37.4.5: The Lack of International Response

Most of the world stood on the sidelines during the Rwandan genocide, hoping to avoid the loss of life and political entanglement that the American debacle in Somalia had created. As reports of the genocide spread through the media, the Security Council agreed to supply more than 5,000 troops to Rwanda to combat the genocide. But the delay and denial of recommendations prevented the force from getting there in a timely fashion, and ultimately they arrived months after the genocide was over. After the genocide, many government officials in the international community mourned the loss of thousands of civilians within Rwanda, though they took no action to prevent the slaughter as it was happening.

UNAMIR

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had been in Rwanda since October 1993 with a mandate to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords following the Rwandan civil war. UNAMIR commander Romeo Dallaire learned of the Hutu Power movement during the mission’s deployment, as well as plans for the mass extermination of Tutsi. Dallaire also learned of growing secret weapons caches, but his request to raid them was turned down by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). UNAMIR’s effectiveness in peacekeeping was also hampered by President Habyarimana and Hutu hardliners, and by April 1994, the Security Council threatened to terminate UNAMIR’s mandate if it did not make progress with its mission.

A school chalkboard in Kigali. Note the names “Dallaire,” UNAMIR Force Commander, and “Marchal,” UNAMIR Kigali sector commander.

Following the death of Habyarimana and the start of the genocide, Dallaire liaised repeatedly with both the Crisis Committee and the RPF, attempting to re-establish peace and prevent the resumption of the civil war. Neither side was interested in a ceasefire: the government was controlled by backers of the genocide, and the RPF considered continued fighting necessary to stop the killings. UNAMIR’s Chapter VI mandate rendered it powerless to intervene militarily, and most of its Rwandan staff were killed in the early days of the genocide, severely limiting its ability to operate. On April 12, the Belgian government, one of the largest troop contributors to UNAMIR, lost ten soldiers who were protecting Prime Minister Uwilingillyimana, and subsequently announced its withdrawal from the force, reducing UNAMIR’s effectiveness further.

UNAMIR was therefore largely reduced to a bystander role, and Dallaire later labeled it a failure. Its most significant contribution was to provide refuge for thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu at its headquarters in Amahoro Stadium as well as other secure UN sites, and in assisting with the evacuation of foreign nationals. In mid-May, the UN finally conceded that “acts of genocide may have been committed” and agreed to reinforcement, which would be referred to as UNAMIR 2. New soldiers did not start arriving until June, however, and following the end of the genocide in July, the role of UNAMIR 2 was largely confined to maintaining security and stability until its termination in 1996.

France and Operation Turquoise

During President Habyarimana’s years in power, France maintained very close relations with him as part of its Françafrique policy and assisted Rwanda militarily against the RPF during the Civil War. France considered the RPF, along with Uganda, to be a part of a plot to increased Anglophone influence at the expense of that of the French. During the first few days of the genocide, France launched Amaryllis, a military operation assisted by the Belgian army and UNAMIR, to evacuate expatriates from Rwanda. The French and Belgians refused to allow any Tutsi to accompany them, and those who boarded the evacuation trucks were forced off at Rwandan government checkpoints, where they were killed. The French also separated several expatriates and children from their Tutsi spouses, rescuing the foreigners but leaving the Rwandans to a likely death. The French did, however, rescue several high profile members of Habyarimana’s government, as well as his wife, Agathe.

In late June 1994, France launched Opération Turquoise, a UN-mandated mission to create safe humanitarian areas for displaced persons, refugees, and civilians in danger. The French entered southwestern Rwanda from bases in the Zairian cities of Goma and Bukavu and established the zone Turquoise within the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle, an area occupying approximately one-fifth of Rwanda. Radio France International Estimated that Turquoise saved around 15,000 lives, but as the genocide came to an end and the RPF ascended to a leadership role within the country, many Rwandans interpreted Turquoise as a mission to protect Hutu from the RPF, including some Hutu who had participated in the genocide. The French remained hostile to the RPF and their presence did temporarily stall the RPF’s advance. A number of inquiries have been made into French involvement in Rwanda, including the 1998 French Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda, which accused France of errors of judgement but stopped short of accusing it of direct responsibility for the genocide itself. A 2008 report by the Rwandan government and sponsored by the Mucyo Commission, however, did accuse the French government of knowing about the genocide and helping to train Hutu militia members.

Other International Actors

Southern European Task Force (SETAF) Transporting Water: The water was made by eight chlorinators and two reverse osmosis machines in Goma for Rwandan refugees located at Camp Kimbumba, Zaire. 

Intelligence reports indicated that U.S. president Bill Clinton and his cabinet were aware of a “final solution” for Tutsi people within Rwanda before the height of the massacre. However, fear of a repeat of the events in Somalia shaped U.S. policy at the time, with many commentators identifying the graphic consequences of the Battle of Mogadishu as the key reason for the U.S. failure to intervene in later conflicts such as the Rwandan Genocide. After the Battle of Mogadishu, the bodies of several U.S. casualties were dragged through the streets by crowds of local civilians and members of Aidid’s Somali National Alliance. As a result, 80% of the discussion in Washington in the lead up to the 100 days of violence in Rwanda concerned the evacuation of American citizens. Later, Bill Clinton would refer to the failure of the U.S. government to intervene in the genocide as one of his greatest foreign policy failings while in office.

The Roman Catholic Church affirms that a genocide took place in Rwanda, but states that those who took part did so without the permission of the Church. Many Catholic and other clergy sacrificed their lives to save others from slaughter. However, there is evidence that others contributed to the mayhem, with some even actively participating in crimes. Though religious factors were not prominent, Human Rights Watch faulted a number of religious authorities in Rwanda in a 1999 report on the genocide, including Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and Protestants, for failing to condemn the genocide. Some religious authorities were even tried and convicted for their participation in the genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Father Athanase Seromba was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment (increased on appeal to life imprisonment) by the ICTR for his role in the massacre of 2,000 Tutsis. The court heard that Seromba lured the Tutsis to a church where they believed they would find refuge. When they arrived, he ordered bulldozers to crush the refugees within and Hutu militias to kill any survivors. Similarly, Bishop Misago was accused of corruption and complicity in the genocide, but was cleared of all charges in 2000.

Attributions

• The Lack of International Response
  • “Francafrique.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7afrique. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Rwandan genocide: international involvement.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwandan_genocide#International_involvement. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Role of the international community in the Rwandan Genocide.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role_of_the_international_community_in_the_Rwandan_Genocide. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chapter_VI_of_the_United_Nations_Charter. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Kigali_school_chalk_board.jpg.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kigali_school_chalk_board.jpg. Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 2.0.
  • “SETAF_HISTORY_0004.JPEG.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SETAF_HISTORY_0004.JPEG. Wikimedia Commons Public domain.