37.5.2: NATO and UN Intervention

The United Nations and Bosnia

The UN repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, attempted to stop the Bosnian War, and the much-touted Vance-Owen Peace Plan in the first half of 1993 made little impact. On February 22, 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 808, which decided “that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.” On May 15-16, 96% of Serbs voted to reject the Vance-Owen peace plan. After the failure of the plan, an armed conflict sprang up between Bosniaks and Croats over the 30% of Bosnia the latter held. The peace plan was one of the factors leading to the escalation of the conflict as Lord Owen avoided moderate Croat authorities (pro-unified Bosnia) and negotiated directly with more extreme elements who were in favor of separation.

Sniper Alley: Norwegian UN troops on their way up Sniper Alley in Sarajevo, November 1995.

On May 25, 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was formally established by Resolution 827 of the United Nations Security Council. In April 1993, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 816, calling on member states to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. On April 12, 1993, NATO commenced Operation Deny Flight to enforce this no-fly zone. In an attempt to protect civilians, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which had been established during the Croatian War of Independence, saw its role further extended in May 1993 to protect areas declared as “safe havens” around Sarajevo, Goražde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Žepa, and Bihać by Resolution 824. On June 4, 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 836, authorizing the use of force by UNPROFOR for the purpose of protecting the above-named safe zones.

United Nations Safe Zones

The establishment of the UN Safe Areas is considered one of the most controversial decisions of the United Nations. The resolutions establishing the safe areas were unclear about the procedure by which these areas were to be protected in the war zone that Bosnia and Herzegovina had become. The resolutions also created a difficult diplomatic situation for member states that voted in favor of it due to their unwillingness to take necessary steps to ensure the security of the safe areas. In 1995, the situation in the UN Safe Areas had deteriorated to the point of diplomatic crisis, culminating in the Srebrenica massacre, one of the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II. By the end of the war, every one of the Safe Areas had been attacked by the Serbs, and Srebrenica and Žepa were overrun.

Srebrenica

From the outset, violations of the safe area agreement in Srebrenica were abundant. Between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers from three of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) Drina Corps Brigades were deployed around the enclave, equipped with tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and mortars. The 28th Mountain Division of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) that remained in the enclave was neither well-organized nor well-equipped. A firm command structure and communications system was lacking and some soldiers carried old hunting rifles or no weapons at all. Few had proper uniforms. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Karremans (the Dutchbat Commander with UNPROFOR) testified to the ICTY that his personnel were prevented from returning to the enclave by Serb forces and that equipment and ammunition were also barred. Bosniaks in Srebrenica complained of attacks by Serb soldiers, while to the Serbs it appeared that Bosnian government forces in Srebrenica were using the safe area as a convenient base from which to launch counter-offensives against the VRS, with UNPROFOR failing to take any preventive action. General Sefer Halilović admitted that ARBiH helicopters had flown in violation of the no-fly zone and that he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with ammunition for the 28th Division within the enclave.

A Security Council mission led by Diego Arria arrived in Srebrenica on April 25, 1993, and in their subsequent report to the UN, condemned the Serbs for perpetrating “a slow-motion process of genocide.” The mission then stated that:

“Serb forces must withdraw to points from which they cannot attack, harass or terrorise the town. UNPROFOR should be in a position to determine the related parameters. The mission believes, as does UNPROFOR, that the actual 4.5 km by 0.5 km decided as a safe area should be greatly expanded.”

Specific instructions from UN Headquarters in New York stated that UNPROFOR should not be too zealous in searching for Bosniak weapons and later, that the Serbs should withdraw their heavy weapons before the Bosniaks gave up their weapons. The Serbs never did withdraw their heavy weapons.

By early 1995, fewer and fewer supply convoys were making it through to the enclave. The situation in Srebrenica and in other enclaves had deteriorated into lawless violence as prostitution among young Muslim girls, theft, and black marketeering proliferated. The already meager resources of the civilian population dwindled further and even the UN forces started running dangerously low on food, medicine, ammunition, and fuel, eventually forced to patrol the enclave on foot. Dutchbat soldiers who went out of the area on leave were not allowed to return, and their numbers dropped from 600 to 400 men. In March and April, the Dutch soldiers noticed a build-up of Serb forces near two of their observation posts.

In March 1995, Radovan Karadžić, President of the Republika Srpska (RS), despite pressure from the international community to end the war and ongoing efforts to negotiate a peace agreement, issued a directive to the VRS concerning the long-term strategy of the VRS forces in the enclave. The directive, known as “Directive 7”, specified that the VRS was to completely separate Srebrenica from Žepa and make the situation within Srebrenica enclave unbearable by combat means, with the aim of ending the life of all Srebrenica’s inhabitants. By mid-1995, the humanitarian situation of the Bosniak civilians and military personnel in the enclave was catastrophic. In May, following orders, ARBiH Commander Naser Orić and his staff left the enclave by helicopter to Tuzla, leaving senior officers in command of the 28th Division. In late June and early July, the 28th Division issued a series of reports, including urgent pleas for the humanitarian corridor to the enclave to be reopened. When this failed, Bosniak civilians began dying from starvation. On July 7, the mayor of Srebrenica reported that eight residents had died of starvation.

The Serb offensive against Srebrenica began in earnest the day before, on July 6, 1995. In the following days, the five UNPROFOR observation posts in the southern part of the enclave fell one by one in the face of the Bosnian-Serb advance. Some of the Dutch soldiers retreated into the enclave after their posts were attacked, but the crews of the other observation posts surrendered into Serb custody. Simultaneously, the defending Bosnian forces came under heavy fire and were pushed back towards the town. Once the southern perimeter began to collapse, about 4,000 Bosniak residents who had been living in a Swedish housing complex for refugees nearby fled north into the town of Srebrenica. Dutch soldiers reported that the advancing Serbs were “cleansing” the houses in the southern part of the enclave.

Late on July 9, 1995, emboldened by early successes and little resistance from the largely demilitarized Bosniaks and the absence of any significant reaction from the international community, Karadžić issued a new order authorizing the 1,500-strong VRS Drina Corps to capture the town of Srebrenica. The following morning (July 10), Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans made urgent requests for air support from NATO to defend Srebrenica as crowds filled the streets, some carrying weapons. VRS tanks were approaching the town, and NATO airstrikes on these began on the afternoon of July 11, 1995. NATO bombers attempted to attack VRS artillery locations outside the town, but poor visibility forced NATO to cancel this operation. Further NATO air attacks were cancelled after the VRS threatened to bomb the UN’s Potočari compound, kill Dutch and French military hostages, and attack surrounding locations where 20,000 to 30,000 civilian refugees were situated. In the days that followed, more than 8,000 Muslim Bosniaks, mainly men and boys, would be killed by units of the VRS under the command of General Ratko Mladić.

 Srebrenica Massacre Victim: Skull of a victim of the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre in an exhumed mass grave outside the village of Potocari, Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 2007.

 NATO Military Involvement

NATO became militarily involved in the conflict when its jets shot down four Serb aircraft in violation of the UN no-fly zone over central Bosnia on February 28, 1994. On March 12, 1994, the UNPROFOR made its first request for NATO air support, but close air support was not deployed as the approval process was delayed. On April 10-11, 1994, UNPROFOR called in NATO air strikes to protect the Goražde safe area, resulting in the bombing of a Serbian military command outpost near Goražde by 2 US F-16 jets. This was the first time in NATO’s history that it had participated in this type of military maneuver. As a result, 150 UN personnel were taken hostage on April 14, and on April 16, a British Sea Harrier was shot down over Goražde by Serb forces.

On August 5, at the request of UNPROFOR, NATO aircraft attacked a target within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone after weapons were seized by Bosnian Serbs from a collection site near Sarajevo. On September 22, 1994, NATO aircraft carried out an air strike against a Bosnian Serb tank at the request of UNPROFOR.

Operation Deliberate Force

Operation Deliberate Force was a sustained air campaign conducted by NATO in concert with UNPROFOR ground operations to undermine the military capability of the VRS, which had threatened and attacked UN-designated safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian War. Events such as the Srebrenica and Markale massacres precipitated intervention. The operation was carried out between August 30 and September 20, 1995, involving 400 aircraft and 5,000 personnel from 15 nations. Commanded by Admiral Leighton W. Smith, the campaign struck 338 Bosnian Serb targets, many of which were destroyed. Overall, 1,026 bombs were dropped during the operation, 708 of which were precision-guided. The air campaign was key in pressuring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take part in negotiations that resulted in the Dayton Agreement reached in November 1995.

Attributions

• NATO and UN Intervention
  • “Srebrenica massacre.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srebrenica_massacre. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Operation Deliberate Force.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Deliberate_Force. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “United Nations Safe Areas.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Safe_Areas. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Bosnian War.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnian_War. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Peace plans proposed before and during the Bosnian War: Vance-Owen plan.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_plans_proposed_before_and_during_the_Bosnian_War#Vance.E2.80.93Owen_plan. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
  • “Opp_mot_Sniper_Alley.jpg.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Opp_mot_Sniper_Alley.jpg. Wikimedia Commons GNU FDL 1.2.
  • “Srebrenica_Massacre_-_Massacre_Victim_2_-_Potocari_2007.jpg.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Srebrenica_Massacre_-_Massacre_Victim_2_-_Potocari_2007.jpg. Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0.