{"id":1256,"date":"2017-09-27T17:43:29","date_gmt":"2017-09-27T17:43:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/?post_type=chapter&p=1256"},"modified":"2019-01-19T19:05:49","modified_gmt":"2019-01-19T19:05:49","slug":"5-1-parties-to-crime","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/chapter\/5-1-parties-to-crime\/","title":{"raw":"5.1 Parties to Crime","rendered":"5.1 Parties to Crime"},"content":{"raw":" \r\n
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Congress can impute to a corporation the commission of certain criminal offenses and subject it to criminal prosecution therefor.<\/em><\/p>\r\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0--New York Central R. Co. v. U.S.<\/em><\/a>, cited in Section 5.2.1 \"Corporate Liability\"<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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Learning Objectives<\/h3>\r\n
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  1. Identify the four parties to crime at early common law.<\/li>\r\n \t
  2. Identify the parties to crime in modern times.<\/li>\r\n \t
  3. Define the criminal act element required for accomplice liability.<\/li>\r\n \t
  4. Define the criminal intent element required for accomplice liability.<\/li>\r\n \t
  5. Define the natural and probable consequences doctrine.<\/li>\r\n \t
  6. Discuss the consequences of accomplice liability.<\/li>\r\n \t
  7. Determine whether an accomplice can be prosecuted when the principal is not prosecuted or acquitted.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

    Often more than one criminal defendant plays a role in the commission of a crime. Defendants working together with a common criminal purpose or design are acting with complicity<\/a><\/span>. When the participation and criminal conduct varies among the defendants, an issue arises as to who<\/em> is responsible for which<\/em> crime and to what degree<\/em>. This chapter analyzes different parties to crime, along with their accompanying criminal liability. Chapter 8 \"Inchoate Offenses\"<\/a> examines crimes that necessarily involve more than one person such as conspiracy<\/strong> and solicitation<\/strong>, as well as another inchoate<\/strong> or incomplete crime, attempt<\/strong>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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    Accomplice Liability<\/h2>\r\n

    At early common law, parties to crime were divided into four categories. A principal in the first degree<\/a><\/span> actually committed the crime. A principal in the second degree<\/a><\/span> was present at the scene of the crime and assisted in its commission. An accessory before the fact<\/a><\/span> was not present at the scene of the crime, but helped prepare for its commission. An accessory after the fact<\/a><\/span> helped a party to the crime after its commission by providing comfort, aid, and assistance in escaping or avoiding arrest and prosecution or conviction.<\/p>\r\n

    In modern times, most states and the federal government divide parties to crime into two categories: principal<\/a><\/span>, and accessories<\/strong> (Idaho Code Ann., 2010). The criminal actor is referred to as the principal<\/strong>, although all accomplices<\/strong> have equal criminal responsibility as is discussed in Section 5.1 \"Parties to Crime\"<\/a>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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    Accomplice Elements<\/h2>\r\n

    An accomplice under most state and federal statutes is responsible for the same crime as the criminal actor or principal<\/strong> (18 U.S.C., 2010). However, accomplice liability is derivative<\/strong>; the accomplice does not actually have to commit the crime to be responsible for it. The policy supporting accomplice liability is the idea that an individual who willingly participates in furthering criminal conduct should be accountable for it to the same extent as the criminal actor. The degree of participation is often difficult to quantify, so statutes and cases attempt to segregate blameworthy accomplices based on the criminal act<\/strong> and intent<\/strong> elements, as is discussed in Section 5.1 \"Parties to Crime\"<\/a>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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    Accomplice Act<\/h2>\r\n

    In the majority of states and federally, an accomplice must voluntarily act in some manner to assist<\/em> in the commission of the offense. Some common descriptors of the criminal act<\/strong> element required for accomplice liability are aid, abet, assist, counsel, command, induce, or procure (K.S.A., 2010). Examples of actions that qualify as the accomplice criminal act are helping plan the crime, driving a getaway vehicle after the crime\u2019s commission, and luring a victim to the scene of the crime. The Model Penal Code defines the accomplice criminal act element as \u201caids\u2026or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing [the offense]\u201d (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a02.06(3) (a) (ii)).<\/p>\r\n

    In many states, words<\/strong> are enough to constitute the criminal act element required for accomplice liability (N.Y. Penal Law, 2010). On the other hand, mere presence at the scene of the crime, even presence at the scene combined with flight<\/em>, is not sufficient to convert a bystander into an accomplice (Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 2010). However, if there is a legal duty to act<\/strong>, a defendant who is present at the scene of a crime without preventing its occurrence could be liable as an accomplice in many jurisdictions (People v. Rolon, 2010). As the Model Penal Code provides, \u201c[a] person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if\u2026having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effect so to do\u201d (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a02.06(3)(a)(iii)).<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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    Example of a Case Lacking Accomplice Act<\/h2>\r\n

    Review the criminal law issues example in Chapter 1 \"Introduction to Criminal Law\"<\/a>, Section 1.2.1 \"Example of Criminal Law Issues\"<\/a>. In that example, Clara and Linda go on a shopping spree. Linda insists that they browse an expensive department store. After they enter the lingerie department, Linda surreptitiously places a bra into her purse. Clara watches, horrified, but does not say anything, even though a security guard is standing nearby. As Linda and Clara leave the store, an alarm is activated. Linda and Clara run away with the security guard in pursuit. In this case, Clara has probably not<\/em> committed the criminal act element required for accomplice liability. Although Clara was present at the scene<\/em> of the crime and did not alert the security guard, mere presence at the scene is not sufficient to constitute the accomplice criminal act. Clara fled the scene when the alarm went off, but presence at the scene of a crime combined with flight is still not enough<\/em> to comprise the accomplice criminal act. Thus Clara has probably not committed theft as an accomplice, and only Linda is subject to a criminal prosecution for this offense.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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    Example of Accomplice Act<\/h2>\r\n

    Phoebe, the parent of a two-year-old named Eliza, watches silently as her live-in boyfriend Ricky beats Eliza. In Phoebe\u2019s state, parents have a duty to come to the aid of their children if their safety is threatened. Ricky severely injures Eliza, and both Phoebe and Ricky are arrested and charged with battery and child endangerment. Phoebe probably has<\/em> committed the criminal act element required for accomplice liability in many jurisdictions. Phoebe does not personally act to physically harm her child. However, her presence at the scene<\/em> combined with a legal duty to act<\/em> could be enough to make her an accomplice. Thus Phoebe has most likely committed battery and child endangerment as an accomplice, and both she<\/em> and Ricky<\/em> are subject to a criminal prosecution for these offenses.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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    Accomplice Intent<\/h2>\r\n

    The criminal intent element required for accomplice liability varies, depending on the jurisdiction. In many jurisdictions, the accomplice must act with specific intent<\/strong> or purposely<\/strong> when aiding or assisting the principal (Or. Rev. Stat., 2010). Specific intent or purposely means the accomplice desires the principal to commit the crime. The Model Penal Code follows this approach and requires the accomplice to act \u201cwith the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense\u201d (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a02.06(3) (a)). In other jurisdictions, if the crime is serious<\/em> and the accomplice acts with general intent<\/strong> or knowingly<\/strong> or has awareness<\/em> that the principal will commit the crime with his or her assistance, intent to further the crime\u2019s commission could be inferred (People v. Lauria, 2010). In a minority of jurisdictions, only general intent<\/strong> or acting knowingly<\/strong> that the crime will be promoted or facilitated is required, regardless of the crime\u2019s seriousness (Washington Rev. Code Ann., 2010).<\/p>\r\nAs used in sections 205.55<\/a> <\/span>, 205.60<\/a> <\/span> and 205.65\u00a0of\u00a0NYS\u00a0Penal\u00a0Law<\/a> <\/span>, a person \u201crenders criminal assistance\u201d when, with intent to prevent, hinder or delay the discovery or apprehension of, or the lodging of a criminal charge against, a person who he knows or believes has committed a crime or is being sought by law enforcement officials for the commission of a crime, or with intent to assist a person in profiting or benefiting from the commission of a crime, he:\r\n

    \r\n\r\n1.\u2003Harbors or conceals such person; \u2009or\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n
    \r\n\r\n2.\u2003Warns such person of impending discovery or apprehension; \u2009or\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n
    \r\n\r\n3.\u2003Provides such person with money, transportation, weapon, disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension; \u2009or\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n
    \r\n\r\n4.\u2003Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against him; \u2009or\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n
    \r\n\r\n5.\u2003Suppresses, by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction, any physical evidence which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against him; \u2009or\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n
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    Example of Accomplice Intent<\/h2>\r\n

    Joullian, a hotel owner, rents a hotel room to Winnifred, a prostitute. In a state that requires an accomplice to act with specific intent<\/strong> or purposely<\/strong>, Joullian must desire<\/em> Winnifred to commit prostitution in the rented room to be Winnifred\u2019s accomplice. Evidence that Joullian stands to benefit from Winnifred\u2019s prostitution, such as evidence that he will receive a portion of the prostitution proceeds, could help prove this intent. If Joullian\u2019s state allows for an inference of specific intent<\/strong> or purposely<\/strong> with serious<\/em> crimes when an accomplice acts with general intent<\/strong> or knowingly<\/strong>, it is unlikely that prostitution is a felony that would give rise to the inference. If Joullian\u2019s state requires only general intent<\/strong> or knowingly<\/strong> for accomplice liability regardless of the crime\u2019s seriousness, to be deemed an accomplice Joullian must simply be aware<\/em> that renting Winnifred the room will promote or facilitate the act of prostitution.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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    The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine<\/h2>\r\n

    Accomplice liability should be imputed only to blameworthy, deserving defendants. However, in some jurisdictions, if the crime the defendant intentionally furthers is related<\/em> to the crime the principal actually commits, the defendant is deemed an accomplice. As with legal causation, discussed in Chapter 4 \"The Elements of a Crime\"<\/a>, foreseeability is the standard. Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine<\/a><\/span>, if the defendant assists the principal with the intent to further a specific crime\u2019s commission, and the principal commits a different<\/em> crime that is foreseeable<\/em> at the time of the defendant\u2019s assistance, the defendant could be liable as an accomplice (ME Rev. Stat. Ann., 2010). Several jurisdictions have rejected this doctrine as an overly harsh extension of accomplice liability (Bogdanov v. People, 2010).<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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    Example of the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine<\/h2>\r\n

    Jos\u00e9 shows up drunk and unruly at his friend Abel\u2019s house and tells Abel he wants to \u201cbeat the hell\u201d out of his girlfriend Maria. Jos\u00e9 asks Abel to drive him to Maria\u2019s house, and Abel promptly agrees. Abel drives Jos\u00e9 to Maria\u2019s house and waits in the car with the engine running. Jos\u00e9 forces his way into Maria\u2019s house and then beats and thereafter rapes her. If Jos\u00e9 and Abel are in a jurisdiction that recognizes the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the trier of fact could find that Abel is an accomplice to the battery, burglary, and rape of Maria. Abel appears to have the criminal intent required to be an accomplice to battery<\/strong> because he assisted Jos\u00e9 in his quest to beat<\/em> Maria. If burglary and rape were foreseeable<\/em> when Abel drove a drunk and angry Jos\u00e9 to Maria\u2019s house, the natural and probable consequences doctrine would extend Abel\u2019s accomplice liability to these crimes. If Abel is not in a natural and probable consequences jurisdiction, the trier of fact must separately determine that Abel had the criminal intent required to be an accomplice to battery<\/em>, burglary<\/em>, and rape<\/em>; Abel\u2019s intent will be ascertained according to the jurisdiction\u2019s accomplice intent requirement\u2014either specific intent<\/strong> or purposely<\/strong> or general intent<\/strong> or knowingly<\/strong>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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    Figure 5.1<\/span> Diagram of Accomplice Liability<\/p>\r\n\"Diagram<\/a>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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    Consequences of Accomplice Liability<\/h2>\r\n

    An accomplice is criminally responsible for the crime(s) the principal<\/strong> commits. Although the sentencing<\/em> may vary based on a defendant-accomplice\u2019s criminal record or other extenuating circumstances related to sentencing, such as prior strikes, in theory, the accomplice is liable to the same<\/em> degree as the principal. So if accomplice liability is established in the examples given in Section 5.1.2 \"Accomplice Elements\"<\/a>; Phoebe is criminally responsible for battery and child endangerment, Joullian is criminally responsible for prostitution, and Abel is criminally responsible for battery and possibly burglary and rape. The principal<\/strong> should also<\/em> be criminally responsible for his or her own actions. However, occasionally a situation arises where the principal is not prosecuted<\/em> or acquitted<\/em> because of a procedural technicality, evidentiary problems, or a plea bargain, as is discussed in Section 5 \"Prosecution of an Accomplice When the Principal Is Not Prosecuted or Is Acquitted\"<\/a>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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    Prosecution of an Accomplice When the Principal Is Not Prosecuted or Is Acquitted<\/h2>\r\n

    Although accomplice liability is derivative, in many jurisdictions the trier of fact can determine that a defendant is an accomplice even if the criminal actor or principal is not prosecuted or has been tried and acquitted for the offense (Standefer v. U.S., 2010). Thus a defendant can be liable for a crime even though he or she did not<\/em> commit it and the defendant who did<\/em> was spared prosecution or found not guilty<\/em>. While this situation appears anomalous, if a defendant helps another commit a crime with the intent to further the crime\u2019s commission, punishment for the completed crime is appropriate. As the Model Penal Code states, \u201c[a]n accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense\u2026or has been acquitted\u201d (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a02.06(7)).<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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    Example of Prosecution of an Accomplice When the Principal Is Not Prosecuted<\/h2>\r\n

    Review the example in Section 5 \"Example of the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine\"<\/a> with Jos\u00e9 and Abel. Assume that after Jos\u00e9 burglarizes, beats, and rapes Maria, local police arrest Jos\u00e9 and Abel. The police transport Jos\u00e9 and Abel to the police station and take them to separate rooms for interrogation. The police officer who interrogates Jos\u00e9 is a rookie and forgets to read Jos\u00e9 his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the police contact Maria, but she refuses to cooperate with the investigation because she fears reprisal from Jos\u00e9. The district attorney decides not to prosecute Jos\u00e9 because of the tainted interrogation. In this case, Abel could still be prosecuted<\/em> for battery and possibly rape and burglary as an accomplice in some jurisdictions. Although Jos\u00e9 is the principal<\/strong> and actually committed the crimes, it is not necessary for Jos\u00e9 to suffer the same criminal prosecution and punishment as Abel. If the elements required for accomplice liability are present, Abel can be fully responsible for the crimes committed by Jos\u00e9<\/em>, whether or not Jos\u00e9 is prosecuted for or convicted of these offenses.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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    Garrido Sentencing Video<\/h4>\r\n

    Attorney: Nancy Garrido in Tears during Sentencing<\/p>\r\n

    Phillip Garrido, with his wife Nancy\u2019s help, kidnapped Jaycee Dugard, an eleven-year-old girl, and held her captive for eighteen years. During that time, Dugard was repeatedly raped, became pregnant twice, and gave birth to two children. Phillip Garrido pleaded guilty to multiple charges of rape and kidnapping and received a sentence of four hundred years to life in prison. Nancy was prosecuted as an accomplice, pleaded guilty and received a sentence of thirty-six years to life in prison (Martinez, M., 2011). Nancy Garrido\u2019s attorney discusses her sentencing as an accomplice<\/strong> in this video:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    (click to see video)<\/a><\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n
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    Ghailani Verdict Video<\/h4>\r\n

    Ghailani Guilty of One Count<\/p>\r\n

    Ahmed Ghailani, an alleged terrorist, was transferred from a military prison in Guantanamo Bay and tried as a civilian in a federal district court in New York. Ghailani was indicted for accomplice liability<\/strong> and conspiracy for the deaths of hundreds of citizens killed during Al Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania. At trial, the prosecution failed to convince the jury that Ghailani had the criminal intent<\/em> required for accomplice liability. He was acquitted of the murders and attempted murders as an accomplice and convicted of one conspiracy charge. However, he received a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the conspiracy charge, the same sentence he would have received if convicted of all the murder and attempted murder charges (Weiser, B., 2011). A news story on the conviction of Ghailani is shown in this video:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    (click to see video)<\/a><\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n
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    Key Takeaways<\/h3>\r\n