37.4.3: 100 Days of Violence

The Rwandan genocide, also known as the genocide against the Tutsi, was a mass slaughter of Tutsi people in Rwanda by members of the Hutu majority government. An estimated 500,000 to one million Rwandans were killed during the 100-day period from April 7 to mid-July 1994, constituting as many as 70% of the Tutsi population and 20% of Rwanda’s overall population.

Nyamata Memorial Site: Human skulls at the Nyamata Genocide Memorial.

Prelude

Preparation for Genocide

Historians do not agree on a precise date on which the idea of a “final solution” to kill every Tutsi in Rwanda was introduced. The army began training Hutu youth in combat and arming civilians with weapons such as machetes in 1990, as part of an official program of civil defense against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which largely consisted of Tutsi refugees whose families had fled to Uganda after the 1959 Hutu revolt against colonial rule. Rwanda also purchased large numbers of grenades and munitions starting in late 1990. In one deal, future UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his role as Egyptian foreign minister, facilitated a large sale of arms from Egypt. The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) also expanded rapidly during this time, growing from fewer than 10,000 troops to almost 30,000 in one year. New recruits were often poorly disciplined, however, and a divide grew between them and the more elite, experienced units.

In March 1993, the Hutu Power group began compiling lists of “traitors” who they planned to kill, and it is possible that President Juvenal Habyarimana’s name was on these lists. The far-right Hutu Power political party Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) was actively and openly accusing the president of treason, and many Power groups believed that the national radio station, Radio Rwanda, had become too liberal and supportive of the opposition. In turn, they founded a new radio station, Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), which broadcast racist propaganda, obscene jokes, and music, and quickly became popular throughout the country. Throughout 1993, hardliners imported machetes on a scale far larger than required for agriculture, as well as other tools that could be used as weapons, such as razor blades, saws, and scissors. These tools were distributed around the country, ostensibly as part of the civil defense network.

In October 1993, the President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, who had been elected in June as the country’s first ever Hutu president, was assassinated by extremist Tutsi army officers. The assassination caused shock waves throughout the country, reinforcing the notion among Hutus that the Tutsi were their enemy and could not be trusted. The CDR and Power wings of other parties quickly realized they could use the situation to their advantage. The idea of a Tutsi “final solution”, which had been floating around as a fringe political viewpoint, now occupied the top of Hutu party agendas and was actively planned. The Hutu Power groups were confident of persuading the Hutu population to carry out killings given the public anger at Ndadaye’s murder, the persuasiveness of RTLM propaganda, and the traditional obedience of Rwandans to authority. Power leaders began arming the interahamwe and other militia groups with AK-47s and other weapons, whereas previously they possessed only machetes and traditional hand weapons.

On January 11, 1994, General Romeo Dallaire, commander of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) sent the infamous “Genocide Fax” to UN Headquarters. The fax stated that Dallaire was in contact with a high-level informant who told him of plans to distribute weapons to Hutu militias to kill Belgian members of UNAMIR and guarantee Belgian withdrawal from the country. The informant, a local politician, had been ordered to register all Tutsis in Kigali. Dallaire requested permission for the protection of his informant and the informant’s family, but Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the UN, repeatedly forbade any operations despite having authority for approval until guidance was received from headquarters, citing UN Charter article 2(4).

Assassination of Habyarimana

On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying President Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu president of Burundi, was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, killing everyone on board. Responsibility for the attack was disputed, with both the RPF and Hutu extremists blamed. A later investigation by the Rwandan government blamed Hutu extremists in the Rwandan army. Despite disagreements about the perpetrators, the attack and deaths of the two Hutu presidents served as the catalyst for the genocide.

Following Habyarimana’s death, on the evening of April 6, a crisis committee was formed of Major General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, and a number of other senior army staff officers. The committee was headed by Bagosora, despite the presence of the more senior Ndindiliyimana. Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana was legally next in the line of political succession, but the committee refused to recognize her authority. Dallaire met with the committee that night and insisted that Uwilingiyimana be placed in charge, but Bagosora refused, saying Uwilingiyimana did not “enjoy the confidence of the Rwandan people” and was “incapable of governing the nation”. Bagosora sought to convince UNAMIR and the RPF that the committee was acting to contain the Presidential Guard, which he described as “out of control,” and that it would abide by the Arusha agreement, which had ended the three-year Rwandan civil war.

Killings of Moderate Leaders

UNAMIR sent an escort of ten Belgian soldiers to bring Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana her to the Radio Rwanda offices to address the nation. The plan was cancelled, however, because the Presidential Guard took over the radio station shortly afterwards and would not permit Uwilingiyimana to speak on air. Later that morning, a number of soldiers and a crowd of civilians overwhelmed the Belgians guarding Uwilingiyimana, forcing them to surrender their weapons. Uwilingiyimana and her husband were killed, but their children survived by hiding behind furniture and were rescued by Senegalese UNAMIR officer Mbaye Diagne. The ten Belgians guards were taken to the Camp Kigali military base where they were tortured and killed.

In addition to assassinating Uwilingiyimana, the extremists spent the night of April 6 in Kigali with lists of prominent moderate politicians and journalists on a mission to kill them. Fatalities that evening included President of the Constitutional Court Joseph Kavaruganda, Minister of Agriculture Frederic Nzamurambaho, Parti Liberal leader Landwald Ndasingwa and his Canadian wife, and chief Arusha negotiator Boniface Ngulinzira. A few moderates survived, including prime minister-delegate Faustin Twagiramungu, but the plot was successful enough that by the morning of April 7, all moderate politicians and leaders were either dead or in hiding.

Genocide

The genocide itself began within a few hours of Habyariamana’s death. Military leaders in Gisenyi province were initially the most organized, convening a large number of interahamwe and civilian Hutu. The commanders announced the president’s death, blamed the RPF, and then ordered the crowd to begin killing. The genocide spread to Ruhengeri, Kibuye, Kigali, Kibungo, Gikongoro, and Cyangugu provinces on April 7. In each case, local officials, responding to orders from Kigali, spread rumors that the RPF had killed the president and commanded the population to kill Tutsi in retribution. The Hutu population, which had been prepared and armed during the preceding months, carried out the orders without question. There were few killings in Gitarama and Butare provinces during the early phases of the genocide, due to the moderation of their governors. Killings began in earnest in Gitarama on April 9 and in Butare on April 19, following the arrest and murder of Tutsi governor Jean Baptiste Habyarimana. The genocide did not affect areas already under RPF control, including parts of Byumba province and eastern Ruhengeri.

For the remainder of April and early May, the Presidential Guard, gendarmerie, and youth militias, aided by local populations, continued killing at very high rates. Historian Gerard Prunier estimates in his book The Rwanda Crisis that up to 800,000 Rwandans were murdered during the first six weeks of the genocide, which represents a rate of killing five times higher than during the German Holocaust. The goal of the genocide was to kill every Tutsi living in Rwanda, and with the exception of the advancing RPF army, there was no opposition force to prevent or slow the killings. Domestic opposition had already been eliminated and UNAMIR was expressly forbidden to use force except in self-defense. In rural areas, where Tutsi and Hutu lived side-by-side and families knew each other, it was easy for Hutu to identify and target their Tutsi neighbors. In urban areas were residents were more anonymous, identification was facilitated using road blocks manned by the military and interahamwe. Each person who encountered a road block was required to show their national identity card, which included ethnicity, and anyone carrying a Tutsi card was slaughtered immediately. Many Hutu were also killed for a variety of reasons, including demonstrating sympathy for moderate opposition parties, being a journalist, or simply appearing Tutsi.

The RPF made slow and steady gains in the north and east of the country, ending killings in each area they occupied. The genocide was effectively ended in April in areas of Ruhengeri, Byumba, Kibungo, and Kigali provinces. The killings also ceased during f April in western Ruhengeri and Gisenyi because almost every Tutsi had been eliminated. Large numbers of Hutu in RPF-conquered areas fled, fearing retribution killings. Half a million Kibungo residents fled over the bridge at Rusumo Falls into Tanzania at the end of April and were accommodated in UN camps effectively controlled by ousted leaders of the Hutu regime.

In the remaining provinces, killings continued throughout May and June, although they became increasingly sporadic. Most Tutsi were already eliminated and the interim government hoped to rein in the growing anarchy and engage the population in fighting the encroaching RPF. On June 23, approximately 2,500 soldiers entered southwestern Rwanda as part of the French-led UN Operation Turquoise, intended as a humanitarian mission, although the soldiers were unable to save significant lives. The genocidal authorities were overtly welcoming of the French, displaying the French flag on their own vehicles, but slaughtering Tutsi who came out of hiding seeking protection.

Planning and Organization

The crisis committee, headed by Bagosora, took power following Habyarimana’s death and was the principal authority coordinating the genocide. Bagosora immediately began issuing orders to kill Tutsi, addressing groups of interahamwe in person in Kigali and making telephone calls to leaders in the provinces. Other leading national organizers included defense minister Augustin Bizimana; commander of the paratroopers, Aloys Ntabakuze; and head of the Presidential Guard, Protais Mpiranya. Businessman Felicien Kabuga funded the RTLM and the interahamwe, while Pascal Musabe and Joseph Nzirorera were responsible for coordinating militia activities nationally. In Kigali, the genocide was led by the Presidential Guard. They were assisted by militias, who in turn set up road blocks throughout the capital. Militias also initiated house searches within the city, slaughtering Tutsi and looting their property. Kigali governor Tharcisse Renzaho played a leading role, touring road blocks to ensure their effectiveness and using his position at the top of the Kigali provincial government to disseminate orders and dismiss officials who were not sufficiently active in perpetuating murder.

In rural areas, the local government hierarchy was also in most cases the chain of command for execution of the genocide. The governor of each province, acting on orders from Kigali, disseminated instructions to the district leaders who in turn issued directions to the leaders of the sector, cells, and villages of their districts. The majority of actual killings in the countryside were carried out by ordinary civilians under orders from their leaders. A combination of historical Hutu repression by the Tutsi minority, a culture of obedience to authority, and duress due to the belief that lack of participation would lead to violent retribution, all contributed to the willingness of ordinary citizens to commit violent acts against their neighbors.

The crisis committee appointed an interim government on April 8. Using the terms of the 1991 constitution instead of the Arusha Accords, the committee designated Theodore Sindikubwabo as interim president and Jean Kambanda was the new prime minister. All political parties were represented in the government, but most members were from the Hutu Power wings of their respective parties. The interim government was sworn in on April 9, and immediately relocated their headquarters from Kigali to Gitarama in order to avoid fighting between the RPF and Rwandan army in the capital. The crisis committee was officially dissolved, but Bagosora and some senior officers remained de facto rulers of the country. The government played some part in mobilizing the population, providing the regime an air of legitimacy, but it was in reality a puppet regime with no ability to halt the army or interahamwe’s activities.

Impact

Given the chaotic nature of the situation, there is no consensus on the number of people killed during the genocide. Unlike the genocides carried out by Nazi Germany or the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, authorities made no attempts to document or systematize deaths. The succeeding RPF government has stated that 1,071,000 were killed in 100 days, 10% of whom were Hutu. Based on those statistics, it could be derived that 10,000 people were murdered every day, which equals 400 people per hour, or seven people every minute. The journalist Philip Gourevitch agrees with an estimate of one million, while the UN estimates the death toll to be 800,000. It is estimated that approximately 300,000 Tutsi survived the genocide. Thousands of widows, many of whom were subjected to rape, are now HIV-positive. The genocide also created about 400,000 orphans, and nearly 85,000 of them were forced to become heads of households.

Rwandan Patriotic Front Military Campaign and Victory

On April 7, as the genocide began, RPF commander Paul Kagame warned the crisis committee and UNAMIR that he would resume the civil war if the killing did not stop. The next day, Rwandan government forces attacked the national parliament building from several directions, but RPF troops stationed there successfully fought back. The RPF then began an attack from the north on three fronts, seeking to link up quickly with the isolated troops in Kigali. Kagame refused to talk to the interim government, believing that it was just a cover for Bagosora’s rule and not truly committed to ending the genocide. Over the next few days, the RPF advanced steadily south, capturing Gabiro and large areas of the countryside to the north and east of Kigali. They avoided attacking Kigali or Byumba, but conducted maneuvers designed to encircle the cities and cut off supply routes. The RPF also allowed Tutsi refugees from Uganda to settle behind the front line in RPF-controlled areas.

Paul Kagame (2014): Kagame was commander of the Rwandan Patriotic Front for most of the Civil War.

Throughout April, there were numerous attempts by UNAMIR to establish a ceasefire, but Kagame insisted each time that the RPF would not stop fighting unless the killings stopped. In late April, the RPF secured the whole of the Tanzanian border area and began to move west from Kibungo to the south of Kigali. They encountered little resistance, except around Kigali and Ruhengeri. By May 16, they cut the road between Kigali and Gitarama, the temporary home of the interim government, and by June 13, they had taken Gitarama itself following an unsuccessful attempt by the Rwandan government forces to reopen the road. Subsequently, the interim government was forced to relocate to Gisenyi in the far northwest. As well as fighting the war, Kagame was recruiting heavily to expand the RPF. The new recruits included Tutsi survivors of the genocide and refugees from Burundi, but they were less well -trained and disciplined than earlier recruits.

Having completed the encirclement of Kigali, the RPF spent the latter of half of June fighting for the city itself. The government forces had superior manpower and weapons, but the RPF steadily gained in territory while conducting raids to rescue civilians behind enemy lines. Kagame was able to exploit the government forces’ focus on the genocide and translate that into RPF wins in the battle for Kigali. The RPF also benefited from the government’s waning morale as it lost territory. The RPF finally defeated Rwandan government forces in Kigali on July 4, and on July 18, they took Gisenyi and the rest of the northwest, forcing the interim government into Zaire, ending the genocide. At the end of July 1994, Kagame’s forces held the whole of Rwanda, except for the zone in the southwest occupied by the French-led UN force, Operation Turquoise.

Attributions

• 100 Days of Violence
  • “Use of force by states.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use_of_force_by_states. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Rwandan genocide.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_genocide. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Arusha Accords.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arusha_Accords. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Interhamwe.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interahamwe. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Paul_Kagame_2014.jpg.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Paul_Kagame_2014.jpg. Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0.
  • “Nyamata_Memorial_Site_13.jpg.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nyamata_Memorial_Site_13.jpg. Wikimedia Commons GNU FDL 1.2.