The Iranian Nuclear Deal

38.2.6: The Iranian Nuclear Deal

The Iran nuclear deal is an international agreement on the limits and international control imposed on the nuclear program of Iran. It was reached in 2015 after years of negotiations between Iran, the P5+1, and the European Union.

Learning Objective

Explain the arguments for and against the nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran

Key Points

  • The nuclear program of Iran has included several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants. In 1970, Iran ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), making its nuclear program subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification. The program was launched in the 1950s with the help of the United States as part of the Atoms for Peace program.
  • The participation of the United States and Western European governments in Iran’s nuclear program continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran. Following the 1979 Revolution, most of the international nuclear cooperation with Iran was cut off.In the 2000s, the revelation of Iran’s clandestine uranium enrichment program raised concerns that it might be intended for non-peaceful uses. While since 2003 the United States has alleged that Iran has a program to develop nuclear weapons, Iran has maintained that its nuclear program is aimed only at generating electricity.
  • Formal negotiations toward the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. For the next twenty months, Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations, and in April 2015 agreed on an Iran nuclear deal framework for the final agreement. In July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 agreed on the plan.
  • Under the agreement, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges. For the next 15 years, Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3.67%. Iran also agreed not to build any new heavy-water facilities for the same period of time. Uranium-enrichment activities will be limited to a single facility. Other facilities will be converted to avoid proliferation risks. To monitor and verify Iran’s compliance with the agreement, the IAEA will have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities.
  • More than 90 countries endorsed the agreement as did many international organizations, including the UN and NATO. The most notable critic of the agreement is the state of Israel. Nuclear experts and watchdogs agreed that the agreement was a positive development. An intense public debate in the United States took place during the congressional review period, with various groups lobbying both opposition and support for the agreement.
  • With the prospective lifting of some sanctions, the agreement is expected to have a significant impact on both the economy of Iran and global markets. The energy sector is particularly important. The agreement will boost Iran’s scientific cooperation with Western powers and has already improved diplomatic relations in some cases. However, Iran and the U.S. have been both accused of violating the agreement, and its future under Trump administration is uncertain.

Examples

Key Terms

International Atomic Energy Agency
An international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. It was established as an autonomous organization in 1957. Although established independently of the United Nations through its own international treaty, it reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.
Joint Plan of Action
A pact signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Geneva, Switzerland in 2013. It consisted of a short-term freeze of portions of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for decreased economic sanctions on Iran as the countries worked towards a long-term agreement. It represented the first formal agreement between the United States and Iran in 34 years. Implementation of the agreement began January 20, 2014.
Iran Sanctions Act
A 1996 act of Congress that imposed economic sanctions on firms doing business with Iran (and originally also with Libya, but the act does not apply to Libya since 2006). The act allows the president to waive sanctions on a case-by-case basis, although this waiver is subject to renewal every six months. Despite the restrictions on American investment in Iran, other provisions apply to all foreign investors, and many Iranian expatriates based in the U.S. continue to make substantial investments in Iran. On December 1, 2016, the Senate voted 99-0 in favor of extending the sanctions a further ten years.
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
An international agreement, known commonly as the Iran deal or Iran nuclear deal, on the nuclear program of Iran reached in Vienna in July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany), and the European Union.
P5+1
A group of six world powers that joined together in diplomatic efforts with Iran with regard to its nuclear program. The group consists of the UN Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
An international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty entered into force in 1970. As of August 2016, 191 states have adhered to the treaty, although North Korea announced its withdrawal in 2003.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

The nuclear program of Iran has included several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants. In 1970, Iran ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), making its nuclear program subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification. The program was launched in the 1950s with the help of the United States as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The participation of the United States and Western European governments in Iran’s nuclear program continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran. Following the 1979 Revolution, most of the international nuclear cooperation with Iran was cut off. In 1981, Iranian officials concluded that the country’s nuclear development should continue. Negotiations took place with France in the late 1980s and with Argentina in the early 1990s, and agreements were reached. In the 1990s, Russia formed a joint research organization with Iran, providing Iran with Russian nuclear experts and technical information.

In the 2000s, the revelation of Iran’s clandestine uranium enrichment program raised concerns that it might be intended for non-peaceful uses. The IAEA launched an investigation in 2003 after an Iranian dissident group revealed undeclared nuclear activities carried out by Iran. While since 2003 the United States has alleged that Iran has a program to develop nuclear weapons, Iran has maintained that its nuclear program is aimed only at generating electricity. The United States’s position is that “a nuclear-armed Iran is not acceptable,” and the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have also attempted to negotiate a cessation of nuclear enrichment activities by Iran.

In 2006, American and European representatives noted that Iran has enough unenriched uranium hexafluoride gas to make ten atomic bombs, adding that it was “time for the Security Council to act.” In 2006, because of Iran’s noncompliance with its NPT obligations, the United Nations Security Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment programs. In 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that Iran halted an alleged active nuclear weapons program in fall 2003. In 2011, the IAEA reported credible evidence that Iran had been conducting experiments aimed at designing a nuclear bomb until 2003 and that research may have continued on a smaller scale after that time.

 

Negotiations

In March 2013, the United States began a series of secret bilateral talks with Iranian officials in Oman and in June, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. Rouhani has been described as “more moderate, pragmatic and willing to negotiate” than his predecessor, the anti-Western hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, in a 2006 nuclear negotiation with European powers, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran managed to master the conversion of uranium yellowcake (the conversion of yellowcake is an important step in the nuclear fuel process). In August 2013, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for a resumption of serious negotiations with the P5+1 (the UN Security Council’s five permanent members,  China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) on the Iranian nuclear program. In September 2013, Obama and Rouhani had a telephone conversation, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry also had a meeting with Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, signaling that the two countries were open to cooperation.

After several rounds of negotiations, in November 2013, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), an interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, was signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Geneva, Switzerland. It consisted of a short-term freeze of portions of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for decreased economic sanctions on Iran as the countries work towards a long-term agreement. The IAEA began “more intrusive and frequent inspections” under this interim agreement, formally activated in January 2014. The IAEA issued a report stating that Iran was adhering to the terms of the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, beginning the dilution process (to reduce half of the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to 3.5 percent), and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor. A major focus of the negotiations was limitations on Iran’s key nuclear facilities.

The foreign ministers of the P5+1 nations, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, and the Iranian foreign minister in November 2013, when the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, was adopted in Geneva, photo by U.S. Department of State.

The foreign ministers of the P5+1 nations, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, and the Iranian foreign minister in November 2013, when the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, was adopted in Geneva, photo by U.S. Department of State. In June 2006, China, Russia, and the United States joined the three EU-3 countries, which had been negotiating with Iran since 2003, to offer another proposal for comprehensive negotiations with Iran.

 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

The final agreement between the P5+1+EU and Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the culmination of 20 months of “arduous” negotiations. It followed the JPA and an Iran nuclear deal framework was reached in April 2015. Under this framework, Iran agreed tentatively to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, all of which would last for at least a decade and some longer, and to submit to an increased intensity of international inspections. The negotiations were extended several times until the final JCPOA was finally reached on July 14, 2015.

The final agreement’s complexity shows the impact of a public letter written by a bipartisan group of 19 U.S. diplomats, experts, and others in June 2015, when negotiations were still ongoing. That letter outlined concerns about the several provisions in the then-unfinished agreement and called for a number of improvements to strengthen the prospective agreement and win support.

Major provisions of the final accord include:

  • Iran’s current stockpile of low-enriched uranium will be reduced by 98 percent, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg. This reduction will be maintained for 15 years. For the same 15-year period, Iran will be limited to enriching uranium to 3.67%, a percentage sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for building a nuclear weapon.
  • For ten years, Iran will place over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium, an enrichment capacity limited to the Natanz plant.
  • Iran will not build any new uranium-enrichment facilities for 15 years.
  • Iran may continue research and development work on enrichment, but that work will take place only at the Natanz facility and include certain limitations for the first eight years.
  • Iran, with cooperation from the “Working Group” (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), will modernize and rebuild the Arak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, but in such a way as to minimize the production of plutonium and prevent production of weapons-grade plutonium.
  • Iran’s Fordow facility will stop enriching uranium and researching uranium enrichment for at least 15 years and the facility will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center.
  • Iran will implement an Additional Protocol agreement, which will continue in perpetuity for as long as Iran remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The signing of the Additional Protocol represents a continuation of the monitoring and verification provisions “long after the comprehensive agreement between the P5+1 and Iran is implemented.”
  • A comprehensive inspections regime will be implemented to monitor and confirm that Iran is complying with its obligations and is not diverting any fissile material.

Following the issuance of a IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures, the UN sanctions against Iran and some EU sanctions will terminate and some will be suspended. Once sanctions are lifted, Iran will recover approximately $100 billion of its assets (U.S. Treasury Department estimate) frozen in overseas banks.

 

Response

More than 90 countries endorsed the agreement as did many international organizations, including the UN and NATO. The most notable critic of the agreement is the state of Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “Israel is not bound by this deal with Iran, because Iran continues to seek our destruction, we will always defend ourselves.” Netanyahu called the deal a “capitulation” and “a bad mistake of historic proportions.” Most of Israel’s other political figures, including the opposition, were similarly critical of the agreement. The two countries maintain extremely hostile relations, with some Iranian leaders calling for the destruction of Israel.

Following the unveiling of the agreement, “a general consensus quickly emerged” among nuclear experts and watchdogs that the agreement “is as close to a best-case situation as reality would allow.” In August 2015, 75 arms control and nuclear nonproliferation experts signed a statement endorsing the deal as “a net-plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts” that exceeds the historical standards for arms control agreements.

An intense public debate in the United States took place during the congressional review period, with various groups lobbying both opposition and support for the agreement. Many Iranian Americans, even those who fled repression in Iran and oppose its government, welcomed the JCPOA as a step forward. U.S. pro-Israel groups are divided on the JCPOA. Various other groups have run ad campaigns for or against the agreement. For example, the New York-based Iran Project, a nonprofit led by former high-level U.S. diplomats and funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, along with the United Nations Association of the United States, supports the agreement. In July 2015, a bipartisan open letter endorsing the Iran agreement was signed by more than 100 former U.S. ambassadors and high-ranking State Department officials. A separate public letter to Congress in support of the agreement from five former U.S. ambassadors to Israel from administrations of both parties and three former Under Secretaries of State was also released in July 2015. Another public letter to Congress urging approval of the agreement was signed by a bipartisan group of more than 60 “national-security leaders,” including politicians, retired military officers, and diplomats. In August 2015, 29 prominent U.S. scientists, mostly physicists, published an open letter endorsing the agreement. An open letter endorsing the agreement was also signed by 36 retired military generals and admirals. However, this letter was answered by a letter signed by more than 200 retired generals and admirals opposing the deal.

Republican leaders vowed to attempt to kill the agreement as soon as it was released, even before classified sections were made available to Congress. According to the Washington Post, “most congressional Republicans remained deeply skeptical, some openly scornful, of the prospect of relieving economic sanctions while leaving any Iranian uranium-enrichment capability intact.” Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky, said the deal “appears to fall well short of the goal we all thought was trying to be achieved, which was that Iran would not be a nuclear state.” A New York Times news analysis stated that Republican opposition to the agreement “seems born of genuine distaste for the deal’s details, inherent distrust of President Obama, intense loyalty to Israel and an expansive view of the role that sanctions have played beyond preventing Iran’s nuclear abilities.” The Washington Post identified twelve issues related to the agreement on which the two sides disagreed, including the efficacy of inspections at undeclared sites; the effectiveness of the snapback sanctions; the significance of limits on enrichment; the significance of IAEA side agreements; the effectiveness of inspections of military sites; the consequences of walking away from an agreement; and the effects of lifting sanctions.

One area of disagreement between supporters and opponents of the JCPOA is the consequences of walking away from an agreement and whether renegotiation of the agreement is a realistic option. According to an Associated Press report, the classified assessment of the United States Intelligence Community on the agreement concludes that because Iran will be required by the agreement to provide international inspectors with “unprecedented volume of information about nearly every aspect of its existing nuclear program,” Iran’s ability to conceal a covert weapons program will be diminished.

Souvenir signatures of lead negotiators on the cover page of the JCPOA document. The Persian handwriting on top left side is a homage by Javad Zarif to his counterparts' efforts in the negotiations: "[I am] Sincere to Mr. Abbas [Araghchi] and Mr. Majid [Takht-Ravanchi].

Souvenir signatures of lead negotiators on the cover page of the JCPOA document. The Persian handwriting on top left side is a homage by Javad Zarif to his counterparts’ efforts in the negotiations: “[I am] Sincere to Mr. Abbas [Araghchi] and Mr. Majid [Takht-Ravanchi]. The final agreement is based upon (and buttresses) “the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially the IAEA safeguards system.”

Impact

With the prospective lifting of some sanctions, the agreement is expected to have a significant impact on both the economy of Iran and global markets. The energy sector is particularly important, with Iran having nearly 10 percent of global oil reserves and 18 percent of natural gas reserves. Millions of barrels of Iranian oil may come onto global markets, lowering the price of crude oil. The economic impact of a partial lifting of sanctions extends beyond the energy sector. The New York Times reported that “consumer-oriented companies, in particular, could find opportunity in this country with 81 million consumers,” many of whom are young and prefer Western products. Iran is “considered a strong emerging market play” by investment and trading firms.

In July 2015, Richard Stone wrote in the journal Science that if the agreement is fully implemented, “Iran can expect a rapid expansion of scientific cooperation with Western powers. As its nuclear facilities are repurposed, scientists from Iran and abroad will team up in areas such as nuclear fusion, astrophysics, and radioisotopes for cancer therapy.”

In August 2015, the British embassy in Tehran reopened almost four years after it was closed after protesters attacked the embassy in 2011.

Hours before the official announcement of the activation of JCPOA in January 2016, Iran released four imprisoned Iranian Americans. A fifth American left Iran in a separate arrangement.

After the adoption of the JCPOA, the United States imposed several new non-nuclear sanctions against Iran, some of which have been condemned by Iran as a possible violation of the deal. According to Seyed Mohammad Marandi, professor at the University of Tehran, the general consensus in Iran while the negotiations were taking place was that the United States would move towards increasing sanctions on non-nuclear areas. He said that these post-JCPOA sanctions could “severely damage the chances for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action bearing fruit.”

In March 2016, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),  defined by English-speaking media as a branch of Iran’s Armed Forces,  conducted ballistic missile tests as part of its military drills, with one of the missiles carrying the inscription, “Israel should be wiped off the Earth.” Israel called on Western powers to punish Iran for the tests, which U.S. officials said do not violate the nuclear deal, but may violate a United Nations Security Council Resolution. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif insisted that the tests were not in violation of the UNSC resolution. On March 17, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Iranian and British companies for involvement in the Iranian ballistic missile program.

 

Future?

In November 2016, Deutsche Welle, citing a source from the IAEA, reported that “Iran has violated the terms of its nuclear deal.” In December 2016, the U.S. Senate voted to renew the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) for another decade. The Obama Administration and outside experts said the extension would have no practical effect and risked antagonizing Iran. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, President Rouhani, and Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the extension of sanctions would be a breach of the nuclear deal. Some Iranian officials said that Iran might ramp up uranium enrichment in response.

In January 2017, representatives from Iran, P5+1, and EU gathered in Vienna’s Palais Coburg hotel to address Iran’s complaint about the US congressional bill. The future of nuclear agreement with Iran is uncertain under the administration of President Trump.

Attributions