36.3.3: Allende and Popular Unity
The United States was distrustful of Chile’s President Salvador Allende due to his Marxist beliefs and policies, leading to a military coup ousting Allende from power that was strongly encouraged by the CIA.
Learning Objective
Evaluate why the United States was distrustful of Allende’s policies
Key Points
- Salvador Allende was the president of Chile from 1970 until 1973 as well as the head of the Popular Unity government. He was the first Marxist to be elected to the national presidency of a democratic country.
- There was an active campaign against Allende’s presidential confirmation within Chile’s Congress, including clandestine efforts to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. In the end, his presidency was only ratified once he signed a Statute of Constitutional Guarantees.
- While in office, Allende pursued a policy he called “La via chilena al socialismo”, or “the Chilean way to socialism”, which included nationalization of certain large-scale industries such as copper and healthcare, land redistribution, the continuation of the educational policies of his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva, and a program guaranteeing free milk for children.
- The Popular Unity coalition was not perfectly united around Allende’s platform due to the president’s more moderate leanings and commitment to the principles of democracy.
- During his first year in office, Allende’s government achieved economic growth, reductions in inflation and unemployment, redistribution of income, and increases in consumption.
- Despite his predecessor’s deepening of Chile’s relations with the USSR, Allende attempted to maintain normal relations with the United States. However, after the United States cut off credits and increased its support to Allende’s opposition, the government was forced to seek alternative sources of trade and finance from the USSR.
- The U.S. government encouraged Allende’s resignation, overthrow, or electoral defeat due to a fear of .Marxism and dissatisfaction with the nationalization of U.S copper concerns within Chile.
- On August 22, 1973, the Christian Democrats and the National Party members of the Chamber of Deputies voted 81 to 47 in favor of a resolution that asked the authorities to preserve Chilean democracy in face of the threat Allende’s government presented.
- Two days later, Allende responded point-by point to the accusations and accused Congress in return of encouraging sedition, civil war, and even a coup.
- The Chilean military seized the opportunity created by the Chamber of Deputies’ August 22nd Resolution to oust Allende on September 11, 1973. As the Presidential Palace was surrounded and bombed, Allende committed suicide.
Salvador Allende was the president of Chile from 1970 until 1973 and the head of the Popular Unity government. He was the first ever Marxist to be elected to the national presidency of a democratic country. Although the 1970 Chilean presidential election was lawful, the Chilean Senate declared the Allende government unlawful in August 1973 due to its practice of unconstitutional expropriation of private property. Allende’s presidency was cut short by a military coup shortly thereafter.
Chilean Presidential Election, 1970
Allende ran with the Popular Unity coalition during the 1970 presidential election. Succeeding the FRAP left-wing coalition, it was comprised primarily of leftist political parties, including the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Radical Party, the Party of the Radical Left (until 1972), the Social Democratic Party, MAPU, or Movimient de Accion Popular Unitario, and the Christian Left, which joined the coalition in 1971. Allende won a plurality of the popular vote at 36.2% with a platform promising nationalization of the mineral industry as well as income and land redistribution. Conservative former president Jorge Alessandri, the candidate from the National Party, received slightly fewer votes, approximately 34.9%. According the Chilean constitution, Congress had to decide between the two candidates with the most votes, and according to precedent, Congress tended to choose the candidate with the largest number of votes.
However, there was an active campaign against Allende’s confirmation within Congress at the time, including clandestine efforts to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. In the end, his presidency was only ratified once he signed a Statute of Constitutional Guarantees, convincing the majority of Christian Democratic senators who favored Alessandri of Allende’s allegiance to democracy. Having signed this statute, members of the Christian Democratic Party in the Senate were willing to vote in favor of granting the presidency to Allende.
“The Chilean Way to Socialism”
While in office, Allende pursued a policy he called “La via chilena al socialismo,” or “the Chilean way to socialism,” which included nationalization of certain large-scale industries such as copper and healthcare, land redistribution, the continuation of the educational policies of his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva, and a program guaranteeing free milk for children. Eduardo Frei’s government already partially nationalized the copper industry by acquiring a 51% share in foreign-owned mines, but copper remained the primary U.S. business in Chile during this time. Early on, Congress supported Allende’s extensive vision for government involvement in the economy, especially since the Popular Unity and Christian Democratic parties combined had a clear majority in the legislature. However, the government’s efforts to pursue these policies led to strong outpouring of opposition from landowners, some middle class sectors, financiers, the Roman Catholic Church, and the rightist National Party. Eventually, the Christian Democrats united with the National Party in Congress as opposition grew.
The Popular Unity coalition itself was far from perfectly united around the platform of the president. Allende himself was a more moderate representative of the Socialist Party and was committed to the principles of democracy. He was supported by the Communist Party, which, although less committed to the principles of representative democracy, favored a cautious and gradual approach to the vast reforms that had been proposed. By contrast, the radical left wing of the Socialist Party wanted an immediate disruption to the existing capitalist system, even if it meant resorting to violent means.
During his first year in office, Allende’s government achieved economic growth, reductions in inflation and unemployment, redistribution of income, and increases in consumption. The government also significantly increased salaries and wages, reduced taxes, and introduced free distribution of certain items deemed necessities. Groups previously excluded from the state labor insurance scheme, such as the self-employed or those employed by small businesses, were included for the first time. Additionally, pensions were increased for widows, invalids, orphans, and the elderly. The National Milk Plan provided more than 3 million liters of milk per day in 1970, free of charge.
Foreign Relations
Soviet Union
Allende’s predecessor, Eduardo Frei, had improved relations with the USSR, and in February 1970, Frei’s government signed Chile’s first cultural and scientific agreement with the Soviet Union. When Allende assumed the presidency, he attempted to maintain normal relations with the United States. However, as a result of Chile’s nationalization of the copper industry, the US cut off credits and increased its support to the opposition. As a result, Allende’s government was forced to seek alternative sources of trade and finance. Chile gained commitments from the USSR to invest approximately $400 million in Chile over the course of the next six years, though that number was smaller than the amount Allende hoped to receive. Trade between the two countries did not significantly increase and mainly involved the purchase of Soviet equipment. When Allende visited the USSR in late 1972 to request more aid and additional lines of credit, he was turned down.
In mid-1973, the USSR approved the delivery of weaponry to the Chilean army. However, when news of an attempted army coup to overthrow Allende reached Soviet officials, the shipment was redirected to another country.
U.S. Opposition to Allende
U.S. opposition to Allende began several years before he was elected President of Chile, but escalated once the prospect of a second Marxist regime being established in the Western Hemisphere became more likely (the first being Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba). The administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon was already embroiled in the Vietnam War and the broader Cold War with the Soviet Union. The U.S. government intended to encourage Allende’s resignation, overthrow, or defeat by the presidential election of 1976. To this end, the Nixon administration clandestinely funded independent and non-state media and labor unions within Chile and directed other governmental entities that no new bilateral economic aid commitments should be undertaken with the government of Chile. The United States did however provide humanitarian aid to Chile in addition to forgiving old loans valued at $200 million from 1971 to 1972. The United States also did not invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment, which would have required an immediate cut-off of U.S aid due to Allende’s nationalizations. Allende received new sources of credit valued between $600 million and $950 million in 1972 and $547 million by June 1973. The International Monetary Fund also loaned $100 million to Chile during the Allende years.
The U.S. government used two tactics when countering Allende’s government. “Track I” was a State Department initiative designed to thwart Allende by subverting Chilean elected officials within the bounds of the Chilean constitution. This tactic excluded the CIA. Track I expanded to encompass a number of policies with the ultimate goal of creating conditions that would encourage a coup. “Track II” was a CIA operation overseen by Henry Kissinger and the CIA’s director of covert operations, Thomas Karamessine. Track II excluded the State Department and Department of Defense. The goal of Track II was to find and support Chilean military officers who would engage in a coup.
Crisis
Congressional Resolutions
On August 22, 1973, the Christian Democrats and the National Party members of the Chamber of Deputies voted 81 to 47 in favor of a resolution that asked the authorities to preserve Chilean democracy in face of the threat Allende’s government presented. They believed Allende’s policies infringed upon the freedoms guaranteed by the Chilean constitution and accused Allende of attempting to establish a totalitarian order upon the country. Most accusations centered around a perceived disregard for the separation of powers and the erosion of legislative and judicial prerogatives in favor of granting these powers to the executive branch of government. Finally, the resolution condemned the creation and development of government-protected armed forces. President Allende’s efforts to reorganize the military and police forces were characterized as nefarious attempts to use the armed and police forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks.
Two days later on August 24, 1973, Allende responded point-by point to the accusations. He accused Congress of encouraging sedition, civil war, and even a coup. He also pointed out that the declaration failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority constitutionally required to bring an accusation against the president and argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role.
1973 Chilean Coup D’etat
In early September 1973, Allende floated the idea of resolving the congressional resolution crisis with a referendum. However, the Chilean military seized the opportunity created by the Chamber of Deputies’ August 22nd Resolution to oust Allende on September 11, 1973. As the Presidential Palace was surrounded and bombed, Allende committed suicide.
A September 2000 report released by the CIA using declassified documents related to the military coup found that the CIA had probably approved of and encour.aged the 1973 coup, but there was no evidence that the U.S actually participated in it.
This view has been challenged by some historians, such as Tim Weiner and Peter Kornbluh, who have stated that the covert support of the United States was crucial to the preparation for the coup, the coup itself, and the consolidation of the regime afterward.
Attributions
- Allende and Popular Unity
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“Presidency of Salvador Allende.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Salvador_Allende. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
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“United States intervention in Chile.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_intervention_in_Chile. Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
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“Popular Unity (Chile).” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Unity_(Chile). Wikipedia CC BY-SA 3.0.
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“Salvador_Allende_Gossens-.jpg.” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Salvador_Allende_Gossens-.jpg. Wikimedia Commons CC BY 3.0.
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Candela Citations
- Boundless World History. Authored by: Boundless. Located at: https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-worldhistory/. License: CC BY: Attribution