{"id":1294,"date":"2017-09-27T17:43:58","date_gmt":"2017-09-27T17:43:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=1294"},"modified":"2019-02-02T15:37:23","modified_gmt":"2019-02-02T15:37:23","slug":"10-1-sex-offenses","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/","title":{"raw":"10.1 Sex Offenses","rendered":"10.1 Sex Offenses"},"content":{"raw":"&nbsp;\r\n<div>\r\n<div class=\"textbox\">\r\n\r\n<a class=\"irc_mil i3597\" href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/url?sa=i&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=images&amp;cd=&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjhyf7WzfrfAhUBvKwKHYSiDeAQjRx6BAgBEAU&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fnypost.com%2F2019%2F01%2F14%2Fchilling-details-of-jayme-closs-kidnapping-revealed%2F&amp;psig=AOvVaw1rrzy9TPbWKxMlFSvFdPPe&amp;ust=1548013413223444\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><img class=\"irc_mi\" src=\"https:\/\/thenypost.files.wordpress.com\/2019\/01\/190114-jayme-closs-kidnapping-split-feature-image.jpg?quality=90&amp;strip=all&amp;w=618&amp;h=410&amp;crop=1\" alt=\"Image result for photos of a kidnapper grabbing a child\" width=\"618\" height=\"410\" \/><\/a>\r\n<div class=\"textbox\">Jayme Closs kidnapping<\/div>\r\n<a href=\"https:\/\/goo.gl\/images\/y7Ad67\">https:\/\/goo.gl\/images\/y7Ad67<\/a>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n<div class=\"informalfigure medium block\"><\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_ep01\" class=\"epigraph block\">\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_p01\" class=\"para\"><em>Among the evils that both the common law and later statutory prohibitions against kidnapping sought to address were the isolation of a victim from the protections of society and the law and the special fear and danger inherent in such isolation.<\/em><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"attribution\">\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0--<a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=13933358391504195031&amp;q=kidnapping&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_ylo=2008\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Salaman<\/em><\/a>, cited in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"http:\/\/open.lib.umn.edu\/criminallaw\/chapter\/10-4-kidnapping-and-false-imprisonment\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s04\">Section 10.4 \"Kidnapping and False Imprisonment\"<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title\">Learning Objectives<\/h3>\r\n<ol id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\r\n \t<li>Compare common-law rape and sodomy offenses with modern rape and sodomy offenses.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Define the criminal act element required for rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Define the attendant circumstance element required for rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Ascertain the amount of resistance a victim must demonstrate to evidence lack of consent.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Ascertain whether the victim\u2019s testimony must be corroborated to convict a defendant for rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Define the criminal intent element required for rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Analyze the relationship between the criminal intent element required for rape and the mistake of fact defense allowed for rape in some jurisdictions.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Define the harm element required for rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Identify the primary components of rape shield laws.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Identify the most prevalent issues in acquaintance rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Compare spousal rape with rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Identify the elements of statutory rape, and compare statutory rape with rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Compare sodomy, oral copulation, and incest with rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Analyze sex offenses grading.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Identify the primary components of sex offender registration statutes.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In this section, you learn the elements of <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">rape<\/a><\/span> and related sex offenses and examine defenses based on <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">consent<\/strong>. In upcoming sections, you analyze the elements of other crimes involving force, fear, and physical restraint, including assault, battery, domestic violence, stalking, and kidnapping.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Synopsis of the History of Rape and Sodomy<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The word <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">rape<\/strong> has its roots in the Latin word <em class=\"emphasis\">rapere<\/em>, which means to steal or seize. At early common law, rape was a capital offense. The elements of rape were forcible sexual intercourse, by a man, with a woman not the spouse of the perpetrator, conducted without consent, or with consent obtained by force or threat of force (Macnamara, D., 2011). The rape prosecution required evidence of the defendant\u2019s use of force, extreme resistance by the victim, and evidence that corroborated the rape victim\u2019s testimony. The common law also recognized the crime of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">sodomy<\/strong>. In general, sodomy was the penetration of the male anus by a man. Sodomy was condemned and criminalized even <em class=\"emphasis\">with consent<\/em> because of religious beliefs deeming it a crime against nature (Lawbrain.com, 2011).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">In the 1970s, many changes were made to rape statutes, updating the antiquated common-law approach and increasing the chances of conviction. The most prominent changes were eliminating the marital rape exemption and the requirement of evidence to corroborate the rape victim\u2019s testimony, creating rape shield laws to protect the victim, and relaxing the necessity for the defendant\u2019s use of force or resistance by the victim (Lyon, M. R., 2011). Many jurisdictions also changed the name of rape to sexual battery, sexual assault, or unlawful sexual conduct and combined sexual offenses like rape, sodomy, and oral copulation into one statute. Although some states still have statutes that provide the death penalty for rape, the US Supreme Court has held that rape, even <em class=\"emphasis\">child rape<\/em>, cannot be considered a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">capital<\/strong> offense without violating the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause, rendering these statutes unenforceable (Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2011).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Sodomy law has likewise been updated to make sodomy a gender-neutral offense and preclude the criminalization of consensual sexual conduct between adults. The US Supreme Court has definitively held that consensual sex between adults may be protected by a right of privacy and cannot be criminalized without a sufficient government interest (Lawrence v. Texas, 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01_t01\" class=\"table block\">\r\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Table 10.1<\/span> Comparing Common Law Rape and Sodomy with Modern Statutes<\/p>\r\n\r\n<table style=\"border-spacing: 0px\" cellpadding=\"0\">\r\n<thead>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th>Crime<\/th>\r\n<th>Criminal Act<\/th>\r\n<th>Lack of Victim Consent?<\/th>\r\n<th>Victim Resistance?<\/th>\r\n<th>Other Differences<\/th>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/thead>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Common-law rape<\/td>\r\n<td>Penis-vagina penetration<\/td>\r\n<td>Yes<\/td>\r\n<td>Yes, extreme resistance<\/td>\r\n<td>Corroborative evidence required; no spousal rape; capital crime<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Modern rape<\/td>\r\n<td>Some states include any sexual penetration<\/td>\r\n<td>Yes<\/td>\r\n<td>Not if force is used, or threat of force that would deter a reasonable person from resisting (See section 10.1.2.2.2.)<\/td>\r\n<td>No corroborative evidence required; spousal rape is a crime in some jurisdictions; rape is not a capital crime.<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Common-law sodomy<\/td>\r\n<td>Male penis-male anus penetration<\/td>\r\n<td>No. Even consensual sodomy was criminal.<\/td>\r\n<td>No. Even consensual sodomy was criminal.<\/td>\r\n<td><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>Modern sodomy<\/td>\r\n<td>Gender-neutral penis-anus penetration<\/td>\r\n<td>Yes<\/td>\r\n<td>Same as modern rape, above<\/td>\r\n<td>Consensual sodomy in prison or jail is still criminal in some jurisdictions. (See section 10.1.7.)<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Elements<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In modern times, rape is a crime that has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, causation, and harm. Rape also has an attendant circumstance element, which is lack of consent by the victim.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Act<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element required for rape in many states is <em class=\"emphasis\">sexual intercourse<\/em>, accomplished by <em class=\"emphasis\">force or threat<\/em> of force (Md. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-303, 2011). Sexual intercourse is typically defined as penetration of a woman\u2019s vagina by a man\u2019s penis and can also be referred to as vaginal intercourse (Md. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-301(g), 2011). Some jurisdictions include the penetration of the woman\u2019s vagina by other body parts, like a finger, as sexual intercourse (K.S.A., 2011). The Model Penal Code defines the criminal act element required for rape as sexual intercourse that includes \u201cintercourse per os or per anum,\u201d meaning oral and anal intercourse (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0213.0(2)). In most jurisdictions, a man or a woman can commit rape (K.S.A., 2011).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Although it is common to include force or threat of force as an indispensible part of the rape criminal act, some modern statutes expand the crime of rape to include situations where the defendant does <em class=\"emphasis\">not<\/em> use force or threat, but the victim is <em class=\"emphasis\">extremely vulnerable<\/em>, such as an intoxicated victim, an unconscious victim, or a victim who is of tender years (K.S.A., 2011). The Model Penal Code includes force, threat of force, and situations where the defendant has impaired the victim\u2019s power to control conduct by administering intoxicants or drugs without the victim\u2019s knowledge or sexual intercourse with an unconscious female or a female who is fewer than ten years old (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0213.1(1)). Other statutes may criminalize <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">unforced<\/strong> <em class=\"emphasis\">nonconsensual<\/em> sexual intercourse or other forms of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">unforced<\/strong> <em class=\"emphasis\">nonconsensual<\/em> sexual contact as less serious forms of rape with reduced sentencing options (N.Y. Penal Law, 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Rape Act<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Alex and Brad play video games while Brad\u2019s sister Brandy watches. Brad tells Alex he is going to go the store and purchase some beer. While Brad is gone, Alex turns to Brandy, pulls a knife out of his pocket, and tells her to take off her pants and lie down. Brandy tells Alex, \u201cNo, I don\u2019t want to,\u201d but thereafter acquiesces, and Alex puts his penis into Brandy\u2019s vagina. Alex has probably committed the criminal act element required for rape in most jurisdictions. Although Alex did not use physical force to accomplish sexual intercourse, his <em class=\"emphasis\">threat<\/em> of force by display of the knife is sufficient. If the situation is reversed, and Brandy pulls out the knife and orders Alex to put his penis in her vagina, many jurisdictions would also criminalize Brandy\u2019s criminal act as rape. If Alex does not use force or a threat of force, but Brandy is only nine years old, some jurisdictions still criminalize Alex\u2019s act as rape, as would the Model Penal Code.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Attendant Circumstance<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In many jurisdictions, the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">attendant circumstance<\/strong> element required for rape is <em class=\"emphasis\">the victim\u2019s lack of consent<\/em> to the defendant\u2019s act (Md. Code Ann \u00a7 3-304, 2011). Thus victim\u2019s consent could operate as a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">failure of proof<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">affirmative defense<\/strong>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Proving Lack of Consent as an Attendant Circumstance<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Proving lack of consent has two components. First, the victim must be legally <em class=\"emphasis\">capable<\/em> of giving consent. If the victim is under the age of consent or is mentally or intellectually impaired because of a permanent condition, intoxication, or drugs, the prosecution does not have to prove lack of consent in many jurisdictions (K.S.A., 2011). Sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of consent is a separate crime, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">statutory rape<\/strong>, which is discussed shortly.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The second component to proving lack of consent is separating true consent from consent rendered <em class=\"emphasis\">involuntarily<\/em>. Involuntary consent is present in two situations. First, if the victim consents to the defendant\u2019s act because of fraud or trickery\u2014for example, when the victim is unaware of the <em class=\"emphasis\">nature<\/em> of the act of sexual intercourse\u2014the consent is involuntary. A victim is generally unaware of the nature of the act of sexual intercourse when a doctor shams a <em class=\"emphasis\">medical procedure<\/em> (Iowa v. Vander Esch, 2011). This is called <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">fraud in the factum<\/a><\/span>. <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Fraud in the inducement<\/a><\/span>, which is a fraudulent representation as to the <em class=\"emphasis\">circumstances<\/em> accompanying the sexual conduct, does not render the consent involuntary in many jurisdictions. An example of fraud in the inducement is a defendant\u2019s false statement that the sexual intercourse will <em class=\"emphasis\">cure<\/em> a medical condition (Boro v. Superior Court, 2011).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">A more common example of involuntary consent is when the victim consents to the defendant\u2019s act because of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">force<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">threat<\/strong> of force. The prosecution generally proves this type of consent is involuntary by introducing evidence of the victim\u2019s <em class=\"emphasis\">resistance<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div style=\"text-align: center\">\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01_f01\" class=\"figure large medium-height editable block\">\r\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.1<\/span> Diagram of Consent<\/p>\r\n<a href=\"\/criminallaw\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/179\/2015\/11\/3d6b0c47d90c633c448e874c969ee205.jpg\"><img src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2479\/2017\/09\/26210034\/3d6b0c47d90c633c448e874c969ee205.jpg\" alt=\"Diagram of Consent. True consent to sexual intercourse: victim cannot be under the age of consent, victim cannot be mentally impaired, victim consent cannot be based on force or threat\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Proving Involuntary Consent by the Victim\u2019s Resistance<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Under the common law, the victim had to manifest <em class=\"emphasis\">extreme resistance<\/em> to indicate lack of consent. In modern times, the victim does not have to fight back or otherwise endanger his or her life if it would be futile to do so. In most jurisdictions, the victim only needs to resist to the same extent as a reasonable person under similar circumstances, which is an objective standard (Del. Code Ann. tit. II, \u00a7 761(j), 2011).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The use of force by the defendant could eliminate <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> requirement of victim resistance to prove lack of consent (N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 130.05, 2011). If the defendant obtains consent using a <em class=\"emphasis\">threat<\/em> of force, rather than force, the victim may not have to resist if the victim experiences subjective fear of serious bodily injury, and a reasonable person under similar circumstances would not resist, which is an objective standard (Minn. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 609.343(c), 2011). Threat of force can be accomplished by words, weapons, or gestures. It can also be present when there is a discrepancy in size or age between the defendant and the victim or if the sexual encounter takes place in an isolated location. The Model Penal Code considers it a felony of the third degree and gross sexual imposition when a male has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife by compelling \u201cher to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution\u201d (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0213.1(2)(a)). Note that the Model Penal Code\u2019s position does not require the threat to be a <em class=\"emphasis\">threat of force<\/em>; it can be <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> type of threat that prevents physical resistance.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">If the victim does not physically resist the criminal act, the prosecution must prove that the victim affirmatively indicated lack of consent in some other manner. This could be a verbal response, such as saying, \u201cNo,\u201d but the verbal response must be unequivocal. In the most extreme case, at least one court has held that a verbal \u201cNo\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">during the act<\/em> of sexual intercourse is sufficient, and the defendant who <em class=\"emphasis\">continues<\/em> with sexual intercourse after being told \u201cNo\u201d is committing the criminal act of rape (In re John Z., 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02_f01\" class=\"figure large editable block\" style=\"max-width: 600px;margin: auto\">\r\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.2<\/span> Proving Lack of Consent<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th>Proving<\/th>\r\n<td><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th>Lack of<\/th>\r\n<td><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th>Consent<\/th>\r\n<td><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">The Requirement of Corroborative Evidence<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">At early common law, a victim\u2019s testimony was insufficient evidence to meet the burden of proving the elements of rape, including lack of consent. The victim\u2019s testimony had to be supported by additional <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">corroborative evidence<\/a><\/span>. Modern jurisdictions have done away with the corroborative evidence requirement and allow the trier of fact to determine the elements of rape or lack of consent based on the victim\u2019s testimony alone (State v. Borthwick, 2011). However, statistics indicate that rape prosecutions often result in acquittal. Thus although technically the victim\u2019s testimony need not be corroborated, it is paramount that the victim <em class=\"emphasis\">promptly report<\/em> the rape to the appropriate authorities and submit to testing and interrogation to preserve any and all forms of relevant rape evidence.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s04\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Rape Attendant Circumstance<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Review the example with Brandy and Alex in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01\">Section 10 \"Example of Rape Act\"<\/a>. In this example, after an initial protest, Brandy lies down, takes off her pants, and allows Alex to put his penis in her vagina when he pulls out a knife. It is likely that the trier of fact will find the rape attendant circumstance in this case. Although Brandy acquiesced to Alex\u2019s demands <em class=\"emphasis\">without resisting<\/em>, she did so after Alex took a knife out of his pocket, which is a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">threat<\/strong> of force. In addition, Brandy expressed her lack of consent verbally before submitting to Alex\u2019s demand. A trier of fact could determine that Brandy experienced a fear of serious bodily injury from Alex\u2019s display of the knife, and that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would give in to Alex\u2019s demands without physical resistance.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s04_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Change this example and assume that after Brad leaves, Alex asks Brandy to have sexual intercourse with him. Brandy responds, \u201cNo,\u201d but allows Alex to remove her pants and put his penis in her vagina without physically resisting. The trier of fact must make the determination of whether Alex accomplished the sexual act by force or threat of force and without Brandy\u2019s consent. If Brandy testifies that she said \u201cNo\u201d and did not consent to Alex\u2019s act, and Alex testifies that Brandy\u2019s verbal response was insufficient to indicate lack of consent, the trier of fact must resolve this issue of fact, and it can do so based on Brandy\u2019s testimony, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">uncorroborated<\/strong>, in many jurisdictions. The trier of fact can use the criteria of the difference in age and size between Brandy and Alex, any gestures or words indicating force or threat, and the location and isolation of the incident, among other factors.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Intent<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The criminal intent element required for rape in most jurisdictions is the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">general intent<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">knowingly<\/strong> to perform the rape criminal act (State v. Lile, 2011). This may include the intent to use force to accomplish the objective if the state\u2019s rape statute includes force or threat of force as a component of the criminal act.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">As <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/4-1-criminal-elements\">Chapter 4 \"The Elements of a Crime\"<\/a> stated, occasionally, a different criminal intent supports the other elements of an offense. In some states, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">negligent<\/strong> intent supports the rape attendant circumstance of lack of victim consent. This creates a viable <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">mistake of fact<\/strong> defense if the defendant has an incorrect perception as to the victim\u2019s consent. To be successful with this defense, the facts must indicate that the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that the victim consented to the rape criminal act (People v. Mayberry, 2011). Many jurisdictions expressly disallow the defense, requiring <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">strict liability<\/strong> intent for the lack of consent attendant circumstance (State v. Plunkett, 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Rape Intent<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Review the example with Alex and Brandy in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01\">Section 10 \"Example of Rape Act\"<\/a>. Change the example so that Alex does not display a knife and simply asks Brandy if she would like to have sex with him. Brandy does not respond. Alex walks over to Brandy and removes her pants. Brandy does not protest or physically resist. Thereafter, Alex asks Brandy if she \u201clikes it rough.\u201d Brandy remains silent. Alex physically and forcibly puts his penis in Brandy\u2019s vagina. In states that allow a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">negligent<\/strong> intent to support the attendant circumstance of rape, Alex may be able to successfully assert <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">mistake of fact<\/strong> as a defense. It appears that Alex has with general intent or knowingly committed forcible sexual intercourse, based on his actions. In most jurisdictions, the jury could be instructed on an <em class=\"emphasis\">inference<\/em> of this intent from Alex\u2019s behavior under the circumstances. However, if <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">negligent<\/strong> intent is required to support the <em class=\"emphasis\">attendant circumstance<\/em> of the victim\u2019s lack of consent, the trier of fact may find that Alex\u2019s mistake as to Brandy\u2019s consent was honest and reasonable, based on her lack of response or physical resistance. If Alex is in a jurisdiction that requires <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">strict liability<\/strong> intent to support the attendant circumstance element, Alex cannot raise the defense because Alex\u2019s belief as to Brandy\u2019s consent would be irrelevant.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s04\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Causation<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The defendant\u2019s criminal act must be the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">factual<\/strong> and <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">legal cause<\/strong> of the harm, which is defined in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05\">Section 10 \"Rape Harm\"<\/a>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Harm<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">harm<\/strong> element of rape in most jurisdictions is <em class=\"emphasis\">penetration<\/em>, no matter how slight (Idaho Code Ann. \u00a7 18-6101, 2011). This precludes virginity as a defense. In addition, modern statutes do not require male ejaculation, which precludes lack of semen as a defense (Ala. Code \u00a7 13A-6-69, 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Rape Harm<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Review the example with Alex and Brandy in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01\">Section 10 \"Example of Rape Act\"<\/a>. Assume that Brad walks into the room while Alex and Brandy are engaging in sexual intercourse. Brad tackles Alex and pulls him off Brandy. Alex may be charged with rape, not <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">attempted<\/strong> rape, in most jurisdictions. The fact that Alex did not ejaculate does not affect the rape analysis in any way because most jurisdictions do not require ejaculation as a component of the harm element of rape.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Shield Laws<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Rape prosecutions can be extremely stressful for the victim, especially when the defendant pursues a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">consent<\/strong> defense. Before the comprehensive rape reforms of the 1970s, rape defendants would proffer any evidence they could find to indicate that the victim was sexually promiscuous and prone to consenting to sexual intercourse. Fearing humiliation, many rape victims kept their rape a secret, not reporting it to law enforcement. This allowed serial rapists to escape punishment and did not serve our criminal justice goal of deterrence.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">In modern times, most states protect rape victims with <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">rape shield laws<\/a><\/span>. Rape shield laws prohibit the admission of evidence of the victim\u2019s past sexual conduct to prove consent in a rape trial, unless the judge allows it in a pretrial <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">in camera<\/a><\/span> hearing, outside the presence of the jury. Rape shield laws could include the additional protections of the exclusion of evidence relating to the victim\u2019s style of dress to prove consent, the exclusion of evidence that the victim requested the defendant to wear a condom to prove consent, and the affirmation that a victim\u2019s testimony in a rape trial need not be corroborated by other evidence (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 794.022, 2011). Most courts permit the admission of evidence proving the victim\u2019s previous consensual sex <em class=\"emphasis\">with the defendant<\/em> because this evidence is particularly relevant to any consent defense (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann \u00a7 18-3-497(1), 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of the Effect of a Rape Shield Law<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Review the example with Alex and Brandy in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_s01\">Section 10 \"Example of Rape Intent\"<\/a>. Assume that the jurisdiction in which the example takes place has a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">rape shield law<\/strong>. If Alex is put on trial for the rape of Brandy and he decides to pursue a consent defense, Alex would <em class=\"emphasis\">not<\/em> be able to introduce evidence of Brandy\u2019s sexual history with <em class=\"emphasis\">other men<\/em> unless he receives approval from a judge in an in camera hearing before the trial.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title\">Law and Ethics<\/h3>\r\n<p class=\"simpara\">Should the Media Be Permitted to Publish Negative Information about a Rape Victim?<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_p02\" class=\"para\">In 2003, Kobe Bryant, a professional basketball player, was indicted for sexually assaulting a nineteen-year-old hotel desk clerk. A mistake by a court reporter listed the accuser\u2019s name on a court website (MSNBC.com, 2011). The court removed the victim\u2019s name after discovery of the mistake, but the damage was done. Thereafter, in spite of a court order prohibiting the publication of the accuser\u2019s name, the media, including radio, newspaper, Internet, and television, published the accuser\u2019s name, phone number, address, and e-mail address (Kenworty, T. &amp; O'Driscoll, P., 2011). Products like underwear, t-shirts, and coffee mugs with pictures of the accuser and Bryant in sexual positions were widely available for sale, and the accuser received constant harassment, including death threats (Haddad, R., 2011). Although the Colorado Supreme Court ordered pretrial in camera transcripts of hearings pursuant to Colorado\u2019s rape shield law to remain confidential, an order that was confirmed by the US Supreme Court (Associated Press et. al. v. District Court for the Fifth Judicial Distric of Colorado, 2011), the accuser was subjected to so much negative publicity that she eventually refused to cooperate and the prosecution dropped the charges in 2004.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\r\n \t<li>Do you think <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">rape shield laws<\/strong> should include prohibitions against negative publicity? What are the <em class=\"emphasis\">constitutional<\/em> ramifications of this particular type of statutory protection?<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_p03\" class=\"para\">Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Kobe Bryant Video<\/h4>\r\n<p class=\"simpara\">Kobe Claims Innocence to Sexual Assault Charges<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_p04\" class=\"para\">Kobe Bryant and his attorney discuss the charge of rape filed against Kobe in this video:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"mediaobject\"><a class=\"replaced-iframe\" href=\"http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/v\/SSamEqtPVao\">(click to see video)<\/a><\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s04\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Acquaintance Rape<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In modern times, rape defendants are frequently known to the victim, which may change the factual situation significantly from stranger rape. <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Acquaintance rape<\/a><\/span>, also called <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">date rape<\/strong>, is a phenomenon that could increase a victim\u2019s reluctance to report the crime and could also affect the defendant\u2019s need to use force and the victim\u2019s propensity to physically resist (The National Center for Victims of Crime, 2011). Although studies indicate that acquaintance rape is on the rise (The National Center for Victims of Crime, 2011), statutes have not entirely addressed the issues presented in an acquaintance rape fact pattern. To adequately punish and deter acquaintance or date rape, rape statutes should punish <em class=\"emphasis\">nonforcible<\/em>, <em class=\"emphasis\">nonconsensual<\/em> sexual conduct <em class=\"emphasis\">as severely<\/em> as forcible rape. Although the majority of states still require forcible sexual intercourse as the rape criminal act element, at least one modern court has rejected the necessity of any force other than what is required to accomplish the sexual intercourse (State of New Jersey in the Interest of M.T.S., 2011). Some rape statutes have also eliminated the requirement that the defendant use force and punish <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> sexual intercourse without consent as rape (Utah Code Ann \u00a7 76-5-402(1).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s05\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Spousal Rape<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s05_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">As stated previously, at early common law, a man could not rape his spouse. The policy supporting this exemption can be traced to a famous seventeenth-century jurist, Matthew Hale, who wrote, \u201c[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract\u201d (Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, p. 629). During the rape reforms of the 1970s, many states eliminated the marital or <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">spousal rape<\/a><\/span> exemption, in spite of the fact that the Model Penal Code does <em class=\"emphasis\">not<\/em> recognize spousal rape. At least one court has held that the spousal rape exemption violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates against <em class=\"emphasis\">single men<\/em> without a sufficient government interest (People v. Liberta, 2011). In several states that criminalize spousal rape, the criminal act, criminal intent, attendant circumstance, causation, and harm elements are exactly the same as the elements of forcible rape (N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 632-A, 2011). Many states also <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">grade<\/strong> spousal rape the same as forcible rape\u2014as a serious felony (Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 76-5-402(2), 2011). Grading of sex offenses is discussed shortly.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Statutory Rape<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_p01\" class=\"para editable block\"><span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Statutory rape<\/a><\/span>, also called <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">unlawful sexual intercourse<\/strong>, criminalizes sexual intercourse with a victim who is under the age of legal consent. The age of legal consent varies from state to state and is most commonly sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen (Age of Consent Chart for the U.S.-2010, 2011).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element required for statutory rape in many jurisdictions is sexual intercourse, although other types of sexual conduct with a victim below the age of consent are also criminal (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">harm<\/strong> element of statutory rape also varies, although many jurisdictions mirror the harm element required for rape (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">attendant circumstance<\/strong> element required for statutory rape is an underage victim (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 261.5, 2011). There is no requirement for <em class=\"emphasis\">force<\/em> by the defendant. Nor is there an attendant circumstance element of lack of consent because the victim is incapable of legally consenting.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">In the majority of states, the criminal intent element of statutory rape is <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">strict liability<\/strong> (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 14-80, 2011). However, a minority of states require <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">reckless<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">negligent<\/strong> criminal intent, allowing for the defense of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">mistake of fact<\/strong> as to the victim\u2019s age. If the jurisdiction recognizes mistake of age as a defense, the mistake must be made <em class=\"emphasis\">reasonably<\/em>, and the defendant must take <em class=\"emphasis\">reasonable<\/em> measures to verify the victim\u2019s age (Alaska Stat \u00a7 11.41.445(b), 2011). The mistake of age defense can be proven by evidence of a falsified identification, witness testimony that the victim lied about his or her age to the defendant, or even the appearance of the victim.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">It is much more common to prosecute males for statutory rape than females. The historical reason for this selective prosecution is the policy of preventing teenage pregnancy (Michael M. v. Superior Court, 2011). However, modern statutory rape statutes are gender-neutral (N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 130.30, 2011). This ensures that women, especially women who are older than their sexual partner, are equally subject to prosecution.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Statutory Rape<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Gary meets Michelle in a nightclub that only allows entrance to patrons eighteen and over. Gary and Michelle end up spending the evening together, and later they go to Gary\u2019s apartment where they have consensual sexual intercourse. In reality, Michelle is actually fifteen and was using false identification to enter the nightclub. If Gary and Michelle are in a state that requires <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">strict liability<\/strong> for the criminal intent element of statutory rape, Gary can be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense if fifteen is under the age of legal consent. If Gary and Michelle are in a state that allows for <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">mistake of age<\/strong> as a defense, Gary could use Michelle\u2019s presence in the nightclub as evidence that he acted <em class=\"emphasis\">reasonably<\/em> in believing that Michelle was capable of rendering legal consent. If both Gary and Michelle used false identification to enter the nightclub, and both Gary and Michelle are under the age of legal consent, <em class=\"emphasis\">both<\/em> could be prosecuted for and convicted of statutory rape in most jurisdictions because modern statutory rape statutes are gender-neutral.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_s01_f01\" class=\"figure large medium-height editable block\">\r\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.3<\/span> Comparison of Rape and Statutory Rape<\/p>\r\n<a href=\"\/criminallaw\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/179\/2015\/11\/3ab01d69fcce2a380877fef2669e36d9.jpg\"><img src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2479\/2017\/09\/26210039\/3ab01d69fcce2a380877fef2669e36d9.jpg\" alt=\"Comparison of Rape and Statutory Rape\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Sodomy and Oral Copulation<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">As stated previously, some states include rape, <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">sodomy<\/a><\/span>, and <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">oral copulation<\/a><\/span> in a sexual assault or sexual conduct statute that criminalizes a variety of sexual acts involving penetration (Alaska Stat. \u00a7 11.41.410, 2011). In states that distinguish between rape and sodomy, the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element of sodomy is often defined as forcible <em class=\"emphasis\">penis to anus<\/em> penetration (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 286(a), 2011). Typically, the other sodomy elements, including the lack of consent attendant circumstance, criminal intent, causation, and harm, are the same as the elements of rape. Many jurisdictions also <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">grade<\/strong> sodomy the same as rape. Grading is discussed shortly.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Sodomy that is <em class=\"emphasis\">nonforcible<\/em> but committed with an individual below the age of legal consent is also criminal (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 286(b), 2011). As stated previously, the US Supreme Court has held that statutes criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults unreasonably encroach on a right to privacy without a sufficient government interest (Lawrence v. Texas, 2011). In some states, consensual nonforcible sodomy is criminal if it is committed in a <em class=\"emphasis\">state penitentiary<\/em> or <em class=\"emphasis\">local detention facility<\/em> or <em class=\"emphasis\">jail<\/em> (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 286(c), 2011).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">In states that distinguish between rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element of oral copulation is forcible <em class=\"emphasis\">mouth to sexual organ<\/em> or <em class=\"emphasis\">anus<\/em> penetration (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 288a, 2011). Typically, the other oral copulation elements, including the lack of consent attendant circumstance, criminal intent, causation, and harm, are the same as the elements of rape. Many jurisdictions also <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">grade<\/strong> oral copulation the same as rape. Grading is discussed shortly.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">A few states still criminalize oral copulation with consent (Ala. Code \u00a7 13A-6-65, 2011). Based on the US Supreme Court precedent relating to sodomy, these statutes may be unenforceable and unconstitutional.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s08\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Incest<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s08_p01\" class=\"para editable block\"><span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Incest<\/a><\/span> is also criminal in many jurisdictions. The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element required for incest is typically sexual intercourse (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 826.04, 2011). The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">attendant circumstance<\/strong> element required for incest is a victim the defendant cannot legally marry because of a family relationship (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11 \u00a7 766, 2011). In the majority of jurisdictions, <em class=\"emphasis\">force<\/em> is not required, and <em class=\"emphasis\">consent<\/em> is not an attendant circumstance element of incest (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, 2011). Thus consent by the victim cannot operate as a defense. If the sexual intercourse with a family member is forcible and nonconsensual, the defendant could be charged with and convicted of rape. The criminal intent element required for incest is typically <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">general intent<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">knowingly<\/strong> (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 826.04, 2011). The causation and harm elements of incest are generally the same as the causation and harm elements of rape (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 826.04, 2011). However, incest is generally <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">graded<\/strong> lower than forcible rape or sexual assault because force and lack of consent are not required (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7 766, 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s08_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Incest<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s08_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Hal and Harriet, brother and sister, have consensual sexual intercourse. Both Hal and Harriet are above the age of legal consent. In spite of the fact that there was no force, threat of force, or fraud, and both parties consented to the sexual act, Hal and Harriet could be charged with and convicted of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">incest<\/strong> in many jurisdictions, based on their <em class=\"emphasis\">family relationship<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s09\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Sex Offenses Grading<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s09_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Jurisdictions vary when it comes to <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">grading<\/strong> sex offenses. In general, forcible sex crimes involving penetration are graded as serious felonies. Factors that could aggravate grading are gang rape (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 794.023, 2011), the infliction of bodily injury, the use of a weapon, a youthful victim, the commission of other crimes in concert with the sexual offense, or a victim who has mental or intellectual disabilities or who has been compromised by intoxicants (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7 773, 2011). The Model Penal Code grades rape as a felony of the second degree unless the actor inflicts serious bodily injury on the victim or another, or the defendant is a stranger to the victim, in which case the grading is elevated to a felony of the first degree (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0213.1 (1)).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s09_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Sexual offenses that do not include penetration are graded lower (N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 130.52, 2011), along with offenses that could be consensual (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7 766, 2011). Sex offense statutes that criminalize sexual conduct with a victim below the age of legal consent often grade the offense more severely when there is a large age difference between the defendant and the victim, when the defendant is an adult, or the victim is of tender years (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 261.5, 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s09_f01\" class=\"figure large editable block\" style=\"max-width: 600px;margin: auto\">\r\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.4<\/span> Diagram of Sex Offenses<\/p>\r\n<a href=\"\/criminallaw\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/179\/2015\/11\/bc5debe80c455a0db89aa6c076e451b9.jpg\"><img src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2479\/2017\/09\/26210047\/bc5debe80c455a0db89aa6c076e451b9.jpg\" alt=\"Diagram of Sex Offenses\" \/><\/a>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Sex Offender Registration Statutes<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Based on a public awareness that sex offenders often reoffend, many states have enacted some form of <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Megan\u2019s law<\/a><\/span> or <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Jessica\u2019s law<\/a><\/span>, which provide for registration, monitoring, control, and elevated sentencing for sex offenders, including those that harm children. Both laws were written and enacted after high-profile cases with child victims became the subject of enormous media attention. Megan\u2019s and Jessica\u2019s law statutes enhance previously enacted statutes that require the registration of sex offenders with local law enforcement agencies.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Typically, a Megan\u2019s law statute provides for registration and notification to the public that a convicted sex offender lives in their area (42 Pa. C. S. \u00a7 9799.1, 2011). A Jessica\u2019s law statute often includes a stay-away order, mandating that a sex offender cannot live within a certain distance from areas such as a school or park where children tend to congregate. Jessica\u2019s law statutes also provide for GPS monitoring and extend the sentencing and parole terms of child sex offenders (Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 19.2-295.2:1, 2011).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_f01\" class=\"figure large editable block\" style=\"max-width: 600px;margin: auto\">\r\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.5<\/span> Diagram of Megan\u2019s and Jessica\u2019s Law Statutes<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<table>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th>Megan's Law<\/th>\r\n<td><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<th>Jessica's Law<\/th>\r\n<td><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-success\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title\">Key Takeaways<\/h3>\r\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_l01\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\r\n \t<li>Common-law rape was a capital offense, did not include rape of a spouse, required extreme resistance by the victim, and required evidence to corroborate a victim\u2019s testimony. Modern statutes do not make rape a capital offense, often criminalize spousal rape, and do not require extreme resistance by the victim or evidence to corroborate the victim\u2019s testimony. At early common law, sodomy was the anal penetration of a man, by a man. Modern statutes make sodomy gender-neutral and only criminalize sodomy without consent.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The criminal act element required for rape is sexual penetration accomplished with force or threat of force in many jurisdictions.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The attendant circumstance element required for rape is lack of consent by the victim.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>In many jurisdictions, the victim does not need to resist if the defendant uses force. If the victim is faced with a threat of force rather than force, the victim need not resist if he or she has a subjective fear of serious bodily injury, and this fear is reasonable under the circumstances.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>In modern times, a victim\u2019s testimony does not need to be corroborated by other evidence to convict a defendant of rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The criminal intent element required for rape is general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>In some jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for the rape attendant circumstance is negligent intent\u2014providing for a defense of mistake of fact as to the victim\u2019s consent. In other jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for the rape attendant circumstance is strict liability, which does not allow for the mistake of fact defense.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The harm element required for rape is penetration, no matter how slight. Ejaculation is not a requirement for rape in most jurisdictions.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Rape shield laws generally preclude the admission of evidence of the victim\u2019s past sexual conduct in a rape trial, unless it is allowed by a judge at an in camera hearing. Rape shield laws also preclude the admission of evidence of the victim\u2019s style of dress and the victim\u2019s request that the defendant wear a condom to prove victim consent. Some rape shield laws provide that the victim\u2019s testimony need not be corroborated by other evidence to convict the defendant of rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Acquaintance rape often goes unreported and does not necessarily include use of force by the defendant or resistance by the victim.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>States that criminalize spousal rape generally require the same elements for spousal rape as for rape and grade spousal rape the same as rape.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Statutory rape is generally sexual intercourse with a victim who is under the age of legal consent. Statutory rape does not have the requirement that the intercourse be forcible and does not require the attendant circumstance of the victim\u2019s lack of consent because the victim is incapable of rendering legal consent. In the majority of jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for statutory rape is strict liability. In a minority of jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for statutory rape is negligent or reckless intent, providing for a defense of mistake of fact as to the victim\u2019s age.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Sodomy has the same elements as rape except for the criminal act element, which is often defined as forcible penis to anus penetration, rather than penis to vagina penetration. In addition, in some states sodomy is criminal with consent when it occurs in a state prison or a local detention facility or jail. Oral copulation also has the same elements as rape, except for the criminal act element, which is forcible mouth to sexual organ or anus penetration. Incest is sexual intercourse between family members who cannot legally marry.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Generally, rape, sodomy, and oral copulation are graded as serious felonies. Factors that enhance grading of sex offenses are penetration, gang rape, bodily injury, the use of a weapon, a victim who has intellectual or mental disabilities or is youthful or intoxicated, and the commission of other crimes in concert with the sex offense. Sex offenses committed with the victim\u2019s consent and without penetration are typically graded lower. If the victim is below the age of consent, a large age difference exists between the defendant and the victim, the defendant is an adult, or the victim is of tender years, grading typically is enhanced.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Typically, a Megan\u2019s law statute provides for sex offender registration and notification to the public that a convicted sex offender lives in their area. A Jessica\u2019s law statute often includes a stay-away order mandating that a sex offender cannot live within a certain distance from areas such as a school or park where children tend to congregate. Jessica\u2019s law statutes also provide for GPS monitoring and extend the sentencing and parole terms of child sex offenders.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\r\n<h3 class=\"title\">Exercises<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_p03\" class=\"para\">Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_l02\" class=\"orderedlist\">\r\n \t<li>Jorge and Christina have consensual sexual intercourse. Could this consensual sexual intercourse be criminal? Which crime(s), if any, could exist in this fact pattern?<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Read <em class=\"emphasis\">Toomer v. State<\/em>, 529 SE 2d 719 (2000). In <em class=\"emphasis\">Toomer<\/em>, the defendant was convicted of rape after having sexual intercourse with his daughter, who was under the age of fourteen. The jury instruction did not include any requirement for the defendant\u2019s use of force or victim resistance. The defendant appealed and claimed that the prosecution should have proven he used force and the victim\u2019s resistance because the charge was <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">rape<\/strong>, not <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">statutory rape<\/strong>. Did the Supreme Court of South Carolina uphold the defendant\u2019s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=3593808516097562509&amp;q=Toomer+v.+State&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=3593808516097562509&amp;q= Toomer+v.+State&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Read <em class=\"emphasis\">Fleming v. State<\/em>, 323 SW 3d 540 (2010). In <em class=\"emphasis\">Fleming<\/em>, the defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen because he was not allowed to present a mistake of age defense. The defendant claimed that the requirement of strict liability intent as to the age of the victim deprived him of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">due process of law<\/strong>. Did the Court of Appeals of Texas agree with the defendant? The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=12908572719333538188&amp;q=%22Scott+v.+State+36+SW+3d+240%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=12908572719333538188&amp;q= %22Scott+v.+State+36+SW+3d+240%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5<\/a>.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<h2>References<\/h2>\r\nAge of Consent Chart for the U.S.-2010, Ageofconsent.us website, accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.ageofconsent.us\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.ageofconsent.us<\/a>.\r\n\r\nAla. Code \u00a7\u00a013A-6-60, accessed February 11, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alabama\/codes\/2009\/Title13A\/Chapter6\/13A-6-60.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alabama\/codes\/2009\/Title13A\/Chapter6\/13A-6-60.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nAla. Code \u00a7\u00a013A-6-65, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.legislature.state.al.us\/CodeofAlabama\/1975\/13A-6-65.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.legislature.state.al.us\/CodeofAlabama\/1975\/13A-6-65.htm<\/a>.\r\n\r\nAlaska Stat. \u00a7\u00a011.41.410, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alaska\/codes\/2009\/title-11\/chapter-11-41\/article-04\/sec-11-41-410\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alaska\/codes\/2009\/title-11\/chapter-11-41\/article-04\/sec-11-41-410<\/a>.\r\n\r\nAlaska Stat. \u00a7\u00a011.41.445(b), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alaska\/codes\/2009\/title-11\/chapter-11-41\/article-04\/sec-11-41-445\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alaska\/codes\/2009\/title-11\/chapter-11-41\/article-04\/sec-11-41-445<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">Associated Press et. al. v. District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of Colorado<\/em>, 542 U.S. 1301 (2004), accessed February 27, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/ftp.resource.org\/courts.gov\/c\/US\/542\/542.US.1301.04.73.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/ftp.resource.org\/courts.gov\/c\/US\/542\/542.US.1301.04.73.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">Boro v. Superior Court<\/em>, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1985), accessed February 17, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=8450241145233624189&amp;q=Boro+v.+Superior+Court&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=8450241145233624189&amp;q= Boro+v.+Superior+Court&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5<\/a>.\r\n\r\nCal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0261.5, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/california\/penal\/261.5.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/california\/penal\/261.5.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nCal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0286(a), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nCal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0286(b), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nCal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0286(c) (3) (e), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nCal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0288a, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/california\/penal\/288a.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/california\/penal\/288a.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a018-3-407(1) (a), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.michie.com\/colorado\/lpext.dll?f=templates&amp;fn=main-h.htm&amp;cp=\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.michie.com\/colorado\/lpext.dll?f=templates&amp;fn=main-h.htm&amp;cp=<\/a>.\r\n\r\nDel. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7\u00a0766, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nDel. Code Ann. tit. II, \u00a7\u00a0761(j) (1), accessed February 9, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/delcode.delaware.gov\/title11\/c005\/sc02\/index.shtml#761\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/delcode.delaware.gov\/title11\/c005\/sc02\/index.shtml#761<\/a>.\r\n\r\nDel. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7\u00a0766, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nDel. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7\u00a0773, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nFla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0794.022, accessed February 11, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/florida\/codes\/2010\/TitleXLVI\/chapter794\/794_022.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/florida\/codes\/2010\/TitleXLVI\/chapter794\/794_022.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nFla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0794.023, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/florida\/crimes\/794.023.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/florida\/crimes\/794.023.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nFla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0826.04, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/florida\/crimes\/826.04.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/florida\/crimes\/826.04.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nHaddad, R., \u201cShield or Sieve? People v. Bryant and the Rape Shield Law in High-Profile Cases,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems<\/em>, accessed February 27, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.columbia.edu\/cu\/jlsp\/pdf\/Spring2%202006\/Haddad10.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.columbia.edu\/cu\/jlsp\/pdf\/Spring2%202006\/Haddad10.pdf<\/a>.\r\n\r\nIdaho Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a018-6101, accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.legislature.idaho.gov\/idstat\/Title18\/T18CH61SECT18-6101.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.legislature.idaho.gov\/idstat\/Title18\/T18CH61SECT18-6101.htm<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">In re John Z.<\/em>, 29 Cal. 4th 756 (2003), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scocal.stanford.edu\/opinion\/re-john-z-32309\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scocal.stanford.edu\/opinion\/re-john-z-32309<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">Iowa v. Vander Esch<\/em>, 662 N.W. 2d 689 (2002), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=4906781834239023314&amp;q=rape+%22fraud+in+the+inducement%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_ylo=2002\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=4906781834239023314&amp;q= rape+%22fraud+in+the+inducement%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_ylo=2002<\/a>.\r\n\r\nJayme Closs kidnapping,<span style=\"color: #3366ff\"> https:\/\/goo.gl\/images\/y7Ad67<span style=\"color: #373d3f\">.<\/span><\/span>\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">Kennedy v. Louisiana<\/em>, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/2000-2009\/2007\/2007_07_343\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/2000-2009\/2007\/2007_07_343<\/a>.\r\n\r\nK.S.A. \u00a7\u00a021-3501(1), accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/kansas\/codes\/2006\/chapter21\/statute_11553.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/kansas\/codes\/2006\/chapter21\/statute_11553.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nKenworty, T., Patrick O\u2019Driscoll, \u201cJudge Dismisses Bryant Rape Case,\u201d USAtoday.com website, accessed February 27, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/sports\/basketball\/nba\/2004-09-01-kobe-bryant-case_x.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/sports\/basketball\/nba\/2004-09-01-kobe-bryant-case_x.htm<\/a>.\r\n\r\nLa. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a014-80, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/louisiana\/codes\/2009\/rs\/title14\/rs14-80.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/louisiana\/codes\/2009\/rs\/title14\/rs14-80.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nLawbrain.com website, \u201cSex Offenses,\u201d accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/lawbrain.com\/wiki\/Sex_Offenses\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/lawbrain.com\/wiki\/Sex_Offenses<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">Lawrence v. Texas<\/em>, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/2000-2009\/2002\/2002_02_102\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/2000-2009\/2002\/2002_02_102<\/a>.\r\n\r\nLyon, M. R., \u201cNo means No? Withdrawal of Consent During Intercourse and the Continuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape,\u201d Findarticles.com website, accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/findarticles.com\/p\/articles\/mi_hb6700\/is_1_95\/ai_n29148498\/pg_3\/?tag=content;col1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/findarticles.com\/p\/articles\/mi_hb6700\/is_1_95\/ai_n29148498\/pg_3\/?tag=content;col1<\/a>.\r\n\r\nMacnamara, D., \u201cHistory of Sexual Violence,\u201d Interactive theatre.org website, accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.interactivetheatre.org\/resc\/history.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.interactivetheatre.org\/resc\/history.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nMd. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-301(g), accessed February 8, 2011, http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/2005\/gcr\/3-301.html.\r\n\r\nMd. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-303, accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/2005\/gcr\/3-303.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/2005\/gcr\/3-303.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nMd. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-304, accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/gcr\/3-304.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/gcr\/3-304.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">Michael M. v. Superior Court<\/em>, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/1980-1989\/1980\/1980_79_1344\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/1980-1989\/1980\/1980_79_1344<\/a>.\r\n\r\nMinn. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0609.343(c), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.revisor.mn.gov\/statutes\/?id=609.343\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.revisor.mn.gov\/statutes\/?id=609.343<\/a>.\r\n\r\nMSNBC.com website, \u201cRape Case against Bryant Dismissed,\u201d accessed February 27, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/nbcsports.msnbc.com\/id\/5861379\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/nbcsports.msnbc.com\/id\/5861379<\/a>.\r\n\r\nN. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0632-A: 5, accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.gencourt.state.nh.us\/rsa\/html\/LXII\/632-A\/632-A-5.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.gencourt.state.nh.us\/rsa\/html\/LXII\/632-A\/632-A-5.htm<\/a>.\r\n\r\nThe National Center for Victims of Crime, \u201cAcquaintance Rape,\u201d Ncvc.org website, accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.ncvc.org\/ncvc\/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&amp;DocumentID=32306\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.ncvc.org\/ncvc\/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&amp;DocumentID=32306<\/a>.\r\n\r\nN.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a0130.05, accessed February 9, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.05_130.05.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.05_130.05.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nN.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a0130.25(3), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.25_130.25.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.25_130.25.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nN.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a0130.30, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.30_130.30.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.30_130.30.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\nN.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a0130.52, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.52_130.52.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.52_130.52.html<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">People v. Liberta<\/em>, 64 N.Y. 2d 152 (1984), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=1399209540378549726&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=1399209540378549726&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">People v. Mayberry<\/em>, 542 P.2d 1337 (1975), accessed February 11, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=6471351898025391619&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=6471351898025391619&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">State of New Jersey in the Interest of M.T.S.<\/em>, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.4lawnotes.com\/showthread.php?t=1886\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.4lawnotes.com\/showthread.php?t=1886<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Borthwick<\/em>, 880 P.2d 1261 (1994), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www1.law.umkc.edu\/suni\/CrimLaw\/calendar\/Class_24_borthwick_case.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www1.law.umkc.edu\/suni\/CrimLaw\/calendar\/Class_24_borthwick_case.htm<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Lile<\/em>, 699 P.2d 456 (1985), accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=5958820374035014869&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=5958820374035014869&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.\r\n\r\n<em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Plunkett<\/em>, 934 P.2d 113 (1997), accessed February 11, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=17940293485668190575&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=17940293485668190575&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.\r\n\r\nUS Department of Health and Human Services, \u201cStatutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements,\u201d ASPE.hhs.gov website, accessed February 16, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/aspe.hhs.gov\/hsp\/08\/SR\/StateLaws\/statelaws.shtml\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/aspe.hhs.gov\/hsp\/08\/SR\/StateLaws\/statelaws.shtml<\/a>.\r\n\r\nUtah Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a076-5-402(1), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/le.utah.gov\/~code\/TITLE76\/htm\/76_05_040200.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/le.utah.gov\/~code\/TITLE76\/htm\/76_05_040200.htm<\/a>.\r\n\r\nUtah Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a076-5-402(2), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/le.utah.gov\/~code\/TITLE76\/htm\/76_05_040200.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/le.utah.gov\/~code\/TITLE76\/htm\/76_05_040200.htm<\/a>.\r\n\r\nVa. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a019.2-295.2:1, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/leg1.state.va.us\/cgi-bin\/legp504.exe?000+cod+19.2-295.2C1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/leg1.state.va.us\/cgi-bin\/legp504.exe?000+cod+19.2-295.2C1<\/a>.\r\n\r\n42 Pa. C. S. \u00a7\u00a09799.1, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us<\/a>.","rendered":"<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div>\n<div class=\"textbox\">\n<p><a class=\"irc_mil i3597\" href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/url?sa=i&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=images&amp;cd=&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjhyf7WzfrfAhUBvKwKHYSiDeAQjRx6BAgBEAU&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fnypost.com%2F2019%2F01%2F14%2Fchilling-details-of-jayme-closs-kidnapping-revealed%2F&amp;psig=AOvVaw1rrzy9TPbWKxMlFSvFdPPe&amp;ust=1548013413223444\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"irc_mi\" src=\"https:\/\/thenypost.files.wordpress.com\/2019\/01\/190114-jayme-closs-kidnapping-split-feature-image.jpg?quality=90&amp;strip=all&amp;w=618&amp;h=410&amp;crop=1\" alt=\"Image result for photos of a kidnapper grabbing a child\" width=\"618\" height=\"410\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox\">Jayme Closs kidnapping<\/div>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/goo.gl\/images\/y7Ad67\">https:\/\/goo.gl\/images\/y7Ad67<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div class=\"informalfigure medium block\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_ep01\" class=\"epigraph block\">\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_p01\" class=\"para\"><em>Among the evils that both the common law and later statutory prohibitions against kidnapping sought to address were the isolation of a victim from the protections of society and the law and the special fear and danger inherent in such isolation.<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"attribution\">\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0&#8212;<a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=13933358391504195031&amp;q=kidnapping&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_ylo=2008\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Salaman<\/em><\/a>, cited in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"http:\/\/open.lib.umn.edu\/criminallaw\/chapter\/10-4-kidnapping-and-false-imprisonment\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s04\">Section 10.4 &#8220;Kidnapping and False Imprisonment&#8221;<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h3 class=\"title\">Learning Objectives<\/h3>\n<ol id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\n<li>Compare common-law rape and sodomy offenses with modern rape and sodomy offenses.<\/li>\n<li>Define the criminal act element required for rape.<\/li>\n<li>Define the attendant circumstance element required for rape.<\/li>\n<li>Ascertain the amount of resistance a victim must demonstrate to evidence lack of consent.<\/li>\n<li>Ascertain whether the victim\u2019s testimony must be corroborated to convict a defendant for rape.<\/li>\n<li>Define the criminal intent element required for rape.<\/li>\n<li>Analyze the relationship between the criminal intent element required for rape and the mistake of fact defense allowed for rape in some jurisdictions.<\/li>\n<li>Define the harm element required for rape.<\/li>\n<li>Identify the primary components of rape shield laws.<\/li>\n<li>Identify the most prevalent issues in acquaintance rape.<\/li>\n<li>Compare spousal rape with rape.<\/li>\n<li>Identify the elements of statutory rape, and compare statutory rape with rape.<\/li>\n<li>Compare sodomy, oral copulation, and incest with rape.<\/li>\n<li>Analyze sex offenses grading.<\/li>\n<li>Identify the primary components of sex offender registration statutes.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In this section, you learn the elements of <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">rape<\/a><\/span> and related sex offenses and examine defenses based on <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">consent<\/strong>. In upcoming sections, you analyze the elements of other crimes involving force, fear, and physical restraint, including assault, battery, domestic violence, stalking, and kidnapping.<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Synopsis of the History of Rape and Sodomy<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The word <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">rape<\/strong> has its roots in the Latin word <em class=\"emphasis\">rapere<\/em>, which means to steal or seize. At early common law, rape was a capital offense. The elements of rape were forcible sexual intercourse, by a man, with a woman not the spouse of the perpetrator, conducted without consent, or with consent obtained by force or threat of force (Macnamara, D., 2011). The rape prosecution required evidence of the defendant\u2019s use of force, extreme resistance by the victim, and evidence that corroborated the rape victim\u2019s testimony. The common law also recognized the crime of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">sodomy<\/strong>. In general, sodomy was the penetration of the male anus by a man. Sodomy was condemned and criminalized even <em class=\"emphasis\">with consent<\/em> because of religious beliefs deeming it a crime against nature (Lawbrain.com, 2011).<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">In the 1970s, many changes were made to rape statutes, updating the antiquated common-law approach and increasing the chances of conviction. The most prominent changes were eliminating the marital rape exemption and the requirement of evidence to corroborate the rape victim\u2019s testimony, creating rape shield laws to protect the victim, and relaxing the necessity for the defendant\u2019s use of force or resistance by the victim (Lyon, M. R., 2011). Many jurisdictions also changed the name of rape to sexual battery, sexual assault, or unlawful sexual conduct and combined sexual offenses like rape, sodomy, and oral copulation into one statute. Although some states still have statutes that provide the death penalty for rape, the US Supreme Court has held that rape, even <em class=\"emphasis\">child rape<\/em>, cannot be considered a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">capital<\/strong> offense without violating the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause, rendering these statutes unenforceable (Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2011).<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">Sodomy law has likewise been updated to make sodomy a gender-neutral offense and preclude the criminalization of consensual sexual conduct between adults. The US Supreme Court has definitively held that consensual sex between adults may be protected by a right of privacy and cannot be criminalized without a sufficient government interest (Lawrence v. Texas, 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s01_t01\" class=\"table block\">\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Table 10.1<\/span> Comparing Common Law Rape and Sodomy with Modern Statutes<\/p>\n<table style=\"border-spacing: 0px\" cellpadding=\"0\">\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Crime<\/th>\n<th>Criminal Act<\/th>\n<th>Lack of Victim Consent?<\/th>\n<th>Victim Resistance?<\/th>\n<th>Other Differences<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Common-law rape<\/td>\n<td>Penis-vagina penetration<\/td>\n<td>Yes<\/td>\n<td>Yes, extreme resistance<\/td>\n<td>Corroborative evidence required; no spousal rape; capital crime<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Modern rape<\/td>\n<td>Some states include any sexual penetration<\/td>\n<td>Yes<\/td>\n<td>Not if force is used, or threat of force that would deter a reasonable person from resisting (See section 10.1.2.2.2.)<\/td>\n<td>No corroborative evidence required; spousal rape is a crime in some jurisdictions; rape is not a capital crime.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Common-law sodomy<\/td>\n<td>Male penis-male anus penetration<\/td>\n<td>No. Even consensual sodomy was criminal.<\/td>\n<td>No. Even consensual sodomy was criminal.<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Modern sodomy<\/td>\n<td>Gender-neutral penis-anus penetration<\/td>\n<td>Yes<\/td>\n<td>Same as modern rape, above<\/td>\n<td>Consensual sodomy in prison or jail is still criminal in some jurisdictions. (See section 10.1.7.)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Elements<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In modern times, rape is a crime that has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, causation, and harm. Rape also has an attendant circumstance element, which is lack of consent by the victim.<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Act<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element required for rape in many states is <em class=\"emphasis\">sexual intercourse<\/em>, accomplished by <em class=\"emphasis\">force or threat<\/em> of force (Md. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-303, 2011). Sexual intercourse is typically defined as penetration of a woman\u2019s vagina by a man\u2019s penis and can also be referred to as vaginal intercourse (Md. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-301(g), 2011). Some jurisdictions include the penetration of the woman\u2019s vagina by other body parts, like a finger, as sexual intercourse (K.S.A., 2011). The Model Penal Code defines the criminal act element required for rape as sexual intercourse that includes \u201cintercourse per os or per anum,\u201d meaning oral and anal intercourse (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0213.0(2)). In most jurisdictions, a man or a woman can commit rape (K.S.A., 2011).<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Although it is common to include force or threat of force as an indispensible part of the rape criminal act, some modern statutes expand the crime of rape to include situations where the defendant does <em class=\"emphasis\">not<\/em> use force or threat, but the victim is <em class=\"emphasis\">extremely vulnerable<\/em>, such as an intoxicated victim, an unconscious victim, or a victim who is of tender years (K.S.A., 2011). The Model Penal Code includes force, threat of force, and situations where the defendant has impaired the victim\u2019s power to control conduct by administering intoxicants or drugs without the victim\u2019s knowledge or sexual intercourse with an unconscious female or a female who is fewer than ten years old (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0213.1(1)). Other statutes may criminalize <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">unforced<\/strong> <em class=\"emphasis\">nonconsensual<\/em> sexual intercourse or other forms of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">unforced<\/strong> <em class=\"emphasis\">nonconsensual<\/em> sexual contact as less serious forms of rape with reduced sentencing options (N.Y. Penal Law, 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Rape Act<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Alex and Brad play video games while Brad\u2019s sister Brandy watches. Brad tells Alex he is going to go the store and purchase some beer. While Brad is gone, Alex turns to Brandy, pulls a knife out of his pocket, and tells her to take off her pants and lie down. Brandy tells Alex, \u201cNo, I don\u2019t want to,\u201d but thereafter acquiesces, and Alex puts his penis into Brandy\u2019s vagina. Alex has probably committed the criminal act element required for rape in most jurisdictions. Although Alex did not use physical force to accomplish sexual intercourse, his <em class=\"emphasis\">threat<\/em> of force by display of the knife is sufficient. If the situation is reversed, and Brandy pulls out the knife and orders Alex to put his penis in her vagina, many jurisdictions would also criminalize Brandy\u2019s criminal act as rape. If Alex does not use force or a threat of force, but Brandy is only nine years old, some jurisdictions still criminalize Alex\u2019s act as rape, as would the Model Penal Code.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Attendant Circumstance<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In many jurisdictions, the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">attendant circumstance<\/strong> element required for rape is <em class=\"emphasis\">the victim\u2019s lack of consent<\/em> to the defendant\u2019s act (Md. Code Ann \u00a7 3-304, 2011). Thus victim\u2019s consent could operate as a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">failure of proof<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">affirmative defense<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Proving Lack of Consent as an Attendant Circumstance<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Proving lack of consent has two components. First, the victim must be legally <em class=\"emphasis\">capable<\/em> of giving consent. If the victim is under the age of consent or is mentally or intellectually impaired because of a permanent condition, intoxication, or drugs, the prosecution does not have to prove lack of consent in many jurisdictions (K.S.A., 2011). Sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of consent is a separate crime, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">statutory rape<\/strong>, which is discussed shortly.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The second component to proving lack of consent is separating true consent from consent rendered <em class=\"emphasis\">involuntarily<\/em>. Involuntary consent is present in two situations. First, if the victim consents to the defendant\u2019s act because of fraud or trickery\u2014for example, when the victim is unaware of the <em class=\"emphasis\">nature<\/em> of the act of sexual intercourse\u2014the consent is involuntary. A victim is generally unaware of the nature of the act of sexual intercourse when a doctor shams a <em class=\"emphasis\">medical procedure<\/em> (Iowa v. Vander Esch, 2011). This is called <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">fraud in the factum<\/a><\/span>. <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Fraud in the inducement<\/a><\/span>, which is a fraudulent representation as to the <em class=\"emphasis\">circumstances<\/em> accompanying the sexual conduct, does not render the consent involuntary in many jurisdictions. An example of fraud in the inducement is a defendant\u2019s false statement that the sexual intercourse will <em class=\"emphasis\">cure<\/em> a medical condition (Boro v. Superior Court, 2011).<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">A more common example of involuntary consent is when the victim consents to the defendant\u2019s act because of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">force<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">threat<\/strong> of force. The prosecution generally proves this type of consent is involuntary by introducing evidence of the victim\u2019s <em class=\"emphasis\">resistance<\/em>.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center\">\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s01_f01\" class=\"figure large medium-height editable block\">\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.1<\/span> Diagram of Consent<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"\/criminallaw\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/179\/2015\/11\/3d6b0c47d90c633c448e874c969ee205.jpg\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2479\/2017\/09\/26210034\/3d6b0c47d90c633c448e874c969ee205.jpg\" alt=\"Diagram of Consent. True consent to sexual intercourse: victim cannot be under the age of consent, victim cannot be mentally impaired, victim consent cannot be based on force or threat\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Proving Involuntary Consent by the Victim\u2019s Resistance<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Under the common law, the victim had to manifest <em class=\"emphasis\">extreme resistance<\/em> to indicate lack of consent. In modern times, the victim does not have to fight back or otherwise endanger his or her life if it would be futile to do so. In most jurisdictions, the victim only needs to resist to the same extent as a reasonable person under similar circumstances, which is an objective standard (Del. Code Ann. tit. II, \u00a7 761(j), 2011).<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The use of force by the defendant could eliminate <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> requirement of victim resistance to prove lack of consent (N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 130.05, 2011). If the defendant obtains consent using a <em class=\"emphasis\">threat<\/em> of force, rather than force, the victim may not have to resist if the victim experiences subjective fear of serious bodily injury, and a reasonable person under similar circumstances would not resist, which is an objective standard (Minn. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 609.343(c), 2011). Threat of force can be accomplished by words, weapons, or gestures. It can also be present when there is a discrepancy in size or age between the defendant and the victim or if the sexual encounter takes place in an isolated location. The Model Penal Code considers it a felony of the third degree and gross sexual imposition when a male has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife by compelling \u201cher to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution\u201d (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0213.1(2)(a)). Note that the Model Penal Code\u2019s position does not require the threat to be a <em class=\"emphasis\">threat of force<\/em>; it can be <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> type of threat that prevents physical resistance.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">If the victim does not physically resist the criminal act, the prosecution must prove that the victim affirmatively indicated lack of consent in some other manner. This could be a verbal response, such as saying, \u201cNo,\u201d but the verbal response must be unequivocal. In the most extreme case, at least one court has held that a verbal \u201cNo\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">during the act<\/em> of sexual intercourse is sufficient, and the defendant who <em class=\"emphasis\">continues<\/em> with sexual intercourse after being told \u201cNo\u201d is committing the criminal act of rape (In re John Z., 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s02_f01\" class=\"figure large editable block\" style=\"max-width: 600px;margin: auto\">\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.2<\/span> Proving Lack of Consent<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<th>Proving<\/th>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<th>Lack of<\/th>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<th>Consent<\/th>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">The Requirement of Corroborative Evidence<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">At early common law, a victim\u2019s testimony was insufficient evidence to meet the burden of proving the elements of rape, including lack of consent. The victim\u2019s testimony had to be supported by additional <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">corroborative evidence<\/a><\/span>. Modern jurisdictions have done away with the corroborative evidence requirement and allow the trier of fact to determine the elements of rape or lack of consent based on the victim\u2019s testimony alone (State v. Borthwick, 2011). However, statistics indicate that rape prosecutions often result in acquittal. Thus although technically the victim\u2019s testimony need not be corroborated, it is paramount that the victim <em class=\"emphasis\">promptly report<\/em> the rape to the appropriate authorities and submit to testing and interrogation to preserve any and all forms of relevant rape evidence.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s04\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Rape Attendant Circumstance<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Review the example with Brandy and Alex in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01\">Section 10 &#8220;Example of Rape Act&#8221;<\/a>. In this example, after an initial protest, Brandy lies down, takes off her pants, and allows Alex to put his penis in her vagina when he pulls out a knife. It is likely that the trier of fact will find the rape attendant circumstance in this case. Although Brandy acquiesced to Alex\u2019s demands <em class=\"emphasis\">without resisting<\/em>, she did so after Alex took a knife out of his pocket, which is a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">threat<\/strong> of force. In addition, Brandy expressed her lack of consent verbally before submitting to Alex\u2019s demand. A trier of fact could determine that Brandy experienced a fear of serious bodily injury from Alex\u2019s display of the knife, and that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would give in to Alex\u2019s demands without physical resistance.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s02_s04_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Change this example and assume that after Brad leaves, Alex asks Brandy to have sexual intercourse with him. Brandy responds, \u201cNo,\u201d but allows Alex to remove her pants and put his penis in her vagina without physically resisting. The trier of fact must make the determination of whether Alex accomplished the sexual act by force or threat of force and without Brandy\u2019s consent. If Brandy testifies that she said \u201cNo\u201d and did not consent to Alex\u2019s act, and Alex testifies that Brandy\u2019s verbal response was insufficient to indicate lack of consent, the trier of fact must resolve this issue of fact, and it can do so based on Brandy\u2019s testimony, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">uncorroborated<\/strong>, in many jurisdictions. The trier of fact can use the criteria of the difference in age and size between Brandy and Alex, any gestures or words indicating force or threat, and the location and isolation of the incident, among other factors.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Intent<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The criminal intent element required for rape in most jurisdictions is the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">general intent<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">knowingly<\/strong> to perform the rape criminal act (State v. Lile, 2011). This may include the intent to use force to accomplish the objective if the state\u2019s rape statute includes force or threat of force as a component of the criminal act.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">As <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/4-1-criminal-elements\">Chapter 4 &#8220;The Elements of a Crime&#8221;<\/a> stated, occasionally, a different criminal intent supports the other elements of an offense. In some states, <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">negligent<\/strong> intent supports the rape attendant circumstance of lack of victim consent. This creates a viable <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">mistake of fact<\/strong> defense if the defendant has an incorrect perception as to the victim\u2019s consent. To be successful with this defense, the facts must indicate that the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that the victim consented to the rape criminal act (People v. Mayberry, 2011). Many jurisdictions expressly disallow the defense, requiring <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">strict liability<\/strong> intent for the lack of consent attendant circumstance (State v. Plunkett, 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Rape Intent<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Review the example with Alex and Brandy in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01\">Section 10 &#8220;Example of Rape Act&#8221;<\/a>. Change the example so that Alex does not display a knife and simply asks Brandy if she would like to have sex with him. Brandy does not respond. Alex walks over to Brandy and removes her pants. Brandy does not protest or physically resist. Thereafter, Alex asks Brandy if she \u201clikes it rough.\u201d Brandy remains silent. Alex physically and forcibly puts his penis in Brandy\u2019s vagina. In states that allow a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">negligent<\/strong> intent to support the attendant circumstance of rape, Alex may be able to successfully assert <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">mistake of fact<\/strong> as a defense. It appears that Alex has with general intent or knowingly committed forcible sexual intercourse, based on his actions. In most jurisdictions, the jury could be instructed on an <em class=\"emphasis\">inference<\/em> of this intent from Alex\u2019s behavior under the circumstances. However, if <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">negligent<\/strong> intent is required to support the <em class=\"emphasis\">attendant circumstance<\/em> of the victim\u2019s lack of consent, the trier of fact may find that Alex\u2019s mistake as to Brandy\u2019s consent was honest and reasonable, based on her lack of response or physical resistance. If Alex is in a jurisdiction that requires <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">strict liability<\/strong> intent to support the attendant circumstance element, Alex cannot raise the defense because Alex\u2019s belief as to Brandy\u2019s consent would be irrelevant.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s04\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Causation<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The defendant\u2019s criminal act must be the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">factual<\/strong> and <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">legal cause<\/strong> of the harm, which is defined in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05\">Section 10 &#8220;Rape Harm&#8221;<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Harm<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">harm<\/strong> element of rape in most jurisdictions is <em class=\"emphasis\">penetration<\/em>, no matter how slight (Idaho Code Ann. \u00a7 18-6101, 2011). This precludes virginity as a defense. In addition, modern statutes do not require male ejaculation, which precludes lack of semen as a defense (Ala. Code \u00a7 13A-6-69, 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Rape Harm<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s05_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Review the example with Alex and Brandy in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s01_s01\">Section 10 &#8220;Example of Rape Act&#8221;<\/a>. Assume that Brad walks into the room while Alex and Brandy are engaging in sexual intercourse. Brad tackles Alex and pulls him off Brandy. Alex may be charged with rape, not <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">attempted<\/strong> rape, in most jurisdictions. The fact that Alex did not ejaculate does not affect the rape analysis in any way because most jurisdictions do not require ejaculation as a component of the harm element of rape.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rape Shield Laws<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Rape prosecutions can be extremely stressful for the victim, especially when the defendant pursues a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">consent<\/strong> defense. Before the comprehensive rape reforms of the 1970s, rape defendants would proffer any evidence they could find to indicate that the victim was sexually promiscuous and prone to consenting to sexual intercourse. Fearing humiliation, many rape victims kept their rape a secret, not reporting it to law enforcement. This allowed serial rapists to escape punishment and did not serve our criminal justice goal of deterrence.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">In modern times, most states protect rape victims with <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">rape shield laws<\/a><\/span>. Rape shield laws prohibit the admission of evidence of the victim\u2019s past sexual conduct to prove consent in a rape trial, unless the judge allows it in a pretrial <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">in camera<\/a><\/span> hearing, outside the presence of the jury. Rape shield laws could include the additional protections of the exclusion of evidence relating to the victim\u2019s style of dress to prove consent, the exclusion of evidence that the victim requested the defendant to wear a condom to prove consent, and the affirmation that a victim\u2019s testimony in a rape trial need not be corroborated by other evidence (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 794.022, 2011). Most courts permit the admission of evidence proving the victim\u2019s previous consensual sex <em class=\"emphasis\">with the defendant<\/em> because this evidence is particularly relevant to any consent defense (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann \u00a7 18-3-497(1), 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of the Effect of a Rape Shield Law<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Review the example with Alex and Brandy in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-fmcc-criminallaw\/chapter\/10-1-sex-offenses\/#storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s02_s03_s01\">Section 10 &#8220;Example of Rape Intent&#8221;<\/a>. Assume that the jurisdiction in which the example takes place has a <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">rape shield law<\/strong>. If Alex is put on trial for the rape of Brandy and he decides to pursue a consent defense, Alex would <em class=\"emphasis\">not<\/em> be able to introduce evidence of Brandy\u2019s sexual history with <em class=\"emphasis\">other men<\/em> unless he receives approval from a judge in an in camera hearing before the trial.<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\n<h3 class=\"title\">Law and Ethics<\/h3>\n<p class=\"simpara\">Should the Media Be Permitted to Publish Negative Information about a Rape Victim?<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_p02\" class=\"para\">In 2003, Kobe Bryant, a professional basketball player, was indicted for sexually assaulting a nineteen-year-old hotel desk clerk. A mistake by a court reporter listed the accuser\u2019s name on a court website (MSNBC.com, 2011). The court removed the victim\u2019s name after discovery of the mistake, but the damage was done. Thereafter, in spite of a court order prohibiting the publication of the accuser\u2019s name, the media, including radio, newspaper, Internet, and television, published the accuser\u2019s name, phone number, address, and e-mail address (Kenworty, T. &amp; O&#8217;Driscoll, P., 2011). Products like underwear, t-shirts, and coffee mugs with pictures of the accuser and Bryant in sexual positions were widely available for sale, and the accuser received constant harassment, including death threats (Haddad, R., 2011). Although the Colorado Supreme Court ordered pretrial in camera transcripts of hearings pursuant to Colorado\u2019s rape shield law to remain confidential, an order that was confirmed by the US Supreme Court (Associated Press et. al. v. District Court for the Fifth Judicial Distric of Colorado, 2011), the accuser was subjected to so much negative publicity that she eventually refused to cooperate and the prosecution dropped the charges in 2004.<\/p>\n<ol id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\n<li>Do you think <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">rape shield laws<\/strong> should include prohibitions against negative publicity? What are the <em class=\"emphasis\">constitutional<\/em> ramifications of this particular type of statutory protection?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_p03\" class=\"para\">Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Kobe Bryant Video<\/h4>\n<p class=\"simpara\">Kobe Claims Innocence to Sexual Assault Charges<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s03_s01_p04\" class=\"para\">Kobe Bryant and his attorney discuss the charge of rape filed against Kobe in this video:<\/p>\n<div class=\"mediaobject\"><a class=\"replaced-iframe\" href=\"http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/v\/SSamEqtPVao\">(click to see video)<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s04\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Acquaintance Rape<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s04_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">In modern times, rape defendants are frequently known to the victim, which may change the factual situation significantly from stranger rape. <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Acquaintance rape<\/a><\/span>, also called <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">date rape<\/strong>, is a phenomenon that could increase a victim\u2019s reluctance to report the crime and could also affect the defendant\u2019s need to use force and the victim\u2019s propensity to physically resist (The National Center for Victims of Crime, 2011). Although studies indicate that acquaintance rape is on the rise (The National Center for Victims of Crime, 2011), statutes have not entirely addressed the issues presented in an acquaintance rape fact pattern. To adequately punish and deter acquaintance or date rape, rape statutes should punish <em class=\"emphasis\">nonforcible<\/em>, <em class=\"emphasis\">nonconsensual<\/em> sexual conduct <em class=\"emphasis\">as severely<\/em> as forcible rape. Although the majority of states still require forcible sexual intercourse as the rape criminal act element, at least one modern court has rejected the necessity of any force other than what is required to accomplish the sexual intercourse (State of New Jersey in the Interest of M.T.S., 2011). Some rape statutes have also eliminated the requirement that the defendant use force and punish <em class=\"emphasis\">any<\/em> sexual intercourse without consent as rape (Utah Code Ann \u00a7 76-5-402(1).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s05\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Spousal Rape<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s05_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">As stated previously, at early common law, a man could not rape his spouse. The policy supporting this exemption can be traced to a famous seventeenth-century jurist, Matthew Hale, who wrote, \u201c[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract\u201d (Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, p. 629). During the rape reforms of the 1970s, many states eliminated the marital or <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">spousal rape<\/a><\/span> exemption, in spite of the fact that the Model Penal Code does <em class=\"emphasis\">not<\/em> recognize spousal rape. At least one court has held that the spousal rape exemption violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates against <em class=\"emphasis\">single men<\/em> without a sufficient government interest (People v. Liberta, 2011). In several states that criminalize spousal rape, the criminal act, criminal intent, attendant circumstance, causation, and harm elements are exactly the same as the elements of forcible rape (N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 632-A, 2011). Many states also <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">grade<\/strong> spousal rape the same as forcible rape\u2014as a serious felony (Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 76-5-402(2), 2011). Grading of sex offenses is discussed shortly.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Statutory Rape<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_p01\" class=\"para editable block\"><span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Statutory rape<\/a><\/span>, also called <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">unlawful sexual intercourse<\/strong>, criminalizes sexual intercourse with a victim who is under the age of legal consent. The age of legal consent varies from state to state and is most commonly sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen (Age of Consent Chart for the U.S.-2010, 2011).<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element required for statutory rape in many jurisdictions is sexual intercourse, although other types of sexual conduct with a victim below the age of consent are also criminal (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">harm<\/strong> element of statutory rape also varies, although many jurisdictions mirror the harm element required for rape (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">attendant circumstance<\/strong> element required for statutory rape is an underage victim (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 261.5, 2011). There is no requirement for <em class=\"emphasis\">force<\/em> by the defendant. Nor is there an attendant circumstance element of lack of consent because the victim is incapable of legally consenting.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">In the majority of states, the criminal intent element of statutory rape is <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">strict liability<\/strong> (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 14-80, 2011). However, a minority of states require <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">reckless<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">negligent<\/strong> criminal intent, allowing for the defense of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">mistake of fact<\/strong> as to the victim\u2019s age. If the jurisdiction recognizes mistake of age as a defense, the mistake must be made <em class=\"emphasis\">reasonably<\/em>, and the defendant must take <em class=\"emphasis\">reasonable<\/em> measures to verify the victim\u2019s age (Alaska Stat \u00a7 11.41.445(b), 2011). The mistake of age defense can be proven by evidence of a falsified identification, witness testimony that the victim lied about his or her age to the defendant, or even the appearance of the victim.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">It is much more common to prosecute males for statutory rape than females. The historical reason for this selective prosecution is the policy of preventing teenage pregnancy (Michael M. v. Superior Court, 2011). However, modern statutory rape statutes are gender-neutral (N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 130.30, 2011). This ensures that women, especially women who are older than their sexual partner, are equally subject to prosecution.<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Statutory Rape<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Gary meets Michelle in a nightclub that only allows entrance to patrons eighteen and over. Gary and Michelle end up spending the evening together, and later they go to Gary\u2019s apartment where they have consensual sexual intercourse. In reality, Michelle is actually fifteen and was using false identification to enter the nightclub. If Gary and Michelle are in a state that requires <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">strict liability<\/strong> for the criminal intent element of statutory rape, Gary can be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense if fifteen is under the age of legal consent. If Gary and Michelle are in a state that allows for <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">mistake of age<\/strong> as a defense, Gary could use Michelle\u2019s presence in the nightclub as evidence that he acted <em class=\"emphasis\">reasonably<\/em> in believing that Michelle was capable of rendering legal consent. If both Gary and Michelle used false identification to enter the nightclub, and both Gary and Michelle are under the age of legal consent, <em class=\"emphasis\">both<\/em> could be prosecuted for and convicted of statutory rape in most jurisdictions because modern statutory rape statutes are gender-neutral.<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s06_s01_f01\" class=\"figure large medium-height editable block\">\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.3<\/span> Comparison of Rape and Statutory Rape<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"\/criminallaw\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/179\/2015\/11\/3ab01d69fcce2a380877fef2669e36d9.jpg\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2479\/2017\/09\/26210039\/3ab01d69fcce2a380877fef2669e36d9.jpg\" alt=\"Comparison of Rape and Statutory Rape\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Sodomy and Oral Copulation<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">As stated previously, some states include rape, <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">sodomy<\/a><\/span>, and <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">oral copulation<\/a><\/span> in a sexual assault or sexual conduct statute that criminalizes a variety of sexual acts involving penetration (Alaska Stat. \u00a7 11.41.410, 2011). In states that distinguish between rape and sodomy, the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element of sodomy is often defined as forcible <em class=\"emphasis\">penis to anus<\/em> penetration (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 286(a), 2011). Typically, the other sodomy elements, including the lack of consent attendant circumstance, criminal intent, causation, and harm, are the same as the elements of rape. Many jurisdictions also <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">grade<\/strong> sodomy the same as rape. Grading is discussed shortly.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Sodomy that is <em class=\"emphasis\">nonforcible<\/em> but committed with an individual below the age of legal consent is also criminal (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 286(b), 2011). As stated previously, the US Supreme Court has held that statutes criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults unreasonably encroach on a right to privacy without a sufficient government interest (Lawrence v. Texas, 2011). In some states, consensual nonforcible sodomy is criminal if it is committed in a <em class=\"emphasis\">state penitentiary<\/em> or <em class=\"emphasis\">local detention facility<\/em> or <em class=\"emphasis\">jail<\/em> (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 286(c), 2011).<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07_p03\" class=\"para editable block\">In states that distinguish between rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, the <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element of oral copulation is forcible <em class=\"emphasis\">mouth to sexual organ<\/em> or <em class=\"emphasis\">anus<\/em> penetration (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 288a, 2011). Typically, the other oral copulation elements, including the lack of consent attendant circumstance, criminal intent, causation, and harm, are the same as the elements of rape. Many jurisdictions also <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">grade<\/strong> oral copulation the same as rape. Grading is discussed shortly.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s07_p04\" class=\"para editable block\">A few states still criminalize oral copulation with consent (Ala. Code \u00a7 13A-6-65, 2011). Based on the US Supreme Court precedent relating to sodomy, these statutes may be unenforceable and unconstitutional.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s08\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Incest<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s08_p01\" class=\"para editable block\"><span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Incest<\/a><\/span> is also criminal in many jurisdictions. The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">criminal act<\/strong> element required for incest is typically sexual intercourse (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 826.04, 2011). The <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">attendant circumstance<\/strong> element required for incest is a victim the defendant cannot legally marry because of a family relationship (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11 \u00a7 766, 2011). In the majority of jurisdictions, <em class=\"emphasis\">force<\/em> is not required, and <em class=\"emphasis\">consent<\/em> is not an attendant circumstance element of incest (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, 2011). Thus consent by the victim cannot operate as a defense. If the sexual intercourse with a family member is forcible and nonconsensual, the defendant could be charged with and convicted of rape. The criminal intent element required for incest is typically <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">general intent<\/strong> or <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">knowingly<\/strong> (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 826.04, 2011). The causation and harm elements of incest are generally the same as the causation and harm elements of rape (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 826.04, 2011). However, incest is generally <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">graded<\/strong> lower than forcible rape or sexual assault because force and lack of consent are not required (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7 766, 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s08_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Example of Incest<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s08_s01_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Hal and Harriet, brother and sister, have consensual sexual intercourse. Both Hal and Harriet are above the age of legal consent. In spite of the fact that there was no force, threat of force, or fraud, and both parties consented to the sexual act, Hal and Harriet could be charged with and convicted of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">incest<\/strong> in many jurisdictions, based on their <em class=\"emphasis\">family relationship<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s09\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Sex Offenses Grading<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s09_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Jurisdictions vary when it comes to <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">grading<\/strong> sex offenses. In general, forcible sex crimes involving penetration are graded as serious felonies. Factors that could aggravate grading are gang rape (Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 794.023, 2011), the infliction of bodily injury, the use of a weapon, a youthful victim, the commission of other crimes in concert with the sexual offense, or a victim who has mental or intellectual disabilities or who has been compromised by intoxicants (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7 773, 2011). The Model Penal Code grades rape as a felony of the second degree unless the actor inflicts serious bodily injury on the victim or another, or the defendant is a stranger to the victim, in which case the grading is elevated to a felony of the first degree (Model Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0213.1 (1)).<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s09_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Sexual offenses that do not include penetration are graded lower (N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 130.52, 2011), along with offenses that could be consensual (Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7 766, 2011). Sex offense statutes that criminalize sexual conduct with a victim below the age of legal consent often grade the offense more severely when there is a large age difference between the defendant and the victim, when the defendant is an adult, or the victim is of tender years (Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 261.5, 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s09_f01\" class=\"figure large editable block\" style=\"max-width: 600px;margin: auto\">\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.4<\/span> Diagram of Sex Offenses<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"\/criminallaw\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/179\/2015\/11\/bc5debe80c455a0db89aa6c076e451b9.jpg\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com\/courses-images\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2479\/2017\/09\/26210047\/bc5debe80c455a0db89aa6c076e451b9.jpg\" alt=\"Diagram of Sex Offenses\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Sex Offender Registration Statutes<\/h2>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_p01\" class=\"para editable block\">Based on a public awareness that sex offenders often reoffend, many states have enacted some form of <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Megan\u2019s law<\/a><\/span> or <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">Jessica\u2019s law<\/a><\/span>, which provide for registration, monitoring, control, and elevated sentencing for sex offenders, including those that harm children. Both laws were written and enacted after high-profile cases with child victims became the subject of enormous media attention. Megan\u2019s and Jessica\u2019s law statutes enhance previously enacted statutes that require the registration of sex offenders with local law enforcement agencies.<\/p>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_p02\" class=\"para editable block\">Typically, a Megan\u2019s law statute provides for registration and notification to the public that a convicted sex offender lives in their area (42 Pa. C. S. \u00a7 9799.1, 2011). A Jessica\u2019s law statute often includes a stay-away order, mandating that a sex offender cannot live within a certain distance from areas such as a school or park where children tend to congregate. Jessica\u2019s law statutes also provide for GPS monitoring and extend the sentencing and parole terms of child sex offenders (Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 19.2-295.2:1, 2011).<\/p>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_f01\" class=\"figure large editable block\" style=\"max-width: 600px;margin: auto\">\n<p class=\"title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 10.5<\/span> Diagram of Megan\u2019s and Jessica\u2019s Law Statutes<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<th>Megan&#8217;s Law<\/th>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<th>Jessica&#8217;s Law<\/th>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-success\">\n<h3 class=\"title\">Key Takeaways<\/h3>\n<ul id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_l01\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\n<li>Common-law rape was a capital offense, did not include rape of a spouse, required extreme resistance by the victim, and required evidence to corroborate a victim\u2019s testimony. Modern statutes do not make rape a capital offense, often criminalize spousal rape, and do not require extreme resistance by the victim or evidence to corroborate the victim\u2019s testimony. At early common law, sodomy was the anal penetration of a man, by a man. Modern statutes make sodomy gender-neutral and only criminalize sodomy without consent.<\/li>\n<li>The criminal act element required for rape is sexual penetration accomplished with force or threat of force in many jurisdictions.<\/li>\n<li>The attendant circumstance element required for rape is lack of consent by the victim.<\/li>\n<li>In many jurisdictions, the victim does not need to resist if the defendant uses force. If the victim is faced with a threat of force rather than force, the victim need not resist if he or she has a subjective fear of serious bodily injury, and this fear is reasonable under the circumstances.<\/li>\n<li>In modern times, a victim\u2019s testimony does not need to be corroborated by other evidence to convict a defendant of rape.<\/li>\n<li>The criminal intent element required for rape is general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act.<\/li>\n<li>In some jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for the rape attendant circumstance is negligent intent\u2014providing for a defense of mistake of fact as to the victim\u2019s consent. In other jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for the rape attendant circumstance is strict liability, which does not allow for the mistake of fact defense.<\/li>\n<li>The harm element required for rape is penetration, no matter how slight. Ejaculation is not a requirement for rape in most jurisdictions.<\/li>\n<li>Rape shield laws generally preclude the admission of evidence of the victim\u2019s past sexual conduct in a rape trial, unless it is allowed by a judge at an in camera hearing. Rape shield laws also preclude the admission of evidence of the victim\u2019s style of dress and the victim\u2019s request that the defendant wear a condom to prove victim consent. Some rape shield laws provide that the victim\u2019s testimony need not be corroborated by other evidence to convict the defendant of rape.<\/li>\n<li>Acquaintance rape often goes unreported and does not necessarily include use of force by the defendant or resistance by the victim.<\/li>\n<li>States that criminalize spousal rape generally require the same elements for spousal rape as for rape and grade spousal rape the same as rape.<\/li>\n<li>Statutory rape is generally sexual intercourse with a victim who is under the age of legal consent. Statutory rape does not have the requirement that the intercourse be forcible and does not require the attendant circumstance of the victim\u2019s lack of consent because the victim is incapable of rendering legal consent. In the majority of jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for statutory rape is strict liability. In a minority of jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for statutory rape is negligent or reckless intent, providing for a defense of mistake of fact as to the victim\u2019s age.<\/li>\n<li>Sodomy has the same elements as rape except for the criminal act element, which is often defined as forcible penis to anus penetration, rather than penis to vagina penetration. In addition, in some states sodomy is criminal with consent when it occurs in a state prison or a local detention facility or jail. Oral copulation also has the same elements as rape, except for the criminal act element, which is forcible mouth to sexual organ or anus penetration. Incest is sexual intercourse between family members who cannot legally marry.<\/li>\n<li>Generally, rape, sodomy, and oral copulation are graded as serious felonies. Factors that enhance grading of sex offenses are penetration, gang rape, bodily injury, the use of a weapon, a victim who has intellectual or mental disabilities or is youthful or intoxicated, and the commission of other crimes in concert with the sex offense. Sex offenses committed with the victim\u2019s consent and without penetration are typically graded lower. If the victim is below the age of consent, a large age difference exists between the defendant and the victim, the defendant is an adult, or the victim is of tender years, grading typically is enhanced.<\/li>\n<li>Typically, a Megan\u2019s law statute provides for sex offender registration and notification to the public that a convicted sex offender lives in their area. A Jessica\u2019s law statute often includes a stay-away order mandating that a sex offender cannot live within a certain distance from areas such as a school or park where children tend to congregate. Jessica\u2019s law statutes also provide for GPS monitoring and extend the sentencing and parole terms of child sex offenders.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\">\n<h3 class=\"title\">Exercises<\/h3>\n<p id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_p03\" class=\"para\">Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.<\/p>\n<ol id=\"storm_1.0-ch10_s01_s10_l02\" class=\"orderedlist\">\n<li>Jorge and Christina have consensual sexual intercourse. Could this consensual sexual intercourse be criminal? Which crime(s), if any, could exist in this fact pattern?<\/li>\n<li>Read <em class=\"emphasis\">Toomer v. State<\/em>, 529 SE 2d 719 (2000). In <em class=\"emphasis\">Toomer<\/em>, the defendant was convicted of rape after having sexual intercourse with his daughter, who was under the age of fourteen. The jury instruction did not include any requirement for the defendant\u2019s use of force or victim resistance. The defendant appealed and claimed that the prosecution should have proven he used force and the victim\u2019s resistance because the charge was <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">rape<\/strong>, not <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">statutory rape<\/strong>. Did the Supreme Court of South Carolina uphold the defendant\u2019s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=3593808516097562509&amp;q=Toomer+v.+State&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=3593808516097562509&amp;q= Toomer+v.+State&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>Read <em class=\"emphasis\">Fleming v. State<\/em>, 323 SW 3d 540 (2010). In <em class=\"emphasis\">Fleming<\/em>, the defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen because he was not allowed to present a mistake of age defense. The defendant claimed that the requirement of strict liability intent as to the age of the victim deprived him of <strong class=\"emphasis bold\">due process of law<\/strong>. Did the Court of Appeals of Texas agree with the defendant? The case is available at this link: <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=12908572719333538188&amp;q=%22Scott+v.+State+36+SW+3d+240%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=12908572719333538188&amp;q= %22Scott+v.+State+36+SW+3d+240%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h2>References<\/h2>\n<p>Age of Consent Chart for the U.S.-2010, Ageofconsent.us website, accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.ageofconsent.us\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.ageofconsent.us<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ala. Code \u00a7\u00a013A-6-60, accessed February 11, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alabama\/codes\/2009\/Title13A\/Chapter6\/13A-6-60.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alabama\/codes\/2009\/Title13A\/Chapter6\/13A-6-60.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ala. Code \u00a7\u00a013A-6-65, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.legislature.state.al.us\/CodeofAlabama\/1975\/13A-6-65.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.legislature.state.al.us\/CodeofAlabama\/1975\/13A-6-65.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Alaska Stat. \u00a7\u00a011.41.410, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alaska\/codes\/2009\/title-11\/chapter-11-41\/article-04\/sec-11-41-410\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alaska\/codes\/2009\/title-11\/chapter-11-41\/article-04\/sec-11-41-410<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Alaska Stat. \u00a7\u00a011.41.445(b), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alaska\/codes\/2009\/title-11\/chapter-11-41\/article-04\/sec-11-41-445\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/alaska\/codes\/2009\/title-11\/chapter-11-41\/article-04\/sec-11-41-445<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">Associated Press et. al. v. District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of Colorado<\/em>, 542 U.S. 1301 (2004), accessed February 27, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/ftp.resource.org\/courts.gov\/c\/US\/542\/542.US.1301.04.73.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/ftp.resource.org\/courts.gov\/c\/US\/542\/542.US.1301.04.73.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">Boro v. Superior Court<\/em>, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1985), accessed February 17, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=8450241145233624189&amp;q=Boro+v.+Superior+Court&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=8450241145233624189&amp;q= Boro+v.+Superior+Court&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0261.5, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/california\/penal\/261.5.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/california\/penal\/261.5.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0286(a), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0286(b), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0286(c) (3) (e), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/california\/codes\/2009\/pen\/281-289.6.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Cal. Penal Code \u00a7\u00a0288a, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/california\/penal\/288a.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/california\/penal\/288a.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a018-3-407(1) (a), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.michie.com\/colorado\/lpext.dll?f=templates&amp;fn=main-h.htm&amp;cp=\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.michie.com\/colorado\/lpext.dll?f=templates&amp;fn=main-h.htm&amp;cp=<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7\u00a0766, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Del. Code Ann. tit. II, \u00a7\u00a0761(j) (1), accessed February 9, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/delcode.delaware.gov\/title11\/c005\/sc02\/index.shtml#761\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/delcode.delaware.gov\/title11\/c005\/sc02\/index.shtml#761<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7\u00a0766, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, \u00a7\u00a0773, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/delaware\/codes\/2010\/title11\/c005-sc02.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0794.022, accessed February 11, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/florida\/codes\/2010\/TitleXLVI\/chapter794\/794_022.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/florida\/codes\/2010\/TitleXLVI\/chapter794\/794_022.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0794.023, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/florida\/crimes\/794.023.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/florida\/crimes\/794.023.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0826.04, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/florida\/crimes\/826.04.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/florida\/crimes\/826.04.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Haddad, R., \u201cShield or Sieve? People v. Bryant and the Rape Shield Law in High-Profile Cases,\u201d <em class=\"emphasis\">Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems<\/em>, accessed February 27, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.columbia.edu\/cu\/jlsp\/pdf\/Spring2%202006\/Haddad10.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.columbia.edu\/cu\/jlsp\/pdf\/Spring2%202006\/Haddad10.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Idaho Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a018-6101, accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.legislature.idaho.gov\/idstat\/Title18\/T18CH61SECT18-6101.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.legislature.idaho.gov\/idstat\/Title18\/T18CH61SECT18-6101.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">In re John Z.<\/em>, 29 Cal. 4th 756 (2003), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scocal.stanford.edu\/opinion\/re-john-z-32309\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scocal.stanford.edu\/opinion\/re-john-z-32309<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">Iowa v. Vander Esch<\/em>, 662 N.W. 2d 689 (2002), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=4906781834239023314&amp;q=rape+%22fraud+in+the+inducement%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_ylo=2002\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=4906781834239023314&amp;q= rape+%22fraud+in+the+inducement%22&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,5&amp;as_ylo=2002<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Jayme Closs kidnapping,<span style=\"color: #3366ff\"> https:\/\/goo.gl\/images\/y7Ad67<span style=\"color: #373d3f\">.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">Kennedy v. Louisiana<\/em>, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/2000-2009\/2007\/2007_07_343\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/2000-2009\/2007\/2007_07_343<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>K.S.A. \u00a7\u00a021-3501(1), accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/kansas\/codes\/2006\/chapter21\/statute_11553.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/kansas\/codes\/2006\/chapter21\/statute_11553.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Kenworty, T., Patrick O\u2019Driscoll, \u201cJudge Dismisses Bryant Rape Case,\u201d USAtoday.com website, accessed February 27, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/sports\/basketball\/nba\/2004-09-01-kobe-bryant-case_x.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/sports\/basketball\/nba\/2004-09-01-kobe-bryant-case_x.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a014-80, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/louisiana\/codes\/2009\/rs\/title14\/rs14-80.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/louisiana\/codes\/2009\/rs\/title14\/rs14-80.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Lawbrain.com website, \u201cSex Offenses,\u201d accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/lawbrain.com\/wiki\/Sex_Offenses\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/lawbrain.com\/wiki\/Sex_Offenses<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">Lawrence v. Texas<\/em>, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/2000-2009\/2002\/2002_02_102\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/2000-2009\/2002\/2002_02_102<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Lyon, M. R., \u201cNo means No? Withdrawal of Consent During Intercourse and the Continuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape,\u201d Findarticles.com website, accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/findarticles.com\/p\/articles\/mi_hb6700\/is_1_95\/ai_n29148498\/pg_3\/?tag=content;col1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/findarticles.com\/p\/articles\/mi_hb6700\/is_1_95\/ai_n29148498\/pg_3\/?tag=content;col1<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Macnamara, D., \u201cHistory of Sexual Violence,\u201d Interactive theatre.org website, accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.interactivetheatre.org\/resc\/history.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.interactivetheatre.org\/resc\/history.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Md. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-301(g), accessed February 8, 2011, http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/2005\/gcr\/3-301.html.<\/p>\n<p>Md. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-303, accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/2005\/gcr\/3-303.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/2005\/gcr\/3-303.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Md. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a03-304, accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/gcr\/3-304.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.justia.com\/maryland\/codes\/gcr\/3-304.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">Michael M. v. Superior Court<\/em>, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/1980-1989\/1980\/1980_79_1344\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.oyez.org\/cases\/1980-1989\/1980\/1980_79_1344<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Minn. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0609.343(c), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.revisor.mn.gov\/statutes\/?id=609.343\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.revisor.mn.gov\/statutes\/?id=609.343<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>MSNBC.com website, \u201cRape Case against Bryant Dismissed,\u201d accessed February 27, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/nbcsports.msnbc.com\/id\/5861379\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/nbcsports.msnbc.com\/id\/5861379<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a0632-A: 5, accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.gencourt.state.nh.us\/rsa\/html\/LXII\/632-A\/632-A-5.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.gencourt.state.nh.us\/rsa\/html\/LXII\/632-A\/632-A-5.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The National Center for Victims of Crime, \u201cAcquaintance Rape,\u201d Ncvc.org website, accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.ncvc.org\/ncvc\/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&amp;DocumentID=32306\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.ncvc.org\/ncvc\/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&amp;DocumentID=32306<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a0130.05, accessed February 9, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.05_130.05.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.05_130.05.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a0130.25(3), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.25_130.25.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.25_130.25.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a0130.30, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.30_130.30.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.30_130.30.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a0130.52, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.52_130.52.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/law.onecle.com\/new-york\/penal\/PEN0130.52_130.52.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">People v. Liberta<\/em>, 64 N.Y. 2d 152 (1984), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=1399209540378549726&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=1399209540378549726&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">People v. Mayberry<\/em>, 542 P.2d 1337 (1975), accessed February 11, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=6471351898025391619&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=6471351898025391619&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">State of New Jersey in the Interest of M.T.S.<\/em>, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.4lawnotes.com\/showthread.php?t=1886\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.4lawnotes.com\/showthread.php?t=1886<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Borthwick<\/em>, 880 P.2d 1261 (1994), accessed February 10, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www1.law.umkc.edu\/suni\/CrimLaw\/calendar\/Class_24_borthwick_case.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www1.law.umkc.edu\/suni\/CrimLaw\/calendar\/Class_24_borthwick_case.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Lile<\/em>, 699 P.2d 456 (1985), accessed February 8, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=5958820374035014869&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=5958820374035014869&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><em class=\"emphasis\">State v. Plunkett<\/em>, 934 P.2d 113 (1997), accessed February 11, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=17940293485668190575&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=17940293485668190575&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2&amp;as_vis=1&amp;oi=scholarr<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>US Department of Health and Human Services, \u201cStatutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements,\u201d ASPE.hhs.gov website, accessed February 16, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/aspe.hhs.gov\/hsp\/08\/SR\/StateLaws\/statelaws.shtml\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/aspe.hhs.gov\/hsp\/08\/SR\/StateLaws\/statelaws.shtml<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Utah Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a076-5-402(1), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/le.utah.gov\/~code\/TITLE76\/htm\/76_05_040200.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/le.utah.gov\/~code\/TITLE76\/htm\/76_05_040200.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Utah Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a076-5-402(2), accessed February 14, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/le.utah.gov\/~code\/TITLE76\/htm\/76_05_040200.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/le.utah.gov\/~code\/TITLE76\/htm\/76_05_040200.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Va. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a019.2-295.2:1, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/leg1.state.va.us\/cgi-bin\/legp504.exe?000+cod+19.2-295.2C1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/leg1.state.va.us\/cgi-bin\/legp504.exe?000+cod+19.2-295.2C1<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>42 Pa. C. S. \u00a7\u00a09799.1, accessed February 15, 2011, <a class=\"link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">http:\/\/www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t <section class=\"citations-section\" role=\"contentinfo\">\n\t\t\t <h3>Candela Citations<\/h3>\n\t\t\t\t\t <div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <div id=\"citation-list-1294\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t <div class=\"licensing\"><div class=\"license-attribution-dropdown-subheading\">CC licensed content, Shared previously<\/div><ul class=\"citation-list\"><li>Criminal Law. <strong>Provided by<\/strong>: University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing . <strong>Located at<\/strong>: <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/open.lib.umn.edu\/criminallaw\/\">http:\/\/open.lib.umn.edu\/criminallaw\/<\/a>. <strong>License<\/strong>: <em><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"license\" href=\"https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by-nc-sa\/4.0\/\">CC BY-NC-SA: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike<\/a><\/em><\/li><\/ul><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t <\/div>\n\t\t\t <\/section>","protected":false},"author":23485,"menu_order":1,"template":"","meta":{"_candela_citation":"[{\"type\":\"cc\",\"description\":\"Criminal Law\",\"author\":\"\",\"organization\":\"University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing \",\"url\":\"http:\/\/open.lib.umn.edu\/criminallaw\/\",\"project\":\"\",\"license\":\"cc-by-nc-sa\",\"license_terms\":\"\"}]","CANDELA_OUTCOMES_GUID":"","pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-1294","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":1290,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/1294","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/23485"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/1294\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1707,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/1294\/revisions\/1707"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/1290"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/1294\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1294"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=1294"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=1294"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-sccc-criminallaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=1294"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}