{"id":87,"date":"2016-08-09T17:04:13","date_gmt":"2016-08-09T17:04:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-hccc-social-psychology\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=87"},"modified":"2016-11-22T16:48:30","modified_gmt":"2016-11-22T16:48:30","slug":"exploring-attitudes","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/chapter\/exploring-attitudes\/","title":{"raw":"Exploring Attitudes","rendered":"Exploring Attitudes"},"content":{"raw":"<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h3>Learning Objectives<\/h3>\r\n<ol>\r\n \t<li>Define the concept of an attitude and explain why it is of such interest to social psychologists.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Review the variables that determine attitude strength.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Outline the factors that affect the strength of the attitude-behavior relationship.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\nAlthough we might use the term in a different way in our everyday life (e.g., \u201cHey, he's really got an <em>attitude<\/em>!\u201d), social psychologists reserve the term <strong>attitude<\/strong> to refer to our <em>relatively enduring evaluation of something, where the something is called the attitude object<\/em>. The attitude object might be a person, a product, or a social group (Albarrac\u00edn, Johnson, &amp; Zanna, 2005; Wood, 2000).\u00a0In this section, we will consider the nature and strength of attitudes and the conditions under which attitudes best predict our behaviors.\r\n<h2>Attitudes Are Evaluations<\/h2>\r\nWhen we say that attitudes are evaluations, we mean that they involve a preference for or against the attitude object, as commonly expressed in terms such\u00a0as <em>prefer<\/em>, <em>like<\/em>, <em>dislike<\/em>, <em>hate<\/em>, and <em>love<\/em>. When we express our attitudes\u2014for instance, when we say, \u201cI like\u00a0swimming,\u201d \u201cI hate snakes,\u201d or \u201cI\u00a0love my parents\u201d \u2014we are expressing the relationship (either positive or negative) between the self and an attitude object. Statements such as these make it clear that attitudes are an important part of the self-concept.\r\n\r\nEvery human being holds thousands of attitudes, including those about family and friends, political figures, abortion rights, terrorism, preferences for music, and much more. Each of our attitudes has its own unique characteristics, and no two attitudes come to us or influence us in quite the same way. Research has found that some of our attitudes are inherited, at least in part, via genetic transmission from our parents (Olson, Vernon, Harris, &amp; Jang, 2001).\u00a0Other attitudes are learned mostly through direct and indirect experiences with the attitude objects (De Houwer, Thomas, &amp; Baeyens, 2001).\u00a0We may like to ride roller coasters in part because our genetic code has given us a thrill-loving personality and in part because we\u2019ve had some really great times on roller coasters in the past. Still other attitudes are learned via the media (Hargreaves &amp; Tiggemann, 2003; Levina, Waldo, &amp; Fitzgerald, 2000)\u00a0or through our interactions with friends (Poteat, 2007).\u00a0Some of our attitudes are shared by others (most of us like sugar, fear snakes, and are disgusted by cockroaches), whereas other attitudes\u2014such as our preferences for different styles of music or art\u2014are more individualized.\r\n\r\n<a href=\"#table4-1\">Table 4.1, \"Heritability of Some Attitudes,\"<\/a> shows some of the attitudes that have been found to be the most highly heritable (i.e., most strongly determined by genetic variation among people). These attitudes form earlier and are stronger and more resistant to change than others (Bourgeois, 2002),\u00a0although it is not yet known why some attitudes are more genetically determined than are others.\r\n\r\n<a id=\"table4-1\"><\/a>Table 4.1 Heritability of Some Attitudes\r\n<table>\r\n<thead>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th>Attitude<\/th>\r\n<th>Heritability<\/th>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/thead>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Abortion on demand<\/td>\r\n<td>0.54<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Roller coaster rides<\/td>\r\n<td>0.52<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Death penalty for murder<\/td>\r\n<td>0.5<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Organized religion<\/td>\r\n<td>0.45<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Doing athletic activities<\/td>\r\n<td>0.44<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Voluntary euthanasia<\/td>\r\n<td>0.44<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Capitalism<\/td>\r\n<td>0.39<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Playing chess<\/td>\r\n<td>0.38<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Reading books<\/td>\r\n<td>0.37<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Exercising<\/td>\r\n<td>0.36<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Education<\/td>\r\n<td>0.32<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Big parties<\/td>\r\n<td>0.32<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Smoking<\/td>\r\n<td>0.31<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Being the center of attention<\/td>\r\n<td>0.28<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Getting along well with other people<\/td>\r\n<td>0.28<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Wearing clothes that draw attention<\/td>\r\n<td>0.24<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Sweets<\/td>\r\n<td>0.22<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Public speaking<\/td>\r\n<td>0.2<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Castration as punishment for sex crimes<\/td>\r\n<td>0.17<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Loud music<\/td>\r\n<td>0.11<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Looking my best at all times<\/td>\r\n<td>0.1<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Doing crossword puzzles<\/td>\r\n<td>0.02<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Separate roles for men and women<\/td>\r\n<td>0<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Making racial discrimination illegal<\/td>\r\n<td>0<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Playing organized sports<\/td>\r\n<td>0<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Easy access to birth control<\/td>\r\n<td>0<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Being the leader of groups<\/td>\r\n<td>0<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Being assertive<\/td>\r\n<td>0<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th colspan=\"2\">Ranked from most heritable to least heritable. Data are from Olson, Vernon, Harris, and Jang (2001). Olson, J. M., Vernon, P. A., Harris, J. A., Harris, J.A., &amp; Jang, K. L. (2001). The heritability of attitudes: A study of twins. <em>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80<\/em>(6), 845\u2013860.<\/th>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\nOur attitudes are made up of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Consider an environmentalist's\u00a0attitude toward recycling, which is probably very positive:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><em>In terms of affect:\u00a0They\u00a0feel happy when they recycle.<\/em><\/li>\r\n \t<li><em>In terms of\u00a0behavior:\u00a0They<\/em><em>\u00a0regularly\u00a0recycle their bottles and cans.<\/em><\/li>\r\n \t<li><em>In terms of cognition: They believe\u00a0recycling is the responsible thing to do.<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nAlthough most attitudes are determined by affect, behavior, and cognition, there is nevertheless variability in this regard across people and across attitudes. Some attitudes are more likely to be based on feelings, some are more likely to be based on behaviors, and some are more likely to be based on beliefs. For example, your\u00a0attitude toward chocolate ice cream is probably determined in large part by affect\u2014although you\u00a0can describe its taste, mostly you\u00a0may just like it. Your\u00a0attitude toward\u00a0your toothbrush, on the other hand, is probably\u00a0more cognitive (you\u00a0understand the importance of its\u00a0function). Still other of your\u00a0attitudes may be\u00a0based more on behavior. For example, your attitude toward note-taking during lectures probably depends, at least in part, on whether or not you regularly take notes.\r\n\r\nDifferent people may hold attitudes toward the same attitude object for different reasons. For example, some people vote for politicians\u00a0because they like their\u00a0policies, whereas others vote for (or against) politicians\u00a0because they just like (or dislike) their public persona. Although you might think that cognition would be more important in this regard, political scientists have shown that many voting decisions are made primarily on the basis of affect. Indeed, it is fair to say that the affective component of attitudes is generally the strongest and most important (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, &amp; Fiske, 1981; Stangor, Sullivan, &amp; Ford, 1991).\r\n\r\nHuman beings hold attitudes because they are useful. Particularly, our attitudes enable us to determine, often very quickly and effortlessly, which behaviors to engage in, which people to approach or avoid, and even which products to buy (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, &amp; Chaiken, 2002; Maio &amp; Olson, 2000).\u00a0You can imagine that making quick decisions about what to avoid or approach\u00a0has had substantial value in our evolutionary experience. For example:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>Snake = bad \u27f6 run away<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Blueberries = good \u27f6 eat<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nBecause attitudes are evaluations, they can be assessed using any of the normal measuring techniques used by social psychologists (Banaji &amp; Heiphetz, 2010).\u00a0Attitudes are frequently assessed using self-report measures, but they can also be assessed more indirectly using measures of arousal and facial expressions (Mendes, 2008)\u00a0as well as implicit measures of cognition, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Attitudes can also be seen in the brain by using neuroimaging techniques. This research has found that our attitudes, like most of our social knowledge, are stored primarily in the prefrontal cortex but that the amygdala is important in emotional attitudes, particularly those associated with fear (Cunningham, Raye, &amp; Johnson, 2004; Cunningham &amp; Zelazo, 2007; van den Bos, McClure, Harris, Fiske, &amp; Cohen, 2007).\u00a0Attitudes can be activated extremely quickly\u2014often within one-fifth of a second after we see an attitude object (Handy, Smilek, Geiger, Liu, &amp; Schooler, 2010).\r\n<h2>Some Attitudes Are Stronger Than Others<\/h2>\r\nSome attitudes are more important than others because they are more useful to us and thus have more impact on our daily lives. <em>The importance of an attitude, as assessed by how quickly it comes to mind<\/em>, is known as <strong>attitude strength<\/strong> (Fazio, 1990; Fazio, 1995; Krosnick &amp; Petty, 1995).\u00a0Some of our attitudes are strong attitudes, in the sense that we find them important, hold them with confidence, do not change them very much, and use them frequently to guide our actions. These strong attitudes may guide our actions completely out of our awareness (Ferguson, Bargh, &amp; Nayak, 2005).\r\n\r\nOther attitudes are weaker and have little influence on our actions. For instance, John Bargh and his colleagues (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, &amp; Hymes, 1996)\u00a0found that people could express attitudes toward nonsense words such as <em>juvalamu<\/em> (which people liked) and <em>chakaka<\/em> (which they did not like). The researchers also found that these attitudes were very weak.\r\n\r\nStrong attitudes are more cognitively accessible\u2014they come to mind quickly, regularly, and easily. We can easily measure attitude strength by assessing how quickly our attitudes are activated when we are exposed to the attitude object. If we can state our attitude quickly, without much thought, then it is a strong one. If we are unsure about our attitude and need to think about it for a while before stating our opinion, the attitude is weak.\r\n\r\nAttitudes become stronger when we have direct positive or negative experiences with the attitude object, and particularly if those experiences have been in strong positive or negative contexts. Russell Fazio and his colleagues (Fazio, Powell, &amp; Herr, 1983)\u00a0had people either work on some puzzles or watch other people work on the same puzzles. Although the people who watched ended up either liking or disliking the puzzles as much as the people who actually worked on them, Fazio found that attitudes, as assessed by reaction time measures, were stronger (in the sense of being expressed quickly) for the people who had directly experienced the puzzles.\r\n\r\nBecause attitude strength is determined by cognitive accessibility, it is possible to make attitudes stronger by increasing the accessibility of the attitude. This can be done directly by having people think about, express, or discuss their attitudes with others. After people think about their attitudes, talk about them, or just say them out loud, the attitudes they have expressed become stronger (Downing, Judd, &amp; Brauer, 1992; Tesser, Martin, &amp; Mendolia, 1995).\u00a0Because attitudes are linked to the self-concept, they also become stronger when they are activated along with the self-concept. When we are looking into a mirror or sitting in front of a TV camera, our attitudes are activated and we are then more likely to act on them (Beaman, Klentz, Diener, &amp; Svanum, 1979).\r\n\r\nAttitudes are also stronger when the ABCs of affect, behavior, and cognition all align. As an example, many people\u2019s attitude toward their own nation is universally positive. They have strong positive feelings about their country, many positive thoughts about it, and tend to engage in behaviors that support it. Other attitudes are less strong because the affective, cognitive, and behavioral components are each somewhat different (Thompson, Zanna, &amp; Griffin, 1995). Your\u00a0cognitions toward physical exercise may be positive\u2014you believe that regular physical activity\u00a0is good for your health.\u00a0On the other hand, your affect may be negative\u2014you may resist exercising because you prefer to engage in tasks that provide more immediate rewards. Consequently,\u00a0you may not exercise as often as you believe\u00a0you ought to. These inconsistencies among the components of your\u00a0attitude make it less strong than it would be if all the components lined up together.\r\n<h2>When Do Our Attitudes Guide Our Behavior?<\/h2>\r\nSocial psychologists (as well as advertisers, marketers, and politicians) are particularly interested in the behavioral aspect of attitudes. Because it is normal that the ABCs of our attitudes are at least somewhat consistent, our behavior tends to follow from our affect and cognition. If I determine that you have more positive cognitions about and more positive affect toward waffles\u00a0than French toast, then I will naturally predict (and probably be correct when I do so) that you\u2019ll be more likely to order waffles than French toast when you eat breakfast at a restaurant. Furthermore, if I can do something to make your thoughts or feelings toward French toast\u00a0more positive, then your likelihood of ordering it\u00a0for breakfast\u00a0will also increase.\r\n\r\n<strong>The principle of attitude consistency<\/strong> (that <em>for any given attitude object, the ABCs of affect, behavior, and cognition are normally in line with each other<\/em>) thus predicts that our attitudes (for instance, as measured via a self-report measure) are likely to <em>guide behavior<\/em>. Supporting this idea, meta-analyses have found that there is a significant and substantial positive correlation among the different components of attitudes, and that attitudes expressed on self-report measures do predict behavior (Glasman &amp; Albarrac\u00edn, 2006).\r\n\r\nHowever,\u00a0our attitudes are not the only factor that influence our decision to act.\u00a0The <em>theory of planned behavior<\/em>, developed by Martin Fishbein and Izek Ajzen (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein &amp; Ajzen, 1975), outlines three key variables that\u00a0affect the attitude-behavior relationship: (a) the\u00a0attitude toward the behaviour (the stronger the better), (b) subjective norms (the support of those we value), and (c) perceived behavioral control (the extent to which we believe\u00a0we can actually perform the behavior). These three factors jointly predict our intention to perform the\u00a0behavior, which in turn predicts our actual behavior (<a href=\"#figure4-2\">Figure 4.2, \"Theory of Planned Behavior\"<\/a>).\r\n\r\nTo illustrate, imagine\u00a0for a moment that your friend Sharina is trying to decide whether to recycle her used laptop batteries or just throw them away. We know that her attitude toward recycling is positive\u2014she thinks she should do it\u2014but we also know that recycling takes work. It\u2019s much easier to just throw the batteries away. But if Sharina feels strongly about the importance of recycling, if her family and friends are also in favor of recycling, and if she has easy access to a battery recycling facility, then she will develop a strong intention to perform the behavior and likely follow through on it.\r\n\r\nSince it was first proposed, the\u00a0theory of planned behavior\u00a0has grown to become an extremely influential model for\u00a0predicting human social behavior. However, although it has been used to study virtually every kind of planned behavior, a\u00a0recent meta-analysis of 206 articles found that this model was especially effective at predicting physical activity and dietary behaviors\u00a0(McEachan, Conner, Taylor, &amp; Lawton, 2011).\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"attachment_1648\" align=\"alignnone\" width=\"400\"]<a href=\"http:\/\/opentextbc.ca\/socialpsychology\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/21\/2014\/07\/graph.png\"><img class=\"wp-image-1648\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/457\/2016\/08\/09165336\/graph.png\" alt=\"Figure 4.2 Theory\" width=\"400\" height=\"175\" \/><\/a> Figure 4.2 Theory of Planned Behavior, adapted by Hilda Aggregani under CC BY.[\/caption]\r\n\r\nMore generally, research has also discovered\u00a0that attitudes\u00a0predict behaviors well only under certain conditions and for some people. These include:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>When the attitude and the behavior both occur in similar social situations<\/li>\r\n \t<li>When the same components of the attitude (either affect or cognition) are accessible when the attitude is assessed and when the behavior is performed<\/li>\r\n \t<li>When the attitudes are measured at a specific, rather than a general, level<\/li>\r\n \t<li>For low self-monitors (rather than for high self-monitors)<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nThe extent of the match between the social situations in which the attitudes are expressed and the behaviors are engaged in is important;\u00a0there is a greater attitude-behavior correlation when the social situations match. Imagine for a minute the case of Magritte, a 16-year-old high school student. Magritte tells her parents that she hates the idea of smoking cigarettes. Magritte\u2019s negative attitude toward smoking seems to be a strong one because she\u2019s thought a lot about it\u2014she believes that cigarettes are dirty, expensive, and unhealthy. But how sure are you that Magritte\u2019s attitude will predict her behavior? Would you be willing to bet that she\u2019d never try smoking when she\u2019s out with her friends?\r\n\r\nYou can see that the problem here is that Magritte\u2019s attitude is being expressed in one social situation (when she is with her parents), whereas the behavior (trying a cigarette) is going to occur in a very different social situation (when she is out with her friends). The relevant social norms are of course much different in the two situations. Magritte\u2019s friends might be able to convince her to try smoking, despite her initial negative attitude, when they entice her with peer pressure. Behaviors are more likely to be consistent with attitudes when the social situation in which the behavior occurs is similar to the situation in which the attitude is expressed (Ajzen, 1991; LaPiere, 1936).\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h3>Research Focus<\/h3>\r\nAttitude-Behavior Consistency\r\n\r\nAnother variable that has an important influence on attitude-behavior consistency is the current cognitive accessibility of the underlying affective and cognitive components of the attitude. For example, if we assess the attitude in a situation in which people are thinking primarily about the attitude object in cognitive terms, and yet the behavior is performed in a situation in which the affective components of the attitude are more accessible, then the attitude-behavior relationship will be weak. Wilson and Schooler (1991)\u00a0showed a similar type of effect by first choosing attitudes that they expected would be primarily determined by affect\u2014attitudes toward five different types of strawberry jam. They asked a sample of college students to taste each of the jams. While they were tasting, one-half of the participants were instructed to think about the cognitive aspects of their attitudes to these jams\u2014that is, to focus on the reasons they held their attitudes\u2014whereas the other half of the participants were not given these instructions. Then all the students completed measures of their attitudes toward each of the jams.\r\n\r\nWilson and his colleagues then assessed the extent to which the attitudes expressed by the students correlated with taste ratings of the five jams as indicated by experts at <em>Consumer Reports<\/em>. They found that the attitudes expressed by the students correlated significantly higher with the expert ratings for the participants who had <em>not<\/em> listed their cognitions first. Wilson and his colleagues argued that this occurred because our liking of jams is primarily affectively determined\u2014we either like them or we don\u2019t. And the students who simply rated the jams used their feelings to make their judgments. On the other hand, the students who were asked to list their thoughts about the jams had some extra information to use in making their judgments, but it was information that was not actually useful. Therefore, when these students used their thoughts about the jam to make the judgments, their judgments were less valid.\r\n\r\nMacDonald, Zanna, and Fong (1996)\u00a0showed male college students a video of two other college students, Mike and Rebecca, who were out on a date.\u00a0According to random assignment to conditions, half of the men were shown the video while sober and the other half viewed the video after they had had several alcoholic drinks. In the video, Mike and Rebecca go to the campus bar and drink and dance. They then go to Rebecca\u2019s room, where they end up kissing passionately. Mike says that he doesn\u2019t have any condoms, but Rebecca says that she is on the pill.\r\n\r\nAt this point the film clip ends, and the male participants are asked about their likely behaviors if they had been Mike. Although all men indicated that having unprotected sex in this situation was foolish and irresponsible, the men who had been drinking alcohol were more likely to indicate that they would engage in sexual intercourse with Rebecca even without a condom. One interpretation of this study is that sexual behavior is determined by both cognitive factors (e.g., \u201cI know that it is important to practice safe sex and so I should use a condom\u201d) and affective factors (e.g., \u201cSex is enjoyable, I don\u2019t want to wait\u201d). When the students were intoxicated at the time the behavior was to be performed, it seems likely the affective component of the attitude was a more important determinant of behavior than was the cognitive component.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nOne other type of match that has an important influence on the attitude-behavior relationship concerns how we measure the attitude and behavior. Attitudes predict behavior better when the attitude is measured at a level that is similar to the behavior to be predicted. Normally, the behavior is specific, so it is better to measure the attitude at a specific level too. For instance, if we measure cognitions at a very general level (e.g., \u201cDo you think it is important to use condoms?\u201d; \u201cAre you a religious person?\u201d) we will not be as successful at predicting actual behaviors as we will be if we ask the question more specifically, at the level of behavior we are interested in predicting (e.g., \u201cDo you think you will use a condom the next time you have sex?\u201d; \u201cHow frequently do you expect to attend church in the next month?\u201d). In general, more specific questions are better predictors of specific behaviors, and thus if we wish to accurately predict behaviors, we should remember to attempt to measure <em>specific<\/em> attitudes. One example of this principle is shown in <a href=\"#figure4-3\">Figure 4.3, \"Predicting Behavior from Specific and Nonspecific Attitude Measures.\"<\/a> Davidson and Jaccard (1979)\u00a0found that they were much better able to predict whether women actually used birth control when they assessed the attitude at a more specific level.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"attachment_2686\" align=\"alignnone\" width=\"400\"]<a href=\"http:\/\/opentextbc.ca\/socialpsychology\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/21\/2014\/09\/Figure-4-3.png\"><img class=\"wp-image-2686\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/457\/2016\/08\/09165339\/Figure-4-3.png\" alt=\"Behaviour Prediction\" width=\"400\" height=\"183\" \/><\/a> Figure 4.3 Predicting Behavior from Specific and Nonspecific Attitude Measures. Attitudes that are measured using more specific questions are more highly correlated with behavior than are attitudes measured using less specific questions. Data are from Davidson and Jaccard (1979).Davidson, A. R., &amp; Jaccard, J. J. (1979). Variables that moderate the attitude-behavior relation: Results of a longitudinal survey. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(8), 1364\u20131376.[\/caption]\r\n\r\nAttitudes also predict behavior better for some people than for others. As we saw in Chapter 3, self-monitoring refers to individual differences in the tendency to attend to social cues and to adjust one\u2019s behavior to one\u2019s social environment. To return to our example of Magritte, you might wonder whether she is the type of person who is likely to be persuaded by peer pressure because she is particularly concerned with being liked by others. If she is, then she\u2019s probably more likely to want to fit in with whatever her friends are doing, and she might try a cigarette if her friends offer her one. On the other hand, if Magritte is not particularly concerned about following the social norms of her friends, then she\u2019ll more likely be able to resist the persuasion. <em>High self-monitors<\/em> are those who tend to attempt to blend into the social situation in order to be liked; <em>low self-monitors<\/em> are those who are less likely to do so. You can see that, because they allow the social situation to influence their behaviors, the relationship between attitudes and behavior will be weaker for high self-monitors than it is for low self-monitors (Kraus, 1995).\r\n<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-success\">\r\n<h3>Key Takeaways<\/h3>\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>The term <em>attitude<\/em> refers to our relatively enduring evaluation of an attitude object.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Our attitudes are inherited and also learned through direct and indirect experiences with the attitude objects.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Some attitudes are more likely to be based on beliefs, some are more likely to be based on feelings, and some are more likely to be based on behaviors.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Strong attitudes are important in the sense that we hold them with confidence, we do not change them very much, and we use them frequently to guide our actions.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Although there is a general consistency between attitudes and behavior, the relationship is stronger in some situations than in others, for some measurements than for others, and for some people than for others.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\r\n<h3>Exercises and Critical Thinking<\/h3>\r\n<ol>\r\n \t<li>Describe an example of a behavior that you engaged in that might be explained by the theory of planned behavior. Include each of the components of the theory in your analysis.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Consider a time when you acted on your own attitudes and a time when you did not act on your own attitudes. What factors do you think determined the difference?<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h3>References<\/h3>\r\nAbelson, R. P., Kinder, D. R., Peters, M. D., &amp; Fiske, S. T. (1981). Affective and semantic components in political person perception.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42<\/i>, 619\u2013630.\r\n\r\nAjzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior.\u00a0<i>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50<\/i>(2), 179\u2013211.\r\n\r\nAlbarrac\u00edn, D., Johnson, B. T., &amp; Zanna, M. P. (Eds.). (2005).\u00a0<i>The handbook of attitudes<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 223\u2013271). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.\r\n\r\nBanaji, M. R., &amp; Heiphetz, L. (2010). Attitudes. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, &amp; G. Lindzey (Eds.),\u00a0<i>Handbook of social psychology<\/i>\u00a0(5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 353\u2013393). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &amp; Sons.\r\n\r\nBargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Raymond, P., &amp; Hymes, C. (1996). The automatic evaluation effect: Unconditional automatic attitude activation with a pronunciation task.\u00a0<i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32<\/i>(1), 104\u2013128.\r\n\r\nBeaman, A. L., Klentz, B., Diener, E., &amp; Svanum, S. (1979). Self-awareness and transgression in children: Two field studies.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37<\/i>(10), 1835\u20131846.\r\n\r\nBourgeois, M. J. (2002). Heritability of attitudes constrains dynamic social impact.\u00a0<i>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28<\/i>(8), 1063\u20131072.\r\n\r\nCunningham, W. A., &amp; Zelazo, P. D. (2007). Attitudes and evaluations: A social cognitive neuroscience perspective.\u00a0<i>Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11<\/i>(3), 97\u2013104;\r\n\r\nCunningham, W. A., Raye, C. L., &amp; Johnson, M. K. (2004). Implicit and explicit evaluation: fMRI correlates of valence, emotional intensity, and control in the processing of attitudes.\u00a0<i>Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16<\/i>(10), 1717\u20131729;\r\n\r\nDavidson, A. R., &amp; Jaccard, J. J. (1979). Variables that moderate the attitude-behavior relation: Results of a longitudinal survey.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37<\/i>(8), 1364\u20131376.\r\n\r\nDe Houwer, J., Thomas, S., &amp; Baeyens, F. (2001).\u00a0Association learning of likes and dislikes: A review of 25 years of research on human evaluative conditioning.\u00a0<em>Psychological Bulletin, 127<\/em>(6), 853-869.\r\n\r\nDowning, J. W., Judd, C. M., &amp; Brauer, M. (1992). Effects of repeated expressions on attitude extremity.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63<\/i>(1), 17\u201329; Tesser, A., Martin, L., &amp; Mendolia, M. (Eds.). (1995).\u00a0<i>The impact of thought on attitude extremity and attitude-behavior consistency<\/i>. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.\r\n\r\nDuckworth, K. L., Bargh, J. A., Garcia, M., &amp; Chaiken, S. (2002). The automatic evaluation of novel stimuli.\u00a0<i>Psychological Science, 13<\/i>(6), 513\u2013519.\r\n\r\nFazio, R. H. (1990). The MODE model as an integrative framework.\u00a0<i>Advances in Experimental Social Psychology<\/i>,\u00a0<i>23<\/i>, 75\u2013109;\r\n\r\nFazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determinants, consequences, and correlates of attitude accessibility. In\u00a0<i>Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 247\u2013282). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum;\r\n\r\nFazio, R. H., Powell, M. C., &amp; Herr, P. M. (1983). Toward a process model of the attitude-behavior relation: Accessing one\u2019s attitude upon mere observation of the attitude object.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44<\/i>(4), 723\u2013735.\r\n\r\nFerguson, M. J., Bargh, J. A., &amp; Nayak, D. A. (2005). After-affects: How automatic evaluations influence the interpretation of subsequent, unrelated stimuli.\u00a0<i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41<\/i>(2), 182\u2013191. doi: 10.1016\/j.jesp.2004.05.008\r\n\r\nFishbein, M., &amp; Ajzen, I. (1975).\u00a0<i>Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research<\/i>. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.\r\n\r\nGlasman, L. R., &amp; Albarrac\u00edn, D. (2006). Forming attitudes that predict future behavior: A meta-analysis of the attitude-behavior relation.\u00a0<i>Psychological Bulletin, 132<\/i>(5), 778\u2013822.\r\n\r\nHandy, T. C., Smilek, D., Geiger, L., Liu, C., &amp; Schooler, J. W. (2010). ERP evidence for rapid hedonic evaluation of logos.\u00a0<i>Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22<\/i>(1), 124\u2013138. doi: 10.1162\/jocn.2008.21180\r\n\r\nHargreaves, D. A., &amp; Tiggemann, M. (2003). Female \u201cthin ideal\u201d media images and boys\u2019 attitudes toward girls.\u00a0<i>Sex Roles, 49<\/i>(9\u201310), 539\u2013544.\r\n\r\nKraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of behavior: A meta-analysis of the empirical literature.\u00a0<i>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21<\/i>(1), 58\u201375.\r\n\r\nKrosnick, J. A., &amp; Petty, R. E. (1995). Attitude strength: An overview. In\u00a0<i>Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 1\u201324). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.\r\n\r\nLaPiere, R. T. (1936). Type rationalization of group antipathy.\u00a0<i>Social Forces, 15<\/i>, 232\u2013237.\r\n\r\nLevina, M., Waldo, C. R., &amp; Fitzgerald, L. F. (2000). We\u2019re here, we\u2019re queer, we\u2019re on TV: The effects of visual media on heterosexuals\u2019 attitudes toward gay men and lesbians.\u00a0<i>Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30<\/i>(4), 738\u2013758.\r\n\r\nMacDonald, T. K., Zanna, M. P., &amp; Fong, G. T. (1996). Why common sense goes out the window: Effects of alcohol on intentions to use condoms.\u00a0<i>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22<\/i>(8), 763\u2013775.\r\n\r\nMaio, G. R., &amp; Olson, J. M. (Eds.). (2000).\u00a0<i>Why we evaluate: Functions of attitudes<\/i>. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. doi:10.1080\/17437199.2010.521684\r\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\r\n<div class=\"section\">\r\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\r\n<div class=\"column\">\r\n\r\nMcEachan, R. R. C., Conner, M., Taylor, N. J., &amp; Lawton, R. J. (2011) Prospective prediction of health-related behaviours with the theory of planned behaviour: A\u00a0meta-analysis, <em>Health Psychology Review, 5<\/em>(2), 97-144.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\nMendes, W. B. (2008). Assessing autonomic nervous system reactivity. In E. Harmon-Jones &amp; J. Beer (Eds.),\u00a0<i>Methods in the neurobiology of social and personality psychology<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 118\u2013147). New York, NY: Guilford Press.\r\n\r\nOlson, J. M., Vernon, P. A., Harris, J. A., &amp; Jang, K. L. (2001). The heritability of attitudes: A study of twins.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80<\/i>(6), 845\u2013860.\r\n\r\nPoteat, V. P. (2007). Peer group socialization of homophobic attitudes and behavior during adolescence.\u00a0<i>Child Development, 78<\/i>(6), 1830\u20131842.\r\n\r\nStangor, C., Sullivan, L. A., &amp; Ford, T. E. (1991). Affective and cognitive determinants of prejudice.\u00a0<i>Social Cognition, 9<\/i>(4), 359\u2013380.\r\n\r\nTesser, A., Martin, L., &amp; Mendolia, M. (1995).\u00a0The impact of thought on attitude extremity and attitude-behavior consistency. \u00a0In R. E. Petty &amp; J. A. Krosnick (Eds.),\u00a0<em>Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences. Ohio State University series on attitudes and persuasion<\/em> (4th ed., pp. 73-92). Hillsdale, NJ:\u00a0Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.\r\n\r\nThompson, M. M., Zanna, M. P., &amp; Griffin, D. W. (1995). Let\u2019s not be indifferent about (attitudinal) ambivalence. In\u00a0<i>Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 361\u2013386). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.\r\n\r\nvan den Bos, W., McClure, S. M., Harris, L. T., Fiske, S. T., &amp; Cohen, J. D. (2007). Dissociating affective evaluation and social cognitive processes in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex.\u00a0<i>Cognitive, Affective &amp; Behavioral Neuroscience, 7<\/i>(4), 337\u2013346.\r\n\r\nWilson, T. D., &amp; Schooler, J. W. (1991). Thinking too much: Introspection can reduce the quality of preferences and decisions.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60<\/i>(2), 181\u2013192.\r\n\r\nWood, W. (2000). Attitude change: Persuasion and social influence.\u00a0<i>Annual Review of Psychology<\/i>, 539\u2013570.\r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h3>Learning Objectives<\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li>Define the concept of an attitude and explain why it is of such interest to social psychologists.<\/li>\n<li>Review the variables that determine attitude strength.<\/li>\n<li>Outline the factors that affect the strength of the attitude-behavior relationship.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<p>Although we might use the term in a different way in our everyday life (e.g., \u201cHey, he&#8217;s really got an <em>attitude<\/em>!\u201d), social psychologists reserve the term <strong>attitude<\/strong> to refer to our <em>relatively enduring evaluation of something, where the something is called the attitude object<\/em>. The attitude object might be a person, a product, or a social group (Albarrac\u00edn, Johnson, &amp; Zanna, 2005; Wood, 2000).\u00a0In this section, we will consider the nature and strength of attitudes and the conditions under which attitudes best predict our behaviors.<\/p>\n<h2>Attitudes Are Evaluations<\/h2>\n<p>When we say that attitudes are evaluations, we mean that they involve a preference for or against the attitude object, as commonly expressed in terms such\u00a0as <em>prefer<\/em>, <em>like<\/em>, <em>dislike<\/em>, <em>hate<\/em>, and <em>love<\/em>. When we express our attitudes\u2014for instance, when we say, \u201cI like\u00a0swimming,\u201d \u201cI hate snakes,\u201d or \u201cI\u00a0love my parents\u201d \u2014we are expressing the relationship (either positive or negative) between the self and an attitude object. Statements such as these make it clear that attitudes are an important part of the self-concept.<\/p>\n<p>Every human being holds thousands of attitudes, including those about family and friends, political figures, abortion rights, terrorism, preferences for music, and much more. Each of our attitudes has its own unique characteristics, and no two attitudes come to us or influence us in quite the same way. Research has found that some of our attitudes are inherited, at least in part, via genetic transmission from our parents (Olson, Vernon, Harris, &amp; Jang, 2001).\u00a0Other attitudes are learned mostly through direct and indirect experiences with the attitude objects (De Houwer, Thomas, &amp; Baeyens, 2001).\u00a0We may like to ride roller coasters in part because our genetic code has given us a thrill-loving personality and in part because we\u2019ve had some really great times on roller coasters in the past. Still other attitudes are learned via the media (Hargreaves &amp; Tiggemann, 2003; Levina, Waldo, &amp; Fitzgerald, 2000)\u00a0or through our interactions with friends (Poteat, 2007).\u00a0Some of our attitudes are shared by others (most of us like sugar, fear snakes, and are disgusted by cockroaches), whereas other attitudes\u2014such as our preferences for different styles of music or art\u2014are more individualized.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#table4-1\">Table 4.1, &#8220;Heritability of Some Attitudes,&#8221;<\/a> shows some of the attitudes that have been found to be the most highly heritable (i.e., most strongly determined by genetic variation among people). These attitudes form earlier and are stronger and more resistant to change than others (Bourgeois, 2002),\u00a0although it is not yet known why some attitudes are more genetically determined than are others.<\/p>\n<p><a id=\"table4-1\"><\/a>Table 4.1 Heritability of Some Attitudes<\/p>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Attitude<\/th>\n<th>Heritability<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Abortion on demand<\/td>\n<td>0.54<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Roller coaster rides<\/td>\n<td>0.52<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Death penalty for murder<\/td>\n<td>0.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Organized religion<\/td>\n<td>0.45<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Doing athletic activities<\/td>\n<td>0.44<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Voluntary euthanasia<\/td>\n<td>0.44<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Capitalism<\/td>\n<td>0.39<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Playing chess<\/td>\n<td>0.38<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Reading books<\/td>\n<td>0.37<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Exercising<\/td>\n<td>0.36<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Education<\/td>\n<td>0.32<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Big parties<\/td>\n<td>0.32<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Smoking<\/td>\n<td>0.31<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Being the center of attention<\/td>\n<td>0.28<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Getting along well with other people<\/td>\n<td>0.28<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Wearing clothes that draw attention<\/td>\n<td>0.24<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Sweets<\/td>\n<td>0.22<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Public speaking<\/td>\n<td>0.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Castration as punishment for sex crimes<\/td>\n<td>0.17<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Loud music<\/td>\n<td>0.11<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Looking my best at all times<\/td>\n<td>0.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Doing crossword puzzles<\/td>\n<td>0.02<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Separate roles for men and women<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Making racial discrimination illegal<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Playing organized sports<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Easy access to birth control<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Being the leader of groups<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Being assertive<\/td>\n<td>0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<th colspan=\"2\">Ranked from most heritable to least heritable. Data are from Olson, Vernon, Harris, and Jang (2001). Olson, J. M., Vernon, P. A., Harris, J. A., Harris, J.A., &amp; Jang, K. L. (2001). The heritability of attitudes: A study of twins. <em>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80<\/em>(6), 845\u2013860.<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>Our attitudes are made up of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components. Consider an environmentalist&#8217;s\u00a0attitude toward recycling, which is probably very positive:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>In terms of affect:\u00a0They\u00a0feel happy when they recycle.<\/em><\/li>\n<li><em>In terms of\u00a0behavior:\u00a0They<\/em><em>\u00a0regularly\u00a0recycle their bottles and cans.<\/em><\/li>\n<li><em>In terms of cognition: They believe\u00a0recycling is the responsible thing to do.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Although most attitudes are determined by affect, behavior, and cognition, there is nevertheless variability in this regard across people and across attitudes. Some attitudes are more likely to be based on feelings, some are more likely to be based on behaviors, and some are more likely to be based on beliefs. For example, your\u00a0attitude toward chocolate ice cream is probably determined in large part by affect\u2014although you\u00a0can describe its taste, mostly you\u00a0may just like it. Your\u00a0attitude toward\u00a0your toothbrush, on the other hand, is probably\u00a0more cognitive (you\u00a0understand the importance of its\u00a0function). Still other of your\u00a0attitudes may be\u00a0based more on behavior. For example, your attitude toward note-taking during lectures probably depends, at least in part, on whether or not you regularly take notes.<\/p>\n<p>Different people may hold attitudes toward the same attitude object for different reasons. For example, some people vote for politicians\u00a0because they like their\u00a0policies, whereas others vote for (or against) politicians\u00a0because they just like (or dislike) their public persona. Although you might think that cognition would be more important in this regard, political scientists have shown that many voting decisions are made primarily on the basis of affect. Indeed, it is fair to say that the affective component of attitudes is generally the strongest and most important (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, &amp; Fiske, 1981; Stangor, Sullivan, &amp; Ford, 1991).<\/p>\n<p>Human beings hold attitudes because they are useful. Particularly, our attitudes enable us to determine, often very quickly and effortlessly, which behaviors to engage in, which people to approach or avoid, and even which products to buy (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, &amp; Chaiken, 2002; Maio &amp; Olson, 2000).\u00a0You can imagine that making quick decisions about what to avoid or approach\u00a0has had substantial value in our evolutionary experience. For example:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Snake = bad \u27f6 run away<\/li>\n<li>Blueberries = good \u27f6 eat<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Because attitudes are evaluations, they can be assessed using any of the normal measuring techniques used by social psychologists (Banaji &amp; Heiphetz, 2010).\u00a0Attitudes are frequently assessed using self-report measures, but they can also be assessed more indirectly using measures of arousal and facial expressions (Mendes, 2008)\u00a0as well as implicit measures of cognition, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Attitudes can also be seen in the brain by using neuroimaging techniques. This research has found that our attitudes, like most of our social knowledge, are stored primarily in the prefrontal cortex but that the amygdala is important in emotional attitudes, particularly those associated with fear (Cunningham, Raye, &amp; Johnson, 2004; Cunningham &amp; Zelazo, 2007; van den Bos, McClure, Harris, Fiske, &amp; Cohen, 2007).\u00a0Attitudes can be activated extremely quickly\u2014often within one-fifth of a second after we see an attitude object (Handy, Smilek, Geiger, Liu, &amp; Schooler, 2010).<\/p>\n<h2>Some Attitudes Are Stronger Than Others<\/h2>\n<p>Some attitudes are more important than others because they are more useful to us and thus have more impact on our daily lives. <em>The importance of an attitude, as assessed by how quickly it comes to mind<\/em>, is known as <strong>attitude strength<\/strong> (Fazio, 1990; Fazio, 1995; Krosnick &amp; Petty, 1995).\u00a0Some of our attitudes are strong attitudes, in the sense that we find them important, hold them with confidence, do not change them very much, and use them frequently to guide our actions. These strong attitudes may guide our actions completely out of our awareness (Ferguson, Bargh, &amp; Nayak, 2005).<\/p>\n<p>Other attitudes are weaker and have little influence on our actions. For instance, John Bargh and his colleagues (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, &amp; Hymes, 1996)\u00a0found that people could express attitudes toward nonsense words such as <em>juvalamu<\/em> (which people liked) and <em>chakaka<\/em> (which they did not like). The researchers also found that these attitudes were very weak.<\/p>\n<p>Strong attitudes are more cognitively accessible\u2014they come to mind quickly, regularly, and easily. We can easily measure attitude strength by assessing how quickly our attitudes are activated when we are exposed to the attitude object. If we can state our attitude quickly, without much thought, then it is a strong one. If we are unsure about our attitude and need to think about it for a while before stating our opinion, the attitude is weak.<\/p>\n<p>Attitudes become stronger when we have direct positive or negative experiences with the attitude object, and particularly if those experiences have been in strong positive or negative contexts. Russell Fazio and his colleagues (Fazio, Powell, &amp; Herr, 1983)\u00a0had people either work on some puzzles or watch other people work on the same puzzles. Although the people who watched ended up either liking or disliking the puzzles as much as the people who actually worked on them, Fazio found that attitudes, as assessed by reaction time measures, were stronger (in the sense of being expressed quickly) for the people who had directly experienced the puzzles.<\/p>\n<p>Because attitude strength is determined by cognitive accessibility, it is possible to make attitudes stronger by increasing the accessibility of the attitude. This can be done directly by having people think about, express, or discuss their attitudes with others. After people think about their attitudes, talk about them, or just say them out loud, the attitudes they have expressed become stronger (Downing, Judd, &amp; Brauer, 1992; Tesser, Martin, &amp; Mendolia, 1995).\u00a0Because attitudes are linked to the self-concept, they also become stronger when they are activated along with the self-concept. When we are looking into a mirror or sitting in front of a TV camera, our attitudes are activated and we are then more likely to act on them (Beaman, Klentz, Diener, &amp; Svanum, 1979).<\/p>\n<p>Attitudes are also stronger when the ABCs of affect, behavior, and cognition all align. As an example, many people\u2019s attitude toward their own nation is universally positive. They have strong positive feelings about their country, many positive thoughts about it, and tend to engage in behaviors that support it. Other attitudes are less strong because the affective, cognitive, and behavioral components are each somewhat different (Thompson, Zanna, &amp; Griffin, 1995). Your\u00a0cognitions toward physical exercise may be positive\u2014you believe that regular physical activity\u00a0is good for your health.\u00a0On the other hand, your affect may be negative\u2014you may resist exercising because you prefer to engage in tasks that provide more immediate rewards. Consequently,\u00a0you may not exercise as often as you believe\u00a0you ought to. These inconsistencies among the components of your\u00a0attitude make it less strong than it would be if all the components lined up together.<\/p>\n<h2>When Do Our Attitudes Guide Our Behavior?<\/h2>\n<p>Social psychologists (as well as advertisers, marketers, and politicians) are particularly interested in the behavioral aspect of attitudes. Because it is normal that the ABCs of our attitudes are at least somewhat consistent, our behavior tends to follow from our affect and cognition. If I determine that you have more positive cognitions about and more positive affect toward waffles\u00a0than French toast, then I will naturally predict (and probably be correct when I do so) that you\u2019ll be more likely to order waffles than French toast when you eat breakfast at a restaurant. Furthermore, if I can do something to make your thoughts or feelings toward French toast\u00a0more positive, then your likelihood of ordering it\u00a0for breakfast\u00a0will also increase.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The principle of attitude consistency<\/strong> (that <em>for any given attitude object, the ABCs of affect, behavior, and cognition are normally in line with each other<\/em>) thus predicts that our attitudes (for instance, as measured via a self-report measure) are likely to <em>guide behavior<\/em>. Supporting this idea, meta-analyses have found that there is a significant and substantial positive correlation among the different components of attitudes, and that attitudes expressed on self-report measures do predict behavior (Glasman &amp; Albarrac\u00edn, 2006).<\/p>\n<p>However,\u00a0our attitudes are not the only factor that influence our decision to act.\u00a0The <em>theory of planned behavior<\/em>, developed by Martin Fishbein and Izek Ajzen (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein &amp; Ajzen, 1975), outlines three key variables that\u00a0affect the attitude-behavior relationship: (a) the\u00a0attitude toward the behaviour (the stronger the better), (b) subjective norms (the support of those we value), and (c) perceived behavioral control (the extent to which we believe\u00a0we can actually perform the behavior). These three factors jointly predict our intention to perform the\u00a0behavior, which in turn predicts our actual behavior (<a href=\"#figure4-2\">Figure 4.2, &#8220;Theory of Planned Behavior&#8221;<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>To illustrate, imagine\u00a0for a moment that your friend Sharina is trying to decide whether to recycle her used laptop batteries or just throw them away. We know that her attitude toward recycling is positive\u2014she thinks she should do it\u2014but we also know that recycling takes work. It\u2019s much easier to just throw the batteries away. But if Sharina feels strongly about the importance of recycling, if her family and friends are also in favor of recycling, and if she has easy access to a battery recycling facility, then she will develop a strong intention to perform the behavior and likely follow through on it.<\/p>\n<p>Since it was first proposed, the\u00a0theory of planned behavior\u00a0has grown to become an extremely influential model for\u00a0predicting human social behavior. However, although it has been used to study virtually every kind of planned behavior, a\u00a0recent meta-analysis of 206 articles found that this model was especially effective at predicting physical activity and dietary behaviors\u00a0(McEachan, Conner, Taylor, &amp; Lawton, 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_1648\" style=\"width: 410px\" class=\"wp-caption alignnone\"><a href=\"http:\/\/opentextbc.ca\/socialpsychology\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/21\/2014\/07\/graph.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-1648\" class=\"wp-image-1648\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/457\/2016\/08\/09165336\/graph.png\" alt=\"Figure 4.2 Theory\" width=\"400\" height=\"175\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-1648\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Figure 4.2 Theory of Planned Behavior, adapted by Hilda Aggregani under CC BY.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>More generally, research has also discovered\u00a0that attitudes\u00a0predict behaviors well only under certain conditions and for some people. These include:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>When the attitude and the behavior both occur in similar social situations<\/li>\n<li>When the same components of the attitude (either affect or cognition) are accessible when the attitude is assessed and when the behavior is performed<\/li>\n<li>When the attitudes are measured at a specific, rather than a general, level<\/li>\n<li>For low self-monitors (rather than for high self-monitors)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The extent of the match between the social situations in which the attitudes are expressed and the behaviors are engaged in is important;\u00a0there is a greater attitude-behavior correlation when the social situations match. Imagine for a minute the case of Magritte, a 16-year-old high school student. Magritte tells her parents that she hates the idea of smoking cigarettes. Magritte\u2019s negative attitude toward smoking seems to be a strong one because she\u2019s thought a lot about it\u2014she believes that cigarettes are dirty, expensive, and unhealthy. But how sure are you that Magritte\u2019s attitude will predict her behavior? Would you be willing to bet that she\u2019d never try smoking when she\u2019s out with her friends?<\/p>\n<p>You can see that the problem here is that Magritte\u2019s attitude is being expressed in one social situation (when she is with her parents), whereas the behavior (trying a cigarette) is going to occur in a very different social situation (when she is out with her friends). The relevant social norms are of course much different in the two situations. Magritte\u2019s friends might be able to convince her to try smoking, despite her initial negative attitude, when they entice her with peer pressure. Behaviors are more likely to be consistent with attitudes when the social situation in which the behavior occurs is similar to the situation in which the attitude is expressed (Ajzen, 1991; LaPiere, 1936).<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h3>Research Focus<\/h3>\n<p>Attitude-Behavior Consistency<\/p>\n<p>Another variable that has an important influence on attitude-behavior consistency is the current cognitive accessibility of the underlying affective and cognitive components of the attitude. For example, if we assess the attitude in a situation in which people are thinking primarily about the attitude object in cognitive terms, and yet the behavior is performed in a situation in which the affective components of the attitude are more accessible, then the attitude-behavior relationship will be weak. Wilson and Schooler (1991)\u00a0showed a similar type of effect by first choosing attitudes that they expected would be primarily determined by affect\u2014attitudes toward five different types of strawberry jam. They asked a sample of college students to taste each of the jams. While they were tasting, one-half of the participants were instructed to think about the cognitive aspects of their attitudes to these jams\u2014that is, to focus on the reasons they held their attitudes\u2014whereas the other half of the participants were not given these instructions. Then all the students completed measures of their attitudes toward each of the jams.<\/p>\n<p>Wilson and his colleagues then assessed the extent to which the attitudes expressed by the students correlated with taste ratings of the five jams as indicated by experts at <em>Consumer Reports<\/em>. They found that the attitudes expressed by the students correlated significantly higher with the expert ratings for the participants who had <em>not<\/em> listed their cognitions first. Wilson and his colleagues argued that this occurred because our liking of jams is primarily affectively determined\u2014we either like them or we don\u2019t. And the students who simply rated the jams used their feelings to make their judgments. On the other hand, the students who were asked to list their thoughts about the jams had some extra information to use in making their judgments, but it was information that was not actually useful. Therefore, when these students used their thoughts about the jam to make the judgments, their judgments were less valid.<\/p>\n<p>MacDonald, Zanna, and Fong (1996)\u00a0showed male college students a video of two other college students, Mike and Rebecca, who were out on a date.\u00a0According to random assignment to conditions, half of the men were shown the video while sober and the other half viewed the video after they had had several alcoholic drinks. In the video, Mike and Rebecca go to the campus bar and drink and dance. They then go to Rebecca\u2019s room, where they end up kissing passionately. Mike says that he doesn\u2019t have any condoms, but Rebecca says that she is on the pill.<\/p>\n<p>At this point the film clip ends, and the male participants are asked about their likely behaviors if they had been Mike. Although all men indicated that having unprotected sex in this situation was foolish and irresponsible, the men who had been drinking alcohol were more likely to indicate that they would engage in sexual intercourse with Rebecca even without a condom. One interpretation of this study is that sexual behavior is determined by both cognitive factors (e.g., \u201cI know that it is important to practice safe sex and so I should use a condom\u201d) and affective factors (e.g., \u201cSex is enjoyable, I don\u2019t want to wait\u201d). When the students were intoxicated at the time the behavior was to be performed, it seems likely the affective component of the attitude was a more important determinant of behavior than was the cognitive component.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>One other type of match that has an important influence on the attitude-behavior relationship concerns how we measure the attitude and behavior. Attitudes predict behavior better when the attitude is measured at a level that is similar to the behavior to be predicted. Normally, the behavior is specific, so it is better to measure the attitude at a specific level too. For instance, if we measure cognitions at a very general level (e.g., \u201cDo you think it is important to use condoms?\u201d; \u201cAre you a religious person?\u201d) we will not be as successful at predicting actual behaviors as we will be if we ask the question more specifically, at the level of behavior we are interested in predicting (e.g., \u201cDo you think you will use a condom the next time you have sex?\u201d; \u201cHow frequently do you expect to attend church in the next month?\u201d). In general, more specific questions are better predictors of specific behaviors, and thus if we wish to accurately predict behaviors, we should remember to attempt to measure <em>specific<\/em> attitudes. One example of this principle is shown in <a href=\"#figure4-3\">Figure 4.3, &#8220;Predicting Behavior from Specific and Nonspecific Attitude Measures.&#8221;<\/a> Davidson and Jaccard (1979)\u00a0found that they were much better able to predict whether women actually used birth control when they assessed the attitude at a more specific level.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_2686\" style=\"width: 410px\" class=\"wp-caption alignnone\"><a href=\"http:\/\/opentextbc.ca\/socialpsychology\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/21\/2014\/09\/Figure-4-3.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-2686\" class=\"wp-image-2686\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/457\/2016\/08\/09165339\/Figure-4-3.png\" alt=\"Behaviour Prediction\" width=\"400\" height=\"183\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-2686\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Figure 4.3 Predicting Behavior from Specific and Nonspecific Attitude Measures. Attitudes that are measured using more specific questions are more highly correlated with behavior than are attitudes measured using less specific questions. Data are from Davidson and Jaccard (1979).Davidson, A. R., &amp; Jaccard, J. J. (1979). Variables that moderate the attitude-behavior relation: Results of a longitudinal survey. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(8), 1364\u20131376.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Attitudes also predict behavior better for some people than for others. As we saw in Chapter 3, self-monitoring refers to individual differences in the tendency to attend to social cues and to adjust one\u2019s behavior to one\u2019s social environment. To return to our example of Magritte, you might wonder whether she is the type of person who is likely to be persuaded by peer pressure because she is particularly concerned with being liked by others. If she is, then she\u2019s probably more likely to want to fit in with whatever her friends are doing, and she might try a cigarette if her friends offer her one. On the other hand, if Magritte is not particularly concerned about following the social norms of her friends, then she\u2019ll more likely be able to resist the persuasion. <em>High self-monitors<\/em> are those who tend to attempt to blend into the social situation in order to be liked; <em>low self-monitors<\/em> are those who are less likely to do so. You can see that, because they allow the social situation to influence their behaviors, the relationship between attitudes and behavior will be weaker for high self-monitors than it is for low self-monitors (Kraus, 1995).<\/p>\n<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-success\">\n<h3>Key Takeaways<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>The term <em>attitude<\/em> refers to our relatively enduring evaluation of an attitude object.<\/li>\n<li>Our attitudes are inherited and also learned through direct and indirect experiences with the attitude objects.<\/li>\n<li>Some attitudes are more likely to be based on beliefs, some are more likely to be based on feelings, and some are more likely to be based on behaviors.<\/li>\n<li>Strong attitudes are important in the sense that we hold them with confidence, we do not change them very much, and we use them frequently to guide our actions.<\/li>\n<li>Although there is a general consistency between attitudes and behavior, the relationship is stronger in some situations than in others, for some measurements than for others, and for some people than for others.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\n<h3>Exercises and Critical Thinking<\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li>Describe an example of a behavior that you engaged in that might be explained by the theory of planned behavior. Include each of the components of the theory in your analysis.<\/li>\n<li>Consider a time when you acted on your own attitudes and a time when you did not act on your own attitudes. What factors do you think determined the difference?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h3>References<\/h3>\n<p>Abelson, R. P., Kinder, D. R., Peters, M. D., &amp; Fiske, S. T. (1981). Affective and semantic components in political person perception.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42<\/i>, 619\u2013630.<\/p>\n<p>Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior.\u00a0<i>Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50<\/i>(2), 179\u2013211.<\/p>\n<p>Albarrac\u00edn, D., Johnson, B. T., &amp; Zanna, M. P. (Eds.). (2005).\u00a0<i>The handbook of attitudes<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 223\u2013271). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.<\/p>\n<p>Banaji, M. R., &amp; Heiphetz, L. (2010). Attitudes. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, &amp; G. Lindzey (Eds.),\u00a0<i>Handbook of social psychology<\/i>\u00a0(5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 353\u2013393). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &amp; Sons.<\/p>\n<p>Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., Raymond, P., &amp; Hymes, C. (1996). The automatic evaluation effect: Unconditional automatic attitude activation with a pronunciation task.\u00a0<i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32<\/i>(1), 104\u2013128.<\/p>\n<p>Beaman, A. L., Klentz, B., Diener, E., &amp; Svanum, S. (1979). Self-awareness and transgression in children: Two field studies.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37<\/i>(10), 1835\u20131846.<\/p>\n<p>Bourgeois, M. J. (2002). Heritability of attitudes constrains dynamic social impact.\u00a0<i>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28<\/i>(8), 1063\u20131072.<\/p>\n<p>Cunningham, W. A., &amp; Zelazo, P. D. (2007). Attitudes and evaluations: A social cognitive neuroscience perspective.\u00a0<i>Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11<\/i>(3), 97\u2013104;<\/p>\n<p>Cunningham, W. A., Raye, C. L., &amp; Johnson, M. K. (2004). Implicit and explicit evaluation: fMRI correlates of valence, emotional intensity, and control in the processing of attitudes.\u00a0<i>Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16<\/i>(10), 1717\u20131729;<\/p>\n<p>Davidson, A. R., &amp; Jaccard, J. J. (1979). Variables that moderate the attitude-behavior relation: Results of a longitudinal survey.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37<\/i>(8), 1364\u20131376.<\/p>\n<p>De Houwer, J., Thomas, S., &amp; Baeyens, F. (2001).\u00a0Association learning of likes and dislikes: A review of 25 years of research on human evaluative conditioning.\u00a0<em>Psychological Bulletin, 127<\/em>(6), 853-869.<\/p>\n<p>Downing, J. W., Judd, C. M., &amp; Brauer, M. (1992). Effects of repeated expressions on attitude extremity.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63<\/i>(1), 17\u201329; Tesser, A., Martin, L., &amp; Mendolia, M. (Eds.). (1995).\u00a0<i>The impact of thought on attitude extremity and attitude-behavior consistency<\/i>. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.<\/p>\n<p>Duckworth, K. L., Bargh, J. A., Garcia, M., &amp; Chaiken, S. (2002). The automatic evaluation of novel stimuli.\u00a0<i>Psychological Science, 13<\/i>(6), 513\u2013519.<\/p>\n<p>Fazio, R. H. (1990). The MODE model as an integrative framework.\u00a0<i>Advances in Experimental Social Psychology<\/i>,\u00a0<i>23<\/i>, 75\u2013109;<\/p>\n<p>Fazio, R. H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: Determinants, consequences, and correlates of attitude accessibility. In\u00a0<i>Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 247\u2013282). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum;<\/p>\n<p>Fazio, R. H., Powell, M. C., &amp; Herr, P. M. (1983). Toward a process model of the attitude-behavior relation: Accessing one\u2019s attitude upon mere observation of the attitude object.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44<\/i>(4), 723\u2013735.<\/p>\n<p>Ferguson, M. J., Bargh, J. A., &amp; Nayak, D. A. (2005). After-affects: How automatic evaluations influence the interpretation of subsequent, unrelated stimuli.\u00a0<i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41<\/i>(2), 182\u2013191. doi: 10.1016\/j.jesp.2004.05.008<\/p>\n<p>Fishbein, M., &amp; Ajzen, I. (1975).\u00a0<i>Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research<\/i>. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.<\/p>\n<p>Glasman, L. R., &amp; Albarrac\u00edn, D. (2006). Forming attitudes that predict future behavior: A meta-analysis of the attitude-behavior relation.\u00a0<i>Psychological Bulletin, 132<\/i>(5), 778\u2013822.<\/p>\n<p>Handy, T. C., Smilek, D., Geiger, L., Liu, C., &amp; Schooler, J. W. (2010). ERP evidence for rapid hedonic evaluation of logos.\u00a0<i>Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22<\/i>(1), 124\u2013138. doi: 10.1162\/jocn.2008.21180<\/p>\n<p>Hargreaves, D. A., &amp; Tiggemann, M. (2003). Female \u201cthin ideal\u201d media images and boys\u2019 attitudes toward girls.\u00a0<i>Sex Roles, 49<\/i>(9\u201310), 539\u2013544.<\/p>\n<p>Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of behavior: A meta-analysis of the empirical literature.\u00a0<i>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21<\/i>(1), 58\u201375.<\/p>\n<p>Krosnick, J. A., &amp; Petty, R. E. (1995). Attitude strength: An overview. In\u00a0<i>Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 1\u201324). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.<\/p>\n<p>LaPiere, R. T. (1936). Type rationalization of group antipathy.\u00a0<i>Social Forces, 15<\/i>, 232\u2013237.<\/p>\n<p>Levina, M., Waldo, C. R., &amp; Fitzgerald, L. F. (2000). We\u2019re here, we\u2019re queer, we\u2019re on TV: The effects of visual media on heterosexuals\u2019 attitudes toward gay men and lesbians.\u00a0<i>Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30<\/i>(4), 738\u2013758.<\/p>\n<p>MacDonald, T. K., Zanna, M. P., &amp; Fong, G. T. (1996). Why common sense goes out the window: Effects of alcohol on intentions to use condoms.\u00a0<i>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22<\/i>(8), 763\u2013775.<\/p>\n<p>Maio, G. R., &amp; Olson, J. M. (Eds.). (2000).\u00a0<i>Why we evaluate: Functions of attitudes<\/i>. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. doi:10.1080\/17437199.2010.521684<\/p>\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\n<div class=\"section\">\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\n<div class=\"column\">\n<p>McEachan, R. R. C., Conner, M., Taylor, N. J., &amp; Lawton, R. J. (2011) Prospective prediction of health-related behaviours with the theory of planned behaviour: A\u00a0meta-analysis, <em>Health Psychology Review, 5<\/em>(2), 97-144.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p>Mendes, W. B. (2008). Assessing autonomic nervous system reactivity. In E. Harmon-Jones &amp; J. Beer (Eds.),\u00a0<i>Methods in the neurobiology of social and personality psychology<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 118\u2013147). New York, NY: Guilford Press.<\/p>\n<p>Olson, J. M., Vernon, P. A., Harris, J. A., &amp; Jang, K. L. (2001). The heritability of attitudes: A study of twins.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80<\/i>(6), 845\u2013860.<\/p>\n<p>Poteat, V. P. (2007). Peer group socialization of homophobic attitudes and behavior during adolescence.\u00a0<i>Child Development, 78<\/i>(6), 1830\u20131842.<\/p>\n<p>Stangor, C., Sullivan, L. A., &amp; Ford, T. E. (1991). Affective and cognitive determinants of prejudice.\u00a0<i>Social Cognition, 9<\/i>(4), 359\u2013380.<\/p>\n<p>Tesser, A., Martin, L., &amp; Mendolia, M. (1995).\u00a0The impact of thought on attitude extremity and attitude-behavior consistency. \u00a0In R. E. Petty &amp; J. A. Krosnick (Eds.),\u00a0<em>Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences. Ohio State University series on attitudes and persuasion<\/em> (4th ed., pp. 73-92). Hillsdale, NJ:\u00a0Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.<\/p>\n<p>Thompson, M. M., Zanna, M. P., &amp; Griffin, D. W. (1995). Let\u2019s not be indifferent about (attitudinal) ambivalence. In\u00a0<i>Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences<\/i>\u00a0(pp. 361\u2013386). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.<\/p>\n<p>van den Bos, W., McClure, S. M., Harris, L. T., Fiske, S. T., &amp; Cohen, J. D. (2007). Dissociating affective evaluation and social cognitive processes in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex.\u00a0<i>Cognitive, Affective &amp; Behavioral Neuroscience, 7<\/i>(4), 337\u2013346.<\/p>\n<p>Wilson, T. D., &amp; Schooler, J. W. (1991). Thinking too much: Introspection can reduce the quality of preferences and decisions.\u00a0<i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60<\/i>(2), 181\u2013192.<\/p>\n<p>Wood, W. (2000). Attitude change: Persuasion and social influence.\u00a0<i>Annual Review of Psychology<\/i>, 539\u2013570.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t <section class=\"citations-section\" role=\"contentinfo\">\n\t\t\t <h3>Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t <div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <div id=\"citation-list-87\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t <div class=\"licensing\"><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">CC licensed content, Shared previously<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>Principles of Social Psychology - 1st International Edition. <strong>Authored by<\/strong>: Rajiv Jhangiani, Hammond Tarry, and Charles Stangor. <strong>Provided by<\/strong>: BC Campus OpenEd. <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/open.bccampus.ca\/find-open-textbooks\/?uuid=66c0cf64-c485-442c-8183-de75151f13f5&#038;contributor=&#038;keyword=&#038;subject=\">https:\/\/open.bccampus.ca\/find-open-textbooks\/?uuid=66c0cf64-c485-442c-8183-de75151f13f5&#038;contributor=&#038;keyword=&#038;subject=<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/4.0\/\">CC BY-NC-SA: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike<\/a><\/em><\/li><\/ul><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t <\/section>","protected":false},"author":26,"menu_order":2,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[{\"type\":\"cc\",\"description\":\"Principles of Social Psychology - 1st International Edition\",\"author\":\"Rajiv Jhangiani, Hammond Tarry, and Charles Stangor\",\"organization\":\"BC Campus OpenEd\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/open.bccampus.ca\/find-open-textbooks\/?uuid=66c0cf64-c485-442c-8183-de75151f13f5&contributor=&keyword=&subject=\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by-nc-sa\",\"license_terms\":\"\"}]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-87","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":84,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/87","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/26"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/87\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":347,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/87\/revisions\/347"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/84"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/87\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=87"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=87"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=87"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-social-psychology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=87"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}