r\n\r\nAs the word has several senses, it follows that there are several\u00a0causes of the same thing not merely in virtue of a concomitant attribute),\u00a0e.g. both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue.\u00a0These are causes of the statue qua statue, not in virtue of anything else\u00a0that it may be-only not in the same way, the one being the material cause,\u00a0the other the cause whence the motion comes. Some things cause each other\u00a0reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but again not\u00a0in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the origin of change.\u00a0Further the same thing is the cause of contrary results. For that which\u00a0by its presence brings about one result is sometimes blamed for bringing\u00a0about the contrary by its absence. Thus we ascribe the wreck of a ship\u00a0to the absence of the pilot whose presence was the cause of its\u00a0safety.\r\n\r\nAll the causes now mentioned fall into four familiar divisions.\u00a0The letters are the causes of syllables, the material of artificial products,\u00a0fire, &c., of bodies, the parts of the whole, and the premises of the\u00a0conclusion, in the sense of \u2018that from which\u2019. Of these pairs the one set\u00a0are causes in the sense of substratum, e.g. the parts, the other set in\u00a0the sense of essence-the whole and the combination and the form. But the\u00a0seed and the doctor and the adviser, and generally the maker, are all sources\u00a0whence the change or stationariness originates, while the others are causes\u00a0in the sense of the end or the good of the rest; for \u2018that for the sake\u00a0of which\u2019 means what is best and the end of the things that lead up to\u00a0it. (Whether we say the \u2018good itself or the \u2018apparent good\u2019 makes no\u00a0difference.)\r\nSuch then is the number and nature of the kinds of\u00a0cause.\r\n\r\nNow the modes of causation are many, though when brought under heads\u00a0they too can be reduced in number. For \u2018cause\u2019 is used in many senses and\u00a0even within the same kind one may be prior to another (e.g. the doctor\u00a0and the expert are causes of health, the relation 2:1 and number of the\u00a0octave), and always what is inclusive to what is particular. Another mode\u00a0of causation is the incidental and its genera, e.g. in one way \u2018Polyclitus\u2019,\u00a0in another \u2018sculptor\u2019 is the cause of a statue, because \u2018being Polyclitus\u2019\u00a0and \u2018sculptor\u2019 are incidentally conjoined. Also the classes in which the incidental attribute is included; thus \u2018a man\u2019 could be said to be the\u00a0cause of a statue or, generally, \u2018a living creature\u2019. An incidental attribute\u00a0too may be more or less remote, e.g. suppose that \u2018a pale man\u2019 or \u2018a musical\u00a0man\u2019 were said to be the cause of the statue.\r\n\r\nAll causes, both proper and incidental, may be spoken of either\u00a0as potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is either\u00a0\u2019house-builder\u2019 or \u2018house-builder building\u2019.\r\n\r\nSimilar distinctions can be made in the things of which the causes\u00a0are causes, e.g. of \u2018this statue\u2019 or of \u2018statue\u2019 or of \u2018image\u2019 generally,\u00a0of \u2018this bronze\u2019 or of \u2018bronze\u2019 or of \u2018material\u2019 generally. So too with\u00a0the incidental attributes. Again we may use a complex expression for either\u00a0and say, e.g. neither \u2018Polyclitus\u2019 nor \u2018sculptor\u2019 but \u2018Polyclitus,\u00a0sculptor\u2019.\r\n\r\nAll these various uses, however, come to six in number, under each\u00a0of which again the usage is twofold. Cause means either what is particular\u00a0or a genus, or an incidental attribute or a genus of that, and these either\u00a0as a complex or each by itself; and all six either as actual or as potential.\u00a0The difference is this much, that causes which are actually at work and\u00a0particular exist and cease to exist simultaneously with their effect, e.g.\u00a0this healing person with this being-healed person and that house-building\u00a0man with that being-built house; but this is not always true of potential\u00a0causes--the house and the housebuilder do not pass away\u00a0simultaneously.\r\n\r\nIn investigating the cause of each thing it is always necessary\u00a0to seek what is most precise (as also in other things): thus man builds\u00a0because he is a builder, and a builder builds in virtue of his art of building.\u00a0This last cause then is prior: and so generally.\r\n\r\nFurther, generic effects should be assigned to generic causes,\u00a0particular effects to particular causes, e.g. statue to sculptor, this\u00a0statue to this sculptor; and powers are relative to possible effects, actually\u00a0operating causes to things which are actually being\u00a0effected.\r\n\r\nThis must suffice for our account of the number of causes and the\u00a0modes of causation.\r\n\r\nPart 7<\/strong>\r\n\r\nIt is clear then that there are causes, and that the number of\u00a0them is what we have stated. The number is the same as that of the things\u00a0comprehended under the question \u2018why\u2019. The \u2018why\u2019 is referred ultimately\u00a0either (1), in things which do not involve motion, e.g. in mathematics,\u00a0to the \u2018what\u2019 (to the definition of \u2018straight line\u2019 or \u2018commensurable\u2019,\u00a0&c.), or (2) to what initiated a motion, e.g. \u2018why did they go to war?-because\u00a0there had been a raid\u2019; or (3) we are inquiring \u2018for the sake of what?\u2019-\u2019that\u00a0they may rule\u2019; or (4), in the case of things that come into being, we\u00a0are looking for the matter. The causes, therefore, are these and so many\u00a0in number.\r\n\r\nNow, the causes being four, it is the business of the physicist\u00a0to know about them all, and if he refers his problems back to all of them,\u00a0he will assign the \u2018why\u2019 in the way proper to his science-the matter, the\u00a0form, the mover, \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019. The last three often coincide;\u00a0for the \u2018what\u2019 and \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019 are one, while the primary\u00a0source of motion is the same in species as these (for man generates man),\u00a0and so too, in general, are all things which cause movement by being themselves\u00a0moved; and such as are not of this kind are no longer inside the province\u00a0of physics, for they cause motion not by possessing motion or a source\u00a0of motion in themselves, but being themselves incapable of motion. Hence\u00a0there are three branches of study, one of things which are incapable of\u00a0motion, the second of things in motion, but indestructible, the third of\u00a0destructible things.\r\n\r\nThe question \u2018why\u2019, then, is answered by reference to the matter,\u00a0to the form, and to the primary moving cause. For in respect of coming\u00a0to be it is mostly in this last way that causes are investigated-\u2019what\u00a0comes to be after what? what was the primary agent or patient?\u2019 and so\u00a0at each step of the series.\r\n\r\nNow the principles which cause motion in a physical way are two,\u00a0of which one is not physical, as it has no principle of motion in itself.\u00a0Of this kind is whatever causes movement, not being itself moved, such\u00a0as (1) that which is completely unchangeable, the primary reality, and\u00a0(2) the essence of that which is coming to be, i.e. the form; for this\u00a0is the end or \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019. Hence since nature is for the\u00a0sake of something, we must know this cause also. We must explain the \u2018why\u2019\u00a0in all the senses of the term, namely, (1) that from this that will necessarily\u00a0result (\u2018from this\u2019 either without qualification or in most cases); (2)\u00a0that \u2018this must be so if that is to be so\u2019 (as the conclusion presupposes\u00a0the premises); (3) that this was the essence of the thing; and (4) because\u00a0it is better thus (not without qualification, but with reference to the\u00a0essential nature in each case).\r\n\r\nPart 8<\/strong>\r\nWe must explain then (1) that Nature belongs to the class of causes\u00a0which act for the sake of something; (2) about the necessary and its place\u00a0in physical problems, for all writers ascribe things to this cause, arguing\u00a0that since the hot and the cold, &c., are of such and such a kind, therefore\u00a0certain things necessarily are and come to be-and if they mention any other\u00a0cause (one his \u2018friendship and strife\u2019, another his \u2018mind\u2019), it is only\u00a0to touch on it, and then good-bye to it.\r\n\r\nA difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for\u00a0the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky\u00a0rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity? What is drawn\u00a0up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the\u00a0result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man\u2019s crop is\u00a0spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this-in\u00a0order that the crop might be spoiled-but that result just followed. Why\u00a0then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our\u00a0teeth should come up of necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing,\u00a0the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food-since they did not\u00a0arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with\u00a0all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever then\u00a0all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come\u00a0be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a\u00a0fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to\u00a0perish, as Empedocles says his \u2018man-faced ox-progeny\u2019\u00a0did.\r\n\r\nSuch are the arguments (and others of the kind) which may cause\u00a0difficulty on this point. Yet it is impossible that this should be the\u00a0true view. For teeth and all other natural things either invariably or\u00a0normally come about in a given way; but of not one of the results of chance\u00a0or spontaneity is this true. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence\u00a0the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor\u00a0heat in the dog-days, but only if we have it in winter. If then, it is\u00a0agreed that things are either the result of coincidence or for an end,\u00a0and these cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows\u00a0that they must be for an end; and that such things are all due to nature\u00a0even the champions of the theory which is before us would agree. Therefore action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by\u00a0nature.\r\n\r\nFurther, where a series has a completion, all the preceding steps\u00a0are for the sake of that. Now surely as in intelligent action, so in nature;\u00a0and as in nature, so it is in each action, if nothing interferes. Now intelligent\u00a0action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is\u00a0so. Thus if a house, e.g. had been a thing made by nature, it would have\u00a0been made in the same way as it is now by art; and if things made by nature\u00a0were made also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature.\u00a0Each step then in the series is for the sake of the next; and generally art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates\u00a0her. If, therefore, artificial products are for the sake of an end, so\u00a0clearly also are natural products. The relation of the later to the earlier\u00a0terms of the series is the same in both. This is most obvious in the animals\u00a0other than man: they make things neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation.\u00a0Wherefore people discuss whether it is by intelligence or by some other\u00a0faculty that these creatures work, spiders, ants, and the like. By gradual\u00a0advance in this direction we come to see clearly that in plants too that is produced which is conducive to the end-leaves, e.g. grow to provide\u00a0shade for the fruit. If then it is both by nature and for an end that the\u00a0swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves for\u00a0the sake of the fruit and send their roots down (not up) for the sake of\u00a0nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things\u00a0which come to be and are by nature. And since \u2018nature\u2019 means two things,\u00a0the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all\u00a0the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the\u00a0sense of \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019.\r\n\r\nNow mistakes come to pass even in the operations of art: the grammarian\u00a0makes a mistake in writing and the doctor pours out the wrong dose. Hence\u00a0clearly mistakes are possible in the operations of nature also. If then\u00a0in art there are cases in which what is rightly produced serves a purpose,\u00a0and if where mistakes occur there was a purpose in what was attempted,\u00a0only it was not attained, so must it be also in natural products, and monstrosities\u00a0will be failures in the purposive effort. Thus in the original combinations\u00a0the \u2018ox-progeny\u2019 if they failed to reach a determinate end must have arisen\u00a0through the corruption of some principle corresponding to what is now the\u00a0seed.\r\n\r\nFurther, seed must have come into being first, and not straightway\u00a0the animals: the words \u2018whole-natured first...\u2019 must have meant\u00a0seed.\r\n\r\nAgain, in plants too we find the relation of means to end, though\u00a0the degree of organization is less. Were there then in plants also \u2018olive-headed\u00a0vine-progeny\u2019, like the \u2018man-headed ox-progeny\u2019, or not? An absurd suggestion;\u00a0yet there must have been, if there were such things among\u00a0animals.\r\n\r\nMoreover, among the seeds anything must have come to be at random.\u00a0But the person who asserts this entirely does away with \u2018nature\u2019 and what\u00a0exists \u2018by nature\u2019. For those things are natural which, by a continuous\u00a0movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at some completion:\u00a0the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any chance\u00a0completion, but always the tendency in each is towards the same end, if\u00a0there is no impediment.\r\n\r\nThe end and the means towards it may come about by chance. We say,\u00a0for instance, that a stranger has come by chance, paid the ransom, and\u00a0gone away, when he does so as if he had come for that purpose, though it\u00a0was not for that that he came. This is incidental, for chance is an incidental\u00a0cause, as I remarked before. But when an event takes place always or for\u00a0the most part, it is not incidental or by chance. In natural products the\u00a0sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment.\r\n\r\nIt is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we\u00a0do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the\u00a0ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by\u00a0nature. If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in\u00a0nature. The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is\u00a0like that.\r\n\r\nIt is plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that operates\u00a0for a purpose.","rendered":"

Physics, Book II<\/p>\n

Part 3<\/strong><\/p>\n

Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed\u00a0to consider causes, their character and number. Knowledge is the object\u00a0of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped\u00a0the \u2018why\u2019 of (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly we too must\u00a0do this as regards both coming to be and passing away and every kind of\u00a0physical change, in order that, knowing their principles, we may try to\u00a0refer to these principles each of our problems.<\/p>\n

In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and\u00a0which persists, is called \u2018cause\u2019, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver\u00a0of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are\u00a0species.
\nIn another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement\u00a0of the essence, and its genera, are called \u2018causes\u2019 (e.g. of the octave\u00a0the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition.
\nAgain (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g.\u00a0the man who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and\u00a0generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is\u00a0changed.<\/p>\n

Again (4) in the sense of end or \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019 a\u00a0thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. (\u2018Why is he walking\u00a0about?\u2019 we say. \u2018To be healthy\u2019, and, having said that, we think we have\u00a0assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps\u00a0which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards\u00a0the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments\u00a0are means towards health. All these things are \u2018for the sake of\u2019 the end,\u00a0though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments.<\/p>\n

This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term\u00a0\u2019cause\u2019 is used.<\/p>\n

As the word has several senses, it follows that there are several\u00a0causes of the same thing not merely in virtue of a concomitant attribute),\u00a0e.g. both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue.\u00a0These are causes of the statue qua statue, not in virtue of anything else\u00a0that it may be-only not in the same way, the one being the material cause,\u00a0the other the cause whence the motion comes. Some things cause each other\u00a0reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but again not\u00a0in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the origin of change.\u00a0Further the same thing is the cause of contrary results. For that which\u00a0by its presence brings about one result is sometimes blamed for bringing\u00a0about the contrary by its absence. Thus we ascribe the wreck of a ship\u00a0to the absence of the pilot whose presence was the cause of its\u00a0safety.<\/p>\n

All the causes now mentioned fall into four familiar divisions.\u00a0The letters are the causes of syllables, the material of artificial products,\u00a0fire, &c., of bodies, the parts of the whole, and the premises of the\u00a0conclusion, in the sense of \u2018that from which\u2019. Of these pairs the one set\u00a0are causes in the sense of substratum, e.g. the parts, the other set in\u00a0the sense of essence-the whole and the combination and the form. But the\u00a0seed and the doctor and the adviser, and generally the maker, are all sources\u00a0whence the change or stationariness originates, while the others are causes\u00a0in the sense of the end or the good of the rest; for \u2018that for the sake\u00a0of which\u2019 means what is best and the end of the things that lead up to\u00a0it. (Whether we say the \u2018good itself or the \u2018apparent good\u2019 makes no\u00a0difference.)
\nSuch then is the number and nature of the kinds of\u00a0cause.<\/p>\n

Now the modes of causation are many, though when brought under heads\u00a0they too can be reduced in number. For \u2018cause\u2019 is used in many senses and\u00a0even within the same kind one may be prior to another (e.g. the doctor\u00a0and the expert are causes of health, the relation 2:1 and number of the\u00a0octave), and always what is inclusive to what is particular. Another mode\u00a0of causation is the incidental and its genera, e.g. in one way \u2018Polyclitus\u2019,\u00a0in another \u2018sculptor\u2019 is the cause of a statue, because \u2018being Polyclitus\u2019\u00a0and \u2018sculptor\u2019 are incidentally conjoined. Also the classes in which the incidental attribute is included; thus \u2018a man\u2019 could be said to be the\u00a0cause of a statue or, generally, \u2018a living creature\u2019. An incidental attribute\u00a0too may be more or less remote, e.g. suppose that \u2018a pale man\u2019 or \u2018a musical\u00a0man\u2019 were said to be the cause of the statue.<\/p>\n

All causes, both proper and incidental, may be spoken of either\u00a0as potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is either\u00a0\u2019house-builder\u2019 or \u2018house-builder building\u2019.<\/p>\n

Similar distinctions can be made in the things of which the causes\u00a0are causes, e.g. of \u2018this statue\u2019 or of \u2018statue\u2019 or of \u2018image\u2019 generally,\u00a0of \u2018this bronze\u2019 or of \u2018bronze\u2019 or of \u2018material\u2019 generally. So too with\u00a0the incidental attributes. Again we may use a complex expression for either\u00a0and say, e.g. neither \u2018Polyclitus\u2019 nor \u2018sculptor\u2019 but \u2018Polyclitus,\u00a0sculptor\u2019.<\/p>\n

All these various uses, however, come to six in number, under each\u00a0of which again the usage is twofold. Cause means either what is particular\u00a0or a genus, or an incidental attribute or a genus of that, and these either\u00a0as a complex or each by itself; and all six either as actual or as potential.\u00a0The difference is this much, that causes which are actually at work and\u00a0particular exist and cease to exist simultaneously with their effect, e.g.\u00a0this healing person with this being-healed person and that house-building\u00a0man with that being-built house; but this is not always true of potential\u00a0causes–the house and the housebuilder do not pass away\u00a0simultaneously.<\/p>\n

In investigating the cause of each thing it is always necessary\u00a0to seek what is most precise (as also in other things): thus man builds\u00a0because he is a builder, and a builder builds in virtue of his art of building.\u00a0This last cause then is prior: and so generally.<\/p>\n

Further, generic effects should be assigned to generic causes,\u00a0particular effects to particular causes, e.g. statue to sculptor, this\u00a0statue to this sculptor; and powers are relative to possible effects, actually\u00a0operating causes to things which are actually being\u00a0effected.<\/p>\n

This must suffice for our account of the number of causes and the\u00a0modes of causation.<\/p>\n

Part 7<\/strong><\/p>\n

It is clear then that there are causes, and that the number of\u00a0them is what we have stated. The number is the same as that of the things\u00a0comprehended under the question \u2018why\u2019. The \u2018why\u2019 is referred ultimately\u00a0either (1), in things which do not involve motion, e.g. in mathematics,\u00a0to the \u2018what\u2019 (to the definition of \u2018straight line\u2019 or \u2018commensurable\u2019,\u00a0&c.), or (2) to what initiated a motion, e.g. \u2018why did they go to war?-because\u00a0there had been a raid\u2019; or (3) we are inquiring \u2018for the sake of what?\u2019-\u2019that\u00a0they may rule\u2019; or (4), in the case of things that come into being, we\u00a0are looking for the matter. The causes, therefore, are these and so many\u00a0in number.<\/p>\n

Now, the causes being four, it is the business of the physicist\u00a0to know about them all, and if he refers his problems back to all of them,\u00a0he will assign the \u2018why\u2019 in the way proper to his science-the matter, the\u00a0form, the mover, \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019. The last three often coincide;\u00a0for the \u2018what\u2019 and \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019 are one, while the primary\u00a0source of motion is the same in species as these (for man generates man),\u00a0and so too, in general, are all things which cause movement by being themselves\u00a0moved; and such as are not of this kind are no longer inside the province\u00a0of physics, for they cause motion not by possessing motion or a source\u00a0of motion in themselves, but being themselves incapable of motion. Hence\u00a0there are three branches of study, one of things which are incapable of\u00a0motion, the second of things in motion, but indestructible, the third of\u00a0destructible things.<\/p>\n

The question \u2018why\u2019, then, is answered by reference to the matter,\u00a0to the form, and to the primary moving cause. For in respect of coming\u00a0to be it is mostly in this last way that causes are investigated-\u2019what\u00a0comes to be after what? what was the primary agent or patient?\u2019 and so\u00a0at each step of the series.<\/p>\n

Now the principles which cause motion in a physical way are two,\u00a0of which one is not physical, as it has no principle of motion in itself.\u00a0Of this kind is whatever causes movement, not being itself moved, such\u00a0as (1) that which is completely unchangeable, the primary reality, and\u00a0(2) the essence of that which is coming to be, i.e. the form; for this\u00a0is the end or \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019. Hence since nature is for the\u00a0sake of something, we must know this cause also. We must explain the \u2018why\u2019\u00a0in all the senses of the term, namely, (1) that from this that will necessarily\u00a0result (\u2018from this\u2019 either without qualification or in most cases); (2)\u00a0that \u2018this must be so if that is to be so\u2019 (as the conclusion presupposes\u00a0the premises); (3) that this was the essence of the thing; and (4) because\u00a0it is better thus (not without qualification, but with reference to the\u00a0essential nature in each case).<\/p>\n

Part 8<\/strong>
\nWe must explain then (1) that Nature belongs to the class of causes\u00a0which act for the sake of something; (2) about the necessary and its place\u00a0in physical problems, for all writers ascribe things to this cause, arguing\u00a0that since the hot and the cold, &c., are of such and such a kind, therefore\u00a0certain things necessarily are and come to be-and if they mention any other\u00a0cause (one his \u2018friendship and strife\u2019, another his \u2018mind\u2019), it is only\u00a0to touch on it, and then good-bye to it.<\/p>\n

A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for\u00a0the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky\u00a0rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity? What is drawn\u00a0up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the\u00a0result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man\u2019s crop is\u00a0spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this-in\u00a0order that the crop might be spoiled-but that result just followed. Why\u00a0then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our\u00a0teeth should come up of necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing,\u00a0the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food-since they did not\u00a0arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with\u00a0all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever then\u00a0all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come\u00a0be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a\u00a0fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to\u00a0perish, as Empedocles says his \u2018man-faced ox-progeny\u2019\u00a0did.<\/p>\n

Such are the arguments (and others of the kind) which may cause\u00a0difficulty on this point. Yet it is impossible that this should be the\u00a0true view. For teeth and all other natural things either invariably or\u00a0normally come about in a given way; but of not one of the results of chance\u00a0or spontaneity is this true. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence\u00a0the frequency of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor\u00a0heat in the dog-days, but only if we have it in winter. If then, it is\u00a0agreed that things are either the result of coincidence or for an end,\u00a0and these cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows\u00a0that they must be for an end; and that such things are all due to nature\u00a0even the champions of the theory which is before us would agree. Therefore action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by\u00a0nature.<\/p>\n

Further, where a series has a completion, all the preceding steps\u00a0are for the sake of that. Now surely as in intelligent action, so in nature;\u00a0and as in nature, so it is in each action, if nothing interferes. Now intelligent\u00a0action is for the sake of an end; therefore the nature of things also is\u00a0so. Thus if a house, e.g. had been a thing made by nature, it would have\u00a0been made in the same way as it is now by art; and if things made by nature\u00a0were made also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature.\u00a0Each step then in the series is for the sake of the next; and generally art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates\u00a0her. If, therefore, artificial products are for the sake of an end, so\u00a0clearly also are natural products. The relation of the later to the earlier\u00a0terms of the series is the same in both. This is most obvious in the animals\u00a0other than man: they make things neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation.\u00a0Wherefore people discuss whether it is by intelligence or by some other\u00a0faculty that these creatures work, spiders, ants, and the like. By gradual\u00a0advance in this direction we come to see clearly that in plants too that is produced which is conducive to the end-leaves, e.g. grow to provide\u00a0shade for the fruit. If then it is both by nature and for an end that the\u00a0swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves for\u00a0the sake of the fruit and send their roots down (not up) for the sake of\u00a0nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things\u00a0which come to be and are by nature. And since \u2018nature\u2019 means two things,\u00a0the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, and since all\u00a0the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the\u00a0sense of \u2018that for the sake of which\u2019.<\/p>\n

Now mistakes come to pass even in the operations of art: the grammarian\u00a0makes a mistake in writing and the doctor pours out the wrong dose. Hence\u00a0clearly mistakes are possible in the operations of nature also. If then\u00a0in art there are cases in which what is rightly produced serves a purpose,\u00a0and if where mistakes occur there was a purpose in what was attempted,\u00a0only it was not attained, so must it be also in natural products, and monstrosities\u00a0will be failures in the purposive effort. Thus in the original combinations\u00a0the \u2018ox-progeny\u2019 if they failed to reach a determinate end must have arisen\u00a0through the corruption of some principle corresponding to what is now the\u00a0seed.<\/p>\n

Further, seed must have come into being first, and not straightway\u00a0the animals: the words \u2018whole-natured first…\u2019 must have meant\u00a0seed.<\/p>\n

Again, in plants too we find the relation of means to end, though\u00a0the degree of organization is less. Were there then in plants also \u2018olive-headed\u00a0vine-progeny\u2019, like the \u2018man-headed ox-progeny\u2019, or not? An absurd suggestion;\u00a0yet there must have been, if there were such things among\u00a0animals.<\/p>\n

Moreover, among the seeds anything must have come to be at random.\u00a0But the person who asserts this entirely does away with \u2018nature\u2019 and what\u00a0exists \u2018by nature\u2019. For those things are natural which, by a continuous\u00a0movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at some completion:\u00a0the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any chance\u00a0completion, but always the tendency in each is towards the same end, if\u00a0there is no impediment.<\/p>\n

The end and the means towards it may come about by chance. We say,\u00a0for instance, that a stranger has come by chance, paid the ransom, and\u00a0gone away, when he does so as if he had come for that purpose, though it\u00a0was not for that that he came. This is incidental, for chance is an incidental\u00a0cause, as I remarked before. But when an event takes place always or for\u00a0the most part, it is not incidental or by chance. In natural products the\u00a0sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment.<\/p>\n

It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we\u00a0do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the\u00a0ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by\u00a0nature. If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in\u00a0nature. The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is\u00a0like that.<\/p>\n

It is plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that operates\u00a0for a purpose.<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t

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Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t
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