{"id":66,"date":"2018-11-27T17:04:20","date_gmt":"2018-11-27T17:04:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-monroe-law101\/?post_type=chapter&p=66"},"modified":"2018-11-27T17:04:20","modified_gmt":"2018-11-27T17:04:20","slug":"morse-v-frederick","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-monroe-law101\/chapter\/morse-v-frederick\/","title":{"raw":"MORSE v. FREDERICK","rendered":"MORSE v. FREDERICK"},"content":{"raw":"
\r\n

MORSE v. FREDERICK<\/h2>\r\n

551 U.S. 393 (2007)<\/strong><\/h2>\r\n

(Case Syllabus edited by the Author)<\/p>\r\n

At a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, petitioner Morse, the high school principal, saw students unfurl a banner stating, \u201cBONG HITS 4 JESUS,\u201d which she regarded as promoting illegal drug use. Consistent with established school policy prohibiting such messages at school events, Morse directed the students to take down the banner. When one of the students who had brought the banner to the event \u2014 respondent Frederick \u2014 refused, Morse confiscated the banner and later suspended him. The school superintendent upheld the suspension, explaining, inter alia, that Frederick was disciplined because his banner appeared to advocate illegal drug use in violation of school policy. Petitioner school board also upheld the suspension.<\/p>\r\n

Frederick filed suit under 42 U. S. C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the school board and Morse had violated his First Amendment rights. The District Court granted petitioner\u2019s summary judgment, ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity, and that they had not infringed Frederick\u2019s speech rights. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Accepting that Frederick acted during a school-authorized activity and that the banner expressed a positive sentiment about marijuana use, the court nonetheless found a First Amendment violation because the school punished Frederick without demonstrating that his speech threatened substantial disruption. It also concluded that Morse was not entitled to qualified immunity because Frederick\u2019s right to display the banner was so clearly established that a reasonable principal in Morse\u2019s position would have understood that her actions were unconstitutional.<\/p>\r\n

Held:<\/p>\r\n

Because schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use, the school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending Frederick.<\/p>\r\n

(a) Frederick\u2019s argument that this is not a school speech case is rejected. The event in question occurred during normal school hours and was sanctioned by Morse as an approved social event at which the district\u2019s student-conduct rules expressly applied. Teachers and administrators were among the students and were charged with supervising them. Frederick stood among other students across the street from the school and directed his banner toward the school, making it plainly visible to most students. Under these circumstances, Frederick cannot claim he was not at school.<\/p>\r\n

(b) The Court agrees with Morse that those who viewed the banner would interpret it as advocating or promoting illegal drug use, in violation of school policy. At least two interpretations of the banner\u2019s words \u2014 that they constitute an imperative encouraging viewers to smoke marijuana or, alternatively, that they celebrate drug use \u2014 demonstrate that the sign promoted such use. This pro-drug interpretation gains further plausibility from the paucity of alternative meanings the banner might bear.<\/p>\r\n

(c) A principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.<\/em>, 393 U.S. 503, the Court declared, in holding that a policy prohibiting high school students from wearing antiwar armbands violated the First Amendment, that student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will \u201cmaterially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.\u201d The Court in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser<\/em>, 478 U. S. 675, however, upheld the suspension of a student who delivered a high school assembly speech employing \u201can elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.<\/p>\r\n

Analyzing the case under Tinker<\/em>, the lower courts had found no disruption, and therefore no basis for discipline. 478 U. S., at 679\u2013680. This Court reversed, holding that the school was \u201cwithin its permissible authority in imposing sanctions \u2026 in response to [the student\u2019s] offensively lewd and indecent speech.\u201d<\/p>\r\n

Two basic principles may be distilled from Fraser<\/em>. First, it demonstrates that \u201cthe constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.\u201d Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, he would have been protected. In school, however, his First Amendment rights were circumscribed \u201cin light of the special characteristics of the school environment.\u201d Tinker<\/em>, supra<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n

Second, Fraser<\/em> established that Tinker\u2019s<\/em> mode of analysis is not absolute, since the Fraser <\/em>Court did not conduct the \u201csubstantial disruption\u201d analysis. Subsequently, the Court has held in the Fourth Amendment context that \u201cwhile children assuredly do not \u2018shed their constitutional rights \u2026 at the schoolhouse gate,\u2019 \u2026 the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school,\u201d Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton<\/em>, 515 U. S. 646, and has recognized that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an \u201cimportant \u2014 indeed, perhaps compelling\u201d interest.<\/p>\r\n

Drug abuse by the Nation\u2019s youth is a serious problem. For example, Congress has declared that part of a school\u2019s job is educating students about the dangers of drug abuse, see, e.g., the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994, and petitioners and many other schools have adopted policies aimed at implementing this message. Student speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers, poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect those entrusted to their care. The \u201cspecial characteristics of the school environment,\u201d Tinker<\/em>, 393 U. S., at 506, and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting such abuse. Id.<\/em>, at 508, 509, distinguished. The issue regarding qualified immunity does not need to be resolved since the principal did not violate the student\u2019s rights.<\/p>\r\n

439 F. 3d 1114, reversed and remanded.<\/p>\r\n

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"

\n

MORSE v. FREDERICK<\/h2>\n

551 U.S. 393 (2007)<\/strong><\/h2>\n

(Case Syllabus edited by the Author)<\/p>\n

At a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, petitioner Morse, the high school principal, saw students unfurl a banner stating, \u201cBONG HITS 4 JESUS,\u201d which she regarded as promoting illegal drug use. Consistent with established school policy prohibiting such messages at school events, Morse directed the students to take down the banner. When one of the students who had brought the banner to the event \u2014 respondent Frederick \u2014 refused, Morse confiscated the banner and later suspended him. The school superintendent upheld the suspension, explaining, inter alia, that Frederick was disciplined because his banner appeared to advocate illegal drug use in violation of school policy. Petitioner school board also upheld the suspension.<\/p>\n

Frederick filed suit under 42 U. S. C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the school board and Morse had violated his First Amendment rights. The District Court granted petitioner\u2019s summary judgment, ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity, and that they had not infringed Frederick\u2019s speech rights. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Accepting that Frederick acted during a school-authorized activity and that the banner expressed a positive sentiment about marijuana use, the court nonetheless found a First Amendment violation because the school punished Frederick without demonstrating that his speech threatened substantial disruption. It also concluded that Morse was not entitled to qualified immunity because Frederick\u2019s right to display the banner was so clearly established that a reasonable principal in Morse\u2019s position would have understood that her actions were unconstitutional.<\/p>\n

Held:<\/p>\n

Because schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use, the school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending Frederick.<\/p>\n

(a) Frederick\u2019s argument that this is not a school speech case is rejected. The event in question occurred during normal school hours and was sanctioned by Morse as an approved social event at which the district\u2019s student-conduct rules expressly applied. Teachers and administrators were among the students and were charged with supervising them. Frederick stood among other students across the street from the school and directed his banner toward the school, making it plainly visible to most students. Under these circumstances, Frederick cannot claim he was not at school.<\/p>\n

(b) The Court agrees with Morse that those who viewed the banner would interpret it as advocating or promoting illegal drug use, in violation of school policy. At least two interpretations of the banner\u2019s words \u2014 that they constitute an imperative encouraging viewers to smoke marijuana or, alternatively, that they celebrate drug use \u2014 demonstrate that the sign promoted such use. This pro-drug interpretation gains further plausibility from the paucity of alternative meanings the banner might bear.<\/p>\n

(c) A principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.<\/em>, 393 U.S. 503, the Court declared, in holding that a policy prohibiting high school students from wearing antiwar armbands violated the First Amendment, that student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will \u201cmaterially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.\u201d The Court in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser<\/em>, 478 U. S. 675, however, upheld the suspension of a student who delivered a high school assembly speech employing \u201can elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.<\/p>\n

Analyzing the case under Tinker<\/em>, the lower courts had found no disruption, and therefore no basis for discipline. 478 U. S., at 679\u2013680. This Court reversed, holding that the school was \u201cwithin its permissible authority in imposing sanctions \u2026 in response to [the student\u2019s] offensively lewd and indecent speech.\u201d<\/p>\n

Two basic principles may be distilled from Fraser<\/em>. First, it demonstrates that \u201cthe constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.\u201d Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, he would have been protected. In school, however, his First Amendment rights were circumscribed \u201cin light of the special characteristics of the school environment.\u201d Tinker<\/em>, supra<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Second, Fraser<\/em> established that Tinker\u2019s<\/em> mode of analysis is not absolute, since the Fraser <\/em>Court did not conduct the \u201csubstantial disruption\u201d analysis. Subsequently, the Court has held in the Fourth Amendment context that \u201cwhile children assuredly do not \u2018shed their constitutional rights \u2026 at the schoolhouse gate,\u2019 \u2026 the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school,\u201d Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton<\/em>, 515 U. S. 646, and has recognized that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an \u201cimportant \u2014 indeed, perhaps compelling\u201d interest.<\/p>\n

Drug abuse by the Nation\u2019s youth is a serious problem. For example, Congress has declared that part of a school\u2019s job is educating students about the dangers of drug abuse, see, e.g., the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994, and petitioners and many other schools have adopted policies aimed at implementing this message. Student speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers, poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect those entrusted to their care. The \u201cspecial characteristics of the school environment,\u201d Tinker<\/em>, 393 U. S., at 506, and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting such abuse. Id.<\/em>, at 508, 509, distinguished. The issue regarding qualified immunity does not need to be resolved since the principal did not violate the student\u2019s rights.<\/p>\n

439 F. 3d 1114, reversed and remanded.<\/p>\n

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t

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Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t
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