{"id":644,"date":"2020-06-17T15:24:28","date_gmt":"2020-06-17T15:24:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-philosophy1\/?post_type=chapter&p=644"},"modified":"2026-01-09T20:29:44","modified_gmt":"2026-01-09T20:29:44","slug":"2-3-scholasticism","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-philosophy1\/chapter\/2-3-scholasticism\/","title":{"raw":"2.2: Scholasticism","rendered":"2.2: Scholasticism"},"content":{"raw":"
\r\n

Scholastic Philosophy<\/span><\/h2>\r\n<\/div>\r\n
\r\n\r\nAnselm<\/em><\/a>'s patient and rational approach to philosophical issues and his willingness to engage in debate with other thinkers who disagreed with the positions he defended were greatly influential on western culture. They helped give rise to the development of\u00a0scholasticism<\/a>, a process of intergenerational cooperation engendered by shared appeal to a common tradition of rational argumentation.\r\n\r\nNot everyone participated happily in this process, of course; Christian anti-intellectualism continued to flourish, as is clear in the writings of Peter Damian during the eleventh century. Damian condemned the use of dialectic for both secular and theological purposes, and argued that since human reason is so insignificant in comparison with the power of faith, the untrained and ignorant are bound to be wiser than the educated and thoughtful.\r\n\r\nMany Christian thinkers disagreed, however, and their efforts to comprehend those who had gone before and to develop an intellectual tradition within the church were well served by the\u00a0Book of Sentences<\/i>\u00a0(Libri Quatuor Sententiarum<\/i>) (1158) compiled by\u00a0Peter Lombard<\/a>. An appropriate textbook for an era during which few copies of any book could be made generally available for student use, the\u00a0Sentences<\/i>\u00a0simply quoted the opinions of earlier philosophers with respect to a variety of questions. Rarely commenting on these ancient materials, Lombard simply reported the conflicting views of the authorities issue by issue, leaving adjudication between them to the active participation of the reader. This helped to foster a framework of debate in which the basic positions could be clearly defined and new arguments in their criticism or defense easily developed.\r\n

The Problem of Universals<\/h3>\r\n<\/div>\r\n
\r\n\r\nOne of the issues that most plagued scholastic philosophers during this period was\u00a0the problem of universals<\/a>. What is\u00a0the ontological status<\/a>\u00a0of the species to which many things commonly belong?\u00a0Realists<\/a>, following in the tradition of\u00a0Plato<\/a>, maintained that each universal is an entity in its own right, existing independently of the individual things that happen to participate in it. Nominalists<\/a>, in the vein of Aristotle<\/a> and <\/span>Roscelin<\/a>,\u00a0<\/span>held that only particular things exist, since the universal is nothing more than a name that applies to certain individual substances. W<\/span>ords are then, at best, tools for understanding but do not access the <\/span>essence<\/a> of a substance or concept.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\nThe difficulties with each position are clear.\u00a0Realism introduces a whole range of special abstract entities for the simple purpose of accounting for similarities that particular things exhibit. <\/span>Nominalism, alternatively, seems to suggest that whether or not two things share a feature depends solely upon our accidental decision whether or not to call them by the same name. In the medieval spirit of disputation, each side found it easier to attack its opponents' views than to defend its own. But the most brilliant disputant of the twelfth century invented a third alternative that avoided the difficulties of both extremes.<\/span>\r\n\r\nFrench logician\u00a0Peter Abelard<\/a>,\u00a0<\/span>who was Roscelin's student, felt <\/span>that we ground the genuine similarities among individual things without reifying their universal features, by predicating general terms in conformity with concepts abstracted from experience. This view, which came to be known as <\/span>conceptualism<\/a>, denies the reality of universals as separate entities yet secures the objectivity of our application of general terms. Although only individual things and their particular features truly exist, we effectively employ our shared concepts as universals. This resolution of the traditional problem of universals gained wide acceptance for several centuries, until doubts about the\u00a0<\/span>objectivity<\/a>\u00a0and reality of such mental entities as concepts came under serious question.<\/span>\r\n

Reviving the West<\/h3>\r\n
\r\n\r\nDuring the\u00a0thirteenth century<\/a>, Christian Europe finally began to assimilate the lively intellectual traditions of the Jews and Arabs. Translations of ancient Greek texts (and the fine Arabic commentaries on them) into Latin made the full range of Aristotelian philosophy available to Western thinkers. This encouraged significant modifications of the prevalent\u00a0neoplatonic<\/a>\u00a0emanation-theory.\u00a0Robert Grosseteste<\/a>, for example, followed\u00a0Ibn Sina<\/a>\u00a0in emphasizing the causal regularity evidenced by our experience of the world, and\u00a0Siger of Brabant<\/a>\u00a0used the commentaries of\u00a0Ibn Rushd<\/a>\u00a0as the basis for his thoroughly Aristotelian views.\r\n\r\nIn England,\u00a0Roger Bacon<\/a>\u00a0initiated a national tradition of\u00a0empiricist<\/a>\u00a0thinking. Bacon proposed a systematic plan for supplementing our meager knowledge of the external world. Although he granted that consultation of the ancient authorities has some value, Bacon argued that it is even more important to employ individual experience for experimental confirmation. In coming generations, this reliance upon experimental methods would become vital for the development of modern science.\r\n\r\nWhen\u00a0universities developed in the great cities of Europe during this era, rival clerical orders within the church began to battle for political and intellectual control over these centers of educational life. At Paris during the thirteenth century, two of the newest orders found their most capable philosophical representatives.\r\n\r\nThe Franciscans, founded by Francis of Assisi in 1209, were initially the philosophical conservatives. As their leader in mid-century,\u00a0Bonaventure<\/a>\u00a0defended a traditional\u00a0Augustine<\/em><\/a>'s theology, blending only a little of Aristotle in with the more traditional neoplatonic elements. In later generations, however,\u00a0members of this order<\/a>\u00a0were leaders in the anti-rationalistic attacks that brought an effective end to scholastic traditions.\r\n\r\nThe Dominican order, founded by St. Dominic<\/a> in 1215, on the other hand, placed great emphasis on the use of reason and made extensive use of Aristotelian materials. Thus, their finest expositor was Aquinas<\/a>, whose works became definitive of Dominican (and, eventually, of Catholic) philosophy. Later Dominicans, like Savonarola, were more likely to pursue political power than philosophical truth.\r\n

Bonaventure<\/h3>\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"alignnone\" width=\"500\"]\"Fran\u00e7ois, Saint Bonaventure[\/caption]\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n
\r\n\r\nAfter studying in Paris with Alexander of Hales,\u00a0Bonaventure<\/a>\u00a0taught and wrote extensively, leading his Franciscans in the measured defense of the\u00a0scholastic<\/a>\u00a0synthesis of Platonic philosophy with Christian doctrine. Like\u00a0Anselm<\/em><\/a>, Bonaventure supposed that truth can emerge from rational argumentation only when the methods of philosophy are illuminated by religious faith. Thus, efforts to prove god's existence naturally begin with religious conviction itself, as an internal evidence of creaturely dependence on the deity.\r\n\r\nBonaventure held that the notion of an eternal material order is contradictory, so that reason itself supports the Christian doctrine of creation. Since god is the central being from which all else then\u00a0emanates<\/a>, every creature\u2014including even human beings with sinful natures\u2014may be regarded as a footprint (Lat.,\u00a0vestiguum<\/i>) of the divine reality. Thus, in the language of Christian doctrine, we are made in god's image and likeness; or, as\u00a0Plato<\/em><\/a>\u00a0might have put it, we participate (partly) in the Form of the Good. Even\u00a0matter<\/a>\u00a0itself is endowed by the creator with seminal urges by means of which effective causation can proceed from within.\r\n\r\nDespite his general commitment to\u00a0neoplatonic<\/a>\u00a0principles and rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics, Bonaventure did accept the notion of human nature as a\u00a0hylomorphic composite<\/a>. Although the human soul is indeed the form of the human body, Bonaventure maintained however, it is capable, with the help of god, of continuing to exist after the death of the body. Thus, as always, he accepted the thought of Aristotle only so far as it could be made to conform to his preconceptions about Christian doctrine. As we'll see next time, one of his contemporaries at Paris used a very different approach.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n \r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"
\n

Scholastic Philosophy<\/span><\/h2>\n<\/div>\n
\n

Anselm<\/em><\/a>‘s patient and rational approach to philosophical issues and his willingness to engage in debate with other thinkers who disagreed with the positions he defended were greatly influential on western culture. They helped give rise to the development of\u00a0scholasticism<\/a>, a process of intergenerational cooperation engendered by shared appeal to a common tradition of rational argumentation.<\/p>\n

Not everyone participated happily in this process, of course; Christian anti-intellectualism continued to flourish, as is clear in the writings of Peter Damian during the eleventh century. Damian condemned the use of dialectic for both secular and theological purposes, and argued that since human reason is so insignificant in comparison with the power of faith, the untrained and ignorant are bound to be wiser than the educated and thoughtful.<\/p>\n

Many Christian thinkers disagreed, however, and their efforts to comprehend those who had gone before and to develop an intellectual tradition within the church were well served by the\u00a0Book of Sentences<\/i>\u00a0(Libri Quatuor Sententiarum<\/i>) (1158) compiled by\u00a0Peter Lombard<\/a>. An appropriate textbook for an era during which few copies of any book could be made generally available for student use, the\u00a0Sentences<\/i>\u00a0simply quoted the opinions of earlier philosophers with respect to a variety of questions. Rarely commenting on these ancient materials, Lombard simply reported the conflicting views of the authorities issue by issue, leaving adjudication between them to the active participation of the reader. This helped to foster a framework of debate in which the basic positions could be clearly defined and new arguments in their criticism or defense easily developed.<\/p>\n

The Problem of Universals<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
\n

One of the issues that most plagued scholastic philosophers during this period was\u00a0the problem of universals<\/a>. What is\u00a0the ontological status<\/a>\u00a0of the species to which many things commonly belong?\u00a0Realists<\/a>, following in the tradition of\u00a0Plato<\/a>, maintained that each universal is an entity in its own right, existing independently of the individual things that happen to participate in it. Nominalists<\/a>, in the vein of Aristotle<\/a> and <\/span>Roscelin<\/a>,\u00a0<\/span>held that only particular things exist, since the universal is nothing more than a name that applies to certain individual substances. W<\/span>ords are then, at best, tools for understanding but do not access the <\/span>essence<\/a> of a substance or concept.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The difficulties with each position are clear.\u00a0Realism introduces a whole range of special abstract entities for the simple purpose of accounting for similarities that particular things exhibit. <\/span>Nominalism, alternatively, seems to suggest that whether or not two things share a feature depends solely upon our accidental decision whether or not to call them by the same name. In the medieval spirit of disputation, each side found it easier to attack its opponents’ views than to defend its own. But the most brilliant disputant of the twelfth century invented a third alternative that avoided the difficulties of both extremes.<\/span><\/p>\n

French logician\u00a0Peter Abelard<\/a>,\u00a0<\/span>who was Roscelin’s student, felt <\/span>that we ground the genuine similarities among individual things without reifying their universal features, by predicating general terms in conformity with concepts abstracted from experience. This view, which came to be known as <\/span>conceptualism<\/a>, denies the reality of universals as separate entities yet secures the objectivity of our application of general terms. Although only individual things and their particular features truly exist, we effectively employ our shared concepts as universals. This resolution of the traditional problem of universals gained wide acceptance for several centuries, until doubts about the\u00a0<\/span>objectivity<\/a>\u00a0and reality of such mental entities as concepts came under serious question.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reviving the West<\/h3>\n
\n

During the\u00a0thirteenth century<\/a>, Christian Europe finally began to assimilate the lively intellectual traditions of the Jews and Arabs. Translations of ancient Greek texts (and the fine Arabic commentaries on them) into Latin made the full range of Aristotelian philosophy available to Western thinkers. This encouraged significant modifications of the prevalent\u00a0neoplatonic<\/a>\u00a0emanation-theory.\u00a0Robert Grosseteste<\/a>, for example, followed\u00a0Ibn Sina<\/a>\u00a0in emphasizing the causal regularity evidenced by our experience of the world, and\u00a0Siger of Brabant<\/a>\u00a0used the commentaries of\u00a0Ibn Rushd<\/a>\u00a0as the basis for his thoroughly Aristotelian views.<\/p>\n

In England,\u00a0Roger Bacon<\/a>\u00a0initiated a national tradition of\u00a0empiricist<\/a>\u00a0thinking. Bacon proposed a systematic plan for supplementing our meager knowledge of the external world. Although he granted that consultation of the ancient authorities has some value, Bacon argued that it is even more important to employ individual experience for experimental confirmation. In coming generations, this reliance upon experimental methods would become vital for the development of modern science.<\/p>\n

When\u00a0universities developed in the great cities of Europe during this era, rival clerical orders within the church began to battle for political and intellectual control over these centers of educational life. At Paris during the thirteenth century, two of the newest orders found their most capable philosophical representatives.<\/p>\n

The Franciscans, founded by Francis of Assisi in 1209, were initially the philosophical conservatives. As their leader in mid-century,\u00a0Bonaventure<\/a>\u00a0defended a traditional\u00a0Augustine<\/em><\/a>‘s theology, blending only a little of Aristotle in with the more traditional neoplatonic elements. In later generations, however,\u00a0members of this order<\/a>\u00a0were leaders in the anti-rationalistic attacks that brought an effective end to scholastic traditions.<\/p>\n

The Dominican order, founded by St. Dominic<\/a> in 1215, on the other hand, placed great emphasis on the use of reason and made extensive use of Aristotelian materials. Thus, their finest expositor was Aquinas<\/a>, whose works became definitive of Dominican (and, eventually, of Catholic) philosophy. Later Dominicans, like Savonarola, were more likely to pursue political power than philosophical truth.<\/p>\n

Bonaventure<\/h3>\n
\"Fran\u00e7ois,<\/p>\n

Saint Bonaventure<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

\n

After studying in Paris with Alexander of Hales,\u00a0Bonaventure<\/a>\u00a0taught and wrote extensively, leading his Franciscans in the measured defense of the\u00a0scholastic<\/a>\u00a0synthesis of Platonic philosophy with Christian doctrine. Like\u00a0Anselm<\/em><\/a>, Bonaventure supposed that truth can emerge from rational argumentation only when the methods of philosophy are illuminated by religious faith. Thus, efforts to prove god’s existence naturally begin with religious conviction itself, as an internal evidence of creaturely dependence on the deity.<\/p>\n

Bonaventure held that the notion of an eternal material order is contradictory, so that reason itself supports the Christian doctrine of creation. Since god is the central being from which all else then\u00a0emanates<\/a>, every creature\u2014including even human beings with sinful natures\u2014may be regarded as a footprint (Lat.,\u00a0vestiguum<\/i>) of the divine reality. Thus, in the language of Christian doctrine, we are made in god’s image and likeness; or, as\u00a0Plato<\/em><\/a>\u00a0might have put it, we participate (partly) in the Form of the Good. Even\u00a0matter<\/a>\u00a0itself is endowed by the creator with seminal urges by means of which effective causation can proceed from within.<\/p>\n

Despite his general commitment to\u00a0neoplatonic<\/a>\u00a0principles and rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics, Bonaventure did accept the notion of human nature as a\u00a0hylomorphic composite<\/a>. Although the human soul is indeed the form of the human body, Bonaventure maintained however, it is capable, with the help of god, of continuing to exist after the death of the body. Thus, as always, he accepted the thought of Aristotle only so far as it could be made to conform to his preconceptions about Christian doctrine. As we’ll see next time, one of his contemporaries at Paris used a very different approach.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t

\n\t\t\t

Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
CC licensed content, Specific attribution<\/div>