{"id":245,"date":"2021-03-02T13:39:31","date_gmt":"2021-03-02T13:39:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-hvcc-healthpsychology\/?post_type=chapter&p=245"},"modified":"2021-03-02T13:43:04","modified_gmt":"2021-03-02T13:43:04","slug":"personality-and-coping","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-hvcc-healthpsychology\/chapter\/personality-and-coping\/","title":{"raw":"Personality and coping","rendered":"Personality and coping"},"content":{"raw":"

PERSONALITY<\/h2>\r\nThe psychology of personality is a very broad topic, to which people have taken diverse theoretical approaches (see recent\u00a0Annual Review of Psychology<\/i>\u00a0articles by\u00a0Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Cervone 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Funder 2001<\/a>,\u00a0McAdams & Olson 2010<\/a>,\u00a0Mischel 2004<\/a>,\u00a0Ryan & Deci 2001<\/a>). Personality is easy to observe but hard to pin down. To paraphrase\u00a0Allport (1961)<\/a>, personality is the dynamic organization within the person of the psychological and physical systems that underlie that person's patterns of actions, thoughts, and feelings. What dynamics are assumed, however, and what systems are proposed to underlie those dynamics vary greatly across theoretical viewpoints.\r\n

Human Nature and Individual Differences<\/h3>\r\nPersonality psychology is partly about what makes everyone the same and partly about what makes people differ from each other. That is, personality theories are partly statements about human nature: assertions that people are basically (for example) biological creatures, social creatures, self-protective, self-actualizing, or learning creatures. To understand the person, one has to adopt some view of the essence of human nature.\r\n\r\nPersonality also concerns individual differences. Individual differences can be found on any dimension imaginable, but the so-called five-factor model (Digman 1990<\/a>,\u00a0Goldberg 1981<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & Costa 2003<\/a>) has been widely adopted as a consensual framework. The five factors are most commonly labeled extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience. In this view, these broad dimensions are key determinants of behavior, and the aggregation of information resulting from a person's placement on these dimensions gives a reasonably good snapshot of what that person is like. Each broad trait is composed of multiple facets, which provide a more nuanced picture.\r\n\r\nBroad adoption of the five-factor model does not mean unanimity about it. There are staunch advocates of other frameworks, including two three-factor models (Eysenck 1975<\/a>,\u00a01986<\/a>;\u00a0Tellegen 1985<\/a>), an alternative five-factor model (Zuckerman et al. 1993<\/a>), and a six-factor model (Ashton et al. 2004<\/a>). Indeed, some important traits do not fit smoothly into the five-factor framework. For example, optimism has overtones of both extraversion and neuroticism, but does not quite fit either construct (Marshall et al. 1992<\/a>).\r\n\r\nBoth human nature and individual differences are important to the topic of this review. In thinking about the nature of coping, it is helpful to have some view of how best to construe core human functions. Whatever view of human nature is adopted channels interpretation of people's reactions to stress. It will also be useful to have a sense of some of the ways in which people differ and expectations of how those differences may play a role in coping. These issues are addressed in greater detail in the next two sections.\r\n

Functional Organization: Two Views of Human Nature<\/h3>\r\nOf the great many viewpoints that have been taken on human nature, two appear particularly relevant to stress and coping.\r\n

Biological models.<\/h3>\r\nAn increasingly influential perspective, not just in personality but in all of psychology, treats humans as biological entities. From this view, it is desirable to develop a clear understanding of the basic properties of animal self-regulation and of how those properties are manifested in human behavior. We focus here on three properties: the tendency to approach desirable objects and situations (e.g., food), the tendency to avoid dangerous objects and situations (e.g., predators), and the capacity to regulate the approach and avoidance tendencies.\r\n\r\nBiological models assuming approach and avoidance temperaments have acquired a good deal of influence over the past decade (see\u00a0Davidson 1998<\/a>,\u00a0Depue & Collins 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi & Shiner 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Elliott & Thrash 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Fowles 1993<\/a>,\u00a0Gray 1994<\/a>,\u00a0Rothbart & Hwang 2005<\/a>). They hold that approach and avoidance systems are supported partly by distinct brain areas, and that the sensitivity of each system (which varies among persons) influences behavior in response to environmental reward and threat cues.\r\n\r\nDevelopmental theorists have posited another temperament, generally termed\u00a0effortful control<\/a>\u00a0(Kochanska & Knaack 2003<\/a>;\u00a0Nigg 2000<\/a>,\u00a02003<\/a>,\u00a02006<\/a>;\u00a0Rothbart et al. 2004<\/a>;\u00a0Rothbart & Rueda 2005<\/a>), slower to develop (Casey et al. 2008<\/a>) and superordinate to approach and avoidance temperaments. Effortful control can override impulses stemming from the approach and avoidance systems. It acts as a supervisory system, provided sufficient mental resources are available. This confers many advantages, including constraining emotions and permitting the organism to plan for the future and take situational complexities into account in behavioral decisions. Effortful control is a construct from developmental psychology, but its features closely resemble those of adult self-control: the ability to override impulses to act and the ability to make oneself undertake or persist in difficult, uninteresting, or unpleasant tasks.\r\n\r\nApproach and avoidance systems, together with a supervisory system able to reorder the priorities they pursue, form the core of a biological model of human nature. They also form the core of a conceptually distinct but complementary view of human nature grounded in the goal construct (Austin & Vancouver 1996<\/a>,\u00a0Carver & Scheier 1998<\/a>,\u00a0Elliott 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Higgins 1996<\/a>).\r\n

Goal-based models.<\/h3>\r\nSome views of behavior emphasize its goal-directed quality. From this perspective, knowing a person means knowing the person's goals and values and the relations among them. In goal-based theories, it is important to distinguish between motivational processes aimed at moving toward goals and those aimed at staying away from threats (Carver & Scheier 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Elliott 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Higgins 1996<\/a>). A desired goal has a positive incentive value that pulls behavior to it. Looming harm or pain has a negative incentive value that pushes behavior away from it. Sometimes only approach or avoidance is engaged. Sometimes they conflict, as when moving toward a goal also increases possibility of harm. Sometimes they work together, as when attaining a desired goal simultaneously forestalls something the person wants to avoid.\r\n\r\nGoal-based models also typically incorporate an expectancy construct: a sense of confidence or doubt that a given outcome will be attained successfully (e.g.,\u00a0Bandura 1986<\/a>,\u00a0Carver & Scheier 1998<\/a>). This forms a link to the expectancy-value tradition in motivational theory. Not every behavior produces its intended outcome; goal-directed efforts can be bogged down. Under such conditions, people's efforts are believed to be determined partly by their expectancies of succeeding or failing (e.g.,\u00a0Bandura 1986<\/a>,\u00a0Brehm & Self 1989<\/a>,\u00a0Carver & Scheier 1998<\/a>,\u00a0Eccles & Wigfield 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Klinger 1975<\/a>,\u00a0Wright 1996<\/a>).\r\n\r\nGoal-based models highlight something that is less obvious in biological models: People sometimes give up or scale back on goals they have been pursuing. It is sometimes important to relinquish goals (Miller & Wrosch 2007<\/a>,\u00a0Wrosch et al. 2007<\/a>), though the process of doing so involves feelings of sadness and despair (Klinger 1975<\/a>,\u00a0Nesse 2000<\/a>). An alternative to giving up is scaling back. This is disengagement in the sense that the initial goal is no longer operative. It avoids complete disengagement, however, by substituting the more restricted goal. This accommodation thus keeps the person involved in that area of life, at a level that holds the potential for successful outcomes.\r\n\r\nIssues of goals and threats are important to understanding the structure of stressors. Issues of goal engagement and disengagement are important to understanding the structure of coping, as are issues of positive and negative expectancies for the future.\r\n

Structural Organization: Individual Differences<\/h3>\r\n

Five-factor model.<\/h3>\r\nWe now return to individual differences, first in the form of the five-factor model. This model has its origins in a decades-long factor-analytic research tradition. It has not been without critics (e.g.,\u00a0Block 1995<\/a>), partly because until relatively recently it has had little to say about how the traits function or how they map onto any picture of human nature. This has changed to a considerable extent over the past decade and a half. Not only has more information been collected on how traits operate, but several of the traits have also been linked to the process models of functioning described above.\r\n\r\nThe first of the five factors is extraversion. As is true of several traits, extraversion has different emphases in different measures. Sometimes it is based in assertiveness, sometimes in spontaneity and energy. Sometimes it is based in dominance, confidence, and agency (Depue & Collins 1999<\/a>), sometimes in a tendency toward happiness. Extraversion is often thought of as implying sociability (Ashton et al. 2002<\/a>). Some see a sense of agency and a sense of sociability as two facets of extraversion (Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky 2005<\/a>). Others argue sociability is a by-product of other features of extraversion (Lucas et al. 2000<\/a>). A connection has also been drawn between extraversion and the approach temperament; some now view extraversion as reflecting relative sensitivity of a general approach system (Depue & Collins 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi & Shiner 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Elliott & Thrash 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Evans & Rothbart 2007<\/a>).\r\n\r\nThe second factor, neuroticism, concerns the ease and frequency with which a person becomes upset and distressed. Moodiness, anxiety, and depression reflect higher neuroticism. Measures often include items or facets pertaining to hostility and other negative feelings, but they are dominated by vulnerability to experiences of anxiety and general distress. Neuroticism has been linked to the avoidance temperament discussed above (Caspi & Shiner 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Evans & Rothbart 2007<\/a>), suggesting that anxiety and sensitivity to threat is indeed its emotional core.\r\n\r\nThe next factor is agreeableness. Agreeable people are friendly and helpful (John & Srivastava 1999<\/a>), empathic (Graziano et al. 2007<\/a>), and able to inhibit their negative feelings (Graziano & Eisenberg 1999<\/a>). Agreeable people get less angry over others' transgressions than do less agreeable people (Meier & Robinson 2004<\/a>), and this seems to short-circuit aggression (Meier et al. 2006<\/a>). At the opposite pole is an oppositional or antagonistic quality. People low in agreeableness use displays of power to deal with social conflict (Graziano et al. 1996<\/a>). Agreeableness as a dimension is often characterized as being broadly concerned with the maintaining of relationships (Jensen-Campbell & Graziano 2001<\/a>).\r\n\r\nThe most commonly used label for the next factor is conscientiousness, although this label does not fully reflect the qualities of planning, persistence, and purposeful striving toward goals that are part of it (Digman & Inouye 1986<\/a>). Other suggested names include constraint and responsibility, reflecting qualities of impulse control and reliability. Specific qualities included in this trait vary considerably across measures (Roberts et al. 2005<\/a>).\r\n\r\nAgreeableness and conscientiousness appear to share an important property. Both suggest breadth of perspective. Many manifestations of conscientiousness imply broad time perspective: taking future contingencies into account. Agreeableness implies a broad social perspective: taking the needs of others into account. It has been suggested that both of these traits have origins in the effortful control temperament (Ahadi & Rothbart 1994<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi & Shiner 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Jensen-Campbell et al. 2002<\/a>).\r\n\r\nThe fifth factor, most often called openness to experience (Costa & McCrae 1985<\/a>), is the one about which there is most disagreement on content. Some measures (and theories) imbue this factor with greater overtones of intelligence, terming it intellect (Peabody & Goldberg 1989<\/a>). It involves curiosity, flexibility, imaginativeness, and willingness to immerse oneself in atypical experiences (for a review of its involvement in social experience, see\u00a0McCrae 1996<\/a>).\r\n

Optimism.<\/h3>\r\nAnother individual difference that figures prominently in the coping literature is optimism (Carver et al. 2009<\/a>,\u00a0Scheier & Carver 1992<\/a>). Optimism connects directly to the expectancy-value motivational tradition discussed above in the context of goal-based models. Optimism and pessimism reflect confidence versus doubt, not regarding a specific situation but regarding life in general. As noted above, optimism does not fit neatly into the five-factor model. Its place in the goal-based view of self-regulation, however, has made it a popular trait for examination in the coping literature.\r\n

STRESS<\/h2>\r\nIt is common to think of stress as being a special class of experiences. It may be, however, that stress is nothing more (and nothing less) than the experience of encountering or anticipating adversity in one's goal-related efforts. It is often said that stress exists when people confront situations that tax or exceed their ability to manage them (e.g.,\u00a0Lazarus 1966<\/a>,\u00a01999<\/a>;\u00a0Lazarus & Folkman 1984<\/a>). Whenever a person is hard-pressed to deal with some obstacle or impediment or looming threat, the experience is stressful.\r\n\r\nA somewhat different view of stress uses an economic metaphor (Hobfoll 1989<\/a>,\u00a01998<\/a>), holding that people have resources that they try to protect, defend, and conserve. Resources are anything the person values. They can be physical (e.g., house, car), conditions of life (e.g., having friends and relatives, stable employment), personal qualities (e.g., a positive world view, work skills), or other assets (e.g., money or knowledge). From this view, stress occurs when resources are threatened or lost.\r\n\r\nIn translating adversity to stress, at least three terms are used, two of which are more slippery than they might seem: Threat is the impending occurrence of an event that is expected to have bad consequences, harm is the perception that the bad consequences already exist, and loss is the perception that something desired has been taken away. These adverse experiences are all stressful, but they vary in their motivational underpinnings.\r\n\r\nLoss seems specific to approach goals: Loss precludes the continuation of a desired state of affairs. For example, the death of a spouse prevents the continuation of the relationship and its activities. Threat and harm are more ambiguous because they apply to both failures to gain incentives (approach-related events) and failures to avoid punishers (avoidance-related events). For approach-related events, threat means imminent interference with desired goals or conditions; harm implies that the interference has already occurred. For avoidance-related events, threat implies the imminent arrival of intrinsically aversive states such as pain or discomfort (Rolls 2005<\/a>); harm implies that punishment has already arrived.\r\n\r\nThere appear to be differences in the negative emotions arising from problems in approach versus problems in avoidance (Carver 2004<\/a>,\u00a0Carver & Harmon-Jones 2009<\/a>,\u00a0Higgins 1996<\/a>,\u00a0Higgins et al. 1997<\/a>). Threat in a purely approach context yields frustration and anger; threat in a purely avoidance context yields anxiety and fear. Loss yields sadness and dejection, as may harm in the context of avoidance. To the extent that stress is approach related, then, one set of negatively valenced affects will predominate. To the extent that the experience is avoidance related, other negatively valenced affects will predominate. To the extent that anger and fear differ physiologically, the grounding of the stress response in approach versus avoidance also matters physiologically.\r\n\r\nAlso sometimes invoked in the context of stress is the concept of challenge (Lazarus & Folkman 1984<\/a>). Challenge is a situation in which the person's efforts are strongly engaged, thus taxing abilities, but in which the person sees opportunity for gain. Challenge might be thought of as an \u201coptimal\u201d obstacle\u2014one that appears surmountable (with effort) and the removal of which will lead to a better state of affairs. Pure challenge seems to involve the approach system but not the avoidance system. Challenge also implies expectation of success. Affects linked to challenge include hope, eagerness, and excitement (Lazarus 2006<\/a>). The characteristics (and consequences) of challenge appear to be different enough from those of threat and loss as to cast serious doubt on the position that challenge should be viewed as a form of stress (Blascovich 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Tomaka et al. 1993<\/a>).\r\n\r\nThe experience of stress seems inexorably linked to the pursuit of goals and avoidance of threats. Most basically, stress occurs when a person perceives an impending punisher or the impending inability to attain a goal, or perceives the actual occurrence of a punisher or removal of access to a goal. From the goal-pursuit view, these experiences constitute the broad and very general realm of behavior-under-adversity.\r\n

COPING<\/h2>\r\nPeople respond to perceptions of threat, harm, and loss in diverse ways, many of which receive the label \u201ccoping.\u201d Coping is often defined as efforts to prevent or diminish threat, harm, and loss, or to reduce associated distress. Some prefer to limit the concept of coping to voluntary responses (Compas et al. 2001<\/a>); others include automatic and involuntary responses within the coping construct (Eisenberg et al. 1997<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck 2007<\/a>). Of course, distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary responses to stress is not simple; indeed, responses that begin as intentional and effortful may become automatic with repetition. Here we limit ourselves only to responses that are recognized by the person engaging in them, thus removing unconscious defensive reactions from the realm of consideration (cf.\u00a0Cramer 2003<\/a>).\r\n

Coping Distinctions and Groupings<\/h3>\r\nCoping is a very broad concept with a long and complex history (Compas et al. 2001<\/a>,\u00a0Folkman & Moscowitz 2004<\/a>). Several distinctions have been made within the broad domain; indeed, it might even be said that a bewildering number of distinctions have been made (see\u00a0Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>). Some of the more important ones follow.\r\n

Problem versus emotion focus.<\/h3>\r\nThe distinction that launched modern examination of coping was that between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping (Lazarus & Folkman 1984<\/a>). Problem-focused coping is directed at the stressor itself: taking steps to remove or to evade it, or to diminish its impact if it cannot be evaded. For example, if layoffs are expected, an employee's problem-focused coping might include saving money, applying for other jobs, obtaining training to enhance hiring prospects, or working harder at the current job to reduce the likelihood of being let go. Emotion-focused coping is aimed at minimizing distress triggered by stressors. Because there are many ways to reduce distress, emotion-focused coping includes a wide range of responses, ranging from self-soothing (e.g., relaxation, seeking emotional support), to expression of negative emotion (e.g., yelling, crying), to a focus on negative thoughts (e.g., rumination), to attempts to escape stressful situations (e.g., avoidance, denial, wishful thinking).\r\n\r\nProblem-focused and emotion-focused coping have distinct proximal goals. The proximal goal determines the response's category assignment. Some behaviors can serve either function, depending on the goal behind their use. For example, seeking support is emotion focused if the goal is to obtain emotional support and reassurance, but problem focused if the goal is to obtain advice or instrumental help.\r\n\r\nProblem- and emotion-focused coping can also facilitate one another. Effective problem-focused coping diminishes the threat, but thereby also diminishes the distress generated by that threat. Effective emotion-focused coping diminishes negative distress, making it possible to consider the problem more calmly, perhaps yielding better problem-focused coping. This interrelatedness of problem- and emotion-focused coping makes it more useful to think of the two as complementary coping functions rather than as two fully distinct and independent coping categories (Lazarus 2006<\/a>).\r\n

Engagement versus disengagement.<\/h3>\r\nA particularly important distinction is between engagement or approach coping, which is aimed at dealing with the stressor or related emotions, and disengagement or avoidance coping, which is aimed at escaping the threat or related emotions (e.g.,\u00a0Moos & Schaefer 1993<\/a>,\u00a0Roth & Cohen 1986<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>).\u00a0Engagement coping<\/a>\u00a0includes problem-focused coping and some forms of emotion-focused coping: support seeking, emotion regulation, acceptance, and cognitive restructuring.\u00a0Disengagement coping<\/a>\u00a0includes responses such as avoidance, denial, and wishful thinking. Disengagement coping is often emotion focused, because it involves an attempt to escape feelings of distress. Sometimes disengagement coping is almost literally an effort to act as though the stressor does not exist, so that it does not have to be reacted to, behaviorally or emotionally. Wishful thinking and fantasy distance the person from the stressor, at least temporarily, and denial creates a boundary between reality and the person's experience.\r\n\r\nDespite this aim of escaping distress, disengagement coping is generally ineffective in reducing distress over the long term, as it does nothing about the threat's existence and its eventual impact. If you are experiencing a real threat in your life and you respond by going to the movies, the threat will remain when the movie is over. Eventually it must be dealt with. Indeed, for many stresses, the longer one avoids dealing with the problem, the more intractable it becomes and the less time is available to deal with it when one finally turns to it. Another problem is that avoidance and denial can promote a paradoxical increase in intrusive thoughts about the stressor and an increase in negative mood and anxiety (Najmi & Wegner 2008<\/a>). Finally, some kinds of disengagement create problems of their own. Excessive use of alcohol or drugs can create social and health problems, and shopping or gambling as an escape can create financial problems.\r\n\r\nThe concept of disengagement coping has been extended to include relinquishing goals that are threatened by the stressor (Carver et al. 1989<\/a>). This differs from other disengagement responses in that it addresses both the stressor's existence and its emotional impact by abandoning an investment in something else. Disengaging from the threatened goal may allow the person to avoid negative feelings associated with the threat.\r\n

Accommodative coping and meaning-focused coping.<\/h3>\r\nWithin engagement coping, distinctions have been made between attempts to control the stressor itself, called primary-control coping, and attempts to adapt or adjust to the stressor, termed accommodative or secondary-control coping (Morling & Evered 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>). We use the term \u201caccommodative\u201d here because it does not carry connotations either of exerting control or of being secondary to other coping efforts.\r\n\r\nThe notion of\u00a0accommodative coping<\/a>\u00a0derives from conceptions of the process of successful aging (Brandtst\u00e4dter & Renner 1990<\/a>). It refers to adjustments within the self that are made in response to constraints. In the realm of coping, accommodation applies to responses such as acceptance, cognitive restructuring, and scaling back one's goals in the face of insurmountable interference. Another kind of accommodation is self-distraction. Historically this reaction has been considered disengagement coping, but confirmatory factor analyses consistently indicate that intentionally engaging with positive activities is a means of adapting to uncontrollable events (Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>).\r\n\r\nA related concept is what\u00a0Folkman (1997)<\/a>\u00a0called \u201cmeaning-focused coping\u201d (see also\u00a0Folkman 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Park & Folkman 1997<\/a>), in which people draw on their beliefs and values to find, or remind themselves of, benefits in stressful experiences (Tennen & Affleck 2002<\/a>). Meaning-focused coping may include reordering life priorities and infusing ordinary events with positive meaning. This construct has roots in evidence that positive as well as negative emotions are common during stressful experiences (e.g.,\u00a0Andrykowsky et al. 1993<\/a>), that positive feelings influence outcomes, and particularly that people try to find benefit and meaning in adversity (Helgeson et al. 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Park et al. 2009<\/a>). Although this construct emphasizes the positive changes a stressor brings to a person's life, it is noteworthy that meaning-focused coping also represents an accommodation to the constraints of one's life situation. Meaning-focused coping involves reappraisal, and appears to be most likely when stressful experiences are uncontrollable or are going badly (Folkman 2008<\/a>).\r\n

Proactive coping.<\/h3>\r\nAlthough most discussions of coping emphasize responses to threat and harm,\u00a0Aspinwall & Taylor (1997)<\/a>\u00a0have pointed out that some coping occurs proactively before the occurrence of any stressor. Proactive coping is not necessarily different in nature from other coping, but it is intended to prevent threatening or harmful situations from arising. Proactive coping is nearly always problem focused, involving accumulation of resources that will be useful if a threat arises and scanning the experiential horizon for signs that a threat may be building. If the beginning of a threat is perceived, the person can engage strategies that will prevent it from growing or that will remove the person from its path. If the anticipation of an emerging threat helps the person avoid it, the person will experience fewer stressful episodes and will experience stress of less intensity when the experiences are unavoidable.\r\n

Conclusions.<\/h3>\r\nThis brief review (which is far from exhaustive\u2014see\u00a0Compas et al. 2001<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>) makes clear that there are many ways to group coping responses and that these distinctions do not form a neat matrix into which coping reactions can be sorted. A given response typically fits several places. For example, the seeking of emotional support is engagement, emotion-focused, and accommodative coping. Each distinction has a focus of convenience and is useful for answering different questions about responses to stress. Furthermore, no one distinction fully represents the structure of coping. Confirmatory analyses clearly support hierarchical, multidimensional models of coping (Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>). The distinction that appears to have greatest importance is engagement versus disengagement, a distinction that also maps well onto the goal-based model discussed in the context of personality.\r\n

Coping dispositions and personality.<\/h3>\r\nOne more issue should be addressed before we continue. There is some evidence that coping is stable over time in a given stress domain (e.g.,\u00a0Gil et al. 1997<\/a>,\u00a0Powers et al. 2003<\/a>) and that people have habitual coping tendencies (Moos & Holahan 2003<\/a>). Do these coping dispositions differ in any fundamental way from personality? If coping dispositions are trait-like, how meaningful is the topic of how coping relates to personality?\r\n\r\nMurberg et al. (2002)<\/a>\u00a0argued that several conditions should be met for personality and coping to be viewed as parts of the same construct. First, they should be highly correlated. Second, because personality is quite stable, coping should also be highly stable. Third, coping should not account for substantial unique variance in outcomes after controlling for personality. In general, these conditions do not hold. Relations between personality and coping are modest, coping is less stable than personality, and coping predicts adjustment over and above personality (Connor-Smith & Flachsbart 2007<\/a>,\u00a0Murberg et al. 2002<\/a>). Coping styles are only modestly heritable, and the genetic bases for personality and coping do not overlap strongly (Jang et al. 2007<\/a>). Although personality and coping are related, coping is not simply direct manifestation of personality under adverse conditions.\r\n

PERSONALITY AND COPING<\/h2>\r\nPersonality does influence coping in many ways, however, some of which occur prior to coping. Even prior to coping, personality influences the frequency of exposure to stressors, the type of stressors experienced, and appraisals (Vollrath 2001<\/a>). Neuroticism predicts exposure to interpersonal stress, and tendencies to appraise events as highly threatening and coping resources as low (Bolger & Zuckerman 1995<\/a>,\u00a0Grant & Langan-Fox 2007<\/a>,\u00a0Gunthert et al. 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Penley & Tomaka 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Suls & Martin 2005<\/a>). Conscientiousness predicts low stress exposure (Lee-Baggley et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath 2001<\/a>), probably because conscientious persons plan for predictable stressors and avoid impulsive actions that can lead to financial, health, or interpersonal problems. Agreeableness is linked to low interpersonal conflict and thus less social stress (Asendorpf 1998<\/a>). Extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness all relate to perceiving events as challenges rather than threats and to positive appraisals of coping resources (Penley & Tomaka 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath 2001<\/a>). Unsurprisingly, high neuroticism plus low conscientiousness predicts especially high stress exposure and threat appraisals, and low neuroticism plus high extraversion or high conscientiousness predicts especially low stress exposure and threat appraisals (Grant & Langan-Fox 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath & Torgersen 2000<\/a>).\r\n

Theoretical Relations Between Personality and Coping<\/h3>\r\nGiven exposure to stressors, personality can be expected to influence coping responses in several ways. From a biological view, responses to stress presumably stem from temperament-based approach, avoidance, and attentional regulation systems (Derryberry et al. 2003<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck 2007<\/a>). From an expectancy-value view, coping efforts presumably are influenced by expectations of future outcomes (Carver et al. 2009<\/a>).\r\n\r\nExtraversion, grounded in an approach temperament, involves sensitivity to reward, positive emotions, sociability, assertiveness, and high energy (Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & John 1992<\/a>,\u00a0Rothbart & Hwang 2005<\/a>). Strong approach tendencies and assertiveness should provide the energy required to initiate and persist in problem solving (Lengua et al. 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath 2001<\/a>); positive affect should facilitate cognitive restructuring; and an orientation toward others and access to a social network should facilitate social support coping.\r\n\r\nNeuroticism, grounded in an avoidance temperament, reflects tendencies to experience fear, sadness, distress, and physiological arousal (McCrae & John 1992<\/a>,\u00a0Miles & Hempel 2003<\/a>,\u00a0Rothbart & Hwang 2005<\/a>). Given this vulnerability to distress, neuroticism should lead to emotion-focused coping and disengagement from threat. Disengagement may be reinforced through short-term relief of distress (Lengua et al. 1999<\/a>); this relief may reduce motivation to return to the stressor, thus minimizing engagement coping. Furthermore, the mere presence of intense emotional arousal can interfere with the use of engagement strategies that require careful planning. Negative affect should also make positive thinking and cognitive restructuring difficult.\r\n\r\nConscientiousness implies persistence, self-discipline, organization, achievement orientation, and a deliberative approach (Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & John 1992<\/a>). The planful, disciplined properties of this trait should facilitate problem solving and make disengagement less likely (Lengua et al. 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath 2001<\/a>). The strong attention-regulation capacity underpinning conscientiousness (Derryberry et al. 2003<\/a>) should predict success at cognitive restructuring, which requires a capacity to disengage from powerful negative thoughts.\r\n\r\nAgreeableness involves high levels of trust and concern for others (Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & John 1992<\/a>). Because those high in agreeableness tend to have strong social networks (Bowling et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Tong et al. 2004<\/a>), agreeableness may predict social support coping. Openness to experience involves the tendency to be imaginative, creative, curious, flexible, attuned to inner feelings, and inclined toward new activities and ideas (John & Srivastava 1999<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & John 1992<\/a>). These tendencies may facilitate engagement coping strategies that require considering new perspectives, such as cognitive restructuring and problem solving, but may also facilitate use of disengagement strategies such as wishful thinking.\r\n\r\nOptimism involves the expectation of good outcomes and an engaged approach to life, apparently reflecting the belief that good outcomes require some effort. These characteristics suggest that optimism will relate positively to engagement types of coping, such as problem solving and cognitive restructuring, and inversely to avoidance or disengagement coping. Pessimism involves the expectation of bad outcomes, which should promote distress and disengagement coping.","rendered":"

PERSONALITY<\/h2>\n

The psychology of personality is a very broad topic, to which people have taken diverse theoretical approaches (see recent\u00a0Annual Review of Psychology<\/i>\u00a0articles by\u00a0Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Cervone 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Funder 2001<\/a>,\u00a0McAdams & Olson 2010<\/a>,\u00a0Mischel 2004<\/a>,\u00a0Ryan & Deci 2001<\/a>). Personality is easy to observe but hard to pin down. To paraphrase\u00a0Allport (1961)<\/a>, personality is the dynamic organization within the person of the psychological and physical systems that underlie that person’s patterns of actions, thoughts, and feelings. What dynamics are assumed, however, and what systems are proposed to underlie those dynamics vary greatly across theoretical viewpoints.<\/p>\n

Human Nature and Individual Differences<\/h3>\n

Personality psychology is partly about what makes everyone the same and partly about what makes people differ from each other. That is, personality theories are partly statements about human nature: assertions that people are basically (for example) biological creatures, social creatures, self-protective, self-actualizing, or learning creatures. To understand the person, one has to adopt some view of the essence of human nature.<\/p>\n

Personality also concerns individual differences. Individual differences can be found on any dimension imaginable, but the so-called five-factor model (Digman 1990<\/a>,\u00a0Goldberg 1981<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & Costa 2003<\/a>) has been widely adopted as a consensual framework. The five factors are most commonly labeled extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience. In this view, these broad dimensions are key determinants of behavior, and the aggregation of information resulting from a person’s placement on these dimensions gives a reasonably good snapshot of what that person is like. Each broad trait is composed of multiple facets, which provide a more nuanced picture.<\/p>\n

Broad adoption of the five-factor model does not mean unanimity about it. There are staunch advocates of other frameworks, including two three-factor models (Eysenck 1975<\/a>,\u00a01986<\/a>;\u00a0Tellegen 1985<\/a>), an alternative five-factor model (Zuckerman et al. 1993<\/a>), and a six-factor model (Ashton et al. 2004<\/a>). Indeed, some important traits do not fit smoothly into the five-factor framework. For example, optimism has overtones of both extraversion and neuroticism, but does not quite fit either construct (Marshall et al. 1992<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Both human nature and individual differences are important to the topic of this review. In thinking about the nature of coping, it is helpful to have some view of how best to construe core human functions. Whatever view of human nature is adopted channels interpretation of people’s reactions to stress. It will also be useful to have a sense of some of the ways in which people differ and expectations of how those differences may play a role in coping. These issues are addressed in greater detail in the next two sections.<\/p>\n

Functional Organization: Two Views of Human Nature<\/h3>\n

Of the great many viewpoints that have been taken on human nature, two appear particularly relevant to stress and coping.<\/p>\n

Biological models.<\/h3>\n

An increasingly influential perspective, not just in personality but in all of psychology, treats humans as biological entities. From this view, it is desirable to develop a clear understanding of the basic properties of animal self-regulation and of how those properties are manifested in human behavior. We focus here on three properties: the tendency to approach desirable objects and situations (e.g., food), the tendency to avoid dangerous objects and situations (e.g., predators), and the capacity to regulate the approach and avoidance tendencies.<\/p>\n

Biological models assuming approach and avoidance temperaments have acquired a good deal of influence over the past decade (see\u00a0Davidson 1998<\/a>,\u00a0Depue & Collins 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi & Shiner 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Elliott & Thrash 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Fowles 1993<\/a>,\u00a0Gray 1994<\/a>,\u00a0Rothbart & Hwang 2005<\/a>). They hold that approach and avoidance systems are supported partly by distinct brain areas, and that the sensitivity of each system (which varies among persons) influences behavior in response to environmental reward and threat cues.<\/p>\n

Developmental theorists have posited another temperament, generally termed\u00a0effortful control<\/a>\u00a0(Kochanska & Knaack 2003<\/a>;\u00a0Nigg 2000<\/a>,\u00a02003<\/a>,\u00a02006<\/a>;\u00a0Rothbart et al. 2004<\/a>;\u00a0Rothbart & Rueda 2005<\/a>), slower to develop (Casey et al. 2008<\/a>) and superordinate to approach and avoidance temperaments. Effortful control can override impulses stemming from the approach and avoidance systems. It acts as a supervisory system, provided sufficient mental resources are available. This confers many advantages, including constraining emotions and permitting the organism to plan for the future and take situational complexities into account in behavioral decisions. Effortful control is a construct from developmental psychology, but its features closely resemble those of adult self-control: the ability to override impulses to act and the ability to make oneself undertake or persist in difficult, uninteresting, or unpleasant tasks.<\/p>\n

Approach and avoidance systems, together with a supervisory system able to reorder the priorities they pursue, form the core of a biological model of human nature. They also form the core of a conceptually distinct but complementary view of human nature grounded in the goal construct (Austin & Vancouver 1996<\/a>,\u00a0Carver & Scheier 1998<\/a>,\u00a0Elliott 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Higgins 1996<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Goal-based models.<\/h3>\n

Some views of behavior emphasize its goal-directed quality. From this perspective, knowing a person means knowing the person’s goals and values and the relations among them. In goal-based theories, it is important to distinguish between motivational processes aimed at moving toward goals and those aimed at staying away from threats (Carver & Scheier 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Elliott 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Higgins 1996<\/a>). A desired goal has a positive incentive value that pulls behavior to it. Looming harm or pain has a negative incentive value that pushes behavior away from it. Sometimes only approach or avoidance is engaged. Sometimes they conflict, as when moving toward a goal also increases possibility of harm. Sometimes they work together, as when attaining a desired goal simultaneously forestalls something the person wants to avoid.<\/p>\n

Goal-based models also typically incorporate an expectancy construct: a sense of confidence or doubt that a given outcome will be attained successfully (e.g.,\u00a0Bandura 1986<\/a>,\u00a0Carver & Scheier 1998<\/a>). This forms a link to the expectancy-value tradition in motivational theory. Not every behavior produces its intended outcome; goal-directed efforts can be bogged down. Under such conditions, people’s efforts are believed to be determined partly by their expectancies of succeeding or failing (e.g.,\u00a0Bandura 1986<\/a>,\u00a0Brehm & Self 1989<\/a>,\u00a0Carver & Scheier 1998<\/a>,\u00a0Eccles & Wigfield 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Klinger 1975<\/a>,\u00a0Wright 1996<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Goal-based models highlight something that is less obvious in biological models: People sometimes give up or scale back on goals they have been pursuing. It is sometimes important to relinquish goals (Miller & Wrosch 2007<\/a>,\u00a0Wrosch et al. 2007<\/a>), though the process of doing so involves feelings of sadness and despair (Klinger 1975<\/a>,\u00a0Nesse 2000<\/a>). An alternative to giving up is scaling back. This is disengagement in the sense that the initial goal is no longer operative. It avoids complete disengagement, however, by substituting the more restricted goal. This accommodation thus keeps the person involved in that area of life, at a level that holds the potential for successful outcomes.<\/p>\n

Issues of goals and threats are important to understanding the structure of stressors. Issues of goal engagement and disengagement are important to understanding the structure of coping, as are issues of positive and negative expectancies for the future.<\/p>\n

Structural Organization: Individual Differences<\/h3>\n

Five-factor model.<\/h3>\n

We now return to individual differences, first in the form of the five-factor model. This model has its origins in a decades-long factor-analytic research tradition. It has not been without critics (e.g.,\u00a0Block 1995<\/a>), partly because until relatively recently it has had little to say about how the traits function or how they map onto any picture of human nature. This has changed to a considerable extent over the past decade and a half. Not only has more information been collected on how traits operate, but several of the traits have also been linked to the process models of functioning described above.<\/p>\n

The first of the five factors is extraversion. As is true of several traits, extraversion has different emphases in different measures. Sometimes it is based in assertiveness, sometimes in spontaneity and energy. Sometimes it is based in dominance, confidence, and agency (Depue & Collins 1999<\/a>), sometimes in a tendency toward happiness. Extraversion is often thought of as implying sociability (Ashton et al. 2002<\/a>). Some see a sense of agency and a sense of sociability as two facets of extraversion (Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky 2005<\/a>). Others argue sociability is a by-product of other features of extraversion (Lucas et al. 2000<\/a>). A connection has also been drawn between extraversion and the approach temperament; some now view extraversion as reflecting relative sensitivity of a general approach system (Depue & Collins 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi & Shiner 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Elliott & Thrash 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Evans & Rothbart 2007<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The second factor, neuroticism, concerns the ease and frequency with which a person becomes upset and distressed. Moodiness, anxiety, and depression reflect higher neuroticism. Measures often include items or facets pertaining to hostility and other negative feelings, but they are dominated by vulnerability to experiences of anxiety and general distress. Neuroticism has been linked to the avoidance temperament discussed above (Caspi & Shiner 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Evans & Rothbart 2007<\/a>), suggesting that anxiety and sensitivity to threat is indeed its emotional core.<\/p>\n

The next factor is agreeableness. Agreeable people are friendly and helpful (John & Srivastava 1999<\/a>), empathic (Graziano et al. 2007<\/a>), and able to inhibit their negative feelings (Graziano & Eisenberg 1999<\/a>). Agreeable people get less angry over others’ transgressions than do less agreeable people (Meier & Robinson 2004<\/a>), and this seems to short-circuit aggression (Meier et al. 2006<\/a>). At the opposite pole is an oppositional or antagonistic quality. People low in agreeableness use displays of power to deal with social conflict (Graziano et al. 1996<\/a>). Agreeableness as a dimension is often characterized as being broadly concerned with the maintaining of relationships (Jensen-Campbell & Graziano 2001<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The most commonly used label for the next factor is conscientiousness, although this label does not fully reflect the qualities of planning, persistence, and purposeful striving toward goals that are part of it (Digman & Inouye 1986<\/a>). Other suggested names include constraint and responsibility, reflecting qualities of impulse control and reliability. Specific qualities included in this trait vary considerably across measures (Roberts et al. 2005<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Agreeableness and conscientiousness appear to share an important property. Both suggest breadth of perspective. Many manifestations of conscientiousness imply broad time perspective: taking future contingencies into account. Agreeableness implies a broad social perspective: taking the needs of others into account. It has been suggested that both of these traits have origins in the effortful control temperament (Ahadi & Rothbart 1994<\/a>,\u00a0Caspi & Shiner 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Jensen-Campbell et al. 2002<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The fifth factor, most often called openness to experience (Costa & McCrae 1985<\/a>), is the one about which there is most disagreement on content. Some measures (and theories) imbue this factor with greater overtones of intelligence, terming it intellect (Peabody & Goldberg 1989<\/a>). It involves curiosity, flexibility, imaginativeness, and willingness to immerse oneself in atypical experiences (for a review of its involvement in social experience, see\u00a0McCrae 1996<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Optimism.<\/h3>\n

Another individual difference that figures prominently in the coping literature is optimism (Carver et al. 2009<\/a>,\u00a0Scheier & Carver 1992<\/a>). Optimism connects directly to the expectancy-value motivational tradition discussed above in the context of goal-based models. Optimism and pessimism reflect confidence versus doubt, not regarding a specific situation but regarding life in general. As noted above, optimism does not fit neatly into the five-factor model. Its place in the goal-based view of self-regulation, however, has made it a popular trait for examination in the coping literature.<\/p>\n

STRESS<\/h2>\n

It is common to think of stress as being a special class of experiences. It may be, however, that stress is nothing more (and nothing less) than the experience of encountering or anticipating adversity in one’s goal-related efforts. It is often said that stress exists when people confront situations that tax or exceed their ability to manage them (e.g.,\u00a0Lazarus 1966<\/a>,\u00a01999<\/a>;\u00a0Lazarus & Folkman 1984<\/a>). Whenever a person is hard-pressed to deal with some obstacle or impediment or looming threat, the experience is stressful.<\/p>\n

A somewhat different view of stress uses an economic metaphor (Hobfoll 1989<\/a>,\u00a01998<\/a>), holding that people have resources that they try to protect, defend, and conserve. Resources are anything the person values. They can be physical (e.g., house, car), conditions of life (e.g., having friends and relatives, stable employment), personal qualities (e.g., a positive world view, work skills), or other assets (e.g., money or knowledge). From this view, stress occurs when resources are threatened or lost.<\/p>\n

In translating adversity to stress, at least three terms are used, two of which are more slippery than they might seem: Threat is the impending occurrence of an event that is expected to have bad consequences, harm is the perception that the bad consequences already exist, and loss is the perception that something desired has been taken away. These adverse experiences are all stressful, but they vary in their motivational underpinnings.<\/p>\n

Loss seems specific to approach goals: Loss precludes the continuation of a desired state of affairs. For example, the death of a spouse prevents the continuation of the relationship and its activities. Threat and harm are more ambiguous because they apply to both failures to gain incentives (approach-related events) and failures to avoid punishers (avoidance-related events). For approach-related events, threat means imminent interference with desired goals or conditions; harm implies that the interference has already occurred. For avoidance-related events, threat implies the imminent arrival of intrinsically aversive states such as pain or discomfort (Rolls 2005<\/a>); harm implies that punishment has already arrived.<\/p>\n

There appear to be differences in the negative emotions arising from problems in approach versus problems in avoidance (Carver 2004<\/a>,\u00a0Carver & Harmon-Jones 2009<\/a>,\u00a0Higgins 1996<\/a>,\u00a0Higgins et al. 1997<\/a>). Threat in a purely approach context yields frustration and anger; threat in a purely avoidance context yields anxiety and fear. Loss yields sadness and dejection, as may harm in the context of avoidance. To the extent that stress is approach related, then, one set of negatively valenced affects will predominate. To the extent that the experience is avoidance related, other negatively valenced affects will predominate. To the extent that anger and fear differ physiologically, the grounding of the stress response in approach versus avoidance also matters physiologically.<\/p>\n

Also sometimes invoked in the context of stress is the concept of challenge (Lazarus & Folkman 1984<\/a>). Challenge is a situation in which the person’s efforts are strongly engaged, thus taxing abilities, but in which the person sees opportunity for gain. Challenge might be thought of as an \u201coptimal\u201d obstacle\u2014one that appears surmountable (with effort) and the removal of which will lead to a better state of affairs. Pure challenge seems to involve the approach system but not the avoidance system. Challenge also implies expectation of success. Affects linked to challenge include hope, eagerness, and excitement (Lazarus 2006<\/a>). The characteristics (and consequences) of challenge appear to be different enough from those of threat and loss as to cast serious doubt on the position that challenge should be viewed as a form of stress (Blascovich 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Tomaka et al. 1993<\/a>).<\/p>\n

The experience of stress seems inexorably linked to the pursuit of goals and avoidance of threats. Most basically, stress occurs when a person perceives an impending punisher or the impending inability to attain a goal, or perceives the actual occurrence of a punisher or removal of access to a goal. From the goal-pursuit view, these experiences constitute the broad and very general realm of behavior-under-adversity.<\/p>\n

COPING<\/h2>\n

People respond to perceptions of threat, harm, and loss in diverse ways, many of which receive the label \u201ccoping.\u201d Coping is often defined as efforts to prevent or diminish threat, harm, and loss, or to reduce associated distress. Some prefer to limit the concept of coping to voluntary responses (Compas et al. 2001<\/a>); others include automatic and involuntary responses within the coping construct (Eisenberg et al. 1997<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck 2007<\/a>). Of course, distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary responses to stress is not simple; indeed, responses that begin as intentional and effortful may become automatic with repetition. Here we limit ourselves only to responses that are recognized by the person engaging in them, thus removing unconscious defensive reactions from the realm of consideration (cf.\u00a0Cramer 2003<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Coping Distinctions and Groupings<\/h3>\n

Coping is a very broad concept with a long and complex history (Compas et al. 2001<\/a>,\u00a0Folkman & Moscowitz 2004<\/a>). Several distinctions have been made within the broad domain; indeed, it might even be said that a bewildering number of distinctions have been made (see\u00a0Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>). Some of the more important ones follow.<\/p>\n

Problem versus emotion focus.<\/h3>\n

The distinction that launched modern examination of coping was that between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping (Lazarus & Folkman 1984<\/a>). Problem-focused coping is directed at the stressor itself: taking steps to remove or to evade it, or to diminish its impact if it cannot be evaded. For example, if layoffs are expected, an employee’s problem-focused coping might include saving money, applying for other jobs, obtaining training to enhance hiring prospects, or working harder at the current job to reduce the likelihood of being let go. Emotion-focused coping is aimed at minimizing distress triggered by stressors. Because there are many ways to reduce distress, emotion-focused coping includes a wide range of responses, ranging from self-soothing (e.g., relaxation, seeking emotional support), to expression of negative emotion (e.g., yelling, crying), to a focus on negative thoughts (e.g., rumination), to attempts to escape stressful situations (e.g., avoidance, denial, wishful thinking).<\/p>\n

Problem-focused and emotion-focused coping have distinct proximal goals. The proximal goal determines the response’s category assignment. Some behaviors can serve either function, depending on the goal behind their use. For example, seeking support is emotion focused if the goal is to obtain emotional support and reassurance, but problem focused if the goal is to obtain advice or instrumental help.<\/p>\n

Problem- and emotion-focused coping can also facilitate one another. Effective problem-focused coping diminishes the threat, but thereby also diminishes the distress generated by that threat. Effective emotion-focused coping diminishes negative distress, making it possible to consider the problem more calmly, perhaps yielding better problem-focused coping. This interrelatedness of problem- and emotion-focused coping makes it more useful to think of the two as complementary coping functions rather than as two fully distinct and independent coping categories (Lazarus 2006<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Engagement versus disengagement.<\/h3>\n

A particularly important distinction is between engagement or approach coping, which is aimed at dealing with the stressor or related emotions, and disengagement or avoidance coping, which is aimed at escaping the threat or related emotions (e.g.,\u00a0Moos & Schaefer 1993<\/a>,\u00a0Roth & Cohen 1986<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>).\u00a0Engagement coping<\/a>\u00a0includes problem-focused coping and some forms of emotion-focused coping: support seeking, emotion regulation, acceptance, and cognitive restructuring.\u00a0Disengagement coping<\/a>\u00a0includes responses such as avoidance, denial, and wishful thinking. Disengagement coping is often emotion focused, because it involves an attempt to escape feelings of distress. Sometimes disengagement coping is almost literally an effort to act as though the stressor does not exist, so that it does not have to be reacted to, behaviorally or emotionally. Wishful thinking and fantasy distance the person from the stressor, at least temporarily, and denial creates a boundary between reality and the person’s experience.<\/p>\n

Despite this aim of escaping distress, disengagement coping is generally ineffective in reducing distress over the long term, as it does nothing about the threat’s existence and its eventual impact. If you are experiencing a real threat in your life and you respond by going to the movies, the threat will remain when the movie is over. Eventually it must be dealt with. Indeed, for many stresses, the longer one avoids dealing with the problem, the more intractable it becomes and the less time is available to deal with it when one finally turns to it. Another problem is that avoidance and denial can promote a paradoxical increase in intrusive thoughts about the stressor and an increase in negative mood and anxiety (Najmi & Wegner 2008<\/a>). Finally, some kinds of disengagement create problems of their own. Excessive use of alcohol or drugs can create social and health problems, and shopping or gambling as an escape can create financial problems.<\/p>\n

The concept of disengagement coping has been extended to include relinquishing goals that are threatened by the stressor (Carver et al. 1989<\/a>). This differs from other disengagement responses in that it addresses both the stressor’s existence and its emotional impact by abandoning an investment in something else. Disengaging from the threatened goal may allow the person to avoid negative feelings associated with the threat.<\/p>\n

Accommodative coping and meaning-focused coping.<\/h3>\n

Within engagement coping, distinctions have been made between attempts to control the stressor itself, called primary-control coping, and attempts to adapt or adjust to the stressor, termed accommodative or secondary-control coping (Morling & Evered 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>). We use the term \u201caccommodative\u201d here because it does not carry connotations either of exerting control or of being secondary to other coping efforts.<\/p>\n

The notion of\u00a0accommodative coping<\/a>\u00a0derives from conceptions of the process of successful aging (Brandtst\u00e4dter & Renner 1990<\/a>). It refers to adjustments within the self that are made in response to constraints. In the realm of coping, accommodation applies to responses such as acceptance, cognitive restructuring, and scaling back one’s goals in the face of insurmountable interference. Another kind of accommodation is self-distraction. Historically this reaction has been considered disengagement coping, but confirmatory factor analyses consistently indicate that intentionally engaging with positive activities is a means of adapting to uncontrollable events (Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>).<\/p>\n

A related concept is what\u00a0Folkman (1997)<\/a>\u00a0called \u201cmeaning-focused coping\u201d (see also\u00a0Folkman 2008<\/a>,\u00a0Park & Folkman 1997<\/a>), in which people draw on their beliefs and values to find, or remind themselves of, benefits in stressful experiences (Tennen & Affleck 2002<\/a>). Meaning-focused coping may include reordering life priorities and infusing ordinary events with positive meaning. This construct has roots in evidence that positive as well as negative emotions are common during stressful experiences (e.g.,\u00a0Andrykowsky et al. 1993<\/a>), that positive feelings influence outcomes, and particularly that people try to find benefit and meaning in adversity (Helgeson et al. 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Park et al. 2009<\/a>). Although this construct emphasizes the positive changes a stressor brings to a person’s life, it is noteworthy that meaning-focused coping also represents an accommodation to the constraints of one’s life situation. Meaning-focused coping involves reappraisal, and appears to be most likely when stressful experiences are uncontrollable or are going badly (Folkman 2008<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Proactive coping.<\/h3>\n

Although most discussions of coping emphasize responses to threat and harm,\u00a0Aspinwall & Taylor (1997)<\/a>\u00a0have pointed out that some coping occurs proactively before the occurrence of any stressor. Proactive coping is not necessarily different in nature from other coping, but it is intended to prevent threatening or harmful situations from arising. Proactive coping is nearly always problem focused, involving accumulation of resources that will be useful if a threat arises and scanning the experiential horizon for signs that a threat may be building. If the beginning of a threat is perceived, the person can engage strategies that will prevent it from growing or that will remove the person from its path. If the anticipation of an emerging threat helps the person avoid it, the person will experience fewer stressful episodes and will experience stress of less intensity when the experiences are unavoidable.<\/p>\n

Conclusions.<\/h3>\n

This brief review (which is far from exhaustive\u2014see\u00a0Compas et al. 2001<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>) makes clear that there are many ways to group coping responses and that these distinctions do not form a neat matrix into which coping reactions can be sorted. A given response typically fits several places. For example, the seeking of emotional support is engagement, emotion-focused, and accommodative coping. Each distinction has a focus of convenience and is useful for answering different questions about responses to stress. Furthermore, no one distinction fully represents the structure of coping. Confirmatory analyses clearly support hierarchical, multidimensional models of coping (Skinner et al. 2003<\/a>). The distinction that appears to have greatest importance is engagement versus disengagement, a distinction that also maps well onto the goal-based model discussed in the context of personality.<\/p>\n

Coping dispositions and personality.<\/h3>\n

One more issue should be addressed before we continue. There is some evidence that coping is stable over time in a given stress domain (e.g.,\u00a0Gil et al. 1997<\/a>,\u00a0Powers et al. 2003<\/a>) and that people have habitual coping tendencies (Moos & Holahan 2003<\/a>). Do these coping dispositions differ in any fundamental way from personality? If coping dispositions are trait-like, how meaningful is the topic of how coping relates to personality?<\/p>\n

Murberg et al. (2002)<\/a>\u00a0argued that several conditions should be met for personality and coping to be viewed as parts of the same construct. First, they should be highly correlated. Second, because personality is quite stable, coping should also be highly stable. Third, coping should not account for substantial unique variance in outcomes after controlling for personality. In general, these conditions do not hold. Relations between personality and coping are modest, coping is less stable than personality, and coping predicts adjustment over and above personality (Connor-Smith & Flachsbart 2007<\/a>,\u00a0Murberg et al. 2002<\/a>). Coping styles are only modestly heritable, and the genetic bases for personality and coping do not overlap strongly (Jang et al. 2007<\/a>). Although personality and coping are related, coping is not simply direct manifestation of personality under adverse conditions.<\/p>\n

PERSONALITY AND COPING<\/h2>\n

Personality does influence coping in many ways, however, some of which occur prior to coping. Even prior to coping, personality influences the frequency of exposure to stressors, the type of stressors experienced, and appraisals (Vollrath 2001<\/a>). Neuroticism predicts exposure to interpersonal stress, and tendencies to appraise events as highly threatening and coping resources as low (Bolger & Zuckerman 1995<\/a>,\u00a0Grant & Langan-Fox 2007<\/a>,\u00a0Gunthert et al. 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Penley & Tomaka 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Suls & Martin 2005<\/a>). Conscientiousness predicts low stress exposure (Lee-Baggley et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath 2001<\/a>), probably because conscientious persons plan for predictable stressors and avoid impulsive actions that can lead to financial, health, or interpersonal problems. Agreeableness is linked to low interpersonal conflict and thus less social stress (Asendorpf 1998<\/a>). Extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness all relate to perceiving events as challenges rather than threats and to positive appraisals of coping resources (Penley & Tomaka 2002<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath 2001<\/a>). Unsurprisingly, high neuroticism plus low conscientiousness predicts especially high stress exposure and threat appraisals, and low neuroticism plus high extraversion or high conscientiousness predicts especially low stress exposure and threat appraisals (Grant & Langan-Fox 2006<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath & Torgersen 2000<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Theoretical Relations Between Personality and Coping<\/h3>\n

Given exposure to stressors, personality can be expected to influence coping responses in several ways. From a biological view, responses to stress presumably stem from temperament-based approach, avoidance, and attentional regulation systems (Derryberry et al. 2003<\/a>,\u00a0Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck 2007<\/a>). From an expectancy-value view, coping efforts presumably are influenced by expectations of future outcomes (Carver et al. 2009<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Extraversion, grounded in an approach temperament, involves sensitivity to reward, positive emotions, sociability, assertiveness, and high energy (Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & John 1992<\/a>,\u00a0Rothbart & Hwang 2005<\/a>). Strong approach tendencies and assertiveness should provide the energy required to initiate and persist in problem solving (Lengua et al. 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath 2001<\/a>); positive affect should facilitate cognitive restructuring; and an orientation toward others and access to a social network should facilitate social support coping.<\/p>\n

Neuroticism, grounded in an avoidance temperament, reflects tendencies to experience fear, sadness, distress, and physiological arousal (McCrae & John 1992<\/a>,\u00a0Miles & Hempel 2003<\/a>,\u00a0Rothbart & Hwang 2005<\/a>). Given this vulnerability to distress, neuroticism should lead to emotion-focused coping and disengagement from threat. Disengagement may be reinforced through short-term relief of distress (Lengua et al. 1999<\/a>); this relief may reduce motivation to return to the stressor, thus minimizing engagement coping. Furthermore, the mere presence of intense emotional arousal can interfere with the use of engagement strategies that require careful planning. Negative affect should also make positive thinking and cognitive restructuring difficult.<\/p>\n

Conscientiousness implies persistence, self-discipline, organization, achievement orientation, and a deliberative approach (Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & John 1992<\/a>). The planful, disciplined properties of this trait should facilitate problem solving and make disengagement less likely (Lengua et al. 1999<\/a>,\u00a0Vollrath 2001<\/a>). The strong attention-regulation capacity underpinning conscientiousness (Derryberry et al. 2003<\/a>) should predict success at cognitive restructuring, which requires a capacity to disengage from powerful negative thoughts.<\/p>\n

Agreeableness involves high levels of trust and concern for others (Caspi et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & John 1992<\/a>). Because those high in agreeableness tend to have strong social networks (Bowling et al. 2005<\/a>,\u00a0Tong et al. 2004<\/a>), agreeableness may predict social support coping. Openness to experience involves the tendency to be imaginative, creative, curious, flexible, attuned to inner feelings, and inclined toward new activities and ideas (John & Srivastava 1999<\/a>,\u00a0McCrae & John 1992<\/a>). These tendencies may facilitate engagement coping strategies that require considering new perspectives, such as cognitive restructuring and problem solving, but may also facilitate use of disengagement strategies such as wishful thinking.<\/p>\n

Optimism involves the expectation of good outcomes and an engaged approach to life, apparently reflecting the belief that good outcomes require some effort. These characteristics suggest that optimism will relate positively to engagement types of coping, such as problem solving and cognitive restructuring, and inversely to avoidance or disengagement coping. Pessimism involves the expectation of bad outcomes, which should promote distress and disengagement coping.<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t

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