{"id":203,"date":"2016-07-21T20:37:40","date_gmt":"2016-07-21T20:37:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/wmreadinganthology\/?post_type=chapter&p=203"},"modified":"2016-07-21T20:37:57","modified_gmt":"2016-07-21T20:37:57","slug":"declines-in-american-adults-religious-participation-and-beliefs-1972-2014","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/courses.lumenlearning.com\/suny-wm-readinganthology\/chapter\/declines-in-american-adults-religious-participation-and-beliefs-1972-2014\/","title":{"raw":"Declines in American Adults\u2019 Religious Participation and Beliefs, 1972\u20132014","rendered":"Declines in American Adults\u2019 Religious Participation and Beliefs, 1972\u20132014"},"content":{"raw":"
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\r\n\r\nBy\u00a0Jean M.<\/span> Twenge<\/span><\/span>, Ryne A.<\/span> Sherman<\/span><\/span>, Julie J.<\/span> Exline<\/span><\/span>, Joshua B.<\/span> Grubbs<\/span><\/span>\r\n\r\nPublished March 23, 2106 by SAGE Publications\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

Abstract<\/h2>\r\n

Previous research found declines in Americans\u2019 religious affiliation but few changes in religious beliefs and practices. By 2014, however, markedly fewer Americans participated in religious activities or embraced religious beliefs, with especially striking declines between 2006 and 2014 and among 18- to 29-year-olds in data from the nationally representative General Social Survey (N<\/em> = 58,893, 1972-2014). In recent years, fewer Americans prayed, believed in God, took the Bible literally, attended religious services, identified as religious, affiliated with a religion, or had confidence in religious institutions. Only slightly more identified as spiritual since 1998, and then only those above age 30. Nearly a third of Millennials were secular not merely in religious affiliation but also in belief in God, religiosity, and religious service attendance, many more than Boomers and Generation X\u2019ers at the same age. Eight times more 18- to 29-year-olds never prayed in 2014 versus the early 1980s. However, Americans have become slightly more likely to believe in an afterlife. In hierarchical linear modeling analyses, the decline in religious commitment was primarily due to time period rather than generation\/birth cohort, with the decline in public religious practice larger (d<\/em> = \u2212.50) and beginning sooner (early 1990s) than the smaller (d<\/em> = \u2212.18) decline in private religious practice and belief (primarily after 2006). Differences in religious commitment due to gender, race, education, and region grew larger, suggesting a more religiously polarized nation.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

Are Americans less religious than they used to be? In previous research, the answer depended on how religious commitment was measured. Most studies agree that religious affiliation has declined in the United States since the 1970s; for example, more Americans in recent years chose \u201cnone\u201d when asked to identify their religion (e.g., Hout & Fischer, 2002<\/a>; Lim, MacGregor, & Putnam, 2010<\/a>; Pew Research Center, 2015<\/a>). However, several recent studies have concluded that religious service attendance, belief in God, and prayer have not changed or have even increased in recent years (e.g., Dougherty, Johnson, & Polson, 2007<\/a>; Presser & Chaves, 2007<\/a>; Smith & Snell, 2009<\/a>; P. Taylor, 2014<\/a>; Wachholtz & Sambamoorthi, 2011<\/a>). Based on data up to 2008, Chaves (2011)<\/a> concluded that belief in God and frequency of prayer did not change in the General Social Survey (GSS) since the 1980s. Examining 18- to 24-year-olds in the GSS 1972-2006, Smith and Snell (2009)<\/a> found only small changes in religious affiliation and service attendance, and no changes in frequency of prayer and belief in God. They concluded that emerging adults \u201chave not since 1972 become dramatically less religious or more secular . . . if such a trend is indeed perceptible, it would seem to be weak and slight\u201d (pp. 99-100). Other sociologists of religion have echoed these sentiments. Finke and Stark (1988<\/a>, 2005<\/a>) contended that the overall religiousness of the American public has remained relatively constant as a whole, although fluctuations in affiliation and expression have occurred. Similarly, Berger\u2019s (1999)<\/a> work explored the overall constancy of American religious affiliation over time, with a particular focus on how religiousness moved back to the forefront of political and economic discourse in recent decades\u2014sentiments also echoed in many other seminal works (Berger, 2011<\/a>; Berger, Davie, & Fokas, 2008<\/a>).<\/p>\r\n

Thus, at least up to the mid- to late-2000s, research suggests that Americans\u2019 private religious practice and beliefs (e.g., those religious practices, disciplines, and beliefs that may be conducted alone or without explicit religious affiliation) and religious service attendance remained unchanged even as more did not affiliate with a particular religious tradition. Another possibility is that religious belief has been replaced by spirituality (Fuller, 2001<\/a>; Saucier & Skrzypi\u0144ska, 2006<\/a>). In other words, the prevailing conclusion has been that Americans have remained just as religious and\/or spiritual in a private or personal sense, but less religious in a public sense. This may be due to a more general disassociation from large groups\u2014for example, Americans have become significantly less confident in virtually all large institutions from government to medicine (Twenge, Campbell, & Carter, 2014<\/a>). Such an explanation would also be consistent with many popular conceptions of religion as a socially organizing institution (e.g., Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010<\/a>) that transmits cultural values, mores, and rules (Graham & Haidt, 2010<\/a>). As societal norms have shifted away from institutional identification to individualism, one would expect commitment to religion, a ubiquitous social institution, to similarly decline. However, it is unclear whether such decreases in external commitment would also be associated with decreases in personal religious involvement or practice.<\/p>\r\n

Despite popular conceptions that public religious involvement has decreased while private expressions of religion and spirituality have stayed about the same, stark distinctions between religion and spirituality may be more theoretical than practical. Although religion and spirituality are known to be distinct constructs (i.e., religion comprises social and ritualized aspects of personal belief, whereas spirituality includes the search for meaning or transcendence in daily life;Pargament, 1999<\/a>), these two constructs often overlap, and highly religious individuals often identify as being highly spiritual as well (for a review, see Hill & Pargament, 2003<\/a>). Moreover, although some individuals certainly do identify as spiritual but not religious (e.g., Saucier & Skrzypi\u0144ska, 2006<\/a>), a much larger proportion of individuals identify as both religious and spiritual (Pargament, 1999<\/a>), and many people have difficulty substantively differentiating between the two on an individual level (Hill et al., 2000<\/a>; Zinnbauer et al., 1997<\/a>). Therefore, as religious commitment has decreased, one may also expect decreases in private religious practice and individual spirituality.<\/p>\r\n

In this article, we seek to examine whether Americans\u2019 religious service attendance, religious practice, religious beliefs, religiosity, spirituality, confidence in religious institutions, and religious affiliation have changed since the 1970s, with a particular focus on the years since 2006 and on 18- to 29-year-olds. We take the additional step of calculating effect sizes and performing statistical significance testing to quantify the size of the changes. We draw from the nationally representative GSS of U.S. adults conducted 1972-2014. Because this survey draws from a multiage sample above 42 years, it can isolate the effects of age from those of time period and generation.1<\/a><\/sup> Thus, unlike some surveys conducted over a shorter period of time (e.g., 7 years: Pew Research Center, 2015<\/a>), this data set can determine, for example, if the Millennial generation (born approximately 1980-1994) is less religious because they are young or because of generational or time period change. That is, are Millennials less religious than Generation X (born 1961-1979) and Boomers (born 1943-1960) were when they were 18- to 29-year-olds? This data may also provide an early look at iGen (born 1995-2012) and their religious attitudes.<\/p>\r\n

Changes over time and generations in attitudes, values, and personality traits are rooted in cultural change (Stewart & Healy, 1989<\/a>; Twenge, 2014<\/a>), with cultures and individuals mutually influencing and constituting one another (Markus & Kitayama, 2010<\/a>). One cultural change relevant for religious orientation is the rise in individualism, a cultural system placing more emphasis on the self and less on social rules (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985<\/a>; Fukuyama, 1999<\/a>; Myers, 2000<\/a>; Twenge, 2014<\/a>). Several studies have documented increases in focus on the self (Twenge, Campbell, & Gentile, 2013<\/a>; Twenge & Foster, 2010<\/a>) and declines in focus on institutions, empathy for others, and moral rules (Kesebir & Kesebir, 2012<\/a>; Konrath, O\u2019Brien, & Hsing, 2011<\/a>; Twenge et al., 2014<\/a>). There are several reasons we would expect religion to decline with greater individualism. First, religiosity implies some level of commitment to a larger group or organization. As Welzel (2013)<\/a> suggests, the trend in Western societies has been toward more freedom and less commitment to groups. Second, belonging to a religious group may require assent with the group\u2019s beliefs, opinions, and practices. This can create tension when differences in opinion arise between an individual and an organization (e.g., Exline, Pargament, Grubbs, & Yali, 2014<\/a>;Exline & Rose, 2013<\/a>). Third, religiosity usually involves some rule-following and submission to authority (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2010<\/a>), another characteristic that goes against emancipation and individualism. Fourth, religion often focuses on concerns outside of the self, such as helping others and serving God (e.g., Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007<\/a>; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007<\/a>). Thus, the increasing individualism of American culture may have produced decreased religiosity among more recent time periods and generations.<\/p>\r\n

Based on previous research and cultural changes, we expect a decline in religious affiliation. We also predict declines in religious service attendance; while religiously unaffiliated Americans may attend services for a time, they may become less likely to do so as they feel more disassociated from religion. Most crucially, we predict declines in more private expressions of religious belief and practice, such as prayer, religiosity, and belief in God, with the declines especially evident among young people. Belonging to a religion and more privately believing in its tenets are traditionally linked (e.g., Park et al., 2013<\/a>; Smith, Denton, Faris, & Regnerus, 2002<\/a>); as more Americans are unaffiliated with religion, a greater proportion may become not just unaffiliated but secular in their beliefs and practices. These declines may be especially evident in recent years and among 18- to 29-year-olds, given the generational and cultural trends toward emphasizing social rules less and individual freedom more (known as \u201cGeneration Me\u201d: Twenge, 2014<\/a>; or \u201cemancipative values\u201d:Welzel, 2013<\/a>). Moving away from social institutions and community engagement would likely detract from one of the key facets of religion as a whole\u2014that is, community involvement and social value transmission.<\/p>\r\n

A secondary question is whether changes in religious orientation over time are caused by time period or generational (cohort) effects. If successive generations are less religious (forming their religious orientation while young and not changing), any decline would be due to generation. If people of all ages have become less religious during certain times, any decline would be due to time period. New hierarchical linear modeling techniques (called APC or age-period-cohort analyses) attempt to separate the effects of age, generation, and time period (Yang, 2008<\/a>; Yang & Land, 2013<\/a>). Some have argued that these techniques do not resolve the identification problem that has long plagued simultaneous analysis of age, period, and cohort effects (e.g., Bell & Jones, 2013<\/a>, 2014<\/a>); however, these criticisms appear to largely rest on untenable assumptions that are not consistent with basic APC models (Reither et al., 2015<\/a>). In addition, APC techniques have become widely used. For example, Schwadel (2011)<\/a> performed an APC analysis on some of the GSS religion variables up to 2006. However, at that time the data included only a handful of Millennials, a generation purported to be less religious; by 2014, however, Millennials were the entirety of 20- to 29-year-olds. In addition, further time period change may have occurred in the 8 years of data available since 2006. Thus, we perform APC analyses to examine whether shifts in Americans\u2019 religious orientation are due to generational or time period effects.<\/p>\r\n

In addition, we examine possible moderators of change over time in religious orientation. Trends may differ among men and women, Blacks and Whites, education levels, and U.S. regions, as these groups differ in their levels of religiosity and cultural focus (Blaine & Crocker, 1995<\/a>; Piff, Kraus, Cote, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010<\/a>; Plaut, Markus, & Lachman, 2002<\/a>; R. Taylor, Chatters, Jayakody, & Levin, 1996<\/a>; Vandello & Cohen, 1999<\/a>). We theorize that the decline in religious orientation will be larger among demographic groups and regions with higher social power and more individualism, including Whites, men, those with a college education, and living in the Northwest and West, and lower or nonexistent among groups with lower social power and less individualism, including Blacks, women, those without a college education, and the Midwest and South (e.g., Piff et al., 2010<\/a>;Vandello & Cohen, 1999<\/a>). Groups with relatively high social power might not see themselves as having a significant need for religion or God, so these groups might pioneer the movement toward less religiosity.<\/p>\r\n

Thus, we have three goals in this article: (a) to perform a comprehensive examination of American adults\u2019 religious orientation from 1972 through 2014, with a particular emphasis on 2006-2014 and 18- to 29-year-olds, and including effect sizes; (b) to examine whether these changes are due to generation or time period; and (c) to examine whether the trends differ by gender, race, education, or U.S. region.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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Method<\/h2>\r\n
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Sample<\/h3>\r\n

We drew from the GSS, 1972-2014, a nationally representative survey of U.S. residents over 18. Depending on the item, n<\/em>s range between 12,862 and 58,893. As suggested by the GSS administrators, we weight the analyses by the weight variable WTSSALL to make the sample nationally representative of individuals rather than households and correct for other sampling biases. However, these weighted analyses differ only very slightly from unweighted analyses. Also as suggested by the administrators, we excluded the black oversamples collected in 1982 and 1987.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

\r\n

Items<\/h3>\r\n

We identified and analyzed all items on respondents\u2019 own religious orientation asked in at least six administrations of the GSS. They were as follows:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    \r\n \t
  1. \r\n

    Religious preference: \u201cWhat is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?\u201d We analyzed the percentage of respondents who chose \u201cno religion.\u201d Asked 1972-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  2. \r\n

    Strength of religious affiliation: \u201cWould you call yourself a strong (Christian, Jew, etc.) or not a very strong (Christian, Jew, etc.)?\u201d Response choices were \u201cnot very strong,\u201d \u201csomewhat strong,\u201d and \u201cstrong.\u201d Asked 1974-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  3. \r\n

    Religious service attendance: \u201cHow often do you attend religious services?\u201d Response choices were \u201cnever,\u201d \u201cless than once a year,\u201d \u201cabout once a year,\u201d \u201cabout once or twice a year,\u201d \u201cSeveral times a year,\u201d \u201cabout once a month,\u201d \u201c2-3 times a month,\u201d \u201cnearly every week,\u201d and \u201cevery week.\u201d Asked 1972-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  4. \r\n

    Belief in the afterlife: \u201cDo you believe there is a life after death?\u201d Response choices were \u201cyes\u201d and \u201cno.\u201d Asked 1973-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  5. \r\n

    Believing the Bible is literal: \u201cWhich of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?\u201d Response choices were \u201cThe Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by men\u201d; \u201cThe Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word\u201d; and \u201cThe Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.\u201d Asked 1984-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  6. \r\n

    Frequency of praying: \u201cAbout how often do you pray?\u201d Response choices were \u201cnever,\u201d \u201cless than once a week,\u201d \u201conce a week,\u201d \u201cseveral times a week,\u201d \u201conce a day,\u201d and \u201cseveral times a day.\u201d Asked 1983-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  7. \r\n

    Belief in God: \u201cPlease look at this card and tell me which of the statements comes closest to expressing what you believe about God.\u201d Response choices were \u201cI don\u2019t believe in God\u201d; \u201cI don\u2019t know whether there is a God and I don\u2019t believe there is any way to find out\u201d; \u201cI don\u2019t believe in a personal God, but do believe in a Higher Power of some kind\u201d; \u201cI find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others\u201d; \u201cWhile I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God\u201d; and \u201cI know God really exists and I have no doubts about it.\u201d Asked 1988-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  8. \r\n

    Confidence in religious institutions: \u201cI am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say that you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, only some confidence, or very little in them?\u201d One of the items is \u201corganized religion.\u201d Response choices were \u201chardly any confidence at all,\u201d \u201conly some confidence,\u201d or \u201ca great deal of confidence.\u201d We excluded \u201cdon\u2019t know\u201d and \u201crefused\u201d responses. Asked 1973-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  9. \r\n

    Identification as a religious person: \u201cTo what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?\u201d Response choices of \u201cnot religious at all,\u201d \u201cslightly religious,\u201d \u201cmoderately religious,\u201d and \u201cvery religious.\u201d Asked 1998 and 2006-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t

  10. \r\n

    Identification as a spiritual person: \u201cTo what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person?\u201d Response choices of \u201cnot spiritual at all,\u201d \u201cslightly spiritual,\u201d \u201cmoderately spiritual,\u201d and \u201cvery spiritual.\u201d Asked 1998 and 2006-2014.<\/p>\r\n<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n

    Of these, religious preference, strength of religious affiliation, religious service attendance, and confidence in religious institutions are public religious variables, and belief in an afterlife, believing the Bible is literal, frequency of praying, belief in God, identification as a religious person, and identification as a spiritual person are private religious variables.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

    \r\n

    Possible Moderators<\/h3>\r\n

    We analyzed moderation by gender (men vs. women), race (White vs. Black, the only racial groups measured in all survey years), education level (high school graduate and below vs. attended some college and above), and U.S. region (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

    \r\n

    Procedure<\/h3>\r\n

    Data collected over time can be analyzed in many ways, including grouping by 20-year generation blocks, by decades, or by individual year. Given our focus on both overall change since the 1970s and change since 2006, we separated the data into 5-year intervals from 1972-2004 and reported data by individual year from 2006 to 2014. We report the effect sizes (d<\/em>, or difference in terms of standard deviations) and p<\/em> values for t<\/em> tests comparing 1972-1974 with 2014 and 2006 and 2014. We also include two figures with all of the year-by-year data for some variables. We report both continuous variables (e.g., the 0-8 scale for religious service attendance) and dichotomous variables (e.g., the percentage who never attend religious services). We use the tables for means and report percentage changes in the text.<\/p>\r\n

    For the APC models, we estimated random coefficient models allowing intercepts to vary across time periods (years) and generations (cohorts). Thus, effectively, an intercept (mean religious orientation) score is calculated (using empirical Bayes) for each cohort and each survey year. In addition, a fixed intercept (grand mean) is estimated along with a fixed regression coefficient for age and age squared. This model has three variance components: One for variability in intercepts due to cohorts (\u03c4u0<\/sub>), one for variability in intercepts due to period (\u03c4v0<\/sub>), and a residual term containing unmodeled variance within cohorts and periods. Variance in the intercepts across time periods and cohorts indicates period and cohort differences, respectively (Yang & Land, 2013<\/a>). Thus, the technique allows for a separation of the effects of generation\/cohort, time period, and age. Weighting could not be used for the mixed-effects analyses because proper probability weighting for variance component estimation requires taking into account pairwise selection probabilities, which is not possible in current statistical software.<\/p>\r\n

    In describing the trends in the text and tables, we will sometimes use common labels for the generations such as the G.I. or \u201cGreatest\u201d generation (born 1900-1924), Silent (1925-1942), Boomers (1943-1960; some argue 1946-1964), GenX (1961-1979 or 1965-1979), Millennials (1980-1994; for reviews, see Strauss & Howe, 1991<\/a>; Twenge, 2014<\/a>), and iGen (1995-2012). These birth year cutoffs are arbitrary and are not necessarily justified by empirical evidence, but are useful shorthand labels for those born in certain eras. Differences among those of the same generation certainly occur, and these can be seen in the tables and figures; we use these labels merely for convenience.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

    \r\n

    Results<\/h2>\r\n
    \r\n

    Trends in Religious Orientation<\/h3>\r\n

    American adults in the 2010s were less religious than those in previous decades, based on religious service attendance and more private religious expressions such as belief in God, praying, identifying as a religious person, and believing the Bible is the word of God (see Table 1<\/a> and Figure 1<\/a>).<\/p>\r\nTable 1:\u00a0<\/span>Religious Orientation Among All Adult Americans, 1972-2014, General Social Survey.\r\n

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