Gandhi

Photo of Gandhi and Nehru sitting with each other.

Figure 2: Gandhi and Nehru in 1946

Although praised in popular culture and seen as the icon of India, historians have recently questioned the exact role Gandhi played in the 1940s and the extent of his influence. Gandhi experienced a great deal of early success organizing the South Asian community in South Africa. Gandhi then returned to India, where he organized other very successful protests such as the non-cooperation campaign in 1921-22, a boycott of foreign goods throughout the 1920s, and the “Salt March” in 1930. However, as author V.S. Naipaul bluntly stated: “Gandhi lived too long” and Gandhi’s control over the events in post-war India had greatly diminished. Infamously, Gandhi’s comments following the devastating Bihar earthquake, which included him telling villagers the earthquake was “chastisement for your sins,” further alienated him from the INC leadership and, although still limited, increased popular resentment against him. Gandhi used Hindu iconography, stories and mythology to engage with the masses and would chant Hindu hymns during meetings and prayers, which increasingly alienated him from Sikhs, Muslims and lower-class Hindus. Additionally, B.R. Ambedkar, the self-made leader of the untouchable-caste community, saw Gandhi’s praise of traditional village life and condemnation of Western lifestyles as patronizing and ultimately unhelpful in advancing the interests of the untouchable class. Ambedkar pushed for reservation of a seating for the untouchable community and worried about the tyranny of the Hindu majority. Highlighting this divide, Ambedkar stated: “The Mahatma’s ways of thinking are strange and are certainly beyond my comprehension.” Gandhi’s and Nehru’s visions of post-colonial India clashed. Gandhi advocated for a non-violent approach to issues; relinquishing of possessions and nearly everything Western, including education, medicine, and language. On the other hand, Nehru envisioned a strong state that pursues industrialization and education. Later, after traveling to Calcutta to stop Muslim attacks on Hindus, Gandhi was condemned for failing to do the same in Central India when Hindus attacked rural Muslim communities. While he actively condemned the outbreak of violence occurring throughout India, and in many cases was effective in containing it, he possessed limited control over the more radical aspects of the INC and was seen as being more rigid and idealistic. Gandhi could not concede the point that Muslims and Hindus were equal and separate nations in India, and this viewpoint only increased the divide between Gandhi and many Muslims, especially Jinnah. While undeniably the key figure in the decolonization of India, Gandhi’s effectiveness as a leader peaked in the early 1930s, and historians continue to debate his legacy and role in the events surrounding partition.

The Boundary Commission brought in by the British to formally demarcate the borders was also highly problematic. Its leader, cartographer Sir Cyril Radcliffe, had never been to India and knew almost nothing about the intricacies of the land, the fluid political situation, or the problems in front of him. He arrived on 8 July 1947, with eight weeks to finalize the new border and divide India into two countries. Most of his knowledge was based on outdated maps and incorrect census tables, thus not reflecting the current situation in India. With Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh communities scattered about the Punjab and with Sikh religious sites throughout the region, clearly demarcating a border was an impossible task. Additionally, regions of the Punjab and Bengal, like other regions in India, possessed a unique history and culture. Partition was a plan that no one wanted, but largely due to Mountbatten, no one could avoid. Nehru’s anger over the proposed border only pushed Mountbatten to keep the plans secret.

With regard to the actual location of the border, Mountbatten tried to keep the plan as quiet as possible and did not release it until after Independence Days, Pakistan on 14 August and India on 15 August, in order to protect his reputation and that of the British. He shared portions of his plan with Nehru but kept it from the governors of the Punjab and Bengal. To ensure success, he made it more difficult to anticipate the refugee crisis and combat violence by dispatching troops and trains. In certain areas, the Viceroy intervened and ruled in favor of Nehru’s demands. As a result of the ever-changing border, local communities were confused and worried. One area thought it was under Pakistani control only to find out it was part of India. “Each time one of these rumors became rife, people of the other community would abandon their homes and run,” remembered Urvashi Butalia. With rumors circulating and each community increasingly distrustful of the other, violence broke out in 1946 and peaked in 1947. In the Punjab, villages were attacked by opposing groups in response to real or imagined attacks elsewhere. The violence pitted community against community in Punjab and included attacks on refugees, the abduction or rape of women, and ritual suicides to prevent capture. Trains and caravans of refugees dotted the Indian countryside in one of the largest population movements in the history of the world. Unprotected, they fell victim to Sikh, Muslim, or Hindu attacks or were detained at border crossings. With few possessions, many refugees died while on the road to either countries; meanwhile, those fortunate enough to survive found their new homeland unprepared for their arrival.

The Boundary Commission brought in by the British to formally demarcate the borders was also highly problematic. Its leader, cartographer Sir Cyril Radcliffe, had never been to India and knew almost nothing about the intricacies of the land, the fluid political situation or the problems in front of him. He arrived on July 8, 1947, and had eight weeks to finalize the new border and divide India into two countries. Most of his knowledge was based on outdated maps and incorrect census tables, neither reflecting the current situation in India. With Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities scattered about the Punjab and with Sikh religious sites throughout the region, clearly demarcating a border was an impossible task. Additionally, regions of the Punjab and Bengal, like other regions in India, possessed a unique history and culture.

Partition was a plan that no one wanted but, largely due to Mountbatten, no one could avoid. Nehru’s anger over the proposed border only pushed Mountbatten to keep the plans secret. With regard to the actual location of the border, Mountbatten worked to keep the plan as quiet as possible and did not release it until after Independence Days (Pakistan on August 14 and India on August 15) in order to protect his reputation and that of the British. He shared portions of his plan with Nehru but kept it from the governors of the Punjab and Bengal, only making it more difficult to anticipate the refugee crisis and combat violence by dispatching troops and trains. In certain areas, the Viceroy intervened and ruled in favor of Nehru’s demands.

Nehru’s Reaction to the Border Plan, 11th May 1947: The picture presented by the proposals was an ominous one and the whole approach to them appeared to me to be dangerous. Not only do they menace India but also they endanger the future relation between Britain and India. Instead of producing any sense of certainty, security and stability, they would encourage disruptive tendencies everywhere and chaos and weakness…The proposals start with the rejection of an Indian Union as the successor to power and invite the claims of large numbers of succession States who are permitted to unite if they so wish in two or more States.4. I have no doubt whatever that the announcement of this new policy and proposals by His Majesty’s Government would provoke wide and deep resentment all over the country and no responsible leader of Indian opinion outside the Muslim League would be able to persuade the country to accept or even to acquiesce in them.

The newly drawn border did little to appease any group; it only exacerbated tensions and increased fears between Indian communities. Jinnah was most upset at the “moth-eaten Pakistan” claiming it was “unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse.”

Mountbatten Statement on Partition: Since my arrival in India at the end of March I have spent almost every day in consultation with as many of the leaders and representatives of as many communities and interests as possible…For more than a hundred years, 400,000,000 of you have lived together, and this country has been administered as a single entity. This has resulted in unified communications, defence, postal services and currency; an absence of tariffs and Customs Barriers; and the basis for an integrated political economy. My great hope was that communual differences would not destroy this. I have faith in the future of India and am proud to be with you all at this momentous time. May your decisions be wisely guided and may they be carried out in the peaceful and friendly spirit of the Gandhi-Jinnah appeal.

The new country of Pakistan, divided between East and West, was split by a one thousand-mile zigzagging border that divided villages, fields, rivers, and railway lines. The Sikh community was now in both India and Pakistan and cut off from their religious sites. Industries were alienated from their sources of raw material. In the east, the British-devised Bengali-border was especially problematic. Many people living in close proximity to the border were unsure of which country they belonged. Additionally, the weak British presence was unable to deal with the rumors accompanying the decolonization process and unprepared to deal with the violence. The army of the Raj lacked the ability to respond to local demands. The British commander, Sir Evan Jenkins, had only 7,500 men in Punjab, a force inadequate to control over 14 million people covering 18,000 villages. Violence quickly broke out in Punjab, a region inhabited by over one million. The Punjabis had immense fighting experience, were often fighting against either the British Raj or the princely states; had access to weapons; and most of the people were ready to fight. The region was so volatile to the extent that all trains were to have an armed escort of Gurkhas guards, neutral Nepali troops, but often Muslims would disguise themselves as Gurkhas and attack Hindus and Sikhs in organized, effective hit-and-run raids. Mountbatten knew what was going on but did little to resolve the outbreak of violence. He also refused to call for martial law which could have minimized the chaos. Hindus and Sikhs asked for a neutral border zone, a request that was denied as well. Overall, the Boundary Commission and British attempt at decolonization inadvertently created a refugee crisis and increased distrust between the regions and the people.